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ARTICLES

CONTINUITY, AGE, AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE CROWN: CENTRAL ARGUMENTS IN GERMAN AND ENGLISH NOBLE GENEALOGIES IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

MATTHIAS KUHN

In the late Middle Ages, numerous genealogical manuscripts were produced that depicted the origins not just of royal families, but also of noble ones.[1] These took various forms, such as codices or rolls, and used a variety of communicative techniques—charts, portraits, texts, and coats of arms.[2] As noble courts became centres of historiography, genealogies of the nobility were produced in growing numbers because there was a need to turn vague ancestries and kinship relationships

Translated by Marielle Sutherland and Jozef van der Voort (GHIL).

[1] On royal genealogies, see Michael Thomas Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307* (Chichester, 2013), 144.

[2] Most of the genealogies analysed in this article are rolls. This is because the archival research for it was carried out as part of the 'Rolls for the King' project led by Prof. Jörg Peltzer—a sub-project of the Material Text Cultures collaborative research centre, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Without this project, neither the research findings presented here nor my doctoral thesis, on which this article is partly based, would have been possible. I am therefore very grateful to the centre for its support. I would also like to thank Her Majesty the late Queen Elizabeth II and her son, His Majesty King Charles III, as well as the Duke of Northumberland and His Royal Highness the Duke of Bavaria, for granting access to their archives. Finally, my thanks also go to Prof. Michael Hicks, who gave me an insight into the world of the Wars of the Roses through both his work and in personal conversations, and to Maria Hauber for reviewing this article and making suggestions to improve it.

into concrete lines of descent.[3] These works were created for a range of purposes: for weddings, during dynastic crises, or as an instrument of *memoria*.

Noble genealogies have not yet been analysed systematically and comparatively, although there are numerous studies that deal with individual manuscripts or families.[4] There are various reasons why it is interesting to compare English and German genealogies:[5] not only

[3] Birgit Studt, 'Historiographie am Heidelberger Hof', in Jörg Peltzer et al. (eds.), *Die Wittelsbacher und die Kurpfalz im Mittelalter: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte?* (Regensburg, 2013), 311–28, at 311; Birgit Studt, 'Hofgeschichtsschreibung', in Werner Paravicini, Jan Hirschbiegel, and Jörg Wettlaufer (eds.), *Höfe und Residenzen im spätmittelalterlichen Reich*, vol. iii: *Hof und Schrift* (Ostfildern, 2007), 373–90, at 373–4; Karl-Heinz Spieß, *Familie und Verwandtschaft im deutschen Hochadel des Spätmittelalters: 13. bis Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 2015), 490; Karl Schmid, 'Zur Problematik von Familie, Sippe und Geschlecht, Haus und Dynastie beim mittelalterlichen Adel: Vorfragen zum Thema "Adel und Herrschaft im Mittelalter"', in *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 105 (1957), 1–62, at 2; Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Dynastische Identitäten durch Genealogie', in Udo Friedrich, Ludger Grenzmann, and Frank Rexroth (ed.), *Geschichtsentwürfe und Identitätsbildung am Übergang zur Neuzeit*, vol. ii: *Soziale Gruppen und Identitätspraktiken* (Berlin, 2018), 3–26, at 14.

[4] To name but a few examples: on the Wittelsbachs, see Jean-Marie Moeglin, *Les ancêtres du prince: Propagande politique et naissance d'une histoire nationale en Bavière au Moyen Âge (1180–1500)* (Geneva, 1985); on the rolls of the Margraves of Baden, see Stefan G. Holz and Konrad Krimm, 'Die badischen Genealogien Georg Rüxners: Ein Herold als politischer Waffenträger zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 168 (2020), 65–114; on the founders of Tewkesbury Abbey, see Julian Luxford (ed.), *The Founders' Book: A Medieval History of Tewkesbury Abbey. A Facsimile of Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms Top. Glouc. d. 2* (Donington, 2021); on the Earls of March, Northumberland, and Warwick, see Gudrun Tscherpel, *The Importance of Being Noble: Genealogie im Alltag des englischen Hochadels in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Husum, 2004); and for an important discussion of the Earls of Warwick and their rolls, see Charles Ross, 'The Rous Roll: An Historical Introduction', in William Courthope (ed.), *The Rous Roll: With an Historical Introduction on John Rous and the Warwick Roll* (Gloucester, 1980), pp. v–xviii.

[5] On historical comparison as a research method, see Jörg Peltzer, *Fürst werden: Rangerhöhungen im 14. Jahrhundert – Das römisch-deutsche Reich und England im Vergleich* (Berlin, 2019), 15–17; Benjamin Müsegades, *Heilige in der mittelalterlichen Bischofsstadt: Speyer und Lincoln im Vergleich (11. bis frühes 16. Jahrhundert)* (Vienna, 2021), 26–30.

have numerous fifteenth-century manuscripts survived from both kingdoms, but the comparison is also worthwhile in terms of content. For one thing, there are many structural similarities between the German and English nobility. Both shared a common courtly culture, developed a stratified hierarchy of rank, and used similar conventions and modes of expression.[6] But there are also differences: the German nobility was headed by an elected king or emperor during the late Middle Ages, while England was a hereditary kingdom.[7]

In fact, the relationship to the king is of central importance in both German and English genealogies. It is therefore worth comparing the arguments used by families in their genealogical accounts, as this provides new insights into the self-understanding of the nobility. One would expect to find that the differences between hereditary and elective kingship also influenced that self-understanding, as the nobility derived its authority from the monarch. When the Crown was kept in the hands of a single family through inheritance, it can be assumed that this made the nobility more dependent on the king. By analysing genealogies, therefore, we can work out to what extent they reflect the greater influence of the English king on the nobility. This can only be done through comparison, as the structure of genealogical arguments emerges all the more sharply in their similarities and differences.

This article asks what differences and similarities can be identified between England and the Holy Roman Empire in the genealogical

[6] Werner Paravicini, 'Gab es eine einheitliche Adelskultur Europas im späten Mittelalter?', in Rainer Christoph Schwinges, Christian Hesse, and Peter Moraw (eds.), *Europa im späten Mittelalter: Politik – Gesellschaft – Kultur* (Munich, 2006), 401–34, esp. 433. See also Chris Given-Wilson, 'Rank and Status Among the English Nobility, *c.*1300–1500', in Thorsten Huthwelker, Jörg Peltzer, and Maximilian Wemhöner (eds.), *Princely Rank in Late Medieval Europe: Trodden Paths and Promising Avenues* (Ostfildern, 2011), 97–117, at 97–9; Nicholas Vincent, 'Sources and Methods: Some Anglo-German Comparisons', ibid. 119–38, at 130; Jörg Peltzer, *Der Rang der Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein: Die Gestaltung der politisch-sozialen Ordnung des Reichs im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2013), 24.

[7] Bernd Kannowski, 'The Impact of Lineage and Family Connections on Succession in Medieval Germany's Elective Kingdom', in Frédérique Lachaud and Michael Penman (eds.), *Making and Breaking the Rules: Succession in Medieval Europe c.1000–c.1600 / Établir et abolir les norms: La succession dans l'Europe médiévale, vers 1000–vers 1600* (Turnhout, 2008), 13–22, at 13–15.

representation of the nobility. On the German side, my analysis focuses on the many surviving genealogies of the Margraves of Baden and the Wittelsbachs. Both were princely families, although the margraves were among the lowest-ranked members of this group.[8] On the English side, the genealogies of the Botelers of Sudeley, the Berkeleys, the Mortimers, the Percys, the Beauchamps, and the Earls of Gloucester and of Salisbury survive in numerous manuscripts.[9] The families all belonged to the English peerage, but span almost the entire hierarchy of this group, from the Botelers of Sudeley as barons at the bottom to the Beauchamps as the Earls of Warwick at the top. By analysing these numerous surviving manuscripts, it is therefore possible to answer the question of whether aristocratic genealogies in the kingdoms under study used the same structures, arguments, and

[8] Heinz Krieg, 'Strategien der Herrschaftslegitimation am unteren Rand des Fürstenstandes: Das Beispiel der Markgrafen von Baden', in Grischa Vercamer and Ewa Wółkiewicz (eds.), *Legitimation von Fürstendynastien in Polen und dem Reich: Identitätsbildung im Spiegel schriftlicher Quellen (12.–15. Jahrhundert)* (Wiesbaden, 2016), 225–45, at 225–31.

[9] For the Baden rolls, see Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (hereafter GLA), 47/516 1 (1503); GLA, 47/516 2 (1508); GLA, 47/516 3 (1508). For the Wittelsbach rolls, see Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Hausarchiv (hereafter HSTA GH), HS 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbibliothek Michaelbeuern (hereafter Stiftsbib.), MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); Wittelsbacher Ausgleichs Fond (hereafter WAF), HS 326/18 (1480–1505). A roll produced by the Botelers of Sudeley is held in the New York Public Library (hereafter NYPL), Spencer Collection MS 193 (1447/8). The genealogies of the Berkeleys can be found in Berkeley Castle (hereafter BC), SR 97 (1490/2) and SR 98 (after 1515); and Gloucester Archives (hereafter GA), D471 (after 1492). The Mortimer genealogies are found in the Wigmore Abbey and Brut chronicles: University Library of Chicago (hereafter ULC), Codex MS 224 (1414/60). For the Percys, see Alnwick Castle, DNP 80 (*c.*1461) and Bodleian Library, Oxford (hereafter Bodl.), MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c.*1485). For the rolls of the Earls of Warwick, see British Library (hereafter BL) Add MS 48976m (1483/5) and College of Arms (hereafter CoA), ID 105646 (1477–85). By 'Earls of Gloucester', I refer to the individuals described in multiple genealogies as the founders of Tewkesbury Abbey. This group appears in multiple manuscripts, but not all of them bear the title of Earl of Gloucester. See CoA, ID 9782 (after 1431); Bodl. MS lat misc b 2 (r) (1434/74); Bodl. Ms Top. Glouc. D. 2 (1490). For both versions of the genealogy of the Earls of Salisbury, see BL Loan MS 90, pp. 176–225 (1460) and British Museum (hereafter BM) MS Add. 45133 (1483–5).

communicative techniques and, above all, whether they were produced with the same objectives in mind.

Gert Melville has identified three features that appear so often in genealogies as to be tropes: the age of one's line (which could be extended by claiming descent from earlier dynasties), the highlighting of kinship relationships that establish one's rank, and the showcasing of exceptional ancestors.[10] The genealogical rolls I am examining here had two primary goals in terms of their design, construction, and narrative: they were intended to prove both the age and the continuity of the family's lineage. Rolls were particularly effective in conveying these messages due to their form. They were regarded as an old and venerable style of manuscript, and their writing surface, which could be continuously and flexibly extended by unrolling, also emphasized the impression of continuity, as the manuscript imposed no boundaries, unlike the margins of a book.[11]

Age, continuity, and proximity to the Crown are not only the central themes of the genealogies under examination, but also serve as categories of analysis in order to compare the self-conception of the aristocratic cultures in each kingdom. First, I will present the arguments and techniques used by the families to prove their age and continuity. I will then compare the nobility in the two kingdoms, which will make it possible to analyse the relationships with the king presented in their genealogies.

[10] Gert Melville, 'Zur Technik genealogischer Konstruktionen', in Cristina Andenna and Gert Melville (eds.), *Idoneität – Genealogie – Legitimation: Begründung und Akzeptanz von dynastischer Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Cologne, 2015), 293–304, at 298–301. On key figures in late medieval origin narratives, see František Graus, *Lebendige Vergangenheit: Überlieferung im Mittelalter und in den Vorstellungen vom Mittelalter* (Cologne, 1975), 379; Beate Kellner, 'Kontinuität der Herrschaft: Zum mittelalterlichen Diskurs der Genealogie am Beispiel des "Buches von Bern"', in Jan-Dirk Müller and Horst Wenzel (eds.), *Mittelalter: Neue Wege durch einen alten Kontinent* (Stuttgart, 1999), 43–62, at 45.

[11] Norbert Kössinger, 'Gerollte Schrift: Mittelalterliche Texte auf Rotuli', in Annette Kehnel and Diamantis Panagiotopoulos (eds.), *Schriftträger – Textträger: Zur materialen Präsenz des Geschriebenen in frühen Gesellschaften* (Berlin, 2015), 151–68, at 159, 165.

I. Continuity and Age

In order to prove their age and continuity,[12] English families typically traced their origins back to the Norman Conquest of 1066—their forebears being either Norman associates or Anglo-Saxon opponents of William the Conqueror[13]—whereas Continental noble families preferred to claim descent from Trojan legend.[14] In any case, the repertoire of ancient ancestors was larger on the Continent than in England. Uninterrupted lines of descent were then constructed between these progenitors and the youngest generation of a ruling family.

Due to frequent interruptions to agnatic lines of succession, discontinuities in ancestry were the rule rather than the exception for noble families in England and on the Continent alike. Partly for this reason, continuity represented the greatest possible genealogical success.[15] By

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[12] Maurice Keen, 'Heraldry and Hierarchy: Esquires and Gentlemen', in Jeffrey Denton (ed.), *Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Basingstoke, 1999), 94–108, at 107.

[13] Gudrun Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History: The Past and Future of Noble Families', in Richard Eales and Shaun Tyas (eds.), *Family and Dynasty in Late Medieval England: Proceedings of the 1997 Harlaxton Symposium* (Donington, 2003), 87–104, at 90.

[14] Beate Kellner, *Ursprung und Kontinuität: Studien zum genealogischen Wissen im Mittelalter* (Munich, 2004), 131–4, 294; Tobias Tannenberger, *Vom Paradies über Troja nach Brabant: Die "Genealogia principum Tungro-Brabantinorum" zwischen Fiktion und Akzeptanz* (Berlin, 2012), 91–3; Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 91; Joachim Ehlers, 'Kontinuität und Tradition als Grundlage mittelalterlicher Nationsbildung in Frankreich', in Joachim Ehlers, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, ed. Martin Kintzinger and Bernd Schneidmüller (Berlin, 1996), 288–324, at 315; Wolfgang Brückle, 'Noblesse oblige: Trojasage und legitime Herrschaft in der französischen Staatstheorie des späten Mittelalters', in Kilian Heck and Bernhard Jahn (eds.), *Genealogie als Denkform in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Tübingen, 2000), 39–40.

[15] Birgit Studt, 'Symbole fürstlicher Politik: Stammtafeln, Wappenreihen und Ahnengalerien in Text und Bild', in Rudolf Suntrup, Jan Veenstra, and Anne Bollmann (eds.), *The Mediation of Symbol in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times / Medien der Symbolik in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2005), 221–56, at 226; Gert Melville, 'Vorfahren und Vorgänger: Spätmittelalterliche Genealogien als dynastische Legitimation zur Herrschaft', in Peter-Johannes Schuler (ed.), *Die Familie als sozialer und historischer Verband: Untersuchungen zum Spätmittelalter und zur frühen Neuzeit* (Sigmaringen, 1987),

contrast, for a family line to die out and lose its title and name was a catastrophe, genealogically speaking.[16] In principle, genealogical charts could trace either generations of a family or sequences of rulers. Ideally, these would exactly coincide, but although genealogies were often constructed to show this, they seldom reflected reality.

Despite these efforts to present perfect continuity as far as possible, not all genealogies feature unbroken lines. On closer inspection, the family trees of the Earls of Gloucester and the Wittelsbachs show more of an approximate succession of genealogical networks.[17] The Wittelsbach rolls aim to present a perfect congruence between the line of succession and family descent, as the title of two of the rolls makes clear: *Das ist der Pawm des geschlachts der Herrn von dem Haws zu Bayern*.[18] However, because the Duchy of Bavaria had also been held by the House of Welf and the Ottonian dynasty, the Wittelsbachs could not claim uninterrupted possession of the title. As such, the rolls show only an indeterminate line of descent from the oldest, legendary rulers of Bavaria. Nevertheless, once the family acquired the titles of Count Palatine of the Rhine and Duke of Bavaria, all members of the dynasty subsequently bear them in the genealogy unless they happen to also hold higher-ranking ones. The family's coat of arms is also repeated throughout the rolls, with many variations. Despite discontinuities in both rulership and genealogy, the charts suggest the greatest possible order and a harmonious line of succession through the generations.

Most of the genealogies studied for this article present unbroken lines of descent in the form of charts, thereby concealing interruptions to both the family line and the maintenance of power. The rolls of the

203–309, at 215; Gert Melville, 'Geschichte in graphischer Gestalt: Beobachtungen zu einer spätmittelalterlichen Darstellungsweise', in Hans Patze (ed.), *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter* (Sigmaringen, 1987), 57–154, at 58; Tobias Tannenberger, 'Land und Genealogie: Das Identifikations- und Legitimationspotential des Raumes in der *Genealogia principum Tungro-Brabantinorum*', in Andenna and Melville (eds.), *Idoneität – Genealogie – Legitimation*, 423–39, at 432–3.

[16] Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 89.

[17] CoA, ID 9782 (after 1431); Bodl. MS lat misc b 2 (r) (1434/74); HSTA GH, 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); WAF, HS 326/18 (1480–1505).

[18] 'This is the family tree of the Lords of the House of Bavaria.' HSTA GH, HS 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84).

Earls of Gloucester and the Dukes of Bavaria differ in that they show these breaks, but smooth them over through the overall arrangement of the charts, coats of arms, and drawings, so that the discontinuities only become apparent on closer inspection.[19] By presenting successive generations in vertical columns along the page, the rolls give an impression of unbroken continuity at first glance.

Discontinuities in descent and succession were further concealed on horizontal rolls by arranging portraits in rows, removing the need for connecting lines; the relationships between the figures is thus not explicitly spelled out. This strategy was used by the Earls of Warwick and the Earls of Salisbury, whose lines were in fact interrupted multiple times.[20] Like the genealogies of the Earls of Gloucester, their rolls primarily depict a line of rulers.[21] Admittedly, none of the three families were able to present an unbroken succession of rulers, but it would have been even less plausible to claim genealogical continuity due to the extinction of various families who inherited these titles.

In contrast, the genealogies of the Botelers of Sudeley and the Mortimers are designed to show an unbroken line of descent.[22] Both families trace their ancestry back to the Norman Conquest. It is striking that the genealogies of the Earls of Warwick, the Mortimer family, and (in one case) the Percy family not only construct continuity, but also focus on the exceptional age of their ancestral lines.[23] Aeneas is depicted as the earliest ancestor of the Earls of Warwick—a rare example demonstrating that those stories of Trojan ancestors that were so common on the Continent were also known in England, and were

[19] CoA, ID 9782 (after 1431); Bodl. MS lat misc b 2 (r) (1434/74); HSTA GH, 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); WAF, HS 326/18 (1480–1505).

[20] BL Add MS 48976 (1483/5); CoA, ID 105646 (1477–85); BL Loan MS 90, pp. 176–225 (1460); BM MS Add. 45133 (1483–5).

[21] BL Loan MS 90, pp. 176–225 (1460); BM MS Add. 45133 (1483–5). For the Earls of Warwick, see Matthias Kuhn, 'Die genealogischen Rollen der Markgrafen von Baden und der Earls von Warwick: Ein materialbasierter Vergleich', in Giuseppe Cusa and Thomas Dorfner (eds.), *Genealogisches Wissen in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit: Konstruktion – Darstellung – Rezeption* (Berlin, 2023), 185–211, at 196–9.

[22] NYPL, Spencer Collection MS 193 (1447/8); ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60).

[23] BL Add MS 48976 (1483/5); CoA, ID 105646 (1477–85); ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60); MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c.*1485).

sometimes even used by the English nobility. The Mortimers and the Percys, by contrast, are descended from Adam and Eve—but in both cases the narrative is presented in the context of royal lineages. The nobility were unable to prove that they were directly descended from biblical figures, independently of the Crown.

Most rolls use continuous charts arranged in columns to show an unbroken line of descent. The rolls of the Margraves of Baden, the Percys, and the Berkeleys present uninterrupted lineages from the oldest ancestors down to the youngest members of the dynasty.[24] However, they can only do so by obscuring the difference between genealogical descent and the line of succession, as well as by reshaping the narrative.[25] One ruler appears to be succeeded by his son, even though the accompanying text makes it clear that his title was inherited by a nephew or another relative. There is also no mention of the extinction of titles. What the genealogies of these three families have in common is that they cover comparatively short periods: three centuries for the Margraves of Baden, and around 400 years for the two English families. In these examples, it was thus more important to demonstrate continuity than exceptional age.

Because they consist of one long reading and writing surface, manuscript rolls are ideally suited to show continuity through their format alone, as the genealogy unfurls before the reader's eyes without being interrupted by having to turn the pages of a book. Charts and sequences of figures could thus be designed in such a way as to establish unbroken lines, be they of succession, descent, or a mixture of both categories.[26] The genealogies show the significance of

[24] GLA, 47/516 1 (1503); GLA, 47/516 2 (1508); GLA, 47/516 3 (1508); Alnwick Castle, DNP 80 (*c.*1461); MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c.*1485); BC, SR 97 (1490/2); BC, SR 98 (after 1515); GA, D471 (after 1492).

[25] On the blurring of these categories, see Birgit Studt, 'Formen der Dokumentation und Repräsentation von Macht: Historiographie und Geschichtskultur im Umkreis des Fürstenhofes', in Reinhardt Butz and Jan Hirshbiegel (eds.), *Hof und Macht: Dresdener Gespräche zur Theorie des Hofes. Ergebnisse des gleichnamigen Kolloquiums auf Schloss Scharfenstein bei Dresden, 19. bis 21. November 2004* (Berlin, 2007), 29–54, at 33. For the Margraves of Baden, see e.g. Holz and Krimm, 'Die badischen Genealogien Georg Rüxners', 107, 109.

[26] František Graus, 'Epochenbewußtsein im Spätmittelalter und Probleme der Periodisierung', in Reinhart Herzog and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.),

unbroken lines for the self-understanding of the German and English nobility.[27] How exactly that continuity was established was ultimately of secondary importance, however.[28]

II. A Comparison of the German and English Nobility

In order to analyse the differences between German and English aristocratic families in terms of their relationship to the Crown, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the workings of nobility and kingship in both polities.[29] The most important difference between the two aristocratic cultures was that the King of the Romans was elected, whereas the English Crown was passed on by inheritance.[30] This had

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Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewußtsein (Munich, 1987), 153–66, at 158; Matthew Fisher, 'Genealogy Rewritten: Inheriting the Legendary in Insular Historiography', in Raluca L. Radulescu and Edward Donald Kennedy (eds.), *Broken Lines: Genealogical Literature in Medieval Britain and France* (Turnhout, 2008), 123–41, at 140.

[27] The same is true of genealogies of English kings. See Olivier de Laborderie, 'A New Pattern for English History: The First Genealogical Rolls of the Kings of England', in Radulescu and Kennedy (eds.), *Broken Lines*, 45–62, at 58; Jon Denton, 'Genealogy and Gentility: Social Status in Provincial England', ibid. 143–58, at 143. For a discursive example of how genealogical ruptures could also be used in invective, see Gert Melville, 'Geschichte im Diskurs: Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Herolden über die Frage: "Qui est le royaume chrestien qui plus est digne d'estre approuché d'Onneur?"', in Chantal Grell, Werner Paravicini, and Jürgen Voss (eds.), *Les princes et l'histoire du XIV^e au XVIII^e siècle: Actes du colloque organisé par l'Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin et l'Institut Historique Allemand. Paris/Versailles, 13–16 mars 1996* (Bonn, 1998), 243–62, at 250.

[28] Beate Kellner, 'Genealogien', in Paravicini, Hirschbiegel, und Wettlaufer (eds.), *Höfe und Residenzen im spätmittelalterlichen Reich*, vol. iii: *Hof und Schrift*, 347–60, at 350.

[29] Spieß, *Familie und Verwandtschaft*, 541–2; Kenneth B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England: The Ford Lectures for 1953 and Related Studies* (Oxford, 1973), 268.

[30] Peltzer, *Der Rang der Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein*, 107. On elective monarchy in the Holy Roman Empire, see Andreas Büttner, 'Dynastische Kontinuität im Wahlreich der Kurfürsten? Kandidatur und Thronfolge im Spätmittelalter', in Matthias Becher (ed.), *Die mittelalterliche Thronfolge im europäischen Vergleich*

a major impact on the structure of the nobility and, above all, on the relationship between the Crown and the aristocracy in the two kingdoms.[31] Thanks to their voting rights, the German electors had much greater autonomy, both politically and as rulers, than did the English nobility, whose fiefs were granted directly by the monarch.[32] Although feudal oaths continued to be sworn to the German king, he retained little control over fiefs once they had been issued, and princely fiefs in particular were inherited independently. While the granting of offices and fiefs gradually dwindled in importance in the Holy Roman Empire and increasingly took on a merely ritual character, it remained standard English practice even in the late Middle Ages.[33] German princes who did not hold the dignity of elector nonetheless remained a distinguished group within the nobility and enjoyed a high degree of independence from their overlord.[34]

(Ostfildern, 2017), 289–340, at 292–4; Andreas Büttner, *Der Weg zur Krone: Rituale der Herrschererhebung im spätmittelalterlichen Reich* (Ostfildern, 2012), 652–5. The English royal elections of the fifteenth century did not decide who would become king, but rather confirmed the existing king's status. See Michael Hicks, *English Political Culture in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 2002), 40.

[31] Jörg Peltzer, 'Introduction', in Thorsten Huthwelker, Jörg Peltzer, and Maximilian Wemhöner (eds.), *Princely Rank in Medieval Europe: Trodden Paths and Promising Avenues* (Ostfildern, 2011), 11–26, at 16.

[32] Peltzer, *Der Rang der Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein*, 161; Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, trans. L. A. Manyon, 2 vols. (London, 1965), ii. 370–1.

[33] Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Erbteilung, dynastische Räson und transpersonale Herrschaftsvorstellung: Die Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein und die Pfalz im späten Mittelalter', in Franz Staab (ed.), *Die Pfalz: Probleme einer Begriffsgeschichte vom Kaiserpalast auf dem Palatin bis zum heutigen Regierungsbezirk. Referate und Aussprachen der Arbeitstagung vom 4.–6. Oktober 1988 in St. Martin/Pfalz* (Speyer, 1990), 159–81, at 159; Karl-Heinz Spieß, *Fürsten und Höfe im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt, 2009), 33. In this sense, the ritualized enfeoffments of the late medieval empire are indicative not of the king's strength, but his weakness. See Peltzer, *Fürst werden*, 28.

[34] Peter Moraw, *Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung: Das Reich im späten Mittelalter 1250 bis 1490* (Berlin, 1985), 177; Werner Hechberger, *Adel im fränkisch-deutschen Mittelalter: Zur Anatomie eines Forschungsproblems* (Ostfildern, 2005), 460, 469; Ernst Schubert, 'Probleme der Königsherrschaft im spätmittelalterlichen Reich: Das Beispiel Ruprechts von der Pfalz (1400–1410)', in Reinhard Schneider (ed.), *Das spätmittelalterliche Königtum im europäischen Vergleich* (Sigmaringen, 1987), 135–84, at 183. For a discussion of the title of

The granting of noble titles and the exercise of power also had immediate consequences for the dynamics of inheritance. In the German nobility, princely titles were inherited, but the king was elected.[35] England, by contrast, was a hereditary monarchy, and aristocratic titles were conferred by the Crown. Admittedly, it was customary for English titles to be passed down through the generations of the same noble family: on the death of an earl, the king would grant the title to one of his sons, where possible. However, the king could still assert his power against the nobility through the prerogative to create new titles and to revoke them.[36]

The German nobility saw their offices, titles, and lands as family property. As a result, families strongly identified with their lordly and territorial titles, and this was reflected in how they named themselves.[37] All children of German noble families were permitted to use their father's titles, and any property was usually divided between them on his death, whereas English titles could only be passed on to one son.[38] As a result, the English aristocracy based its nomencla-

Fürst ('prince'), see Hans-Werner Goetz, 'Fürst, Fürstentum', in *Lexikon des Mittelalters* (Turnhout, 2023), vol. iv, 1029–4, at 1029.

[35] Jörg Peltzer, 'Idoneität: Eine Ordnungskategorie oder eine Frage des Rangs?', in Andenna and Melville (eds.), *Idoneität – Genealogie – Legitimation*, 23–38, at 33; Moraw, *Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung*, 186.

[36] On investiture and revocation, see Jörg Peltzer, *Fürst werden*, 26–30; Stephen Henry Rigby, *English Society in the Later Middle Ages: Class, Status and Gender* (London, 1995), 197; Given-Wilson, 'Rank and Status', 99.

[37] Ernst Schubert, *Fürstliche Herrschaft und Territorium im späten Mittelalter* (Munich, 2006), 24; Spieß, *Familie und Verwandtschaft*, 501; Walter Ziegler, 'Wittelsbach', in Jan Hirschbiegel, Werner Paravicini, and Jörg Wettlaufer (eds.), *Höfe und Residenzen im spätmittelalterlichen Reich: Ein dynastisch–topographisches Handbuch*, vol. i, pt. i: *Dynastien und Höfe* (Ostfildern, 2003), 218–25, at 219; Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Zwischen König und Fürsten: Das politische Beziehungssystem südwestdeutscher Grafen und Herren im späten Mittelalter', in Kurt Andermann and Clemens Joos (eds.), *Grafen und Herren in Südwestdeutschland vom 12. bis ins 17. Jahrhundert* (Epfendorf, 2006), 13–34, at 14–15.

[38] Although property continued to be divided in the late Middle Ages, the German nobility also increasingly sought strategies to prevent excessive fragmentation of family estates. See Jörg Rogge, *Herrschaftsweitergabe, Konfliktregelung und Familienorganisation im fürstlichen Hochadel: Das Beispiel der Wettiner von der Mitte des 13. bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 2002), 9, 318–33. On English practices, see Hicks, *English Political Culture*, 52;

ture more on surnames than on noble titles, as the latter were less closely associated with a single family. The German nobility therefore developed stronger group identities by passing on paternal titles to all children. This is reflected in their genealogies, which frequently include secondary branches of the family—a feature rarely found in English manuscripts.[39]

In both kingdoms, agnatic succession prevailed,[40] but England was also subject to the law of primogeniture.[41] This principle of having a sole male heir, which was intended to secure property and titles in one hand, meant that hardly any family lines survived under agnatic succession for more than 100 years.[42] English genealogical rolls, which trace lines of descent over several centuries, are impressive testimony to families' efforts to establish a continuity that hardly existed under an agnatic system.

The English nobility oriented itself much more strongly towards the person of the king than their German counterparts did. This was not only due to the English monarchy's greater control over and independence from the aristocracy,[43] but also because the king was less reliant on the nobility to maintain his power in a hereditary system. The nobility's rank and political influence were also established through kinship with and descent from the king. The number of English noble families related to the royal family had grown

Jörg Peltzer, 'The Marriages of the English Earls in the Thirteenth Century: A Social Perspective', in Janet Burton, Phillipp Schofield, and Björn Weiler (eds.), *Thirteenth Century England XIV: Proceedings of the Aberystwyth and Lampeter Conference, 2011* (Woodbridge, 2013), 61–85, at 62.

[39] On family consciousness in England, see Hicks, *English Political Culture*, 65–70; on nomenclature and family consciousness in the German nobility, see Spieß, *Familie und Verwandtschaft*, 2, 501.

[40] David Crouch, 'The Historian, Lineage and Heraldry 1050–1250', in Peter Coss and Maurice Keen (eds.), *Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England* (Woodbridge, 2002), 17–37, at 36.

[41] McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, 270. 'With minor exceptions the law governing the inheritance of a fief was simple and unambiguous: primogeniture among males, equal shares between females, a son always preferred to a daughter, a daughter to a brother or other collateral.'; Hicks, *English Political Culture*, 65.

[42] McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, 143.

[43] Peltzer, *Fürst werden*, 97.

considerably by the fifteenth century, as Edward III (1312–77) had married most of his thirteen children to the nobility.[44] This resulted in extensive royal kinship networks.[45] The situation was very different in Germany, where the (princely) nobility were more independent than their English counterparts—not only in the exercise of power, but also in their kinship relations with the king; indeed, the electors even regarded themselves as equals of the monarch.[46]

III. Kingship and Nobility

Noble genealogies in both kingdoms centred on the family's relationship with the Crown.[47] In England, this relationship is reflected not least in the fact that many of the genealogical rolls of English kings also contain branch lines listing noble families.[48] Nobility and royalty were depicted on these rolls as members of a wider genealogical network that was characterized by a clear hierarchy: the king

[44] McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, 151; Vincent, 'Sources and Methods', 130. On Edward III's dynastic strategies, see Chris Given-Wilson, *The English Nobility in the Late Middle Ages: The Fourteenth-Century Political Community* (London, 1987), 43–4; Robert Bartlett, *Blood Royal: Dynastic Politics in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 2020), 283–5.

[45] Ralph Alan Griffiths, 'The Crown and the Royal Family in Later Medieval England', in Ralph Alan Griffiths and James W. Sherborne (eds.), *Kings and Nobles in the Later Middle Ages: A Tribute to Charles Derek Ross* (Gloucester, 1986), 15–26, at 16.

[46] Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Kommunikationsformen im Hochadel und am Königshof im Spätmittelalter', in Gerd Althoff (ed.), *Formen und Funktionen öffentlicher Kommunikation im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart, 2001), 261–90, at 278–9; Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Rangdenken und Rangstreit im Mittelalter', in Werner Paravicini (ed.), *Zeremoniell und Raum: 4. Symposium der Residenzen-Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen veranstaltet gemeinsam mit dem Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris und dem Historischen Institut der Universität Potsdam, 25. bis 27. September 1994* (Sigmaringen, 1997), 39–61, at 47.

[47] Schmid, 'Zur Problematik von Familie, Sippe und Geschlecht', 48; Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 89.

[48] e.g. Free Library of Philadelphia, Lewis Roll E 201 (1475); see also the genealogy on the front of Bodl. MS lat misc b 2 (r) (1434/74). Many Considerans rolls also show the lines of succession of noble families with royal kinship; e.g. BL Royal MS 14 B VIII (before 1461).

and his line stood at the centre, with the nobility positioned to the side. Kinship ties with the royal family are also highlighted on many of the genealogical rolls produced by the English nobility. On the rolls of the Botelers of Sudeley, a roll belonging to the Percy family, and one depicting the line of the Earls of Gloucester, the king's family tree is placed at the centre of the page, parallel to those of the noble families—just like on royal rolls.[49] On another roll by the Earls of Gloucester and on the genealogy of the Mortimers, the noble genealogies even come after the royal genealogy.[50] The rolls of the Earls of Warwick include portraits of kings among the series of figures, with royal arms either interlinked with those of the nobility or placed alongside them.[51] Other noble genealogical rolls also include royal coats of arms in order to establish a close link between royalty and nobility.[52]

This close visual connection between kingship and nobility is not found on German rolls. Royal insignia, such as crowns, sceptres, and the heraldic eagles of the kings and emperors, appear on the rolls of the House of Bavaria primarily at times when members of the family held the Crown. Other dynasties, such as the Ottonians, the Habsburgs, and especially the Salians and the kings of the Interregnum, are made less prominent by positioning their portraits at the edge of the roll, without even coats of arms or insignia, and in some cases without royal titles.

Similarly, kings are mentioned only obliquely on the rolls of the Margraves of Baden. Connections with the Habsburgs are described and depicted, with the Habsburg arms establishing a link between the

[49] NYPL, Spencer Collection MS 193; MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c.*1485); CoA, ID 9782 (after 1431).

[50] Bodl. MS Lat misc b 2(r). The Tewkesbury roll features a royal genealogy on the front and a noble one on the reverse. In the Wigmore chronicle, the Mortimer genealogy comes after a genealogy of the English kings: ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60).

[51] BL Add MS 48976 (1483/5); CoA, ID 105646 (1477–85).

[52] Royal coats of arms can be found on NYPL, Spencer Collection MS 193 (1447/8); BL Add. MS 48976 (1484/5); CoA, ID 105646 (1477–85); Bodl. MS Lat misc b 2(r) (1434/74); MS Bodl. Rolls 5 (1485); and ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60). See Kathleen L. Scott, *Later Gothic Manuscripts 1390–1490*, 2 vols. (London, 1996), i. 61.

two houses.[53] In this respect, the Habsburgs are presented as a royal family through the reigns of Frederick III and Maximilian. Nonetheless, such links assume only a subordinate position in the genealogy; other Kings of the Romans are barely mentioned, for example. In short, royal connections are very prominent on the English rolls I examined, but are treated with comparative restraint on the German rolls.

The King as an Ancestor

Many noble families presented themselves as being descended from a king. These narratives sometimes also served to highlight the family's distinctive longevity by naming kings from long ago as ancestors. The Wittelsbach rolls thus all claim that the family is descended from the Carolingians, through Charlemagne and his own forebear Arnulf of Metz.[54] Still more important than these ancestors, however, is the Wittelsbach Emperor Louis IV, who is depicted particularly prominently on the rolls with a central position and heraldic decoration.[55] This is a deliberate choice, as it was thanks to Louis IV that the Wittelsbachs became eligible for election as kings.[56] The other monarchs of

[53] On the considerable importance of the Habsburgs for the Margraves of Baden in the fifteenth century, see Heinz Krieg, 'Die Markgrafen von Baden und ihr Hof zwischen fürstlicher und niederadeliger Außenwelt im 15. Jahrhundert', in Thomas Zotz (ed.), *Fürstenhöfe und ihre Außenwelt: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher und kultureller Identität im deutschen Spätmittelalter* (Würzburg, 2004), 51–84, at 54–9.

[54] While earlier legendary Bavarian kings and dukes appear only as indeterminate ancestors, Arnulf of Metz (b. 582, d. after 640) is named as the progenitor of the family's verifiable lineage.

[55] Jean-Marie Moeglin, 'Das Erbe Ludwigs des Bayern', in Ulrike Hohensee et al. (eds.), *Die Goldene Bulle: Politik – Wahrnehmung – Rezeption* (Berlin, 2009), 17–38, at 27, 37; Jean-Marie Moeglin, 'Das Bild Ludwigs des Bayern in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung des Spätmittelalters (ca. 1370–ca. 1500)', in Hermann Nehlsen and Hans-Georg Hermann (eds.), *Kaiser Ludwig der Bayer: Konflikte, Weichenstellungen und Wahrnehmung seiner Herrschaft* (Paderborn, 2002), 199–260, at 240.

[56] Wilhelm Störmer, 'Die innere Konsolidierung der wittelsbachischen Territorialstaaten in Bayern im 15. Jahrhundert', in Ferdinand Seibt and Winfried Eberhard (eds.), *Europa 1500: Integrationsprozesse im Widerstreit. Staaten, Regionen, Personenverbände, Christenheit* (Stuttgart, 1987), 175–94, at 176; Moeglin, 'Das Erbe Ludwigs des Bayern', 17–19.

the House of Bavaria also enjoy pre-eminent positions in the genealogies, highlighted through heraldry and insignia.[57] By contrast, the Margraves of Baden could not boast any royal forebears. In order to compensate for this to a degree, the oldest ancestor named on their rolls is Irmengard (1200–60), daughter of the Count Palatine, who was a Welf and therefore had royal blood.[58]

Royal descent was also extremely important for the English nobility,[59] who sought to prove it in both genealogical charts and their accompanying texts. However, contemporaries apparently did not distinguish between legendary kings and historically verifiable ones. Some genealogies thus trace the lines of noble families back to mythical kings. Two families, the Mortimers and the Percys, are portrayed as descendants of the legendary British King Brutus, each creating their own complex narrative constructions.[60] Similarly, in an introductory text, the Berkeleys claim descent from the equally legendary King Harding of Denmark.[61] They are also linked cognatically to Edward the Confessor (1004–66) and even (fictionally) to a king of Jerusalem.[62] On the roll of the Earls of Salisbury, a son of Henry II is portrayed in the series of figures as the first earl,[63] while the Botelers of Sudeley

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[57] HSTA GH, HS 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); WAF, HS 326/18 (1480–1505).

[58] On Irmengard's ancestry and the increase in rank conferred by her marriage to the Margrave of Baden, see Maria Pia Schindele, 'Die Abtei Lichtenthal', *Freiburger Diözesanarchiv*, 104 (1984), 19–166, at 26.

[59] Only one roll does not trace the family's descent back to royal ancestors: Alnwick Castle, DNP MS 80 (*c.*1461).

[60] ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60); MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c.*1485). Brutus was also an important ancestor of the Kings of England. However, not all genealogies of the Percy family claim this royal descent, which is always presented in an extremely complicated and not very intelligible way. See Matthias Kuhn, 'Enrolling Lines of Power: Yorkist Pedigree Rolls as Material Evidence of Kingship', in Abigail S. Armstrong et al. (eds.), *Keeping Record: The Materiality of Rulership and Administration in Early China and Medieval Europe* (Berlin, 2024), 211–38, at 231–2.

[61] BC, SR 97 (1490/2); BC, SR 98 (after 1515); GA, D471 (after 1492).

[62] BC, SR 97 (1490/2).

[63] The series of figures begins with William Longespée (1167–1226), an illegitimate son of Henry II. BL Loan MS 90, pp. 176–225 (1460); BM MS Add. 45133 (1483–5).

claim descent from Harald Godwinson (1022–66).[64] The Earls of Warwick produced a much more complicated chart with many branches tracing their line, along with those of the French and English kings, back to Charlemagne—although the main design element of their rolls is a series of figures.[65] Another chart on the same rolls goes a step further and portrays an ancestor of the Earls of Warwick as the forefather of the Plantagenets; however, this chart is tucked away between the figures, making its spectacular claim easy to overlook. Both lines of descent on the rolls of the Earls of Warwick are genealogically verifiable and not fictitious—an astonishing achievement by their author, John Rous, albeit one belied by the poor execution of the charts.[66] Compared to the colourful coats of arms and detailed portraits, the complex, carelessly drawn charts on the Warwick rolls fade into the background. The figures and coats of arms themselves communicate meaning; here, too, we find kings and royal arms.

Aside from the genealogies of the Berkeleys and the Botelers of Sudeley, it is striking that direct lines of descent from royal ancestors are presented rather casually in the English genealogies and by no means assume centre stage. Other family connections to the contemporary royal family take up far more space, however.

Proximity and Distance to the King

Kinship relationships with and marriages into the royal family are presented even more prominently than royal ancestry on the rolls. As well as claiming descent from the Carolingians, the Wittelsbach rolls also present a fictional link with the Ottonians via various lines.[67] This was not done solely to extol the family's illustrious kin; rather, through

[64] NYPL, Spencer Collection MS 193.

[65] BL Add. MS 48976 (1483/5). The Beauchamps, as Earls of Warwick, were not the only ones to claim descent from Charlemagne; the de Veres, who were Earls of Oxford, did so too. Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 103; Lucy Toulmin Smith (ed.), *The Itinerary of John Leland in or about the Years 1535–1543*, 5 vols. (London 1906–10), vol. iv, appendix I(a), 145.

[66] There are further charts on the rolls that, unlike the previous ones, show fictional relationships between the Plantagenets and the Earls of Warwick.

[67] HSTA GH, 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); WAF, HS 326/18 (1480-1505).

direct comparison with the Ottonians, the genealogies demonstrate the Wittelsbachs' success, both as rulers and as a lineage. Although the Ottonians had been kings, emperors, and Dukes of Bavaria, they had died out, whereas the Wittelsbachs had not only prospered across numerous family branches and been Dukes of Bavaria for centuries, but had also become eligible candidates for the Crown thanks to Louis IV and Rupert I.[68] Being descended from the Carolingians and related to the Ottonians, the Wittelsbach family was furthermore a pillar of the empire and its electoral system. They also presented themselves as a royal family: Wittelsbach women who married foreign kings and men who themselves became Kings of Hungary, Bohemia, and Denmark are also mentioned, in order to demonstrate that the Wittelsbachs were eligible to become monarchs.[69]

The Baden rolls also attest to kinship with monarchs across Europe, with four of the margraves' wives displayed alongside the royal arms of their ancestors in order to prove that they had royal blood. These include the coats of arms of the Kings of England, Seville, and Poland.[70] As I have already mentioned, great importance was also attached to emphasizing the family's ties to the Habsburg emperors and kings, and this was likewise done using coats of arms. Thus we see that Charles of Baden (1427–75) married the sister of Emperor Frederick III (1415–93).[71] This provided a pretext to include excerpts of the lineage of Catherine of Austria (1420–93), which allowed numerous other striped shields—symbols of the Habsburgs—to be added to the genealogy. The royal status of the Habsburgs is thus presented on the Baden rolls as dynastic in

[68] Bavarian historiography aimed to show that other families ruled over the Duchy of Bavaria only temporarily. See Joachim Schneider, 'Dynastisch-territoriale Geschichtsschreibung in Bayern und Österreich: Texte und Entstehungsbedingungen—Herkunftsgeschichten und Mythen', in Gerhard Wolf and Norbert H. Ott (eds.), *Handbuch Chroniken des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 2016), 225–65, at 244.

[69] Ziegler, 'Wittelsbach', 224.

[70] The purported link to the English Crown is fictitious, however. See Holz and Krimm, 'Die badischen Genealogien Georg Rüxners', 100.

[71] GLA, 47, no. 516,1 (1503), 'Carolus marggrave zu Baden und Grave zu Sponheym: Sin gemahel was frow katherina von österreich, keisser fridrichs swöster'.

nature, unlike in the Wittelsbach genealogies, which feature royal and imperial eagles and thus emphasize the elective character of German kingship—the eagle being a symbol of the empire rather than a particular family.

While the Wittelsbachs primarily depicted themselves as eligible to rule both the Holy Roman Empire and other European kingdoms, the Margraves of Baden were anxious to demonstrate not only that they were descended from kings across Europe, but also that they had kinship ties to the German royal family in power at the time. Overall, however, both princely families adopted a pan-European perspective on kingship.

This is in striking contrast to the English aristocratic families, who focused on the English Crown in their attempts to prove their proximity to royalty. It should be noted that not every family proclaimed their kinship with the royal dynasty; such relationships are absent from the genealogies of the Berkeleys and the Botelers of Sudeley, even though, as I have mentioned, they claim royal ancestors. In cases where no kinship ties to the current ruling dynasty could be shown, it was all the more important to demonstrate royal ancestry. In any case, however, relationships with the king were of fundamental importance for the English nobility.

All the other English noble houses examined in this study were able to show direct kinship with the royal family. In the Mortimer genealogy, the accompanying text explicitly points out that Edmund Mortimer's wife Philippa of Clarence (1355–82) had royal blood as the granddaughter of Edward III. The coats of arms feature the differenced Plantagenet colours, marking the Mortimers as a cadet branch of the royal family, and are ostentatiously displayed in the manuscript.[72] On the rolls of the Earls of Gloucester, the royal line is always shown alongside the family's genealogical networks; marriage and kinship connections between the two lines are thus established repeatedly over the generations. The complex layout of the charts suggests that the Earls of Gloucester were close to the Crown for centuries, although their connections with the royal family are presented in an unsystematic and disorganized way.

[72] ULC, Codex MS 224 (1414/60), 59r.

A similar approach was taken in at least one of the Percy rolls, with the family line placed alongside that of the king, and shared connections repeatedly emphasized through complex networks.[73] Marriage and kinship relationships are primarily depicted textually,[74] which makes the construction chosen on MS Bodl. Rolls 5 all the more exceptional. Elizabeth Mortimer (1371–1417), daughter of Lionel of Antwerp, married Henry Hotspur, and so her descendants were related to the Plantagenets—but more than that, they were also able to draw upon the Plantagenets' mythic origins. These were particularly fraught with meaning at the time the roll was created, during the reign of the House of York, as the Yorkist kings also claimed descent, via Lionel of Antwerp's wife, from the legendary British monarchs Arthur and Brutus.[75] By linking themselves to the royal line here in particular, the Percys established a special relationship with the Crown. This was particularly opportune because, after initially opposing Henry IV (1366/7–1413), the Percys had long sided with the House of Lancaster; now, however, they could point to their kinship ties with the Yorkist kings, which were based on mythic roots.[76]

Yet the Percys also neglected to use one other possible means of establishing proximity to the House of York. They had initially rebelled against the first Lancastrian king, Henry IV, in support of the claim of Edmund Mortimer, an ancestor of the House of York, and several members of the Percy family had died in battle against the House of Lancaster.[77] Indeed, Henry IV is even depicted as a usurper on MS Bodl. Rolls 5. With that in mind, it would have made sense for the Percys to highlight not only the legendary forebears they shared with the House of York, but also the fact that they had fought against the Yorkists' enemies. Yet there are no such narratives on

[73] MS Bodl. Rolls 5 (1485).
[74] Alnwick Castle, DNP MS 80 (*c.*1461).
[75] Kuhn, 'Lines of Power', 231.
[76] Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 95; Anne F. Sutton and Livia Visser-Fuchs, 'Richard III's Books: Ancestry and "True Nobility"', *The Ricardian*, 9/119 (1992), 343–58, at 345.
[77] John Malcolm William Bean, 'Henry IV and the Percies', *History*, 44/152 (1959), 212–27, at 221–2.

the roll. Henry Hotspur is presented as the primary agitator against the king and loses his life fighting him at the Battle of Shrewsbury, but this episode is told in the margins of the roll and commands no particular attention.[78] The Percys thus did not capitalize on the fact that they had rebelled against the enemies of the ruling dynasty; instead, they suppressed it as much as they could. It was only under the Tudors that the family's struggle against Henry IV was used by the Percys to position themselves as loyal supporters of the Crown, when they asserted that they had upheld the Yorkist claim to the throne out of loyalty to Richard II. In this sense, their rebellion had been legitimate.[79]

Deprecating the king seems to have been completely unthinkable for English noble families, even during the Wars of the Roses, when many of these genealogical rolls were created. The Crown was too sacrosanct for that. This finding is surprising, given that royal genealogies actively tried to delegitimize competing dynasties, as we see in France.[80] During the reigns of both Lancastrian and Yorkist kings, the royal genealogies produced by each house valorized their own line while downplaying those of their rivals.[81] Despite the fact that the Wars of the Roses pitted two branches of the Plantagenets against each other—two royal dynasties descended from the same stock—the nobility was unable to minimize the importance of the monarch, as the German nobility did. Such narratives were not available to the English nobility; the Crown was too central, even when it was disputed. This point is underscored by the dynastic politics of Edward III, who married the majority of his children into the English nobility, with the result that by the time of the Wars of the Roses, many families could claim

[78] Tscherpel, 'The Political Function of History', 95.

[79] Matthew Holford, 'Family, Lineage and Society: Medieval Pedigrees of the Percy Family', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 52 (2008), 165–90, at 184; Bean, 'Henry IV and the Percies', 216.

[80] Marigold Anne Norbye, 'Genealogies in Medieval France', in Radulescu and Kennedy (eds.), *Broken Lines*, 70–101, at 97.

[81] Alison Allan, 'Yorkist Propaganda: Pedigree, Prophecy and the "British History" in the Reign of Edward IV', in Charles Ross (ed.), *Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval England* (Gloucester, 1979), 171–92 , at 172–3; Kuhn, 'Lines of Power', 214–16.

royal descent, as the genealogies also show.[82] Noble families did not generally use this as a basis on which to claim the throne, however.[83]

While a single connection to the royal family was of particular importance on one of the Percys' rolls, the Earls of Warwick could claim numerous connections to the royal line.[84] Isabel (1451–76) and Anne Neville (1456–85) had married brothers of King Edward IV (1442–83), with Anne's husband later becoming king himself as Richard III (1452–85).[85] Richard and Anne's son, Edward of Middleham (1473–84), thus united in his person the lineages of the Earls of Warwick and of the English royal family. This genealogy is set out using heraldry and charts, as I have already described above.[86] Only the rolls of the Earls of Warwick feature Spanish and Bohemian kings alongside English ones in their charts.

Richard III appears in a strikingly large number of English noble genealogies. He is named as the reigning king on one of the Percy rolls, and he also features in the genealogies of the Earls of Salisbury.[87] As the Duke of Gloucester, he also plays a special role in one of the genealogies of the Earls of Tewkesbury and in a later continuation of *The Founders' Book of Tewkesbury Abbey*, alongside his brother George, Duke of Clarence.[88] The differenced Plantagenet arms are

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[82] McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England*, 151.

[83] A rare counter-example can be found on a roll from the Tudor period which indicates that the Yorkist claim has passed on to the de la Pole family. This is an absolute exception, however. Kuhn, 'Lines of Power', 233–4; John Rylands Library, Latin MS 113.

[84] Michael Hicks, 'Heirs and Non-Heirs: Perceptions and Realities amongst the English Nobility, *c*.1300–1500', in Lachaud and Penman (eds.), *Making and Breaking the Rules*, 191–200, at 195.

[85] Michael Hicks, *Anne Neville: Queen to Richard III* (Stroud, 2007), 175.

[86] BL Add MS 48976 (1483/5); CoA, ID 105646 (1477–85).

[87] MS. Bodl. Rolls 5 (*c*.1485); BM MS Add. 45133 (1483–5). Anthony Wagner, Nicolas Barker, and Ann Payne, *Medieval Pageant: Writhe's Garter Book. The Ceremony of the Bath and the Earldom of Salisbury Roll* (London, 1993), 75.

[88] Bodl. MS lat misc b 2 (r) (1434/74); Bodl. MS Top, Glouc. D.2 (1490), fol. 39^{r}. The genealogical line then ends with Edward, son of George, Duke of Clarence, accompanied by a splendid heraldic display. Julian Luxford, 'The Founders' Book', in Richard Morris and Ron Shoesmith (eds.), *Tewkesbury Abbey: History, Art & Architecture* (Almeley, 2003), 53–64, at 61; Julian Luxford, 'The Founders' Book: Object, Images and Purpose', in Luxford (ed.), *The Founders' Book*, 1–19.

ostentatiously displayed next to those of their wives, Anne and Isabelle Neville. In this way, the descendants of the Earls of Warwick, the Earls of Tewkesbury, and the Earls of Salisbury—all of whom were related—could boast direct kinship with the royal family.[89]

Proving kinship with the royal family was therefore important for both the German and English aristocracy. However, some important differences can be identified. Comparing the families of the Margraves of Baden and the Wittelsbachs, it is noticeable that the former claimed close dynastic links with the ruling royal family dynasty, while the Wittelsbachs maintained the greatest possible distance from the Habsburgs and Luxembourgs, the only two other families capable of producing kings in the fifteenth century. Although the Wittelsbachs could have easily demonstrated their connections with both dynasties, they mention them only peripherally. In particular, the Habsburg King Rudolf I and the Salians are virtually ignored, their royal titles going unmentioned on two of the Wittelsbach rolls, and Charles IV of Luxembourg is named only in passing in the margin.[90] Any connections to the royal dynasties of the empire are thus avoided, as the Wittelsbachs considered themselves superior. Such disregard for royalty is surprising even in an elective kingdom, but it reflects the fact that the Wittelsbachs preferred to mention the Crown only when it was in their possession; other, competing royal dynasties were played down as far as possible.[91] The Wittelsbachs presented themselves as equal to the ruling dynasty and capable of rule themselves, and they clearly distinguished themselves from other German royal families while at the same time emphasizing their connections with kings elsewhere in Europe. By contrast, the Margraves of Baden, being lower in rank than the Wittelsbachs, sought proximity to and kinship with the Crown.

When comparing noble kinship relationships with royal families in Germany and England, we see that the German nobility focused not only on the German Crown, but also more broadly on other

[89] It should also be noted that the number of surviving noble genealogies from the reign of Richard III is exceptionally high.

[90] The third roll omits them altogether. HSTA GH, 65 (1479/84); Stiftsbib., MS Chart. 106 (1479/84); WAF, HS 326/18 (1480–1505).

[91] Ernst Schubert, *König und Reich: Studien zur spätmittelalterlichen deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1979), 100–1.

European kings, such as the rulers of Sicily, Poland, Hungary, and France, whereas the English nobility concentrated almost exclusively on the English king. Here, too, a difference between elective kingship on the Continent and the English hereditary system comes into view. In England, kinship with the royal dynasty played a much more important role in establishing a family's rank than in Germany.[92] If an English noble house could demonstrate that they were related to the royal family, that would remain the case for all subsequent generations, as English kings all shared the same line of descent. This was not the case in the Holy Roman Empire. Unlike the Wittelsbachs, who presented themselves on their rolls as equals of the monarch and eligible to become kings in their own right, English noble houses always acknowledged the pre-eminence of the royal family in their genealogies by placing the royal lineage at the centre of the roll, and often by enlarging it too.

IV. Summary: Representing Rank on Genealogical Rolls

Despite the contrasts between the elective and hereditary systems, German and English noble families essentially used the same kinds of arguments in their genealogies to establish their rank. References to the age and continuity of the family line were a central feature, especially on manuscript rolls. Age and continuity could apply either to lines of succession or to lines of genealogical descent. These categories were often deliberately mixed, or not clearly differentiated, in order to produce the longest possible unbroken lines. Despite the fundamental pattern of agnatic succession in both kingdoms, the compilers of genealogies also had to resort to cognatic constructions in order to establish continuity across the centuries. Separate agnatic lines were thus linked through wives and daughters.

[92] In this context, the claims made by the Wittelsbachs and the Margraves of Baden that they were related to the English and French kings respectively—i.e. to hereditary monarchies—are particularly revealing, as they confirm that dynastic ways of thinking about royalty were present even in the German electoral system. Büttner, 'Dynastische Kontinuität im Wahlreich der Kurfürsten?', 301, 307.

Royalty also played an important role in both England and Germany. Direct descent from or kinship with the royal family was emphasized in many noble genealogies, especially in England, where proximity could be established simply by presenting one's own family line alongside that of the king. Furthermore, the clearest differences between German and English noble genealogies can also be seen in their treatment of royalty. Not only are claims to royal descent more common and varied in English genealogies, they also take up a much more central role. This finding is particularly striking in relation to the Wars of the Roses, when the Houses of York and Lancaster—both descendants of the Plantagenets—fought for the English Crown. Noble families had to choose a side, and indeed often changed sides; yet this dynastic conflict is hardly mentioned in the genealogies and plays only a minor part in their narratives. Establishing royal descent seems to have been more important than the question of which side the family had taken during the war.

In German noble genealogies, surprisingly, we also find a dynastic approach to royalty, despite the rolls being produced in an elective monarchy. One example of this is the relationship with the Habsburgs claimed by the Margraves of Baden. Another is provided by the Wittelsbachs, who presented themselves as a royal dynasty and glossed over their relations with the Luxembourgs and the Habsburgs. In fact, they went a step further and demonstrated the strength of their family line by contrasting it with the extinction of the Ottonian and Salian dynasties. The message was clear: the Ottonians, Salians, and Hohenstaufens had died out and other kings were merely an interlude, whereas the Wittelsbachs, with their numerous branches and titles, were thriving. Although the Habsburgs were the unchallenged occupants of the throne at the time the rolls were created, their compilers, by framing the elective monarchy in dynastic terms, suggested that rivals to the Crown could always be supplanted. Such assertiveness towards the king, derived in this case from the Wittelsbachs' rank, is scarcely conceivable for the English nobility, even though the Percy family would have been in a position to deprecate the House of Lancaster more strongly.

Another important difference between the Continental and English nobility is that the former also tried to establish close genealogical

relationships with non-German kings, whereas the English nobility focused almost exclusively on the English king. This close connection between the aristocracy and the Crown reflects the greater control that the English king was able to exercise over his nobles.[93]

All in all, the German and English nobility sought to justify their rank genealogically through the same arguments, communicative strategies, and techniques. The roll format made it possible to present seemingly endless and unbroken lineages, which were generally portrayed using colourful, ostentatious coats of arms and portraits rather than lengthy texts. Charts and figures were also used on the rolls, and codex manuscripts were sometimes employed too. What all these manuscripts have in common is that they always show the age, continuity, and noble origins of the lineages they describe.

[93] Given-Wilson, 'Rank and Status', 98.

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OBSERVING, COUNSELLING, AND ACTING IN A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY: REPORTS TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT ON THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FRENCH HOLY LEAGUE, 1584–1588

SIBYLLE RÖTH

I. Uncertainty Everywhere: The Indistinct Image of the French League and England's State of Insecurity

In March 1584, the younger brother and heir apparent to the French king, François, Duke of Anjou and Alençon, fell severely ill. The English ambassador in Paris, Sir Edward Stafford, and his counterpart in the service of the Holy Roman Empire, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq,[1] reported this to their respective governments with deep concern.[2] The changing state of Alençon's health and the uncertainty of the available information—according to some rumours, his death had already occurred but

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This article is part of a chapter of my current book project *The French Holy League as Polyvalent Event: Self-Representation, External Perceptions, and Historiographical Receptions*. While some aspects had to be shortened to meet the requirements of an article, others still need deeper evaluation. I am grateful to the editors for the opportunity to publish my preliminary findings.

[1] See Charles Thornton Forster and Francis Henry Blackburne Daniell, 'Life of Busbecq', in Charles Thornton Forster and Francis Henry Blackburne Daniell (eds.), *The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq: Seigneur of Bousbecque, Knight, Imperial Ambassador*, 2 vols. (London, 1881), i. 1–72.

[2] Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Letter XXXIII [to Rudolf II, 29 Mar. 1584], ibid. ii. 216–17; [Edward] Stafford to the Queen [Elizabeth], Paris, 9 March, 1583, in Joseph Stevenson et al. (eds.), *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth*, 23 vols. in 26 (London, 1863–50), vol. xviii: *July 1583–July 1584* (London, 1914). In the following, I quote from the online version of this series at [https://www.british-history.ac.uk/series/calendar-state-papers-foreign], accessed 19 Aug. 2024, hereafter abbreviated as *CSPF*. Dates are given according to the original sources, which in most cases follow the Old Style as generally used by English correspondents. Whenever it is important for orientation, both Julian and Gregorian dates are provided.

was being concealed[3]—posed major problems for accurate communication. Nevertheless, both were sure of one thing: Alençon's death would have serious consequences. Since the king was childless and hope for legitimate offspring was fading, the continuation of the dynasty was in doubt.[4] The next heir to the throne, according to the Salic law of succession, was Henry de Bourbon, King of Navarre—a Protestant. In the heated atmosphere of the French confessional troubles—the seventh War of Religion had ended only four years before—this was a source of considerable tension. As Stafford explained when it temporarily appeared that the prince would recover: 'if anything had come to Monsieur [Alençon], there would as great trouble have come in France as ever was in any place, for you never saw such murmuring and privy assemblies, early and late, as were in this town.' Even at this early stage, he knew to report that Charles, Cardinal de Bourbon and Henry of Navarre's uncle, was positioned as a Catholic contender against him in the question of the succession.[5]

Eventually, the ambassadors confirmed Alençon's death on 1/10 June—this time with certainty. Both emphasized again that it would bring about significant changes.[6] On the one hand, King Henry III was evidently willing to recognize Henry of Navarre as heir to the throne.[7] However, like Stafford had done before, Busbecq also raised concerns about the consequences:

> Some prognosticate that Alençon's death will give rise to great changes in France, and I think they are not far wrong, for the chief provinces and cities of the kingdom will not be disposed

[3] Busbecq, Letter XXXVII [to Rudolf II, 6 June 1584], in Forster and Daniell (eds.), *Life and Letters*, ii. 219–20, at 219; cf. Stafford to [Francis] Walsingham, Paris, 16 Apr. 1584, and Stafford to [William Cecil, Lord] Burghley, Paris, 11 May 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii.

[4] Busbecq, Letter XXXVII [to Rudolf II, 6 June 1584], in Forster and Daniell (eds.), *Life and Letters*, ii. 219–20.

[5] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 12 Mar. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii. In the edition, deciphered words are italicized, but I have quoted them in roman for the sake of readability.

[6] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 1 June 1584, ibid.

[7] Busbecq, Letter XXXVIII [to Rudolf II, 18 June, 1584], in Forster and Daniell (eds.), *Life and Letters*, ii. 221–3, at 222; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 June 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii.

> to accept any Sovereign whose religion differs from theirs, neither will they lack leaders when they rise, for the governors of the provinces will come forward, and others to boot.[8]

The ambassadors were to be proven right: Alençon's death marked the beginning of the final phase of the French Wars of Religion in the sixteenth century. The imminent end of the Valois dynasty and the legitimate succession of Henry of Navarre were the starting point of the eighth and longest of these wars, which had plagued France since 1562. Throughout the ensuing conflicts, the alliances shifted; with the emergence of the (second) Holy League, a rebellious Catholic movement formed that opposed not only the Protestants but also their own legitimate and Catholic monarch, Henry III.[9]

The king, who had managed to position himself at the head of the first League in 1576 and thus contained the threat to his power, now found himself in a cycle of forced cooperation alternating with open confrontation, ultimately leading to the final rupture: in 1585, Henry III was compelled to side with the Catholic hardliners in the Treaty of Nemours, officially excluding Henry of Navarre from the succession and recognizing the League's candidate, the Cardinal de Bourbon, as his political heir.[10] However, the *journée des barricades* in 1588, an uprising in Paris, forced the king to flee his capital.[11] Although the conflict was initially resolved and the king and the League reconciled, the situation fully escalated when Henry III, in a sort of pre-emptive strike, ordered the assassination of the League's leaders, the Duke and the Cardinal de Guise.[12] Subsequently, the theologians of the Sorbonne declared him excommunicated, releasing all subjects from their oaths of obedience. Numerous cities and provinces joined the rebellion, with the result that Henry III lost control over large parts of his realm.

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[8] Busbecq, Letter XXXVIII [to Rudolf II, 18 June 1584], in Forster and Daniell (eds.), *Life and Letters*, ii. 221–2.

[9] For an overview, see Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 2005), 123–55; for a comprehensive study, see Jean-Marie Constant, *La Ligue* (Paris, 1996).

[10] See Constant, *La Ligue*, 125–31. On the first League, see ibid. 70–7.

[11] Ibid. 149–55; Denis Richet, 'Les Barricades à Paris, le 12 mai 1588', *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 45/2 (1990), 383–95.

[12] See Constant, *La Ligue*, 201–12.

In response, the king allied himself with Henry of Navarre, which led to an open civil war between Catholic royalists and Protestants on one side and the radical Catholic League on the other.[13] The war only ended when Henry of Navarre converted to Catholicism in 1593 and thus gradually won over the supporters of the League. These conflicts were accompanied by fervent propaganda, ranging from short polemical pamphlets[14] to substantial contributions to political thought. In the process, Catholic writers not only matched the radicalism of the Protestant monarchomachs in legitimizing the right to resist, but even went so far as to justify regicide.[15]

The interpretation of the Catholic League has presented significant challenges to observers and researchers from the outset. Contemporaries primarily associated Protestantism with disobedience and rebellion, while Catholicism, as the established majority religion, was generally aligned with the ruling authorities and hence hardly connected with unrest. This interpretation persisted in research for a long time, but with reversed normative implications: adhering to a narrative of progress, Catholicism, even when engaging in Counter-Reformation reforms, was viewed at most as reform-conservative, while the Reformation was classified as a milestone towards modernity by promoting freedom, tolerance, and fundamental human rights.[16] Against the background of this grand narrative, a lively debate over

[13] Ibid. 213–312.

[14] See e.g. Marco Penzi, 'Les pamphlets ligueurs et la polémique anti-ligueuse: Faux-textes et "vrais faux". Propagande et manipulation des récits', in Jacques Berchtold and Marie-Madeleine Fragonard (eds.), *La mémoire des Guerres de religion: La concurrence des genres historiques (XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles). Actes du colloque international de Paris (15–16 novembre 2002)* (Geneva 2007), 133–51.

[15] See John H. M. Salmon, 'Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist Response, 1580–1620', in James Henderson Burns and Mark Goldie (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700* (Cambridge, 1991), 219–53; Andrei Constantin Sălăvăstru, 'The Problem of Tyrannicide in the Monarchomach and Leaguer Political Discourse during the Reigns of Charles IX (1560–1574) and Henry III (1574–1589)', *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy*, 14/2 (2022), 638–64.

[16] The details of this narrative vary with the specific context. In Germany, there is a strong focus on Luther's writings, whereas English 'Whig history' emphasizes the significance of the revolutions of the seventeenth century. The French monarchomachs play a key role in the history of political thought. See

how to accurately characterize the League arose in the second half of the twentieth century. While older scholarship had primarily focused on the leading actors—King Henry III, the Protestant pretender to the throne Henry of Navarre, and the leader of the ultra-Catholic faction Henri de Guise—researchers increasingly turned to the rebellious urban population. Using categories that might today seem anachronistic, the Parisian League was interpreted as the first modern and proto-totalitarian party;[17] the conflicts were framed as class struggles;[18] and parallels were sought with the French Revolution.[19] Other interpretations depicted the League as traditionalist, drawing from medieval community ideals,[20] or viewed it as radical and reactionary in equal measure.[21] The cultural turn in historiography then led to a new emphasis on religious motivations and characterized the actors primarily as zealots or holy warriors.[22]

Recent scholarship has questioned the generalizability of these predominantly Paris-centric images of the League, seeking a more nuanced perspective through numerous regional studies.[23] This has led to greater emphasis on the ambiguity and internal diversity of the

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John Witte Jr., *The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism* (Cambridge, 2007).

[17] Elie Bar-Navi, 'La Ligue Parisienne (1585–94): Ancêtre des partis totalitaires modernes?', *French Historical Studies*, 11/1 (1979), 29–57.

[18] Henry Heller, *Iron and Blood: Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century France* (Montreal, 1991).

[19] Denis Richet, *De la Réforme à la Révolution: Études sur la France moderne* (Paris, 1991).

[20] Robert Descimon, 'La Ligue à Paris (1585–1594): Une révision', *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 37/1 (1982), 72–111.

[21] Frederic J. Baumgartner, *Radical Reactionaries: The Political Thought of the French Catholic League* (Geneva, 1976).

[22] Nathalie Zemon Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France', *Past & Present*, 59 (1973), 51–91; Denis Crouzet, *Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525–vers 1610*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1990).

[23] e.g. Olivia Carpi, *Une république imaginaire: Amiens pendant les troubles de religion, 1559–1597* (Paris, 2005); Stéphane Gal, *Grenoble au temps de la Ligue: Étude politique, sociale et religieuse d'une cité en crise (vers 1562–vers 1598)* (Grenoble, 2000); Mark W. Konnert, *Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: The Towns of Champagne, the Duc de Guise, and the Catholic League, 1560–1595* (Aldershot, 2006).

movement. It is stressed that not all League followers were committed ideologues; many were moderates and waverers.[24] Furthermore, there is increasing focus on international connections and entanglements.[25] However, this also makes it challenging to achieve a comprehensive interpretation of the League. As Jan-Friedrich Mißfelder noted in 2007, there now seem to be as many Leagues as there were cities.[26]

Given this context, I do not intend to revisit the question of what the League was, but instead consider how it was perceived by contemporary observers. While the loss of definiteness poses no major problem for historians—identifying local differences and uncovering internal contradictions rather appear to enrich our understanding—it was often crucial for contemporaries to obtain a coherent picture of the events. For them, ambiguity meant uncertainty and complicated their assessments, and thus hindered their ability to respond appropriately. This could potentially lead to indecision and, at a time of extreme tensions both internationally and domestically, even to insecurity. Hence, gaining comprehensive and accurate information on political developments in France was often essential. This of course depended on the position of the observer: while the Holy Roman Emperor's concern was evidently limited,[27] and his envoy Busbecq

[24] Sylvie Daubresse and Bertrand Haan (eds.), *La Ligue et ses frontières: Engagements catholiques à distance du radicalisme à la fin des guerres de Religion* (Rennes, 2015); Sophie Nicholls, *Political Thought in the French Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 2021).

[25] e.g. Fabrice Micallef, *Un désordre européen: La compétition internationale autour des 'affaires de Provence' (1580–1598)* (Paris, 2014); Hervé Le Goff, *La Ligue en Bretagne: Guerre civile et conflit international (1588–1598)* (Rennes, 2010); Serge Brunet, 'Philippe II et la Ligue parisienne (1588)', *Revue historique*, 656 (2010), 795–844.

[26] Jan-Friedrich Mißfelder, 'Forschungen zur Rolle der Städte während der Französischen Religionskriege', *sehepunkte*, 7/11 (2007), at [https://www.sehepunkte.de/2007/11/11134.html], accessed 19 Aug. 2024.

[27] Besides his personal disposition, Emperor Rudolph II's reluctant policy towards France was caused by his concerns for stability in the empire and by the unresolved relationship with the Spanish line of the Habsburgs. See Andrey Y. Prokopiev, 'Der deutsche Adel und die französischen Religionskriege', *PROSLOGION: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Social History and Culture*, 1/13 (2016), 270–92, at 274. As late as 1591, the Duke of Mayenne, the leading figure of the League since the death of Henri de Guise in 1588, opened

repeatedly focused on the consequences for his country of origin, the Netherlands,[28] the English government found it expedient to understand events in France. Therefore, this article will concentrate on the English perspective.

Generally speaking, the English government aimed to maintain good relations with France, which had to be carefully balanced with its commitment to international Protestantism. Elizabeth I initially sent troops to support the Protestant rebels in the first War of Religion; however, after they were shamefully defeated, she withdrew, choosing instead to provide financial and diplomatic support for the Protestant cause.[29] In the 1570s in particular, she pursued closer ties with the French court, since tensions with Spain were rising and England was feeling increasingly isolated internationally. Although marriage negotiations between the queen and King Charles IX's younger brother—the later Henry III—did not succeed, they led to the Treaty of Blois in April 1572,[30] solidifying an alliance between the two traditionally adversarial states.[31] Elizabeth did not rescind this treaty despite the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre a few months later, which otherwise severely strained English–French

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a letter to the emperor by explaining the situation in France and the intentions of the League, and by introducing himself in broad terms. Evidently, there had been no previous exchange for him to build on. See No. CCCCXLII [Charles de Mayenne à Empereur Rodolphe II, 2 June 1591], in Charles Loriquet and Édouard Henry (eds.), *Correspondance du duc de Mayenne, publiée sur le manuscrit de la Bibliothèque de Reims*, 2 vols. (Reims, 1860–4), ii. 287–90.

[28] These were, in fact, far-reaching: as most of the Northern Netherlands had submitted to Alençon's protectorship, his death posed the question of whether Henry III would succeed him. Busbecq described the ensuing negotiations in detail. However, even beyond that, the situation of the Netherlands is very present in his letters.

[29] David J. B. Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience on the Continent, 1558–1585', in Susan Doran and Glenn Richardson (eds.), *Tudor England and Its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), 139–77, at 152. In consequence, Elizabeth only deployed troops again after the assassination of Henry III, when Henry of Navarre was proclaimed French king.

[30] Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London, 1996), 99–129.

[31] Pauline Croft, '"The State of the World is Marvellously Changed": England, Spain, and Europe, 1558–1604', in Doran and Richardson (eds.), *Tudor England*, 178–202.

relations.[32] Even the idea of a marriage with one of the king's other brothers was pursued—the very François Alençon whose death in 1584 then triggered the succession crisis.[33] Although this—evidently more serious—endeavour also failed in the early 1580s, Elizabeth continued to support Alençon's involvement in the Netherlands as protector.[34] His death was therefore indeed a loss for her, albeit perhaps in political more than emotional terms.

However, there were further reasons for tension between the two states. Not only did France become a gathering point for English exiles in the 1580s,[35] but also Mary Stuart—whose very existence as a potential Catholic alternative to Elizabeth's rule became a constant threat during this time—had many allies and supporters there as former French queen and close relative of the House of Guise.[36] Additionally, the English College in Reims, likewise sponsored by the Guises, had served as a base for Catholic missions to England since 1578.[37] So the various Catholic conspiracies to replace Elizabeth with Mary Stuart could often be traced back to a network of support, if not active planning and direct involvement, from France.[38] Thus maintaining good

[32] Nate Probasco, 'Queen Elizabeth's Reaction to the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre', in Charles Beem (ed.), *The Foreign Relations of Elizabeth I* (New York, 2011), 77–100; Christopher Archibald, 'Remembering the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in Elizabethan England', *Studies in Philology*, 118/2 (2021), 242–83.

[33] Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony*, 130–94. On the different explanations for why these marriage negotiations failed, see Nathalie Mears, 'Love-Making and Diplomacy: Elizabeth I and the Anjou Marriage Negotiations, *c*.1578–1582', *History*, 86/284 (2001), 442–66.

[34] Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance', 161.

[35] Due to the hostilities in the Netherlands, the centre of English Catholic exile had moved to France; see John Bossy, 'Rome and the Elizabethan Catholics: A Question of Geography', *Historical Journal*, 7/1 (1964), 135–42. On the English exile in Paris in particular, see Katy Gibbons, *English Catholic Exiles in Late Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Woodbridge, 2011).

[36] Mark Greengrass, 'Mary Queen Dowager of France', *The Innes Review*, 38 (1987), 171–94; Alexander S. Wilkinson, *Mary Queen of Scots and French Public Opinion, 1542–1600* (Basingstoke, 2004).

[37] John H. M. Salmon, *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought* (Oxford, 1959), 34.

[38] On the diverse conspiracies and plots aiming to depose Elizabeth and enthrone Mary, see Carole Levin, *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (Basingstoke, 2002), 80–103. On the discussion of how far those plots were manufactured by

relations with France required some effort and sometimes risky decisions on the part of the English government. That Protestant England and Catholic France kept resident ambassadors in each other's countries during this period of religious polarization was by no means a matter of course: in 1568, England had recalled its ambassador from Spain; in 1584, it expelled the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza for his involvement in the Throckmorton Plot, and also declined to accept a successor.[39] In contrast, the French ambassador, Michel de Castelnau, Seigneur de la Mauvissière, who was also evidently involved in the plot, was allowed to remain[40]—even though he used his position to continue supporting Mary Stuart. The same applied to his successor, Guillaume de L'Aubespine, Baron of Châteauneuf, and his circle, who were similarly accused of further conspiring against Elizabeth.[41]

Hence, at a time when the English government was becoming increasingly obsessed with the numerous dangers it faced at home and abroad, developments in France were not only important as part of European power politics, but also perceived as a direct threat.[42] Accordingly, Elizabeth and her council—particularly Lord Treasurer William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and the Secretary of State Francis Walsingham—endeavoured to stay informed through various correspondents extending well beyond official diplomats.[43] It was not

Elizabeth's government itself, see Patrick H. Martin, *Elizabethan Espionage: Plotters and Spies in the Struggle Between Catholicism and the Crown* (Jefferson, NC, 2016).

[39] Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York, 1988; 1st pub. 1955), 174–6.

[40] John Bossy, *Under the Molehill: An Elizabethan Spy Story* (New Haven, 2001), 152–4.

[41] Robert Hutchinson, *Elizabeth's Spymaster: Francis Walsingham and the Secret War That Saved England* (London, 2007), 116–45 and 169–202. However, the English government's role in orchestrating these conspiracies through the use of agents provocateurs must be taken into account.

[42] Stephen Alford, *The Watchers: A Secret History of the Reign of Elizabeth I* (London, 2012), 1–24; Paul E. J. Hammer, 'The Catholic Threat and the Military Response', in Susan Doran and Norman Jones (eds.), *The Elizabethan World*, 2nd edn. (London, 2014), 629–45; Levin, *Reign of Elizabeth I*, 57–103.

[43] Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks and the Spread of News', in Joad Raymond and Noah Moxham (eds.), *News Networks in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2016), 305–27.

only Walsingham, known as Elizabeth's 'spymaster', who maintained a broad network ranging from agents and spies to fixed and occasional informants like merchants, travellers, and personal contacts;[44] Burghley, too, cultivated relations with various official and private correspondents abroad, whom he carefully instructed about the kind of information he needed[45]—not least in order to keep up with Walsingham in their competition for influence.[46] Information became the crucial currency for security, as well as for private ambition within the administration.[47]

Of course, the English ambassador Edward Stafford himself played a central role in this information network. Situated in the Paris embassy, he was not only at the heart of events but also at the centre of the continental postal system.[48] He gathered news from diverse places in Europe, communicated with the French government (including the king and queen mother), maintained contact with French nobles from the different factions, exchanged information with other ambassadors in Paris (including the Spaniard Mendoza), and stayed in touch with English travellers and emigrants (including Catholic exiles).[49] Many of these contacts were facilitated by the fact that Stafford was by no means a Protestant hardliner; due to his family background, he was even assumed to be sympathetic to

[44] On Walsingham's intelligence network, see Hutchinson, *Elizabeth's Spymaster*. For the argument that it was nevertheless no institutionalized 'secret service', see Stephen Alford, 'Some Elizabethan Spies in the Office of Sir Francis Walsingham', in Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (eds.), *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture* (Basingstoke, 2011), 46–62, at 48.

[45] Nicholas Popper, 'An Information State for Elizabethan England', *Journal of Modern History*, 90 (2018), 503–35, at 510–11.

[46] On Burghley, see Susan Doran, *Elizabeth I and Her Circle* (Oxford, 2015), 219–46; on his information network, see Popper, 'Information State'; on the conflicts between Walsingham and Burghley, see Hsuan-Ying Tu, 'The Pursuit of God's Glory: Francis Walsingham's Espionage in Elizabethan Politics, 1568–1588' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of York, 2012), at [https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5680], accessed 19 Aug. 2024.

[47] Popper, 'Information State'.

[48] Sowerby, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Networks', 316.

[49] Besides the question of his loyalty, there is little scholarship on Stafford. An insight into his complex web of contacts can be derived from John Bossy, *Giordano Bruno and the Embassy Affair* (New Haven, 1991).

Catholicism.[50] This, but not only this, also made him suspect. Belonging to Burghley's circle and watched distrustfully by Walsingham, Stafford was a notorious gambler who often faced financial shortages. Evidently, he was added to the payroll of both Philip II of Spain and the Duke of Guise by 1587 at the latest. However, it remains contested whether he tailored the information he transmitted to them in order to make it of little use.[51] This question cannot be resolved here, but it highlights the fact that information gathering was not only challenging because of deficient access to news and complications in transmission—such as poor roads and long postal routes, lost letters due to unreliable messengers, or the perils of a country in civil war[52]—but also involved the deliberate spread of false or misleading information and severe distrust.

In this article I delve into the English struggles to comprehend and interpret the French situation appropriately. I concentrate on the early years of the League—from its emergence in response to Alençon's death in 1584 to the *journée des barricades* in 1588. I analyse reports from France to the English government and the government's reactions, which are taken from English state papers. The main sources are the *Calendars of the State Papers, Foreign Series*, the Cecil Papers held at Hatfield House, and further published letters written or received by the main figures.[53] The aim is to illustrate how actors navigated and responded to the complex web of uncertainties they faced, in which several dimensions of incertitude overlapped: first, they were confronted with factual unknowns, contradictory news, and simply unproven rumours; second, they had to deal with doubts over how to interpret the information gathered; and

[50] Tu, 'The Pursuit of God's Glory', 107; Conyers Read, 'The Fame of Sir Edward Stafford', *American Historical Review*, 20/2 (1915), 292–313, at 293.

[51] Read, 'The Fame'; Mitchell Leimon and Geoffrey Parker, 'Treason and Plot in Elizabethan Diplomacy: The "Fame of Sir Edward Stafford" Reconsidered', *English Historical Review,* 111/444 (1996), 1134–58.

[52] E. John B. Allen, *Post and Courier Services in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe* (The Hague, 1972).

[53] On the problem that the English state papers are not a coherent set, but scattered across different locations, see Angela Andreani, 'Manuscripts, Secretaries, and Scribes: The Production of Diplomatic Letters at Court', in Carlo M. Bajetta, Guillaume Coatalen, and Jonathan Gibson (eds.), *Elizabeth I's Foreign Correspondence: Letters, Rhetoric, and Politics* (New York, 2014), 3–23, at 4.

third, they had to act under conditions of moral distrust towards both the actors they were observing and their communication partners.

This tense situation makes the relation between not knowing, uncertainty, and insecurity obvious. Fabrice Micallef has described this connection especially in times of political crisis, when new political actors with unknown political aims emerge:

> [T]he experience of crisis is an experience of ignorance, of misunderstanding, and of misinterpretation. That risk of misinterpretation implies a political risk, especially when the observers concerned have political interests at stake and have to make choices appropriate to the situation at hand. In that case, overcoming non-knowledge becomes imperative.[54]

But gathering information is not the only challenge in such a situation; the even more pressing question is how to interpret it.[55] Here, Cornel Zwierlein's thesis in regard to conspiracy theories seems to be transferable to political observations in general: in the absence of sufficient information, the given facts have to be supplemented by speculations that are unproven, but possible, in order to 'bridge the gaps of knowledge and understanding'.[56]

The necessity of adding interpretation is also highlighted as a crucial factor in the cognitive and constructivist approaches in current international relations theory, where 'uncertainty' has become a key concept.[57] Regardless of whether the observer is facing an abundance of

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[54] Fabrice Micallef, 'International Crises as Experience of Non-Knowledge: European Powers and the "Affairs of Provence" (1589–1598)', in Cornel Zwierlein (ed.), *The Dark Side of Knowledge: Histories of Ignorance, 1400 to 1800* (Leiden, 2016), 296–313, at 296.

[55] Ibid. 300–1.

[56] Cornel Zwierlein, 'Security Politics and Conspiracy Theories in the Emerging European State System (15th/16th c.)', *Historical Social Research*, 38/1 (2013), 65–95, at 72. On the similarities between conspiracy theory and political analysis in general, see ibid. 66: 'Both use the information of "true" present and/or past facts such as deeds and movements of political actors . . . draw connections between them, interpret coincidences as causalities and give a sense to the whole.'

[57] See Oliver Kessler and Christopher Daase, 'From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*,

information or lacks any trustworthy information at all, he or she must ultimately take a leap into speculation in order not to end in paralysis.[58] This is because in a situation of fundamental complexity, where every new piece of information only heightens confusion, the only stable basis for decision-making is to be found in normative convictions, traditional patterns of interpretation, or established stereotypes.[59] While this enables action and safeguards the feeling of control, it may also lead to biases and premature conclusions. Once a pattern of interpretation is established, it tends to become immune to new, even clearly contradictory information. If this occurs, it is no longer the overall perception that is adapted to the new information, but vice versa.[60] This is how forms of not-wanting-to-know and conscious ignorance also find their way into decision-making processes.[61]

Using these reflections from political science, I will examine how English observers sought to construct a coherent narrative from disparate pieces of information. I will demonstrate how they navigated the important and the unimportant, the probable and the impossible, the credible and the incredible in order to produce certainty from the unknown, ambiguous, or dubious. The question is whether their analysis remained open to changing observations, or whether an interpretative pattern developed that solidified against further alterations. At the end of the last section, I use my findings to reflect on how the

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33/2 (2008), 211–32. This paradigm change was caused by the 'War on Terror' after 9/11, in which states were confronted not with other states but with diffuse enemies whom they were unable to gasp, to attack, or even to address. It could be argued that this situation shows similarities with England's situation when faced with the League.

[58] Brian C. Rathbun, 'Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory', *International Studies Quarterly*, 51/3 (2007), 533–57, at 546–9.

[59] Ibid. 545–52.

[60] Jennifer Mitzen and Randall L. Schweller, 'Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplaced Certainty and the Onset of War', *Security Studies*, 20/1 (2011), 2–35, at 21–2.

[61] The importance of this has been emphasized in the political sciences and is also taken into consideration by Zwierlein in his historical approach to ignorance. See Cornel Zwierlein, 'Introduction: Towards a History of Ignorance', in Zwierlein (ed.), *Dark Side of Knowledge*, 1–47, at 3.

observers' interpretations may be explained by reference to convictions, self-perceptions, or biases. At that point, I will briefly revive the comparison with Busbecq—whose perspective I will now omit for the main part—in order to stress the specificity of the English understanding of events in France.

II. Striving for Orientation: Multiple Enemies, Dubious Allies, and Growing Confusion

Alençon's death caused a highly ambiguous situation as it soon became obvious that Navarre's succession was indeed by no means secure. But while reports from France were certain that something was going on, the form and extent of the consequences were not yet foreseeable. As Stafford put it: 'some extraordinary Thing [will] happen, which everie Body looketh for, and yett theye cannot judge what ytt is lyk to be.'[62] It was entirely unclear 'what Effectes good or bad Monsieur's Death will bring us'.[63] In a letter to Walsingham, the French Protestant François Perrot de Mezières expressed his hope that the king would defend Navarre's claims against those who wished to plunge the country into new turmoil, and he called on the Protestant powers to support him.[64] Stafford stressed the menace of the situation by reporting on meetings of the Guises, which surely pointed to some sinister plans:

> We fynd already heere that great Practyses are made, and great Counsells are kept daylye of the contrarye Partie, great outward Shew that theie meane somewhat, and great Desiers perfectly seen eyther by spredding of false Bruites, or by underhand practysyng some bad Matter to styre some Dissention, coulered by a Beginninge of some of the Relligion.[65]

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[62] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 21 June 1584, in William Murdin (ed.), *A Collection of State Papers Relating to Affairs in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, From the Year 1571 to 1596* (London, 1759), 409–11, at 410.

[63] Ibid. 409.

[64] François Perrot de Mezières to Walsingham, Val de Grace, 9/19 June 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii.

[65] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 21 June 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 409–11, at 409.

Although he did not expect Henry III to support their plans—on several previous occasions he had described the king's strong aversion to them—he noted: 'all these shows cannot put out of some men's heads that there is plain meaning but some hidden matter.'[66]

In other words, the only certainty was uncertainty. Although the rumours spread against the Huguenots ultimately proved to be false, the situation was highly fluid. Within only a few days, Stafford acknowledged a widespread change in attitude towards Navarre and his followers:

> for at the first, everie Bodie had a Respect, a good Countenance, and Eye towardes them, now theie are changed in Statu quo prius, and receave again the same Countenances theie had before the Death; and theie that afore speak and looked gentlie, doe nowe plainlye say, the King of Navarr can never be King withoute Change of Relligion.[67]

Moreover, the Guises had withdrawn from court and displayed great dissatisfaction with the king, just as he did with them. But in this regard, there were uncertainties about the right interpretation: Stafford was unsure whether to take this discontent at face value.[68] As he noted, it had to be taken into consideration that Henry III himself was

> Catholyk in Extreamitye, led by Jesuistes, who are the onlye Servants and Ministers for the King of Spaine, uppon whom the Pope dependeth wholly; the House of Guise is lynked with the King of Spaine, therefore he lysteth to favor others, as is lyklye and most certen he will; then yf the Jesuists maye leade the King, the King of Spaine, the Jesuists, and the Pope coulorably them all, I conclude that ytt standeth uppon the King of Spaine's Gretness to maintain the Pope, uppon the Pope's Gretness to maintain the House of Guise, his onlye Pillar againe the King of Navarr; and that seeing he kanne by his Instruments leade the King, no Doubte but he will seeke to mak him enter into anye

[66] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 June 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii.
[67] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 21 June 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 409–11, at 410.
[68] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 July 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 July 1584, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 Aug. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 415–19.

> Dance againe the King of Navarre, and them that he taketh for his Enemyes.[69]

The ambassador's doubts about the seriousness of Henry III's enmity towards the Guises also arose from the king's failure to proceed against their many public assemblies, at which they proclaimed Charles de Bourbon's right to succession. Moreover, Henry III did nothing to remove their supporters from office. Instead, and contrary to custom, he even confirmed the *prévôt des marchands* in Paris, who was well known for his steadfast support for the League, for another term.[70]

However, since the late summer, some degree of orientation had been emerging from the confusion; at least the main enemy and their intentions were becoming increasingly distinct. In the early stages of the crisis, it was clearly the House of Guise that was held to be responsible, referred to as 'the Guisians',[71] 'the followers of the House of Guise',[72] or through even more complicated constructions such as 'the house of Guise and their adherents'[73] and 'them that were at the devotion of the house of Guise'.[74] It was not until March 1585 that the collective term 'the leaguers' appeared for the first time in the sources analysed here,[75] pointing to an abstraction away from an aristocratic party bound to a personal leader, and towards a broader movement.[76]

Regarding their aims, Stafford was now convinced that they would soon orchestrate unrest in some form or another, with or without the king's consent.[77] This was widely anticipated, since it was obvious

[69] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 Aug. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 415–19, at 417.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 21 June 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 409–11.

[72] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 Mar. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[73] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 10 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[74] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[75] This is only a preliminary finding, because the calendars give extended quotations but not the full text.

[76] The term remains prominent throughout the years 1585–7 and then recedes into the background again.

[77] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 29 Aug. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 421. Deciphered using the version in Historical Manuscripts Commission (ed.), *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury, K.G., etc.:*

that they were gathering weapons and equipment,[78] and there were rumours about the recruitment of troops.[79] Stafford even warned of a massacre of the Huguenots on All Saints' Day.[80] Robert Cecil, Lord Burghley's son, who was staying in Paris at the time, held the motivations of the Guises to be evident: by seeking to prevent Navarre's succession, their ultimate aim was to seize the Crown.[81] They only put forward Charles de Bourbon because they could not legitimately claim it for themselves.[82]

With this framework at hand, the English observers were able to fill in further details in order to calculate risks. Here we can see how pieces of information were mixed in with assessments to create a reasoned expectation. In order to give a detailed report regarding the political configuration, the young Cecil had gathered information on the positioning of the leading nobles and the supposed mood of different parts of the French population. As far as the nobility was concerned, he was convinced that most of them would not be swayed by the Guisian strategy. Generally, they adhered to the Salic law unless driven to oppose it for specific reasons—and those nobles who were against Navarre were all clearly aligned with the Guises. As for the inhabitants of the major cities, however, he thought it likely that they would reject Navarre because they feared revenge for their massacres of Protestants. A notable exception was the municipal elite, who he thought would mostly favour Navarre. Regarding the provinces, Cecil found it difficult to make an assessment. Only a few regions were definitely supportive of Navarre, whereas most 'were so infected with superstition' that loyalty towards him could hardly be expected.[83]

Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire. Part III (London 1889), 63 (hereafter CP, for Cecil Papers).

[78] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 18 Sept. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 422–43, at 422. On the ongoing meetings of the Guises and their adherents see also Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 29 Aug. 1584, ibid. 421; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 5 Sept. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[79] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 29 Oct. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Robert Cecil to Walsingham, Paris, 28 Sept. (New Style) 1584, in Thomas Wright (ed.), *Queen Elizabeth and her Times: A Series of Original Letters*, 2 vols. (London, 1838), ii. 237–40, at 237.

[82] Ibid. 238.

[83] Ibid. 238–9; quotation at 239.

Additionally, both sides had strong foreign allies who would support them, if not openly, then discreetly.[84]

Stafford sent another detailed report containing brief descriptions of the close circle of royal advisers. The categorization of their character is telling. On the one hand, there are obviously negative portrayals like: 'wicked, cruel . . . a sworn enemy to the Protestant princes and to the princes of the blood; partial for the Church of Rome; addicted to Spain, crafty and subtle, full of corruption'; on the other, there are positive ones such as: 'very honest minded, loving the state of the realm and his house, enemy in heart to Spain and to Guise, favouring in his heart the Religion'.[85] Obviously, the supposed relationship with Spain played a crucial role. Although not all members of the royal council could be so easily divided into pro- and anti-Hispanic factions—in some cases, a lack of certainty over their views was admitted[86]—this distinction was not only used to designate friend and foe but was also accompanied by the attribution of moral qualities. On the whole, Stafford held most of the royal advisers to be suspect and was convinced that Philip II had so many supporters in France that, in the event of Henry III's death, 'the realm being divided either for matter of Religion or otherwise, he might hope to have some part of it, and that not small'.[87] In other words, the activity of the Spanish Crown was a major object of suspicion, alongside and connected with the perceived threat from the Guises.

These anxieties about Philip II's influence were further fuelled by the fact that Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador who had been expelled from England, was now serving in Paris. According to Stafford, the French royal house was also worried about Mendoza's intentions.[88] Further concerns arose from supposed secret connections

[84] Ibid. 238–40.

[85] 'The names and dispositions of those of the Council that be ever in ordinary'; enclosure to: Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 17 July 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xviii. The first quotation refers to Albert de Gondi, Duke of Retz, a close confidant of the king; the second to François de Bourbon, Marquess of Conti, son and brother respectively of the Huguenot leaders Louis and Henri, Princes of Condé.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Stafford to Burghley, 11 July 1584, ibid.

[88] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 Nov. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 7 Nov. 1584, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham [Paris, 9 Dec. 1584], in CP, pt. iii, pp. 78–81, at 79. (The date of and some corrections to the last of these sources can be derived from *CSPF*, vol. xix.)

between the French malcontent Henri de Montmorency, the Duke of Savoy, and Philip II.[89] In particular, the planned marriage between the House of Savoy and Spain raised fears that Philip II 'pretendeth some great Enterpryse by this Matche with the Duke of Savoye, and to him the Executioner of ytt'.[90] Additionally, Stafford had heard rumours of a planned marital alliance between the Guises and Montmorency, which would close the circle of enemies—but these were as yet unconfirmed.[91]

As the Spaniards' bad intentions were beyond question, the uncertainty here only concerned their chances of success and the coalitions that might result. In this respect, further factual information was supposed to bring clarity. This differed from the case of Henry III, who became the biggest puzzle for Stafford: the ambassador considered the king's animosity towards the Guises to be authentic,[92] so he could not understand why he remained largely inactive. Henry's efforts concerning the Cardinal de Bourbon could have been an attempt to detach him from the Guise faction, or equally a way of preparing the ground for the king to distance himself from Henry of Navarre.[93] In this regard, Stafford first of all needed a clue to interpret. Only in December 1584 could he report on the king's proceedings against the Guises and the arrest of some of their presumed agents. At the same time, however, he observed that Henry III was becoming highly suspicious of everyone, was ruling in an increasingly authoritarian manner,[94] and had augmented his personal bodyguard enormously.[95] This behaviour caused great concern among the Huguenots, even though the king had met many of their demands and his measures were currently directed against the opposing party.[96] The French king was thus proceeding in a dubious manner.

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[89] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 7 Nov. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.
[90] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 18 Sept. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 422–3, at 422.
[91] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 28 Nov. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.
[92] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 22 Nov. 1584, ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Stafford to Walsingham, [Paris, 9 Dec. 1584], in CP, pt. iii, p. 79.
[95] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 8 Dec. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 424. See also Stafford to Walsingham, 25 Dec. 1584, ibid. 425–7.
[96] Stafford to Walsingham, [Paris, 9 Dec. 1584], in CP, pt. iii, pp. 79–80.

Further news then brought further confusion to a situation already unsettled by Stafford's distrust of the king, England's ally. That same December, Walsingham received a letter from Henry of Navarre's confidant, Jacques de Ségur de Pardaillan, reporting unrest in Brittany caused by rumours that Henry III was already dead:

> I am now informed by some merchants arrived newly from Brittany, that all is in confusion there; for M. de Chasteauneuf has planned to surprise St. Malo, and gathered together a great number of men of war. It is believed there that the King is dead, which has given opportunity to M. de Chasteauneuf to make this enterprise in order to serve the Duke of Guise . . . I pray you to let me know what you have heard from France, for M. de Chasteauneuf having made a beginning in Brittany, I fear the same will be done in other places.[97]

Additionally, Stafford reported that Philip II and the Guises were also seeking connections with German princes.[98] Nonetheless, he was able to give the all-clear on a different front: in several French provinces, the ultra-Catholic party had not met with the expected approval, and the relations with Savoy were not progressing as well as they had hoped either.[99]

Overall, however, the English ambassador perceived the situation at the beginning of 1585 as increasingly disorientating. There were numerous rumours that could neither be confirmed nor refuted. Some suggested that Henry III was seeking to redirect the Guises' ambitions against Spain; conversely, there was speculation that he feared they were attempting to impose their agenda on him with the support of the many malcontents in the realm, while Philip II was raising troops to ally with Montmorency. However, Stafford thought it probable that all these rumours were solely invented to paralyse the king.[100] Near to mental paralysis himself, he remained undecided as to how to interpret the ongoing reports of the Guises'

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[97] [Jacques] Segur-Pardeelhan [*sic*] to Walsingham, Hampton [Southampton], 15 Dec. 1584, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[98] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 17 Dec. 1584, ibid. (two letters).

[99] Stafford to Walsingham, 25 Dec. 1584, in Murdin (ed.), *Collection*, 425–7.

[100] Stafford to Walsingham, St. Denis, [12 Feb. 1585], in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

armament.[101] On 10 March 1585 he submitted a full account of the many possible readings, but no definite analysis:

> Some think they are practices of the King of Spain's faction and that the matter is nothing; which I cannot tell what to think on. Some, that they are real actions practised by the King of Spain to trouble this realm, with which opinion I could easily go. Some, that upon proofs that are made of the King's death ere long they will be ready armed for such a chance, which is neither unlike nor impossible. Some that they mean (upon the colour of seeking the relief of the oppressed people and the abolishing of the Religion, which two things carry here a fair show) to seize upon the King and make him alter his government and his governors, which is not unlikely. Some that they and the King have intelligence together to the ruin of religion and all religious persons, which I cannot tell truly what to say to.[102]

This time, however, the danger proved to be not only real, but immediate: a few days later, Stafford reported that the Duke of Guise had taken Châlons without the slightest resistance.[103]

Faced with this new situation of an armed insurgency by the ultra-Catholic party against the French king, Stafford remained perplexed for a while, wholly unable to anticipate what might follow.[104] In mid March he could at least provide more information about the self-presentation of the insurgents, who insisted that there was no foreign influence—a claim the ambassador rejected as fully implausible—and that they were just a group of nobles and clerics who wanted to remedy certain abuses within the French government.[105] Their demands were to secure a Catholic succession to the throne, ensure religious unity, provide tax relief for the population, and reorganize

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[101] [George] Gilpin to Walsingham, Middelburg, 21 Feb. 1585, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 1 Mar. 1585, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 3 Mar. 1585, ibid.; François de Civille to Walsingham, Rouen, 5/15 March 1585, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 10 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[102] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 10 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[103] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 19 Mar. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

access to the king. To initiate these measures, they proposed convening the Estates General.[106]

In this situation, the French correspondent François Rasse des Neux and the English special envoy William Waad—who had been sent to France to negotiate with the king—went from observation to speculation. The former suspected a connection between the Pope, Philip II, the Duke of Savoy, and the Jesuits,[107] while the latter considered several possible reasons for the development:

> be it that the Guises are set a work by the Spaniard to decry the succour the King in likelihood was to afford to those of the Low Countries; or by their own ambition impatient of further delay; or so far discovered as they were driven to unmask themselves, or else that these be effects of the holy league, it is greatly to be feared lest some mediators working a reconciliation, all the sooner may be driven against those of the Religion.[108]

But these observers were not the only ones who were clueless. The king himself, according to Stafford, had been caught fully unprepared. This, however, posed a danger to, as well as a chance for, the Protestant cause, as Stafford himself now began to speculate. On the one hand, it was likely that the king would endeavour to reach a quick agreement with his opponents, which would mean serious harm for the Huguenots;[109] on the other, he was now looking for allies, and Stafford recommended to Elizabeth that she offer her support. Ideally, this could result in an alliance between the king and the Protestants against the Guises, who then would have achieved the opposite of what they wanted.[110]

London, however, responded hesitantly. Walsingham informed Stafford that he had received secret intelligence suggesting that the Duke of Guise was not acting solely out of personal ambition, but as part of a much broader alliance that included not only the Pope, Philip II, and the Duke of Savoy, but also various Italian and German princes.

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[106] Ibid.

[107] [François] Rasse des Neux to Walsingham, Rouen, 24 Mar. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[108] [William] Waad to Walsingham, Paris, 18 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[109] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 19 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[110] Ibid.

Even the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, was rumoured to support their cause. Because Walsingham also doubted that Henry III was the right man to resist such great pressure, he ordered Stafford to gather more information about the strength of the respective parties and their potential allies.[111]

Again, obtaining facts was the preferred way to minimize uncertainty. But Stafford could fulfil this request only to a limited extent because the situation was too volatile. Not only were the factual circumstances unclear, but it was also challenging to appropriately assess the situation and the actors' intentions. He reported the perceived chaos in great detail: news of captured cities was retracted, only to be confirmed again the next day. It was also impossible to estimate the size of the opposing parties, as no one knew exactly who was friend and who was foe. Rumours from the Dauphiné suggested that numerous towns had fallen to the League because its local leader, the Duke of Mayenne, was popular not only with Catholics but also with Protestants. Conversely, Henry III was offered support by the Huguenots and the Catholic malcontent Montmorency, with the former vouching for the latter's loyalty. However, the royal council recommended that this offer be rejected, so no decision had yet been made. The role of Catherine de Medici, too, remained opaque: for instance, it was alleged that she was seeking to stabilize her son's position by directing the aggression of the Guises, the Pope, and Spain against England. On the other hand, the papal nuncio gave the assurance that his master would never support unrest among Christians, claiming that the Pope was always striving for peace and harmony. To this end, he suggested that Navarre consider converting, as securing a Catholic succession was the main reason for the uprising. Due to this great uncertainty, Stafford reported, the recruitment of royal troops was not progressing either, as everyone was waiting to see how the situation would develop. Although he personally believed in the sincerity of the king, he could not see how Henry III could muster enough soldiers.[112]

[111] Walsingham to Stafford, 22 Mar. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.
[112] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 23 Mar. 1585, ibid.

III. Stabilizing and Contesting the Interpretation: The Weakness of the League, and the King Even Weaker

Some days later, however, Stafford asserted that the League was by no means as strong as initially feared: it had only succeeded in taking a few towns, hardly any of them were of importance, and in fact they could only be held as long as their leaders were in place. Nevertheless, the situation remained unsettled, as the royal council continued to advise against an alliance with the Huguenots, claiming that Henry III would otherwise risk turning all the Catholics in the realm against him by appearing as an ally of heretics and a traitor to his own religion.[113] The Guises themselves, Stafford assumed, were willing to make peace, but could not yield too quickly, as it would make them appear faint-hearted.[114] Samuel Daniel, the later poet, who was staying in Paris during this time as a guest of Stafford,[115] noted a certain war-weariness in a letter to Walsingham and observed that a swift agreement was urgently needed, as the population on both sides was suffering from hunger and poverty. The nobility and the clergy had become more critical of the League's objectives, too, and support for Navarre was growing steadily.[116]

This narrative—that the League was actually weak and could not attract a significant following—subsequently became the established one. It was connected with the conviction that religion was only a pretext, and that the movement was in fact driven by ambition, for this explained why the broader population had not taken sides. The persistence of the rebellion was then explained with a nod to Henry III's ill-intentioned advisers, while the king himself was characterized as weak-willed and undecisive. Of course, this interpretation was not self-evident and was challenged again and again by contradictory observations. News of the League's strength and successes kept arriving and, as mentioned earlier, the wider support base of the League

[113] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 26 Mar. 1585, ibid.

[114] Ibid.

[115] John Pitcher, 'Samuel Daniel: New and Future Research', in *Oxford Handbook Topics in Literature*, online edn. (Oxford, 2013), at [https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935338.013.88].

[116] Samuel Daniell to Walsingham, Paris, Mar. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

was now becoming recognizable. In fact, it was Daniel who first used the abstract term 'leaguers' in his letter. This may have been connected with the League's *Declaration des causes, qui ont meu Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon, & les Princes, Pairs . . . de s'opposer à ceux qui veulent subuertir la Religion & l'Estat*, which appeared at roughly the same time.[117] As can be seen in the title, the Cardinal de Bourbon was presented as spokesperson instead of the Guises. Even though this need not be taken at face value, it became obvious that the movement was more than the House of Guise and its direct clientele. Recognizing this, however, made the situation even more complex.

English observers were again faced with the difficulty of developing a coherent picture. On the one hand, they succeeded in overcoming the peak of confusion that characterized the previous months, when new information often did not help to clarify the situation but only added to the chaos. Gradually—and with setbacks—an interpretative framework emerged into which new information could be placed, or which at least served as a kind of safe haven when the threat of disorientation arose again. However, this sometimes involved ignoring or bending information that did not fit. The broader support for the League, for example, was occasionally taken into account and reflected upon, only to be relegated to the background once again.

One such destabilizing event occurred in April 1585, when Stafford was forced to qualify his previous optimism as he reported the secession of Orleans and numerous other cities of importance. Even the loyalty of Paris was in doubt, but though Henry III hesitated to station troops there, he dared not leave his capital. Particularly troublesome were the clergy, as rumours were circulating that Jesuit priests would only grant absolution to those who promised to join the League.[118] Their role also became evident with the case of Mary Stuart's agent, Thomas Morgan, for it was primarily the clergy who vehemently condemned the English government's demand for him to be surrendered,

[117] *Declaration des causes, qui ont meu Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon, & les Princes, Pairs, Prelats, Seigneurs, Villes, & Communautez Catholiques de ce Royaume de France, de s'opposer à ceux qui veulent subuertir la Religion & l'Estat* ([Peronne], 1585).

[118] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 1 Apr. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix; see also Advertisements from Paris, 5/15 Apr. 1585, ibid.

and who stridently warned Henry III against handing over a good Catholic to the heretic queen.[119] The fact that the activity of preachers began to be mentioned in the reports illustrates a broadening of the English observers' understanding of the League's social basis.

However, Elizabeth's envoy William Waad, who negotiated Morgan's extradition, gave no credence to the religious motivation of the League because the king himself was also Catholic. Consequently, Waad also struggled to grasp the challenges facing Henry III, dismissing his reasons for refusing to hand over Morgan as cheap excuses.[120] Failing to recognize the extent of France's internal crisis, the English officials insisted on the interpretation that the insurgence had been initiated from outside France—with Philip II of Spain as the evil mastermind in the background. Thus they exhorted Henry III to face his enemies with courage, and offered support.[121] Here, the psychological aspect came into play: because Stafford could not understand Henry III's practical reasons for rejecting English advice, he explained it with reference to the king's mindset. The ambassador stated that the king was 'so much betrayed within himself that every score is made to him a thousand, and jealousy put into his head of every town in France to be ready to take their [the League's] part, which in truth is not so'.[122]

At the same time, however, several reports from France emphasized the broad support for the League.[123] In May, the Protestant Claude-Antoine de Vienne, Seigneur de Clervant, confidentially reported to Walsingham:

> Sir, I will say this much only unto you; that the state of France standeth in so ill terms as a man would think that the inhabitants thereof had both lost their sense and forgotten their

[119] Waad to Walsingham, Paris, 1 Apr. 1585, ibid. The complex role of Morgan, which cannot be presented here, is a controversial topic in research. Was he the evil mastermind behind many of the conspiracies against Elizabeth, or was he rather a moderate, or even one of Walsingham's many double agents? See Bossy, *Under The Molehill*, ch. 1, 13–28.

[120] Waad to Walsingham, Paris, 1 Apr. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[121] Instructions for Sir Thomas Layton, 1 Apr. 1585, ibid.

[122] Stafford to Walsingham, 10 Apr. 1585, ibid.

[123] e.g. News from Paris, Paris, 26 Apr./6 May 1585, ibid.; John Spritwell's Report, 1 May 1585, ibid.

> wonted love to their prince and to their blood of France, which change happeneth by the practice and working of preachers and confessors procured thereunto by the pestilent sect of Jesuits. Our league men pretend a colour of religion and of the common weal, and their end tendeth to the overthrow both of the one and the other, whereby they may the easilier attain to that they have long wished for.[124]

Stafford, in contrast, reaffirmed the established picture: the League itself consisted primarily of the House of Guise, which had barely managed to gain any supporters, and they could be expected to lose most of them again soon. Their troops were poorly equipped, their financial resources were dwindling, and they could only sustain themselves due to the indecisiveness of the king, who continued to heed his treacherous advisers. If Henry III were to firmly confront the League over their offences against him and the state, they would surely collapse.[125] While further news initially gave Stafford confidence that Henry III would soon take the initiative and was only awaiting additional troops,[126] his hopes were soon dashed; in early June, the ambassador reported that the king commanded far more soldiers than the opposite side, but still remained inactive.[127]

Evidently, this interpretation was fully adhered to by the government, too. When Elizabeth herself addressed the French king, she admonished him not to yield to those 'traitorous and rebellious subjects' any longer.[128] It was evident that religion was only a pretext, while the true goal of the League was 'to reign under your name, but devoted to themselves'.[129] No sovereign should allow that, and if Henry III would accept her help, the insurrection could easily be quelled. She even added a personal exhortation: 'If it pleases you to reawaken your royal spirits, you will see that the two of us . . . will make them feel the greatest shame that rebels have ever known'.[130]

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[124] [Claude Antoine de Vienne, Seigneur de] Clervant to Walsingham, 3/13 May 1585, ibid.

[125] Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 4 May 1585, ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 5 June 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[128] Elizabeth to the French King [Henry III], May 1585, ibid. Translations my own.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid.

For as soon as the king demonstrated strength, all his loyal subjects would surely follow him. His insistence on peace, in contrast, was misguided, as the queen declared: 'better to lose 20,000 men than to reign at the pleasure of rebels'.[131] The Guises' behaviour was a continued insult to His Majesty which he should tolerate no longer, for complying with their conditions would mean not only dishonour for him but also the loss of his state.[132]

To the French side, however, this counsel evidently seemed somewhat one-sided and undifferentiated. The French ambassador to England, Michel de Castelnau, tried to give a more comprehensive account of Henry III's problematic situation: if the conflict with the League was not resolved soon, it could result in 'the last extremity of the greatest war that has been for three hundred years in France'. The outcome of that war was by no means predictable; although the Guises had not been entirely successful, 'yet they had such parties within the kingdom that those most zealous and resolute to live or die for the king do not see how by arms his Majesty can get the upper hand in these affairs'.[133] This rather pessimistic account was further supported by repeated reports of additional troops joining the League, so Stafford's assertion of a clear advantage for the king proved to be merely a momentary perception.[134]

In line with this, the French Protestant Clervant reported on 22 June that a peace treaty between the king and the League was imminent. This would bring the abolition of tolerance, thus forcing all Protestants to convert within six months or leave the country. While more pessimistic about the factual situation than the English observers, the French correspondent supported the narrative of the weak king surrounded by malign counsellors. In his opinion, these measures were being imposed upon Henry III, who was well aware that the League's objectives were political rather than religious. But his counsellors had consistently exaggerated the strength of the opposition and intimidated him with the threat of excommunication by the Pope. Clervant

[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid.

[133] [Michel de Castelnau, Seigneur de la] Mauvissière to [Charles] Lord Howard, Grand Chamberlain, London, 6/16 May 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

[134] French Advices, [May 1585], ibid.; News From Divers Parts, 6/16 June 1585, ibid.; News from Divers Parts, 10/20 June 1585, ibid.

believed that this was the only reason the House of Guise was now gaining so much power

> that they may make themselves Earls of Champagne, Dukes of Burgundy, and lords of a third part of all the other provinces of France, by means of the holds that have been granted unto them and of the reputation they have gotten by their forcing of the King, and dispersing of our churches against his will.[135]

Clervant's apprehensions were largely correct: on 27 June/7 July 1585, the Treaty of Nemours was concluded, in which Henry III accepted nearly all the League's demands, and thus the war against the Huguenots was resumed. Hence, for the next four years, the French conflict returned to its classic battle lines: the king and the Catholics against the Protestants. Stafford, however, continued to report fierce tensions between Henry III and the Guises.[136] In March 1586, he even wrote that Henry secretly favoured the Protestant party:

> The King carrieth himself so as the League suspect him marvellously, and the others have no great cause to trust him; as for my part, I do not, but it is generally thought he is pleased with anything done against them, and that his show of mislike of any help given to the others is but that they have the hand over him yet, and the Queen Mother their friend.[137]

Yet, as Walsingham reported to Stafford, the new French ambassador Châteauneuf had explicitly warned Elizabeth not to intervene in internal French conflicts, for this was 'not agreeable with the ancient treaties, by the which they were bound reciprocally not to maintain each other's rebels'. At the same time, he had asked her to urge Navarre to convert, because this was 'the only way to work his own good, and to restore the poor afflicted realm of France to his former repose'.[138] The queen had flatly rejected this proposal. Giving an account of her reasoning, Walsingham wrote that besides

[135] Clervant to Walsingham, Paris, 22 June/2 July 1585, ibid.

[136] Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 1 July 1585, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 Feb. 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xx.

[137] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 6 Mar. 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xx.

[138] [Walsingham] to Stafford, 9 Mar. 1586, ibid.

her unwillingness to persuade a co-religionist to apostatize, she had argued that Navarre's conversion would not be in Henry III's interest either, as it would inevitably weaken Navarre and thereby strengthen the League. The king should not delude himself into thinking that this was a religious issue, for the Guises 'sought nothing else but most ambitiously the advancement of their own credits.' The Huguenots, in any case, had not provoked these acts of violence but had remained loyal to the Crown.[139]

In Elizabeth's name, Walsingham also instructed Stafford to remind Henry III that, from the very beginning, the League

> under pretext of religion sought to possess themselves of the principal towns in that realm, with intent, howsoever it fall out, to continue the possession of the said towns, whereby they may both be better able to bridle the said King for the time present, as also to execute their other designs in time future.[140]

Again, he was employing the narrative of the weak and ill-advised king: the League had succeeded in manipulating Henry III, who should recognize that Navarre was 'the only stay and impediment of their malicious intents and designs' and act accordingly. But, as Walsingham admitted, this was a fairly improbable outcome, since the king was 'so weak minded as he is, and betrayed by his mother, who, despairing of his life, buildeth her future standing upon the house of Guise, which she thinketh to make more assured by the overthrow of the King of Navarre'. Therefore, the power of the Duke of Guise would continue to grow.[141]

While this account fits with the established line of interpretation, Stafford at least seems to have arrived at a more nuanced picture of Henry III's dilemma in the further course of events. Although he remained convinced that the king ultimately despised the League more than Henry of Navarre,[142] he equally held that he was not willing to make any concessions on the religious question.[143] The

[139] Ibid. [140] Ibid. [141] Ibid.

[142] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 15 Apr. 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xx; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 15 July 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 Aug. 1586, ibid.

[143] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 15 Apr. 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xx.

ambassador now realized that the trust between the king and his Catholic subjects was severely damaged. Time and again, the king's decrees were rejected and his orders were disobeyed, and sometimes resistance even escalated into violence. As hardly any agreement could be reached, the situation led to a kind of stalemate. The ambassador thus concluded: 'there is nothing like to follow but sedition or worse.'[144] This deterioration in relations between Henry III and the population also affected the capital: as rumours spread that Henry III was planning to disarm the city, fears of impending unrest grew.[145] At the same time, Stafford emphasized the international dimension of the conflict. He repeatedly reported on the connections between Spain and the League[146] and passed on speculations that Spain was preparing a naval assault on England[147]—pointing towards the Armada of 1588.

The entanglement with England's own domestic affairs became evident in 1587; once again, it was the case of Mary Stuart that led to tensions. On the diplomatic level, this centred around the French ambassador Châteauneuf, who seemed to be involved in the Babington Plot—the latest attempt on the queen's life. Elizabeth once more dispatched William Waad as special envoy to deal with the affair. However, the international connections made it advisable to proceed with caution; Waad and Stafford warned their government that tensions between Elizabeth and Henry III would only strengthen Philip II and the Guises.[148] The distrust between the two monarchs, as Walsingham also recognized, provided an opportunity for the League to further sway Henry III to their side.[149] Equally distressing were the widespread sympathies among French Catholics for Mary and their

[144] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 June 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i; see also Stafford to Walsingham, 15 June 1586, ibid.

[145] Stafford to Walsingham, [Paris], 3 July 1586, ibid.

[146] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 Aug. 1586, ibid.; Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 20 Aug. 1586, ibid.

[147] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 14 July 1586, ibid.; French Advertisements from the Court, 27 Mar./6 Apr. 1586, in *CSPF*, vol. xx.

[148] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 Mar. 1587, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i; Waad to Walsingham, Paris, 4 May 1587, ibid. (two letters).

[149] Walsingham to [Robert Dudley,] the Earl of Leicester, at the Court, 3 Apr. 1587, in Wright, *Queen Elizabeth*, ii. 335–6, at 335.

consternation over her judgement and execution.[150] Evidently, Mary's fate further fuelled the English government's image as a tyrannical Protestant regime persecuting innocent Catholics.[151]

In this context, Stafford described a situation which demonstrated the great agitation of the population. A panel had been erected in the churchyard of Saint-Séverin depicting the Catholic martyrs in England, arousing great attention and emotion:

> I never saw a thing done with that fury nor with that danger of a great emotion as that hath brought; for I think not so few as five thousand people a day come to see it . . . Others aposted purposely for the matter, show them how likely Catholics are to grow to that point in France if they have a King an heretic, and that they are at the next door to it, which indeed is the chief intent that the thing is set there, to animate and mutiny the people; and withal there is a book set out to the same effect . . . wherein is contained as much as is in the table set up, with the Queen of Scots' death, whom they will have a martyr, added in the end, and their conclusion to their purpose to mutiny the people, both against Huguenots, the succession of Huguenots, and the Catholics associate that hold their part.[152]

Stafford, who urged the civil authorities to proceed against this provocation, realized that they were also powerless against the clergy and the zealots. A priest who was called upon to take down the picture flatly refused to obey the magistrate because he was 'a layman', and even announced he would excommunicate whoever took it away. In fact, the picture was guarded round the clock. According to Stafford, the priest's 'furious threatenings if it be taken away' caused the greatest fear he had experienced since arriving in France. Further magistrates he called in were also intimidated; the *premier président* of the Parlement of Paris was warned that if anyone should

[150] [Paul Choart, Seigneur de] Buzanval to Burghley, London, 11 Jan. 1587, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i; Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 5 Mar. 1587, ibid.; Waad to Burghley, 6 Mar. 1587, ibid; Waad to Walsingham, 4 May 1587, ibid.

[151] Wilkinson, *Mary Queen of Scots*, 103–27; Charles Giry-Deloison, 'France and Elizabethan England', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 14 (2004), 223–42.

[152] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 22 June 1587, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.

take away the picture, 'the fault should be upon him, and he should have his throat cut for it; and upon this the people more mutinied than ever, and counsels given them and oaths made to come to my house and use violence'.[153] As further events showed, the French government was unable to alleviate the situation. Only a few days later, an advertisement from Paris reported on a mutiny 'about the curate of St. Severin, whom the King commanded to be apprehended for using some large speeches in his preaching; but the people rose and rescued him, and hurt divers.'[154] The king's authority was indeed severely damaged.

The English interpretation was destabilized on the one hand by the realization that the enemy had far more support than assumed, and on the other because Stafford repeatedly voiced criticism of the French Protestants, thereby compromising the allies. Given the widespread destruction and supply shortages, he said, they should recognize that peace was an option worth considering. Yet, by their insistence on war, they were forcing Henry III to maintain his alliance with the League.[155] Moreover, since many French perceived the Protestant attacks on Catholic cities as direct assaults on both the state and the monarchy, Navarre was continuously losing support among the population.[156] According to the ambassador, this unfortunate situation could have been avoided if, at the height of their power, the Huguenots had limited themselves to reasonable demands for freedom of conscience and security, which Henry III would certainly have accommodated. It was now obvious, Stafford continued, that they were motivated more by worldly ambition than by genuine faith, just like the Guises. He even interpreted Navarre's refusal to convert as a mere consequence of his rivalry with the other Huguenot leader, the Prince of Condé: Navarre was not willing to give up his role as leader of the Protestants as long as he could not be sure of being recognized by the Catholics. But even his own allies were beginning to doubt his steadfastness in faith.[157]

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153 Ibid.

154 Advertisements from France, 17/27 Aug. 1587, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.

155 Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 17 Nov. 1586, ibid.

156 Stafford to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1587, ibid.

157 Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 8 Jan. 1588, ibid.

However, Stafford remained convinced that

> the King desireth nothing more than (if the colour of religion were taken away, wherewith these Leaguers cut his throat, both towards the Pope and towards all the chief towns of France) to have means in advancing them [the Huguenots] somewhat (though he will never advance them too much) to pull down the League throughly and ruin them for ever, and upon that durst I lay my life, and that there is nothing that he hateth so much as the Duke of Guise and the League, nor whose throats he would cut so soon.[158]

That the French Protestants were nevertheless urging Elizabeth to break with Henry III, the ambassador continued, showed their poor judgement and their unreliability. Being in enmity with Spain, England could not afford a conflict with France and should endeavour to maintain good relations with Henry III. Stafford asked Burghley to advise the queen not to become too deeply entangled in conflicts that would threaten her own country, and to avoid spending too much money on people who did not deserve her support. Besides, the French Protestants were not in such a bad position; they could hold their own without English assistance.[159]

In a personal conversation with Henry III at the end of February 1588, Stafford had the chance to hear the king's own assessment of the situation, which he reported directly to Elizabeth. The king had assured him that he was personally willing to grant tolerance, but added that it would not be feasible politically in the current situation. The fact that the Protestants had sought foreign support made it impossible for him to side with them. Moreover, as they had turned not only against the League but directly against him, he had no option but to join forces with the League and thereby increase its power. In Henry's view, the only way to deprive the League of its followers would be to convince Navarre to convert and lay down his arms, since it was primarily the fear of a Protestant king and the suppression of their religion that was driving Catholics to resist. If this danger were averted, the League would quickly collapse.[160]

[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Stafford to the Queen, Paris, 25 Feb. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.

As we can see, Navarre's conversion increasingly came to be seen as the solution to the contradiction between his legitimate right of succession and his religion, which many found intolerable. But he was not ready to take this step at the time; nor was the English government willing to support this option, which would mean losing a Protestant ally on the Continent. The following month, as no solution had been found, Stafford reported the further derogation of the king's authority.[161] In addition, the Protestant party had been seriously weakened by the death of Condé. In this regard, the ambassador reiterated his observation of rising tensions within the Protestant camp: there was growing suspicion of Navarre's reliability in religious matters, and Stafford himself was concerned about Navarre's potential heavy-handedness now that Condé was no longer a restraining influence.[162] At this point, all of the ambassador's reports seemed to recommend a re-evaluation of the English strategy.

IV. Not Seeing and Not Wanting to See: Barricades on the Streets and Barriers in the Mind?

Shortly after Stafford advised caution towards Navarre's faction, a representative of the latter, Michel Hurault de L'Hospital du Fay, approached Burghley and warned him that all of England's support would be in vain if Elizabeth slackened in her commitment now. It was in her interest to continue supporting Navarre not only for religious reasons but also for political ones, because every setback for him was a victory for Philip II of Spain. If only out of concern for her own safety, Elizabeth must seek to weaken the Guises, whose growing power—through their connections to Scotland—would ultimately pose a threat to England herself:

> Thus, she must aid the King of Navarre in such sort that he be not only maintained as regards his own party, but that he may preserve his hopes and right of succession to the crown, since she sees that the King of Spain, her enemy, openly supports the

[161] Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 11 Mar. 1588, ibid.
[162] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 17 March 1588, ibid.

> party of the Guises. For if she be still at war with Spain, she has very great reason to desire our preservation, for her own safety; and if she makes peace, she must yet always fear war so long as there is a Pope; yet these dangers may be kept at a distance by giving us a more liberal aid.[163]

If the cause of the French Protestants were lost, L'Hospital stressed, the common enemy would surely turn against England.[164] By directing the view to the international field and thereby to the dangers for England herself, he certainly attracted attention. This line of argument, which favoured foreign over domestic policy and power politics over religious motivations, may have been primarily strategic; besides being used in earlier attempts by the Huguenots to secure Elizabeth's assistance,[165] it was also prominent in Elizabeth's advocacy for Navarre's cause among other Protestant princes.[166] The reference to Spain was evidently intended to make external powers aware of the larger dimension of the conflict and thus persuade them that support for the Huguenots would follow from their own security interests. But being strategic by no means meant being untruthful. In fact, in April 1588 news arrived from Cadiz, via Rouen, that Spain was preparing its fleet.[167]

So the English government turned from interpretation to information gathering once again, which of course included factual uncertainties and therefore reasoned speculations. The informant from Rouen thought it likely that landings would be made in Scotland, but, as he explicitly admitted, this could not be confirmed, for 'no man could certainly say to what place they should go'.[168] Stafford was alarmed. In late April, he passed on information from Mendoza: Spain was building a huge fleet, and people were saying '[t]hat all this is for

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[163] M[ichel] H[urault] de L'Hospital du Fay to Burghley, 1 Apr. 1588, ibid.
[164] Ibid.
[165] See e.g. The King of Navarre to Walsingham, Bragerac [*sic*], 28 Apr./8 May 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix; [Philippe de Mornay, Seigneur] Du Plessis[-Marli] to Walsingham, Bergerac, 9 May 1585, ibid.
[166] See e.g. Instructions for Thomas Bodleigh, sent to the King of Denmark, 17 Apr. 1585, ibid.; The Queen to Duke [John] Casimir [Count Palatine of the Rhine], [Apr. 1585], ibid.
[167] 'Advertisements from "Roan" of the preparation of the King of Spain', 2/12 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.
[168] Ibid.

England. That they mean to take some place upon the sea coast fit to fortify. That the most they fear is to be charged with horsemen at their first landing.' But Stafford added that significant moral doubts about this interlocutor were warranted; it was by no means certain whether Mendoza's information was true or merely intended to mislead.[169]

However, as uncertain information seemed better than no information at all, he continued by informing his government that the Spanish ambassador had contacted Charles Paget and Thomas Morgan, the Lords of Paget and Westmoreland—that is, the usual suspects among the English exiles in France when it came to conspiracies[170]—to tell them 'they must now pray and make themselves ready, for ere long now they should be restored into their country and goods'. Furthermore, Stafford passed on rumours that some Scottish harbours would be handed over to the Spaniards, whose invasion would thereby be supported by a considerable group of locals. Adding plenty of further information from Ireland, Spain, and even the German lands, he nevertheless had to admit that everything was highly unreliable because 'they give out so many tales that there is almost nothing to be believed but that which a man seeth'.[171] From then on, Stafford regularly reported new rumours about the Armada, but they were always highly inconclusive.[172]

Since Stafford was primarily concerned with the international scene and the looming threat to England, his observations on the French situation were at that time somewhat neglected, so that he largely missed the developments that led to the *journée des barricades*, the Paris uprising of 2/12 May. He could, however, have been more attentive to a number of indications. Reporting his negotiations with Henry III's secretary, he informed Elizabeth that the king had rejected her proposals for a settlement with the Protestant party. Although the king acknowledged them to be perfectly reasonable, he was afraid of a 'general revolt of the chiefest and greatest towns in France' if he

[169] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.

[170] See their—still debated—roles in the Throckmorton, Parry, and Babington Plots, e.g. in Francis Edwards, *Plots and Plotters in the Reign of Elizabeth I* (Dublin, 2002), 77–168.

[171] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 24 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.

[172] Leimon and Parker interpret these vague reports as the final proof of his treachery. See Leimon and Parker, 'Treason and Plot', 1152–4.

showed leniency on the religious question. In the current situation, he feared that any imprudent step would 'put himself in a hazard of losing them all in a day'.[173] Stafford evidently did not take this threat at face value. Instead, he fell back on the established interpretation that the king's lack of courage and the bad advice of his counsellors were the reasons for his hesitation. Thus he concluded:

> my poor advice is, as it was in my last, no way in the world to expect any thing of certain from hence, not [but] that I think of the King as well as he can wish but I see his courage so weak that he will be able to do nothing, what will soever he hath, and that by little and by little, Queen Mother will bring him so far in, that what list soever the King, he shall be brought to what she listeth.[174]

Stafford did not consider the possibility that the danger Henry III feared might be real, and that the king might have just cause for hesitation. This changed to some extent on 12 April, when he had to confess his uncertainty about the rumours circulating that the Paris Leaguers were plotting something against the king. The ambassador now saw the real danger of major turmoil.[175] Alarming news also came from Rouen: there were rumours of a planned massacre of royal officials and Protestants during a procession. The massacre was thwarted by stringent security measures, but these greatly agitated the clergy.[176] At this point, an explosive atmosphere was palpable.

But only a few days later, Stafford assured his government that 'all stirs be pacified'. Again, he stuck to the established pattern: the League was actually weak, and had been weakened even further by severe financial difficulties. 'The League (though some here hold it up all they can), was never so bare, neither hath any one of them almost a penny. The clergy is their only support here, and doth keep the towns in liking with them, and withdraws them all they can from the King.'[177]

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[173] Stafford to the Queen, Paris, 5 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 12 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 23 Apr. 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i; see also Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 27 Apr. 1588, ibid.

Nonetheless, the League's demands on the king were excessive, leading Henry III to adopt a harsher stance towards them. But the royal council, and especially the queen mother, pleaded for reconciliation and agreement, so Henry III once again gave in and sent an envoy to the Duke of Guise.[178]

By falling back on the established explanation, Stafford had clearly misinterpreted the situation, for the Paris uprising was beginning to take shape. That same day — 29 April/9 May — the Duke of Guise arrived in Paris to negotiate with the king. On this occasion, Stafford again perceived great unrest in the city. Upon returning from the Louvre, he 'found all the gentlemen coming in at the lower gate by flocks, and all the world in a murmur, and Swisses and soldiers coming that way from all places and met at the gate'.[179] Consequently, he dispatched several observers to monitor the situation, but he could not gather any information about the content of Henry III's secret deliberations. What he did notice, however, was the social isolation of the Duke of Guise: only a few people accompanied him, and he received no public salutations.[180] Nevertheless, the government evidently felt threatened and responded to this sense of insecurity by significantly reinforcing the guards. It seems Stafford himself was deeply concerned, for he concluded his letter with: 'God save us all. In haste.'

In the *Calendars of the State Papers, Foreign Series*, these were Stafford's final words before the *journée des barricades*, which occurred three days later.[181] That day, which is interpreted in the research as a key event in the history of the League and commonly as a sign of the Parisian revolutionary movement's autonomy from its aristocratic leaders,[182] is thus barely visible in Stafford's letters. Only on 5/15 May did a brief,

[178] Stafford to the Queen, Paris, 29 Apr. 1588, ibid.

[179] Stafford to Walsingham, [Paris, 29 Apr. 1588], ibid.

[180] Ibid. See, however, Mark Traugott, *The Insurgent Barricade* (Berkeley, 2010), 28–9: 'a crowd estimated at 30,000 gathered along his route to shower the leader of the Holy League with expressions of affection and acclaim.'

[181] His letter of 3 May, to which he refers in his following report, is missing.

[182] e.g. Traugott, *Insurgent Barricade*, 26. See also Stuart Carroll, 'The Revolt of Paris, 1588: Aristocratic Insurgency and the Mobilization of Popular Support', *French Historical Studies*, 23/2 (2000), 301–37, at 301–2. Carroll emphasizes the close cooperation between the Guises and the Paris Sixteen; however, even he does not see the Guises as dominant.

retrospective report follow, in which he delineated the 'sudden "horly-borlye" of the King's departure'. He stated that, for the moment, the Parisians, 'what fury soever they were in, are marvellously amazed', and that 'as yet the Duke of Guise is not remained full master of this town'. But once again, the ambassador did not dare to estimate what could follow,[183] so we have no elaborate analysis of these events.

But not only is the *journée des barricades* itself scarcely described or analysed in Stafford's reports—the fact that he sent a personal messenger to convey more information rather speaks for the importance he ascribed to it[184]—its genesis, too, is absent from his observations. Whether it was because the English ambassador was preoccupied with the international situation or because the insurgents had actually managed to keep the planning secret, something had evidently escaped his attention. Even if the *journée des barricades* itself may have been given its impetus by spontaneous popular action, the infamous Paris Sixteen had been planning some kind of incident since at least 1587.[185] And while the French king was well informed about these activities by his spy Poulain,[186] the English ambassador evidently was not. As we have seen, in most of his letters he had portrayed the League as a tiny minority: the House of Guise and a few noble adherents, some fanatical priests, and—only occasionally—a crowd of zealots. At no point did his reports indicate the possibility of an uprising supported by a broad mass of people. Instead, he had always conveyed the impression that the League could only survive through Spanish support and Henry III's laxity.

This raises the question of whether Stafford might have picked up on different indications at all. Was his limited perspective due to always engaging with the same interlocutors? Did he overlook the mood of the population because he moved in diplomatic circles and mainly talked to the king, his officials and courtiers, and diplomatic colleagues? Although this may have been a factor, it is not entirely convincing, as

[183] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, Sunday 5 May 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.
[184] Ibid.; Stafford to Burghley, Paris, 17 May 1588, in *CSPF*, vol. xxi, pt. i.
[185] Carroll, 'Revolt of Paris', 321–7.
[186] Ibid. See also 'Le procez-verbal d'un nommé Nicolas Poulain', in Louis Cimber and Felix Danjou (eds.), *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France depuis Louix XI jusqu'à Louis XVIII*, vol. i (Paris, 1836), 289–323.

his embassy was located 'in the heart of Left Bank radicalism'[187] and was staffed by a wide range of personnel who necessarily cultivated connections with their everyday social environment.[188] And the French government, with which Stafford was in direct conversation only some weeks before the situation escalated, was better informed and argued accordingly. In this case, the established narrative of the king's indecisiveness apparently impaired Stafford's perception.

Another explanation for the narrow focus of Stafford's reports would be to see it as a conscious strategy. If the ambassador had been bought by Spain and the Guises and had accordingly supplied Elizabeth with false information, he would then have deliberately concealed the size of the movement to lull the queen into a false sense of security.[189] However, if we shift our perspective from the concrete events of the *journée des barricades* to the general picture, we see that Stafford broadly stuck to the interpretation shared by most English observers. If anything, he was at least for a time more nuanced than the majority of them, and occasionally even emphasized the League's successes.

If we step back from Stafford to the wider English perspective, the first question is: what are the probable alternatives to the pattern of interpretation that was employed by English observers? One would be John Salmon's older view, derived from his analysis of public discourse, that the French Wars of Religion were understood by English contemporaries primarily as a confessional conflict.[190] However, this

[187] Carroll, 'Revolt of Paris', 333.

[188] Recent scholarship on diplomacy stresses the importance of practices and the social embedding of the ambassador, and thus also shows the importance of actors who were not state officials. For an overview, see Jan Hennings and Tracey A. Sowerby, 'Introduction: Practices of Diplomacy', in Jan Hennings and Tracey A. Sowerby (eds.), *Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c.1410–1800* (London, 2017), 1–21.

[189] On this point, my interpretation clearly differs from Leimon and Parker's, who see in Stafford an exaggeration of the dangers posed by the French Catholics compared to the Spanish threat. See Leimon and Parker, 'Treason and Plot', 1152–3.

[190] Salmon, *The French Religious Wars*, 15: 'The politics of the various French factions appeared merely as the reflection of the greater contest between Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Later it became possible to regard them as a number of secular forces competing for power within a single society.

clearly does not fit with the diplomatic correspondence analysed here. Another possibility would be that they read the events as a Catholic popular uprising carried out by uneducated masses blinded by their superstition, as might be suggested by England's own experiences with subversive or even rebellious Catholic subjects.[191] But as we have seen, this was not the case either. On the contrary, despite sporadic indications in the other direction, the English observers largely failed to recognize the religious motivation—which Waad explicitly rejected as implausible—and therefore the broad basis of the League. By overlooking the extent of France's internal political crisis, they concluded that Henry III could and should take a firm stance against the League.

Against this background, the English observers rejected as a mere excuse the argument made by Henry III and his entourage that accepting support from the French Huguenots or Protestant England would only worsen the king's situation, or interpreted it as proof that the king was being betrayed by his ill-intentioned advisers. So, for want of comprehensible reasons on the factual level, they turned to Henry III's personality: the king's indecision and hesitation seemed to be the main obstacles to a resolution of French affairs. As Stafford proclaimed in April 1586: 'if the French King had the grace of himself or . . . were not betrayed . . . the Duke of Guise's party were soon at an end.'[192] As we have seen, this line was fully adhered to by the English government and shaped Elizabeth's arguments when she personally addressed the French king. As for the proposal that the French government made to Elizabeth in return, namely to persuade Henry of Navarre to convert in order to pacify the situation, the queen rejected it as being as dishonourable as it was misguided.

This outlook could not become possible until Englishmen had themselves experienced the turmoil of civil war.'

[191] At the latest since the bull *Regnans in Excelsis* of 1570—and not least because of it—the close connection between Catholicism and treason had become almost a commonplace. See Hammer, 'Catholic Threat', and Carol Z. Wiener, 'The Beleaguered Isle: A Study of Elizabethan and Early Jacobean Anti-Catholicism', *Past & Present*, 51 (1971), 27–62. On the developing contradiction between 'Englishness' and 'Catholicism', see also Hilary Larkin, *The Making of Englishmen: Debates on National Identity 1550–1650* (Leiden, 2014), 131–65.

[192] Stafford to Walsingham, Paris, 10 Apr. 1585, in *CSPF*, vol. xix.

The aim of these considerations is not to speculate on how events might have unfolded differently had the English government employed a different perspective. We cannot know what might have happened if Elizabeth had encouraged Navarre to convert as early as 1588 and he had taken her advice. My goal is not to appear more insightful in hindsight than the historical figures who were directly involved.[193] Rather, this example illustrates how English observers, although faced with uncertainty on various levels and with many known unknowns, constructed a relatively coherent picture of the events. This demonstrates, on the one hand, their ability to synthesize diverse information and craft a unified understanding amidst the chaos and ambiguity of their time. On the other hand, it highlights the fact that unambiguity always comes at the expense of complexity, and that the distinction between what is important and what is unimportant depends on the interpretative framework used.

In this case, the neglect of broad Catholic resentment against a Protestant heir and the fundamental trust that Henry III would in principle be willing to grant tolerance towards the 'true faith', which meant that his weakness and hesitation seemed to be the only obstacles to a good outcome, can be interpreted as English Protestant bias. It is at least plausible that the English regime was less unable than unwilling to recognize the broad support for the Catholic cause. Interpreting the League as merely a noble faction led by the Guise, and driven by personal ambition, was surely more comfortable for the self-perception of the Protestant regime than considering and taking seriously the anxieties of a mainly Catholic population. Viewing Philip II as the main opponent who was also pulling the strings in the League, the English government could resort to a familiar enemy. Moreover, it was only reasonable to pay more attention to his plans against England than to actual events in France. We can thus see how this pattern of interpretation met the English government's need to fit new and confusing events into a familiar framework, while at the same time supporting its self-perception.

To underline these biases and blind spots in the English perspective—which did not stem from a lack of information but from a need

[193] On this methodological pitfall, especially connected with the analysis of unknown unknowns, see Zwierlein, 'Introduction', 26–8.

to bend information in order to fit the established view—it is worth briefly revisiting the comparison with Busbecq's observations that I alluded to at the beginning. This can only be approximate, because his reports to the imperial court were far more irregular than Stafford's correspondence, and after 1585 there are wide gaps in the records.[194] Nevertheless, a few points can be emphasized. Like Stafford, Busbecq interpreted the ambitions of the Guises, who knew that they would be excluded from power in the case of Navarre's succession, as the main motivation behind the League.[195] He also believed that Philip II was pulling the strings in the background[196] and was by no means more sympathetic to the power politics of the Spanish Habsburgs than his English colleague.[197] The dynastic and international dimension therefore played an important role in his reports too.

The decisive difference, however, lies in the central role that Busbecq assigned to the religious motivation of the movement. While he agreed with Stafford that the Guises were primarily driven by power politics, he exempted Charles de Bourbon from this characterization, noting that he 'is fully convinced that he owes it to the Apostolic See, to the faith he professes, to his family, and to himself, not to allow a Protestant to ascend the throne on the death of the King'.[198] In line with this, he emphasized much more strongly than Stafford the widespread support that the League enjoyed in France:

> There is hardly a Catholic nobleman in France who is not suspected of being concerned in the designs of the Guises, and secretly favouring the movement; almost all the provinces are

[194] Of Busbecq's fifty-eight letters to Rudolf II, twenty-two fall within the period under investigation. They were sent relatively regularly from spring 1584 to spring 1585, then there is a first small gap until November 1585, followed by a large gap until November 1589, after which there are only five more letters until the tradition finally breaks off in 1590.

[195] Busbecq, Letter XLVIII [to Rudolf II, 26 Mar. 1585], in Forster and Daniell, *Life and Letters*, ii. 237–41, at 238.

[196] Ibid. 239–40.

[197] Busbecq, Letter XLI [to Rudolf II, Paris, 18 Aug. 1584], in Forster and Daniell, *Life and Letters*, ii. 225–7, at 226.

[198] Busbecq, Letter XLIX [to Rudolf II, 25 Apr. 1585], ibid. 241–7, at 243.

> wavering in their allegiance; of the great cities some are disloyal, while others refuse to receive garrisons from the King . . . And thus, through the length and breadth of the country, numbers are revolting and bidding defiance to the King.[199]

For indeed, many French people feared a Protestant king out of apprehension 'that their ancient ritual, services, and sacraments will be profaned and put down by Navarre, and that the Catholics will be in the same position as the Protestants have hitherto been, if indeed they be not in a worse case.'[200] This widespread anxiety offered the Guises a favourable opportunity to take the lead, as they were seen as staunch defenders of Catholicism, and many held them in higher esteem than the king himself. As a result, their decision to take up arms in defence of the old faith was widely regarded as fully justified.[201] In short, Busbecq identified good reasons why it was advisable for Henry III not to decisively oppose the League and support Navarre. However, not only did his assessment of the political landscape differ from Stafford's, but so did his description of Henry III's own motivations. In his reports, the king did not appear well meaning towards Protestantism but misguided and weak-willed; indeed, Busbecq attributed to him no great sympathy towards the Huguenots in general[202] and Henry of Navarre in particular. Unlike Stafford, he believed that the king hated Navarre even more than he despised the Guises.[203]

The picture the emperor's envoy painted of the situation in France thus diverged significantly from that of the English diplomats. He took the widespread rejection of Protestantism much more seriously, thereby obtaining a more complex view of the conflict and especially of Henry III's situation. To be sure, the English observers grasped these points from time to time too, but, especially in situations of growing

[199] Ibid. 242. See also the statement of broad support for the League already sent in Busbecq, Letter XLII [to Rudolf II, 4 Oct. 1584], in Forster and Daniell, *Life and Letters*, ii. 227–9, at 228.

[200] Busbecq, Letter XLVIII [to Rudolf II, 26 Mar. 1585], ibid. 237–241, at 238.

[201] Ibid. 238–9.

[202] Busbecq, Letter XLV [to Rudolf II, 25 Jan. 1585], in Forster and Daniell, *Life and Letters*, ii. 231–3, at 232.

[203] Busbecq, Letter XLVIII [to Rudolf II, 26 Mar. 1585], ibid. 237–41, at 240.

tension and confusion, their established narrative gave them a form of recourse: it enabled them to handle uncertainty by minimizing complexity and falling back on the familiar. All this allowed them to remain capable of acting—but sometimes also meant that they missed decisive aspects and developments.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PETER H. WILSON, *Iron and Blood: A Military History of the German-Speaking Peoples since 1500* (London: Allen Lane, 2022), 976 pp. ISBN 978 0 241 35556 5 (hardback), £40.00; ISBN 978 0 141 98888 7 (paperback), £18.99

Peter H. Wilson's monumental military history of the German-speaking peoples opens by quoting Otto von Bismarck's famous 1862 remark that the great questions of the day would be decided not by speeches and majority decisions but by 'iron and blood'. This phrase epitomizes the primacy of the military over the political and already features in the titles of various German and English books on the wars of German unification,[1] the *Kaiserreich*,[2] and the First World War.[3] And indeed, Wilson's book is a military history and not a general history, as the subtitle of the German translation, published in 2023, misleadingly suggests.[4] Wilson's main aim is to 'defrost German military history' (p. xliv), which means to liberate history from narrative patterns such as a German '*Sonderweg*', a 'German way of war', or any Borusso-centric teleology that culminates in the violence of the Nazis. 'German history should not be read backwards from it [i.e. the Holocaust] as a teleological 'Special Path' deviating from a civilized norm' (p. 753). A German author would probably not have chosen this perspective for an examination of the *longue durée*; the debate is more likely to be found in the historiography of the *Kaiserreich* (albeit sometimes in a new, methodologically

[1] Christoph Jahr, *Blut und Eisen: Wie Preußen Deutschland erzwang, 1864–1871* (Munich, 2020).
[2] Katja Hoyer, *Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire, 1871–1918* (Cheltenham, 2021); German: *Im Kaiserreich: Eine kurze Geschichte 1871–1918* (Hamburg, 2024).
[3] Sönke Neitzel, *Blut und Eisen: Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Zurich, 2003).
[4] Peter H. Wilson, *Eisen und Blut: Die Geschichte der deutschsprachigen Länder seit 1500* (Darmstadt, 2023).

innovative form, as in Isabel V. Hull's *Absolute Destruction*).[5] After the cultural turn, the *Sonderweg* debate tends to appear in the guise of a German 'military culture', which is somewhat paradoxical in epistemological terms, since cultural history tends to tear down such narratives. Wilson's socio-historical approach does much the same critical work, by repeatedly drawing parallels with the armies of other European powers. In this sense, the book is characterized less by a pointed thesis than by a kind of *histoire totale* that dispels distortions and myths.

Wilson tames the vast material into five chapters, each covering one hundred years between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. While the headings 'Balancing War and Peace' (sixteenth century) and 'Accepting War as Permanent' (seventeenth century) tend to oversimplify the first two centuries, the narrower categories of processes in 'Professionalizing War' (eighteenth century), 'Nationalizing War' (nineteenth century), and 'Democratizing War' (twentieth century) provide a more accurate summary. Each chapter follows a similar structure: the first part summarizes the causes, courses, and outcomes of most of the major wars in which German-speaking actors were involved; this is followed by a second part on the organization of warfare, based on command structure, general staff, recruitment and enlistment, promotion, armament, and units and weapons such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, fortifications, and naval forces. The third part then examines social history under categories such as knowledge, violence, motivation, religion, gender relations, and the impact of war on the population and economy. This approach has clear advantages: it allows comparability between centuries and makes historical change visible without overemphasizing it. The reader can thus construct their own history of military, religious, or gender relations over five hundred years.

However, this approach also reveals a fundamental structural ambivalence. A modern and up-to-date social history in the best sense of the word is juxtaposed with a more conventional political history of battles and treaties, but the interplay between the two is easily lost. Given the necessary brevity of the individual sections, this division of labour means that, for example, the Nine Years War is covered in

[5] Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 2005).

one-and-a-half pages (pp. 149–50) and Wilson's account of it remains inevitably superficial. But the history of events does not have to be more conventional than social and structural history. Battles, for example, are complex formations of practices that have always given rise to critical historiographical reflection. In other words, the way in which the chapters are divided leaves it up to the reader to decide how they wish to link the violence, the characters, and the events.

Wilson is reluctant to commit himself to established historiographical categories, mostly because they are too one-sided and do not stand up to empirical evidence; nonetheless, the 'military revolution' appears here and there, as do 'social militarization' and 'small group cohesion'. From a German academic perspective—not that of a general readership—one might expect a little more theoretical reference in a major research contribution, which the book undoubtedly is, without immediately turning it into a cultural-theoretical treatise. In terms of social history, however, Wilson's particular focus is on the numbers, be they army size, army expenditure, debt, wages, or population loss. The socio-historical perspective also prompts the question of the actors' agency. In Wilson's case, this is rarely attributed to individuals, be they simple soldiers or stubborn generals. Iconic diarists, such as Peter Hagendorf, a German mercenary soldier in the Thirty Years War, or Ulrich Bräker, a lower-class Swiss writer, are mentioned, but remain on the periphery of the analysis of groups and numbers. It is striking that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite the large number of testimonies, seem to have hardly any comparable 'prominent unknowns' to offer, although we are introduced to Wilhelm Voigt (the *Hauptmann* or 'chief' of Köpenick) and Anton Schmidt (a German soldier who saved Jews during the Second World War).

Wilson's almost encyclopaedic approach demands some patience, but the reader is rewarded with a consistent, balanced consideration of often marginalized elements, which also offers the connoisseur some new information and insights. Two aspects stand out for me: the treatment of the naval history of the premodern German-speaking territories, and the integration of Swiss and Habsburg history. Given the enormous amount of research literature that has been carefully processed here, it is a pity that there is no bibliography, as scholars will find it difficult to access the seventy-three pages of cramped endnotes.

What is the overall picture that emerges after more than 750 pages? Prussia loses its hegemonic status as a military power, both socio-historically and historico-philosophically, as the determined father of a united German nation state, and is replaced by Austria's Habsburg Empire—a larger, more aggressive, and sometimes more innovative military state (p. 751). This is of interest, among other things, in relation to the thesis of the Baroque historian Peter Hersche, who attributed a 'positive backwardness' to Catholicism when it came to military matters.[6] This is, in my view, an implausible thesis, and here we have the opportunity to consider compelling counter-evidence. The decentring of Prussia demonstrates the particular strength of the comparative social history approach, whereby some apparent peculiarities are shown to be due more to the general trends of the times.

As a defensive alliance, the premodern Germany of the old empire loses the character of a necessarily belligerent German culture. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is different, as the formula of blood and iron becomes more dominant. Nevertheless, similar to the decentralization of Prussia as a hegemonic part of the German military culture, the German army of the *Kaiserreich* and the Nazi regime also fades in significance in terms of, for example, technology, mobilization, leadership, and success. The fifth and final chapter brings an explosion of thematic complexity, as tanks, submarine warfare, air forces, bombing, and nuclear weapons gain in importance, while war now exposes the population to greater risks, mobilizes larger parts of it, and further increases its significance for the continuation of military operations. A recurring motif in German military history is the belief in quick and decisive blows, although this may have been due as much to ideological processes of reception as to real-life scenarios in which opponents were perceived as overpowering. What kind of image of war and the military is created? The book is characterized by a sober perspective on military professionalism. It neither ignores nor glorifies the suffering associated with war.

It is a welcome surplus when the leading British expert in early modern German military history publishes a magnum opus in both

[6] Peter Hersche, *Muße und Verschwendung: Europäische Gesellschaft und Kultur im Barockzeitalter*, 2 vols. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 2006), i. 27.

English and German. This is a real treat for both audiences, who can enjoy the insights and perspectives in their native language. For German speakers, it is a wonderful opportunity to deepen their understanding of their history through the lens of a foreign expert. I am sure many readers will be delighted to find a comprehensive account of German military history written from a long-term perspective. For English-speaking readers, it might be particularly interesting to see how the author challenges many of the stereotypes that are often associated with this topic, and offers a perspective that is more grounded in social history. Overall, Wilson's book is a significant achievement that will serve as a benchmark for future comprehensive histories.

A last word on marketing aesthetics: the cover of the book shows the uniform of Prince Oscar of Prussia, complete with his spiked helmet (*Pickelhaube*), but without his face. The spiked helmet has become a controversial symbol of the second German Empire. Historians such as Hedwig Richter have recently distanced themselves from this iconography, albeit with the effect of whitewashing the *Kaiserreich*.[7] In this respect, the helmet rightly adorns a book that focuses on Germany's military history and violence; but the Prussian uniform, together with Bismarck's words, also plays into the very stereotype that the book seeks to combat. Sometimes, exorcising spirits can result in their manifestation, albeit in symbolic form.

[7] See e.g. Marcel Schütz, 'Ein Reich in Bewegung', *sozialtheoristen.de*, 29 Mar. 2019, at [https://sozialtheoristen.de/2019/03/21/ein-reich-in-bewegung], accessed 27 Aug. 2024.

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THOMAS PERT, *The Palatine Family and the Thirty Years' War: Experiences of Exile in Early Modern Europe, 1632–1648*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), xv + 299 pp. ISBN 978 0 198 87540 6. £83.00

Both Frederick V, Prince Elector Palatine and 'Winter King', and his wife Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of King James VI/I and Anne of Denmark, have attracted much scholarly attention. Frederick has mostly been the focus of German research, while Elizabeth is at the centre of a lively scholarship in British academia.[1] The Thirty Years War is also an integral part of British, American, and German historiography, as the flood of new publications marking the 400th anniversary of the defenestration of Prague and the outbreak of the war demonstrates.[2] Nevertheless, by focusing on the Palatine family in exile and the 1630s and 1640s in particular—the period after Frederick's death—Thomas Pert succeeds in finding a new angle on the same old story. Pert's study combines British and German historiography, as well as the history of the Thirty Years War and dynastic history. He discusses the agency of the exiled Palatine family and the conditions under which exiled dynasties were able to pursue politics.

The author presents a concise and well-structured study, implicitly divided into three parts. The first thematic block sets the scene for the analysis that follows. Chapter one summarizes the background of the study and situates the electorate of the Palatinate in the constitutional system of the Holy Roman Empire, before zooming in on Frederick

[1] Recently, Nadine Akkerman, *Elizabeth Stuart: Queen of Hearts* (Oxford, 2021). On Frederick V, see Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte (ed.), *Der Winterkönig, Friedrich von der Pfalz: Bayern und Europa im Zeitalter des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2003).

[2] Selected texts: John Matusiak, *Europe in Flames: The Crisis of the Thirty Years War* (Stroud, 2018); Mary Elizabeth Ailes, *Courage and Grief: Women and Sweden's Thirty Years' War* (Lincoln, NE, 2018); Sigrun Haude, *Coping with Life during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648)* (Leiden, 2021); Adam Marks, *England and the Thirty Years' War* (Leiden, 2023); Johannes Burkhardt, *Der Krieg der Kriege: Eine neue Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2018); Herfried Münkler, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg: Europäische Katastrophe, deutsches Trauma 1618–1648* (Berlin, 2017); Georg Schmidt, *Die Reiter der Apokalypse: Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 2018).

V and the prehistory of his and his family's exile, that is, his election as King of Bohemia and the defeat of his troops in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. The following two chapters take a more structural approach and introduce the main protagonists of Palatine exile politics and their attitudes towards the core question of the restoration of the Palatine dynasty (ch. 2), before discussing the resources of the exiled Palatine dynasty (ch. 3).

As the main political actors, Pert identifies Frederick's son and successor, Charles Louis, who was underage at the time of his father's death. He first became active in Palatine politics after reaching majority in 1636. Besides political measures, he also undertook military actions in pursuit of his goal. Until 1636, his father's brother, Louis Philip of Simmern-Kaiserslautern, acted as the guardian of Charles Louis and actively pursued his nephew's restoration. Charles Louis's uncle on his mother's side, Charles I of England, was the family's almost exclusive source of financial support. Like other widows of ruling princes, Elizabeth Stuart assumed responsibility for her dynasty's and thus her children's interests. Due to her exile and the loss of her princely rights, her possibilities of exerting influence were very limited. Nevertheless, she played a central role in Palatine policy-making during the decades following her husband's death. Beyond the inner family circle, a few advisers and adherents supported the Palatine cause despite all the difficulties the Palatine family had in finding adequate ministers and maintaining power. However, the family was heavily dependent on the political and financial support of its dynastic network and (wealthy) supporters.

In line with Pierre Bourdieu's theory, Pert distinguishes three different types of capital that were available to the Palatine family: military, financial, and dynastic. The family's military and financial resources were both dependent on the willing support of others. The only capital genuinely owned by them and thus unconditionally available to them was their dynastic capital.

The second part of the book follows the chronology of the Thirty Years War while focusing on the Palatine family's attempts to regain their lost territories, status, and rights. This process is narrated in three steps: the 1630s (ch. 4), the period of the British Civil Wars (ch. 5), and the negotiations of the Westphalian peace congress (ch. 6). Chapter four

illustrates how the Palatine family was not able to shape the outcome of events itself but depended on its allies, and emphasizes the necessity of changing them if they were unable to meet the family's expectations. After the defeat of the Swedish army at Nördlingen in 1634, and due to its persistent weakness, the Palatine family set their hopes on France.

These ally relations were asymmetrical, and so the Palatine cause had to be useful for the objectives and policy of the family's allies. This becomes especially clear in the case of the Palatine connection to Sweden. Swedish support for the Palatine cause served as proof of Sweden's commitment to 'German liberty', that is, the defence of the constitutional rights of the imperial estates against the absolutist ambitions of the emperor. Moreover, by supporting the exiled Palatine family, Swedish decision-makers hoped to gain assistance from Charles I. Charles was not prepared to become militarily involved in the conflict, and limited himself to providing financial and diplomatic support to the cause. For the Palatine family, therefore, emphasizing the importance of its cause for others was paramount in attracting support. The exclusion of the Palatine dynasty from the Peace of Prague (1635) changed the conditions for its policy fundamentally, as its cause was no longer considered relevant. Pert suggests, therefore, that instead of assessing the policy of the Palatine family in terms of the success or failure of their quest for restoration, 'it is more useful to examine their effectiveness in maintaining the Palatine cause as a relevant issue on the political stage' (p. 165). This was especially true during the period of the British Civil Wars and the conflict between Charles I and Parliament, when the Palatine family ran the risk of losing its most important financial and diplomatic support. Charles Louis succeeded, however, in securing the assistance of the English Parliament, at the expense of the relationship with his royal uncle (ch. 5).

The limited agency of the Palatine family and its dependence on other powers becomes even more obvious during the negotiations of the Westphalian peace congress, as chapter six illustrates. Due to Charles Louis's exclusion from the Peace of Prague, the delegates he dispatched to both congress cities were restricted to informal diplomatic actions and had to rely on other diplomats to promote their interests. However, the Palatine cause was only supported by France, Sweden, and other powers as long as it did not hamper the

achievement of their own goals, or if it could be used as leverage. Thus, most of the negotiating parties agreed on the establishment of an eighth electorate and only a partial restoration of the Palatine family, against its explicit will. Politically isolated and without any support, Charles Louis finally had to accept this solution. Nevertheless, Pert regards the outcome of the Westphalian peace negotiations as a success for Palatine politics, arguing that the quest for a total restoration had never been realistic, and that, at the beginning of the negotiations, the Palatine family had been closer to exclusion from a future peace than to restoration.

The study concludes with an overview of the aftermath of the Thirty Years War through to 1660 (ch. 7). A comprehensive bibliography, an index, and two appendices containing tables of the Palatine Wittelsbach family tree and its European connections complete the book. Pert's findings fall in line with studies of exiled members of other dynasties, such as Amalia Elisabeth of Hesse-Kassel, Maria de Medici, and Charles II. The numerous comparisons with other cases increase the relevance of this micro-study on the Palatine family. The book is well written and very readable, even for those less familiar with the history of the Thirty Years War and the Holy Roman Empire, not to mention the Palatine dynasty. This does not mean that it lacks factual depth or analytical balance, however. Quite the opposite is true.

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ANNIKA HASS, *Europäischer Buchmarkt und Gelehrtenrepublik: Die transnationale Verlagsbuchhandlung Treuttel & Würtz, 1750–1850*, Pariser Historische Studien, 127 (Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Press, 2023), 516 pp. ISBN 978 3 968 22074 1 (hardback, €65.00); ISBN 978 3 968 22073 4 (open access e-book)

The publishing house of Treuttel & Würtz, its predecessors, and (to a lesser extent) its successors between 1750 and 1850 are the subject of this study by Annika Haß. The book is based on her doctoral dissertation, which she completed in Paris and Saarbrücken. The firm became a major player in the developing international book trade, spreading from its original home in Strasbourg to set up branches in Paris and London, and its customers, authors, translators, and partners ranged wider still. The author's initial hypothesis is that Treuttel & Würtz represent a 'crystallization of, and catalyst in, the exchange of ideas between Germany and France in the epochal shift around 1800', both through their professional and personal networks of contacts and through the material provision of books (p. 25), and she demonstrates this in a thorough examination of the firm's history, practices, and publishing programme.

As Haß points out in her introduction, a considerable challenge in this undertaking was the lack of a company archive for Treuttel & Würtz. This meant searching for diverse material in a wide variety of archives, libraries, and museums, as well as consulting contemporary published sources. The breadth is impressive—the list of published and unpublished primary sources runs to twenty-three pages, and the bibliography of secondary literature takes up a further fifteen—and some of the sources are unexpected: even surviving family portraits are scrutinized for what they might tell us about how the families' and firm's self-image fed into their business practices. Haß concludes that the lack of an archive was in one sense an advantage, preventing her from simply falling back on an official record of Treuttel & Würtz, and bringing in more sources that looked at the firm from the perspective of those who had dealings with it. Certainly, it has not prevented the creation of a detailed and comprehensive account, although occasionally it means that Haß has had to extrapolate broad principles from a small amount of archive material.

The firm originated in the bookshop and lending library founded by Jean Geoffroy Bauer in Strasbourg in 1749. Bauer married the daughter of Strasbourg University's printer and began publishing as well as selling books. Jean-George Treuttel became a partner in the firm in 1772 and further developed the publishing business with an eye to a more international market. Following Bauer's death, he took over the business, and at around the same time Jean Godefroi Würtz joined it as a trainee. In 1796, the two men opened their Paris branch and formally established the firm of Treuttel & Würtz with Paris as its main headquarters. A London branch followed in 1817 but was never a great commercial success and was abandoned in 1833. When Treuttel retired in 1823, Würtz continued the business alone but retained the name Treuttel & Würtz. After Würtz's death, the firm carried on under different owners and names until 1875 in Paris and 1934 in Strasbourg.

The London branch, to which Haß devotes a subsection of the first chapter (pp. 95–105), is of particular interest in an Anglo-German context. The appeal of London for an internationally oriented firm was obvious; if Paris was the centre of the European book trade, London offered a better gateway to the New World and to British colonial possessions. Even under Napoleon's Continental System, Treuttel & Würtz had sought and gained permission to export to Britain, demonstrating their ambitions for this market. A London branch was the next logical step, although it meant entering a field where there was already competition from established 'foreign booksellers'. From the start, this was conceived primarily as a bookselling rather than a publishing venture; Haß argues that John Sutherland's quoted figure of thirty-two titles published by Treuttel & Würtz in London from 1824 to 1827 includes ephemeral material and items probably in fact printed in Paris (p. 103). This became a source of contention with one of the partners in London, Adolphe Richter, who was keen to expand the publishing side of the London branch. Richter took over the business after Treuttel & Würtz dissolved it, but declared bankruptcy the following year. Nonetheless, despite its ongoing financial difficulties, Haß points out that the London branch managed to survive for a comparatively long time in a crowded and competitive market. A general crisis in London publishing in the late 1820s contributed to the failure of the business, as did the loss of its role as chief supplier of foreign books to the British Museum Library.

In describing the origins of the main French parts of the firm, Haß emphasizes the importance of its initial location in Strasbourg to its rise to become an international player. A combination of specific geographical, cultural, and economic features meant that the city was well placed as a centre of Franco-German and wider European cultural transfer, something that its book trade was able to exploit, with access to many markets and an effective combination of different French and German traditions and practices. Together with other Strasbourg publishers and booksellers, Bauer, Treuttel, and Würtz formed what Haß describes as an 'aristocracy of the book trade', whose members collaborated to their own advantage and jealously guarded their position against potential rivals. Links with the actual aristocracy and with influential political figures aided them in this, as they were able to lobby the authorities in their own interests. This was often done alongside claims to be working for a greater public good, such as cracking down on pirate editions or promoting public literacy through the provision of public libraries. At the same time, the former measure protected the established publishers' commercial interests and the latter provided them with a ready market for their books.

This is an example of a balance between commerce and Enlightenment ideals—the 'book market and republic of scholars' of the subtitle—which is a recurring theme throughout the book. Bauer, Treuttel, Würtz, and their associates shared an interest in and commitment to the values of the Enlightenment and of their Protestant faith, and their publishing programme reflected this. They saw books not only as marketable commodities but as vessels for the transfer of ideas. By promoting specific authors and disciplines, they could help to shape intellectual discourse and to establish a literary canon. At the same time, they were skilled at turning things to their commercial advantage, as demonstrated by the case study of their complete edition of Germaine de Staël's works, published in 1820–1 (pp. 359–73). De Staël's views chimed closely with those of the firm, and the edition that they produced was a major scholarly project, remaining a standard into the twenty-first century, but de Staël's fame and popularity were also a draw; the work made both ideological and commercial sense. Complicated contractual deals had to be made with those who had published de Staël in her lifetime (the documents are transcribed

in appendix C), and Würtz exploited legal loopholes to ensure that Treuttel & Würtz effectively gained sole rights to de Staël's works. At the same time as being good business for the firm, the acquisition of these rights reflected a growing recognition of the need for formal copyright regulations, again combining business advantage with a contribution towards a more common good.

A similar tension between Enlightenment ideals and canny business sense can be seen in the firm's customer base. They supplied ordinary scholars and university libraries around Europe, especially in France and Germany, but their main (and, it appears, most valued) clients tended to be in the higher echelons of society. They produced high-quality editions aimed at wealthy and aristocratic bibliophiles and were suppliers to various royal libraries in the German states. Haß details in particular Bauer's and Treuttel's dealings with the court in Weimar and the intellectual circles around it (pp. 191–212). In collaboration with the Weimar bookseller Friedrich Justin Bertuch, they supplied the court primarily with French books and occasionally with other goods: Haß mentions letters from Treuttel to Bertuch detailing orders of mirrors, gold epaulettes, and tickets for the Paris lottery, which were supplied to Grand Duke Carl August (p. 199). The move away from the eighteenth-century culture of enlightened scholar–princes and the shift from royal to national libraries is cited as one of the contributing factors in the firm's decline as the nineteenth century drew on.

However, Treuttel & Würtz did also pursue initiatives aimed purely at the less aristocratic. As devout Lutherans, they were committed to producing affordable Bibles and devotional works for a wide audience. In 1821 they acquired Louis-Étienne Herhan's stereotyping equipment and plates, which enabled the quick and economic production particularly of classical texts key to higher school and university study at the time. Both projects served the ideals of promoting piety and learning—and again, both were potentially lucrative. Direct involvement with the production of stereotyped texts did not last long, and by 1827 Treuttel & Würtz were contracting this work out to another firm. A collaboration with Alois Senefelder to set up a lithographic institute in Paris at around the same time was similarly short-lived, but both ventures into new processes indicate an interest on the part of Treuttel & Würtz in technological as well as intellectual progress.

Another of the firm's initiatives, which Haß examines in more detail, was the development of their catalogues and bibliographical journals. Bauer had, of course, issued catalogues from the start of his business, and these were of high quality, but Treuttel refined them further, creating what became a model for others. His major competitor in Salzburg, Frédéric-Rodolphe Salzmann, explicitly stated in a letter to Bertuch in Weimar that his catalogues were 'based on the Treuttel model' (p. 204). This approach to Bertuch was a cause for concern to Treuttel, who was moved to remind Bertuch of their long business association and friendship, and also used other means to stall Salzmann's attempts to take over the lucrative and prestigious trade with the Weimar court.

Like their catalogues, the bibliographical journals published by Treuttel & Würtz were influential among their contemporaries. In 1798, the firm founded the monthly *Journal général de la littérature de France*, comprising bibliographic details of new French publications, usually accompanied by a short review. It was joined in 1801 by the *Journal général de la littérature étrangère*, which covered the rest of Europe in the same way. The *Foreign Quarterly Review*, published with the firm's London imprint between 1827 and the London branch's closure, performed a similar function of bringing news of new Continental publications to a British audience. Haß positions these publications in the context of the development of bibliography and the organization of knowledge during the period, and places them among the forerunners of national bibliographies, the production of which began in the nineteenth century. But as she points out, unlike a purely descriptive national bibliography, these journals demonstrate certain biases in the choice of publications listed: they were skewed towards the output of publishers in Treuttel & Würtz's own geographical, social, and business circles, and towards the genres and subject areas that they favoured in their own programme.

In her detailed analysis of the publishing output of Treuttel & Würtz (ch. 3), Haß identifies four periods of activity, roughly correlating to the major European (and specifically French) political shifts of the period. She links both the firm's rise and its decline to the intellectual, cultural, and political currents of the age. In the eighteenth century, Treuttel & Würtz represented and promoted the values of the Enlightenment and of a transnational European culture. As the nineteenth century drew

on, they failed to keep up with post-Enlightenment cultural and intellectual trends and the changes wrought by the rise of nationalism. Where other firms continued to innovate, Treuttel & Würtz generally remained wedded to earlier values and practices. There were also more practical reasons for decline. Lawsuits brought against Treuttel & Würtz in the 1830s by one of their authors, Jean-Guillaume Locré, although won by the firm, damaged their reputation. More significantly, there was also an increasing number of competitors in the international book trade, many of whom copied and built on Treuttel & Würtz's earlier innovations, making the firm in some ways a victim of its own success. In addition, the death of Jean Godefroi Würtz in 1841 severed the last direct familial link with the original founders; the sons-in-law who took over the business had less of a personal investment in the firm and less talent for running it.

Haß has a slight tendency to repeat information, perhaps betraying the book's origin as a thesis, and her decision to quote at length from the English bibliographer Thomas Frognall Dibdin in French translation struck this reviewer as an odd one. But these are minor issues in a work that is a valuable contribution not only to the history of one specific firm but also to the history of the book trade as a whole and to the intellectual history of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

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FABRICE BENSIMON, *Artisans Abroad: British Migrant Workers in Industrialising Europe, 1815–1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 304 pp. ISBN 978 0 198 83584 4. £83.00 (hardback; also available as open access e-book)

The subject of this masterful study by Fabrice Bensimon is the 'small-scale, but high value' (p. 44) flow of itinerant British workers to Continental Europe in the post-Napoleonic period. As *Artisans Abroad* authoritatively proves, Western European industrialization was profoundly shaped by—and indeed possible only because of—the movement of British labour, expertise, and technology across the Channel.

The book is very much situated within labour history and builds upon developments in the field.[1] However, it is also much more than this, incorporating methodologies from social and cultural history as well as migration studies (pp. 8–10). Bensimon aims to move away from the traditional accounts of industrial magnates and capital and instead uncover the experiences of 'the workers themselves' (p. 2). Yet, as he frequently reminds us, the sources from which to tell these stories are scarce, and finding the authentic voices of migrant workers, particularly of women, is even more difficult. However, by creatively deploying a broad swathe of sources (including newspaper articles, management records, diplomatic correspondence, and parliamentary inquiries), Bensimon manages to extract an astounding amount of information about these workers, deftly weaving together statistical analyses and biographical case studies[2] and thereby reaching these emigrants both 'from below and from above' (pp. 8–9).

The first chapter contextualizes the migration of British workers to the Continent, highlighting governmental fears of a new form of 'industrial espionage' which materialized early in the eighteenth century

[1] e.g. Marcel van der Linden, *Transnational Labour History: Explorations* (Abingdon, 2003); and Marcel van der Linden, 'The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 82 (2012), 57–76.

[2] The latter method follows the approach suggested by Malcolm Chase in an article published in French in 2010, then edited and published in English by Bensimon in 2021: Malcolm Chase, 'Labour History's Biographical Turn', *History Workshop Journal*, 92 (2021), 194–207.

and prompted the prohibition of artisans' migration and the export of machinery (p. 19). Such anxieties only began to peter out from the mid 1820s as Ricardian theories of free trade gained traction over protectionism in economic discourse. Bensimon argues here that the second quarter of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of new attitudes to emigration in Britain, which manifested themselves in colonial settlement schemes and an increasing willingness on the part of politicians and manufacturers to view Continental markets as 'sphere[s] of opportunity' (p. 20). This is clearly evinced by the machine-made lace industry, the growth of which, though originally stymied by export bans, took off in the 1830s and resulted in a 'lively and dynamic' culture of exchange between Nottingham and Calais in the following decades (p. 38).

The remainder of the chapter is dominated by statistics, tackling the thorny issue of calculating the number of British emigrants to France in this period. Though it is 'impossible to give an exact figure', Bensimon extrapolates from patchy French census data and various select committee inquiries and settles on the 'very approximate estimate' of 15–20,000 emigrants over the period in question (pp. 39–42). Another section wades into historiographical debates over the role of wages during the industrial period and asks whether pay was an incentive to emigration. The sheer number of sectors under consideration, plus gendered wage differences, the seasonality of much industrial work, and regional disparities (all of which must be seen against a near-constant backdrop of economic flux), makes this a difficult question to answer definitively. Bensimon aptly demonstrates how these factors interacted in specific sectors such as railway construction, ironworks, and linen production, in which Britons frequently earned more than their French counterparts. Conclusions drawn for emigrants as a group are clouded by the sheer breadth of the investigation, but Bensimon argues persuasively that Continental wages differed more along the axes of skill level and/or gender than of nationality.

The second chapter delves into the specificities of three key industries in which British workers were active. Analysis of the textile industry is subdivided into studies of cotton production, flax working, and wool combing, all of which, as Bensimon proves, were 'transformed by British input' in many Continental regions (p. 62). In terms of iron production, we are shown how the technologically

superior '*forge à l'anglaise*' and the expertise of skilled Welsh iron puddlers was of critical importance in France from the 1820s to the 1850s (pp. 75–6). The British-led construction of the Paris–Rouen–Le Havre railway lines in the 1840s is well known, but Bensimon's account is remarkable—and indeed moving—in its concern for the thousands of itinerant British (and Irish) navvies whose lives, unlike those of their bosses, 'have not [been written] and hardly could' (p. 88). Despite the dearth of first-person accounts, Bensimon draws on a range of sources to illustrate the 'horrifying toll' that navvies' work exacted upon them. He convincingly reasons that the 'overexploited' navvies, despite being unskilled, nevertheless embodied the British industrializing mission on the Continent (pp. 90–2).

The next chapter considers the 'hidden' emigration of working-class women and children. Female migrants' agency, productivity, and skill in a variety of sectors—including, significantly, within the home—are emphasized, despite the contemporary (and unfortunately long-lasting) perception of women's work as unskilled or unimportant. Women's expertise was particularly prized in the linen and jute spinning industries, and many young, single spinners from Dundee relocated—often on their own initiative—to Continental workshops. One industry that employed both women and children was hand- and machine-made lace: they were frequently hired as lace runners, performing back-breaking labour in appalling conditions. British women also commonly faced open hostility from local labourers. Female lace workers, furthermore, received similarly low wages in France and Britain. Bensimon concludes that women 'earned at most a third' of men's wages in that industry despite notable—though scattered—instances of 'female unionism' (pp. 133–4). Concrete statistics on migrant child labour are even harder to come by, though Bensimon's comparative analysis of debates about the phenomenon on both sides of the Channel reveals both its ubiquity and inhumanity. The chapter's central conclusion is that British women and children played a significant role in Continental industrialization, although, to an even greater extent than male workers, 'their names remain . . . shrouded in obscurity, not unlike the dark rooms in which they worked' (p. 137).

Chapter four turns to cultural issues, exploring the role of language barriers, religious differences, leisure activities, and stereotypes within

British labour emigration. The problem of what one Scottish manufacturer called 'the want of the Language' can hardly be overstated; indeed, Bensimon convincingly demonstrates that it was often more difficult to emigrate to the Continent than to far-flung colonial territories for this reason (pp. 143–5). Bearing out his commitment to history from below, he shows that while bosses frequently hired interpreters, British labourers had no such luxuries. Furthermore, 'linguistic competence' varied widely among migrants—often along class lines—though we are shown how many navvies on international building sites developed a 'composite language' to understand one another (pp. 144–8). The consideration of the interplay between ideas of 'national character and diets', which factored into discussions about both labour productivity and living standards, is particularly effective (p. 163). Bensimon establishes that the typecasting of British workers—particularly navvies—as beef-eating drunkards was unfounded, with the latter characterization emerging out of broader upper- and middle-class discourse about the working classes. Contemporary perception of the *rosbifs* as stronger or more productive than local workers, he argues, had more to do with Britain's higher level of industrialization.

Chapter five assesses the level of political engagement among economic migrants abroad. Contributing to the well-established field of cross-Channel political exchange in the nineteenth century (much of which has been authored by Bensimon himself),[3] the chapter asks

[3] e.g. Fabrice Bensimon, 'Continental Exiles, Chartists and Socialists in London (1834–1848)', *History of European Ideas*, 47/2 (2021), 271–84; Fabrice Bensimon, 'The IWMA and its Precursors in London, *c*.1830–1860', in Fabrice Bensimon, Quentin Deluermoz, and Jeanne Moisand (eds.), *'Arise Ye Wretched of the Earth': The First International in a Global Perspective* (Leiden, 2018), 21–38; Sylvie Aprile, '"Translations" politiques et culturelles: Les proscrits français et l'Angleterre', *Genèses*, 38 (2000), 33–55; Thomas C. Jones and Robert Tombs, 'The French Left in Exile: *Quarante-huitards* and Communards in London, 1848–80', in Martyn Cornick and Debra Kelly (eds.), *A History of the French in London: Liberty, Equality, Opportunity* (London, 2013), 165–91; Sabine Freitag (ed.), *Exiles from European Revolutions: Refugees in Mid-Victorian England* (Oxford, 2003); Catherine Brice (ed.), *Exile and the Circulation of Political Practices* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2020); Constance Bantman and Ana Cláudia Suriani da Silva (eds.), *The Foreign Political Press in Nineteenth-Century London: Politics from a Distance* (London, 2018); Christine Lattek, *Revolutionary Refugees: German Socialism in Britain, 1840–1860* (London, 2006).

whether economic migrants played any role in the transmission of radical ideologies to the Continent. We are shown how Calais became a 'hotbed of Chartism' due to its population of Nottingham lacemakers (p. 194), and that migrants were responsible for establishing the only branches of Feargus O'Connor's Land Plan that existed in Europe. Insightfully, Bensimon concludes from such examples that most (Chartist) migrants viewed settlement in Europe as temporary, though the claim that they 'dream[ed] of a life where they could enjoy both economic and political freedom, without having to emigrate for work' may be somewhat overstated (p. 196). Highlighting the concurrent rise of militant trade unionism in Britain, Bensimon seeks to map out similar agitation among Britons on the Continent. In France—where trade unions were banned until 1864—he persuasively demonstrates that migrant workers did successfully import traditional methods of British labour organization, though they 'seldom tried to modify the local political structures' (p. 205). Whether or not these radical Britons influenced their French counterparts is more difficult to prove, though local authorities were clearly concerned: in 1825 the *sous-préfet* of Aisne agonized over British lace workers who were 'trying to draw our own [French] workers into making claims they had never even thought of' (p. 181). The final section, 'Insurgents?', seeks to 'quantify the involvement' of British workers in revolutionary upheavals on the Continent (pp. 200–4). The conclusion that they played an infinitesimal role is definitive (but unsurprising); the inclusion of data relating to the Paris Commune, however, surely extends beyond the scope of this study.

The sixth chapter evaluates British migrants' integration into European societies. It thereby provides a much-needed prehistory of the later clashes between French and foreign workers in the 1880s and 1890s, outlining key inflection points during 'the golden age of British labour immigration' from 1815 to 1848 (p. 216). Earlier incidents had various causes, ranging from residual antipathies from the Napoleonic era to colonial tensions; hostility may also have stemmed from locals' unemployment, as at Fourchambault in 1837. Tensions peaked in 1848, as exemplified by attacks on Scottish and Irish flax workers near Rouen and an apparently xenophobic riot against the Calais lacemakers. Despite the paucity of rioters' accounts, Bensimon painstakingly reconstructs contemporary attitudes and reveals that

such uprisings were generally not Anglophobic. Instead, as he argues, they were largely caused by the economic crisis of 1847–8 and should be read as specific interventions made using an evolving language of 'collective action', as theorized by John Walter and Charles Tilly.[4] Bensimon thus demonstrates that 'nothing corroborates the hypothesis of a profound and structural Anglophobia' directed against emigrants in the decades under consideration (p. 237). Such incidents should not overshadow the fact that the majority of British emigrants lived and worked peacefully on the Continent, whether 'integrated' (like the lace machine manufacturer John Leavers, who settled for life in Grand-Couronne), or not (like the countless labourers who remained within the English-speaking communities that sprang up around British factories).

The conclusion traces the afterlives of individuals discussed in the book and the phenomenon of migrants as agents of industrialization more broadly. Following the market collapse of 1848, many migrant Calais lacemakers emigrated to colonial possessions like Australia under the auspices of various government commissions. Others followed different trajectories to—in Elizabeth Gaskell's words—'the dominions of the Czar and the Sultan' that industrialized later in the century (quoted on p. 245). Bensimon reflects upon the typology of the small-scale mobilities represented by these nineteenth-century migrants, emphasizing the relevance of unplanned, short-distance 'step migration', as posited by Ernst Georg Ravenstein (pp. 44 and 241–4), and compellingly extending Eric Hobsbawm's model of the 'tramping artisan'[5] to encompass labour migration across the Channel (pp. 45 and 253). 'Local' migrations on the Continent are also helpfully contrasted with later 'global' migration patterns within the empire (p. 253).

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[4] John Walter, *Crowds and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Manchester, 2010); Charles Tilly, 'How Protest Modernized in France, 1845–1855', in William O. Aydelotte, Robert William Fogel, and Allan G. Bogue (eds.), *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History* (Princeton, 1972), 192–255; and Charles Tilly, 'Les origines du répertoire d'action collective contemporaine en France et en Grande-Bretagne', *Vingtième Siècle*, 4 (1984), 89–108.

[5] E. J. Hobsbawm, 'The Tramping Artisan', *Economic History Review: New Series*, 3/3 (1951), 299–320.

Bensimon adroitly advances the contemporary relevance of the 'artisans abroad', fulfilling the book's objective of setting out the origins of 'present-day connections and disconnections' between Britain and Europe (p. 3). The book reminds us—in our increasingly anti-migrant, post-Brexit era—that Britain was once 'a country of emigration rather than immigration' (p. 2) and that 'there was never a time when national economies operated in closed circuits' (p. 254). One wonders, however, whether the book's persistent commitment—announced in its title—to exploring industrial emigration from Britain to Europe is fully sustained; indeed, the shorthand 'Europe' is repeatedly substituted for 'France' (or, more rarely, 'Belgium'). Though France was the preferred destination for 'most workers' in this period (p. 1), more data relating to the other countries referred to in the introduction would have been welcome, source material permitting. Overall, though, this is an innovative, lively, and excitingly wide-ranging study of an underappreciated strand of labour migration, and one which pushes back against traditional narratives of economic and national antagonism.

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MAXIMILIAN GEORG, *Deutsche Archäologen und ägyptische Arbeiter: Historischer Kontext, personelle Bedingungen und soziale Implikationen von Ausgrabungen in Ägypten, 1898–1914*, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2023), 472 pp. ISBN 978 3 837 66484 3. €58.00

The history of science has for some time now been the history not only of professors and the learned gentry, but also of midwives, lab technicians, and working-class amateur naturalists. Assistants and subaltern knowledge workers have formed part of the personnel of the historiography of science since Steven Shapin's influential 1989 essay 'The Invisible Technician'.[1] Anne Secord and others have explored 'artisanal knowledge', showing how the sciences have often required interaction between distinct groups of people with different degrees of education, resources, or power.[2] In the three decades since, the social history of science has always had a presence, but recently it has met with increased interest. Last year, three journals, *Isis*, *History of Science*, and *Labor*, partnered up to publish three special issues, each dealing with different dimensions of a workers' history of science.[3]

One would expect Maximilian Georg's book—whose title translates to 'German Archaeologists and Egyptian Workers: The Historical Context, Working Conditions, and Social Implications of Excavations in Egypt, 1898–1914'—to fit well into this newly re-energized field. It was published in Transcript's series on the history of science and technology, and looks at local labourers employed by German archaeologists in Egypt. However, the history of science is not the author's concern. It does not feature in the book's chapters or bibliography. Georg's interest is instead in history from below, global history, and social history, as

[1] Steven Shapin, 'The Invisible Technician', *American Scientist*, 77/6 (1989), 554–63.

[2] e.g. Anne Secord, 'Corresponding Interests: Artisans and Gentlemen in Nineteenth-Century Natural History', *British Journal for the History of Science*, 27/4 (1994), 383–408; Anne Secord, 'Science in the Pub: Artisan Botanists in Early Nineteenth-Century Lancashire', *History of Science*, 32/3 (1994), 269–315.

[3] 'Focus: Let's Get to Work: Bringing Labor History and the History of Science Together', *Isis*, 114/4 (2023), 817–49; 'Special Issue: Science and/as Work', *History of Science*, 61/4 (2023); 'Labor and Science', special issue of *Labor*, 21/1 (2024).

well as in postcolonial and subaltern studies. The fact that it is not a history of science is the least of the book's problems.

Georg's study deals with the excavation sites of the German archaeologists Ludwig Borchardt, Georg Steindorff, Georg Möller, Otto Rubensohn, and Friedrich Zucker between 1898 and 1914. To unearth the great Egyptian archaeological treasures that are now on display in museums in Berlin, London, and Paris, European archaeologists not only spent considerable time in Egypt but also interacted with and employed local residents. German, British, French, and Italian archaeologists—who, in the Age of Empire, competed with each other for the most spectacular finds—are credited in wall texts and historical publications as excavators of important sites and artefacts. Despite the fact that these excavations served, inter alia, nationalist causes, those 'who did the actual digging' (p. 17) were local workers from Egypt. It is these local working men and women whom Georg is interested in.

The vast majority of the local workforce was employed as excavators who literally unearthed the ancient sites, spade in hand. As part of this process, they also cleaned and recorded objects or supervised other labourers. Cooks, guards, and guides were also on the local staff at the sites. Hundreds of workers were engaged for these projects. In 1907 almost 600 workers were on archaeologist Ludwig Borchardt's payroll at Abusir.

This turned archaeologists into large-scale employers and human resource managers. Consequently, the resulting paperwork far exceeded the excavation reports and classification of objects. It included payrolls, cash books, and many a mention of workers in the archaeologists' journals. As authoritarian leaders of hierarchically organized enterprises, German excavation directors imposed severe punishments for mistakes or offences committed by the workforce. Workers who showed up late or were caught stealing or visiting another site could be assigned unpaid overtime, have their wages deducted, be sacked, or even whipped.

Local labourers navigated the competition between European archaeologists in complex ways and sought to make use of it where they could. Some workers preferred to dig for the English archaeologist James Quibell instead of the Germans. Quibell's clerk, who workers said was terrible at paperwork, was unable to keep track of

attendance or stop workers from stealing artefacts that they could sell to local antique dealers. Germans, in turn, prided themselves on the fact that theft was—or seemed to them—nearly impossible at their closely surveilled sites. When Quibell announced that he would only employ workers from Saqqara, those from Abusir simply claimed to be Saqqari and went unchallenged by Quibell's team.

In an effort to make individual workers known and their voices heard, Georg sketches short biographies of three Egyptian workers who are frequently mentioned in his German sources. He portrays foreman Mohammed Ahmed el-Senussi, who had worked at Flinders Petrie's excavations in Qift/Koptos, as an excavator with considerable archaeological expertise. Senussi proudly referred to himself as an *almani* (a German) and was resented by his compatriots for his loyalty to his German employers. Another foreman, and rival to Senussi, was Abu el-Hassan Mohammed, who was appreciated enough by archaeologist Friedrich Zucker that he called for a German physician to check on him when he fell ill with influenza in 1914. Hissen Mabruk ran the light railway on several German digs and was compensated when an accident at work cost him a leg. The Germans paid for a prosthesis and the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft (German Oriental Society) paid him an annuity after the accident. It made sure, however, to pay it out as salary and not as a disability benefit.

In another chapter, Georg describes the workers' living and working conditions. He explains the employment of fellahin—Egyptian farmers or agricultural labourers—at archaeological excavations as an effect of the privatization of land and the proletarianization of the rural population. This is convincing, but it seems somewhat skewed to suggest that imperial archaeology was some kind of development aid because it put impoverished rural populations to work (p. 390).

Georg fleshes all of this out in enormous, sometimes tedious, detail. Historians may not have been aware how long a donkey ride between two excavation sites a mile apart took in 1901 (twenty minutes; p. 129) or what archaeological labourers ate for lunch in 1905 (bread, pulses, fruit, raw onions, dates, and—only on market days—melons; p. 227). But even as someone with a professional interest in the day-to-day business of archaeological excavations at the turn of the twentieth century, I found it hard to be excited by such information.

The practical turn has generated histories that tend to produce odd and very specific information, but readers can usually and reasonably expect these studies to elaborate on their significance; numerous studies have shown, for example, how accounting practices enabled knowledge to travel from one domain to another, or how material practices of writing, collecting, classification, and storage connected a written piece of data with an actual find in the field and thus helped establish referential chains that produce scientific reliability.

Georg makes no such effort. Terms like 'research question' or 'thesis' are hardly mentioned in the book, and never in relation to the study itself; the term *Untersuchungszeitraum* (period under study), however, comes up dozens of times—as if historians compartmentalized the past not into periods defined by relations of production, political systems, or orders of knowledge and bounded by historical caesuras, but into periods under investigation about which (alas!) one has to write dissertations. Accordingly, the reader is constantly reminded that they are reading a text written in exchange for a degree. The many references to subchapters and sub-subchapters down to the fourth level give the book the feel of an index printed in running text, constantly referring to itself. *Deutsche Archäologen und ägyptische Arbeiter* does not tell a story, nor does it make an argument; it summarizes source materials. As a result, it remains unclear what the book adds to Stephen Quirke's *Hidden Hands*.[4] The excavations under study here are German-led, but the workers, as Georg points out more than once, worked at both German and English sites.

This absence of analysis is troubling for other reasons as well. Like the German archaeologists it studies, the book refers to the locals as 'Egyptians', despite making clear in the introduction that things were really not that simple: the staff at German excavation sites were made up of men, women, and children from Egypt, but also of Nubians, Bedouin, and Sudanese who lived in the area. In the absence of a critical framework, the author fails to renounce the German archaeologists' supremacism and even seems prepared to excuse their racism in light of the higher goal of scientific progress. Georg asks readers not to

[4] Stephen Quirke, *Hidden Hands: Egyptian Workforces in Petrie Excavation Archives, 1880–1924* (London, 2010).

misunderstand the Germans' vocabulary, which describes Egyptians as 'inferior' (p. 278):

> Since the archaeologists wanted first and foremost to serve the progress of their scientific enterprise and perceived the workers as tools or material for this purpose . . . this value judgement has no existential, but a purely logistical meaning: the 'inferior' worker, for whatever reason, apparently does not have the skills to sufficiently advance the excavation; therefore, he must be dismissed and another worker hired in his place.

Instead, readers learn that German archaeologists retained their sense of humour in dealing with the locals, wished none of them any harm, and did not long for a return to the time when forced labour was permitted at European excavation sites (p. 278).

For all the book's significant narrative and analytical faults, the wealth of detail could be helpful for historians of archaeology and Egyptology as well as of Egypt. They will most certainly find information they have never read anywhere else.

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JOLITA ZABARSKAITĖ, *'Greater India' and the Indian Expansionist Imagination, c.1885–1965: The Rise and Decline of the Idea of a Lost Hindu Empire*, The Politics of Historical Thinking, 4 (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023), 429 pp. ISBN 978 3 110 98606 8. £72.50

Jolita Zabarskaitė's study is yet to receive the scholarly attention it deserves. As far as I can see, only two academic reviews of the book have been published to date.[1] This is surprising, since Zabarskaitė's is the first book-length exploration of 'Greater India', a theme that, since the publication of Susan Bayly's pioneering article of 2004,[2] has garnered a good deal of attention.[3] Greater India describes Indian intellectuals' framing of the discovery of ancient and medieval civilizational links between South Asia and East and South-East Asia. Previously contextualized as a species of 'interwar internationalism' and pan-Asianism, Zabarskaitė pushes the dating of this discourse back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the watershed of the Swadeshi movement (1905–8). This is one of the book's major contributions. The other is that Hindu nationalism, relegated to the margins by Bayly and others, emerges as the focal point of Greater India discourse in Zabarskaitė's account.

The book is divided into five chapters of hugely varying length. Chapter one explores how Indian scholars first learned and made sense of what they would later come to call Greater India. But as only seven pages are dedicated to the nineteenth century and only one

[1] By Yorim Spoelder in *H-Soz-Kult*, 8 Jan. 2024, at [https://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-134252], accessed 24 July 2024; and by Ana Jelnikar in *Anthropological Notebooks*, 30/1 (2024), S10–S13.

[2] Susan Bayly, 'Imagining "Greater India": French and Indian Visions of Colonialism in the Indic Mode', *Modern Asian Studies*, 38/3 (2004), 703–44.

[3] See e.g. Marieke Bloembergen, 'Borobudur in the Light of Asia: Scholars, Pilgrims, and Knowledge Networks of Greater India', in Michael Laffan (ed.), *Belonging across the Bay of Bengal: Religious Rites, Colonial Migrations, National Rights* (London, 2017), 35–56; Mark Ravinder Frost, '"That Great Ocean of Idealism": Calcutta, the Tagore Circle, and the Idea of Asia, 1900–1920', in Shanti Moorthy and Ashraf Jamal (eds.), *Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural, Social and Political Perspectives* (New York, 2009), 251–79; Carolien Stolte and Harald Fischer-Tiné, 'Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905–1940)', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 54/1 (2012), 65–92.

nineteenth-century work is discussed, it becomes obvious that the time span of 1885 to 1965 indicated in the book's title is somewhat misleading. The Swadeshi movement that jump-started mass protest against the British in the twentieth century and forced a nationalist reflection on the essence of Indian civilization is the real moment of departure for Greater India. The second chapter addresses the Bengali provincialism that flavoured the nationalism behind Greater India and provides a lengthy discussion of social scientist Benoy Kumar Sarkar's vision of it as a present-day geopolitical potentiality, rather than an 'antiquarian' pursuit (p. 128). The third chapter shows how the founding of the Greater India Society in 1926—the focus of Bayly's account—was 'merely an institutionalization' of a long-present theme (p. 16). Clashing with and disinheriting other political and martial visions of conquest, the society reflected the noted scholar Kalidas Nag's vision of India's peaceful and non-political civilizing mission to South-East Asia. Chapter four details how the idea of Greater India became ubiquitous in Indian discussions in the 1920s and 1930s, to the point of forcing engagement even from Jawaharlal Nehru. It tracks protagonists of the discourse who travelled to 'Greater India', and discusses how the growing Indian diaspora was understood as a future Greater India. The fifth and final chapter treats what it frames as the 'decline, revival and afterlife' of the Greater India discourse. The 'revival' took the form of the Hindu nationalist party, the Hindu Mahasabha's fight for *Akhand Bharat* ('Undivided India') and against Partition and Pakistan, and Sarkar's 'Greater Bengal', which countered the partition of his homeland. 'Decline' refers to the period after independence, when Indian statecraft under Nehru refused to make India a Hindu state, and a quest for Asian cooperation necessitated a muting of parochial Greater India discourse. 'Afterlife' then pertains to the work of Greater India's ageing advocates.

The book was submitted as a PhD dissertation at Heidelberg University and, as far as I can see, was published unchanged. In Germany, only once a doctoral thesis has been published may its author claim the title of doctor. There are pros and cons to this approach. It ensures that scholarship is made promptly available to the academic community, but the quality may suffer. As a thesis, Zabarskaitė's work is impressive. As a book, it would have been improved by some

rigorous weeding and further conceptual digging. *'Greater India' and the Indian Expansionist Imagination* features a dizzying cast of figures, and at times it drowns in detail. This is to be expected from a PhD dissertation that needs to demonstrate diligence and completeness, but the book would have benefited from giving the conceptual claims more breathing space and carefully selecting what empirical evidence is needed to make its point.

In other words, the net is sometimes cast too wide. For instance, Zabarskaitė struggles to fit the Hindu nationalist fight for *Akhand Bharat* into the Greater India framework. Overlaps of actors between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Greater India discussion notwithstanding, even Zabarskaitė has to admit that *Akhand Bharat*, which seeks the political unity of the subcontinent, cannot really 'accommodate' the oceanic and far-flung 'Greater India' (p. 308).

Zabarskaitė convincingly demonstrates that an idea of the international was needed in order to construct a cohesive vision of the national in India. Yet 'nationalism' is wielded as a catch-all category in the book, whose slippage into Hindu nationalism is stated but not sufficiently examined. After all, as much as Indian nationalism tended to the Hindu idiom and was criticized for it by Muslim thinkers and politicians, Hindu nationalism also strained against All-India nationalism in significant ways. This introduces a fuzziness into the motivations behind Greater India. Zabarskaitė is careful to point out that competing visions of Greater India existed at the time, which can be roughly divided into India's 'cultural', that is, its benevolent civilizing mission—so different from Europe's violent history of conquest—and its political and military conquest of South-East Asia, very much like European (and, for that matter, British) colonialism. In the end, she privileges the cultural version, while pointing out its Hindu supremacism. But are the motivations behind these two visions really the same? After all, the conquest framing does something the cultural one does not: it makes a statement about sovereignty—a term almost absent from Zabarskaitė's account.

Indians seized on the prospect of Greater India to break free from British framings of India, which foregrounded its lack of national unity, national art, or a history of empire. Foreign (Dutch or French) scholarship was needed for legitimation purposes, but Zabarskaitė

convincingly shows—in what she herself describes as one of her book's major interventions—that Greater India was not a derivative but an essentially Indian discourse. Consequently, the French Indologist Sylvain Lévi, who underpins Susan Bayly's account, makes his first appearance in Zabarskaitė's only on page eighty.

'Even in their first versions', writes Zabarskaitė, notions of Greater India were 'linked to political arguments about potential presents and futures in India' (p. 19). This is certainly true, and well demonstrated in the book. The last three pages gesture towards the 'comeback' (p. 390) of the concept and language of Greater India since 2014, when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party first came to power in India, but they amount to little more than a teaser. Certainly, Greater India dovetails with Hindu nationalism's supremacist vision and its attempt to rewrite (or 'redress') Indian history by writing Muslims out of it. Arguably, Hindutva (the ideology of Hindu nationalism) itself has an imperial texture. Readers interested in this topic should compare recent work by Arkotong Longkumer exploring the Sangh Parivar (the 'family' of Hindu nationalist organizations) and its mission of Hinduizing northeast India as an exercise in creating Greater India.[4]

Jolita Zabarskaitė's study is a must-read for anyone interested in Indian and Hindu ideas of empire. More broadly, it is also of interest to scholars of Indian and Hindu nationalism and of the Indian Ocean world.

[4] Arkotong Longkumer, *The Greater India Experiment: Hindutva and the Northeast* (Stanford, CA, 2020).

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MARK FENEMORE, *Dismembered Policing in Postwar Berlin: The Limits of Four-Power Government* (London: Bloomsbury, 2023), 258 pp. ISBN 978 1 3503 3416 8. £85.00

There is certainly no dearth of literature on mid twentieth-century Berlin; Mark Fenemore's most recent monograph will be placed on a bookshelf packed with works by historians such as Atina Grossmann, Annette Timm, and Malte Zierenberg. What *Dismembered Policing* does, however, is answer calls to treat the occupation of Germany as a 'subject in its own right'.[1] Fenemore analyses it as a system of rule through the lens of policing. Examining the police not only as a 'political instrument' but also as 'the organization tasked with solving crimes' (p. 10), his book can be situated among more recent studies of the *practical* functioning and impact of the police and penal system in post-war Germany.[2] Methodologically, Fenemore places his work within a 'history of mentalities' in which, refreshingly, he 'sees mentalities as expressed principally through behaviour rather than through discourse' (p. 3). It is from this more practical angle that Fenemore seeks to tell the story of the gradual breakdown of Allied governance in Berlin—from a city that the American (deputy) military governor Lucius Clay initially envisioned as a model for international cooperation to one that became a front line of the Cold War.

This story is told roughly chronologically, and opens with the central Police Presidium on Alexanderplatz, which, along with most of its records, had been destroyed during the war. The first chapter describes how policing had broken down exactly when crime was increasing: July 1945 saw 123 murders in the capital, compared to 350 in the three years from 1922 to 1924 (p. 22). This is not to mention the less easily quantifiable mass rapes, as well as the persistent 'stench of death' (p. 29). Somewhat questionably rehabilitating the label of

[1] Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles, 'Introduction: Reframing Occupation as a System of Rule', in Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles (eds.), *Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions* (London, 2018), 3–24, at 4.

[2] David M. Livingstone, *Militarization and Democracy in West Germany's Border Police, 1951–2005* (Rochester, NY, 2024); Sarah Colvin, *Shadowland: The Story of Germany Told by Its Prisoners* (London, 2022).

1945 as 'zero hour' (p. 21), Fenemore describes the first moves by the Soviets to re-establish local government. The arrival of the Western Allies in July fractured the policing situation.

The second chapter charts the rebuilding of the police. Fenemore introduces readers to a set of characters, starting with Paul Markgraf, a decorated Wehrmacht captain captured at Stalingrad, who, after attending the 'Antifa School' in captivity and writing the essay 'What I Would Do If I Was Appointed Berlin Police President', was in fact appointed to this very role in May 1945. His second-in-command, Johannes Stumm, was seen as more experienced in police matters. While cementing Soviet power, Markgraf had difficulties asserting his authority: some communists in Charlottenburg, for example, refused to serve a former *Wehrmacht* captain. Conversely, given the lack of resources to screen candidates, many of the first men to join the force would have had a past irreconcilable with the aim of denazifying the police.

This chapter also introduces readers to the women police officers who were recruited from April 1946. Aged between 23 and 30, they served alongside men, albeit for quite a short time in West Berlin; the administration stopped recruiting women officers in 1950, a ban that was only lifted in 1978. Their recruitment did not bring about a change in police culture. Moreover, women complained that they were falling ill because they were not allowed to wear trousers. Clothing proved a problem for the police in general; uniforms initially consisted only of a white armband, and dyed Wehrmacht uniforms went streaky when it rained. Fenemore showcases the importance of such practical details when it comes to policing. Indeed, it was only in March 1946 that the British and American sectors restored working street lamps. The night-time darkness in the Soviet and French zones continued to facilitate everyday crime. However, the police in all sectors faced a common problem: with police officers receiving the most ration cards, the force consequently not only saw a high turnover but also attracted criminals.

In the third chapter, Fenemore discusses not these criminals in German police uniform, but those he sees as criminals in Allied military uniforms. Occupation, he claims, was itself a source of crime, as 'often Berliners required protection from their protectors' (p. 61).

Here, Allied soldiers are presented as drunkards and rapists, with Fenemore quoting an American GI who compared Berlin to a lunatic asylum. In this book, dedicated to 'survivors of trauma, not least those who inhabited Greater Berlin in the period 1945–9' (p. v), Berliners are largely presented as victims, especially those who protested against Allied violence; the acting mayor of Reinickendorf was beaten up by the French after pointing out Allied transgressions. While Fenemore contends that Allied behaviour was 'unnecessarily harsh' (p. 74), he also maintains an awareness that it could be misconstrued. For example, when the American colonel Francis Miller accused US forces in Berlin of misconduct in August 1946, this was deeply motivated by racism against Black GIs.

This racial theme is expanded in the fourth chapter, which moves away from uniformed police and to the policing of morals. While conscious of widespread racism within German society, the chapter provides a largely favourable reading of the relationships between White German women and Black GIs; the latter were especially cordial, as they incurred harsher consequences for misconduct than their White counterparts in what was still a segregated army. Citing the recollections of numerous Black GIs, Fenemore arrives at the rather bold conclusion that for most children and some adults, these friendly interactions created 'a fundamental rupture in racial consciousness' (p. 88). He does, however, recognize that the absence of US-style segregation also may have created an 'imaginary space' (p. 92) that allowed some GIs to gloss over the extent of German racism—racism with which German women in relationships with Black soldiers often had to contend.

Chapter five turns away from the relationship between Germans and the Allies to discuss how the Allies initially cooperated with each other. While casting the Allied Kommandatura, the body ruling Berlin, as one of the most radical attempts by nations to cooperate to date, Fenemore argues the police force caused more friction 'than any other branch' of the new city government (p. 109). In October 1946, each sector was assigned an assistant police chief, usurping the authority of the Greater Berlin police president, Paul Markgraf. Initial attempts at cooperation quickly unravelled.

These tensions culminated in the splitting of the police, which the sixth chapter details. The Western Allies had tried to have Police

President Markgraf dismissed from the beginning of 1948. The Western SPD had accused him of turning a blind eye to (Soviet) kidnapping, producing a list of over 5,000 missing people. While this list was highly dubious, certain individuals had 'been disappeared' by the Soviets, including Karl Heinrich, the head of the uniformed police, in August 1945. In April 1948, Markgraf attempted to have Heinrich's successor as the West Berlin uniformed police chief arrested for insulting the Soviets. Following multiple other points of friction, including the Soviet walkout from the Kommandatura, Markgraf was suspended in July 1948. Two-thirds of the police on the ground also deserted Markgraf to follow the new West Berlin police chief, Johannes Stumm.

The seventh chapter takes readers through the 'slow and agonizing' (p. 144) death of collaboration during the summer of 1948, caused especially by crowd actions. Fenemore describes multiple Soviet-orchestrated sieges of the city's parliament, located in the Soviet sector, in which police officers and crowds sought to intimidate representatives. On 9 September, the policing of crowds again took centre-stage when Ernst Reuter gave a speech against the backdrop of the Reichstag calling for solidarity with Berliners. Berlin was then left with two mayors and two police forces, and formal police cooperation was essentially reduced to guarding the war criminals incarcerated in Spandau (until the last prisoner, Rudolf Hess, committed suicide in 1987).

Chapter eight discusses a key ingredient in souring Allied relations: the Berlin blockade. Fenemore sees the blockade and airlift as harmful to Berliners, but helpful in cementing anti-Soviet solidarity. The final two chapters of the book then return to crime and policing by exploring two high-profile criminal investigations. Examining police work on the ground allows Fenemore to show that despite political splits, the police continued to cooperate across the inner-Berlin border—underscoring the importance of an approach that moves beyond a focus on high-level policy.

The first case study tells the story of the Gladow Gang. This eclectic gang managed to steal pistols and ammunition from sixteen policemen stationed close to the border, as well as a ladder from Police Chief Stumm's Dahlem villa, which they used to burgle his neighbour's property. Fenemore is particularly interested in the ringleader, the teenaged Werner Gladow, seemingly agreeing with the court

psychiatrist Weimann that it was the 'poisoning' of Nazism that made him the criminal he was (p. 191). He was executed in November 1950 following an East Berlin show trial.

The final chapter brings gruesome physicality to the metaphor of the book's title; not only was policing dismembered, but so were corpses. Fenemore's second case study is that of a nurse with a morphine addiction, Elisabeth Kusian, who murdered two people mainly to provide her boyfriend—who, incidentally, was a Western police officer—with gifts taken from the victims. She dismembered the bodies with forensic precision and scattered their limbs across Berlin's sectors. The East Berlin police, who arrested Kusian and took her confession, unsurprisingly politicized the affair.

With these case studies, Fenemore bridges the traditional division of labour in the historical profession whereby early modernists focus on criminals and their positionality, while modernists turn their attention to penal institutions and discourse.[3] However, his analysis that we need a 'new conceptual palette' to understand these individuals as being 'human and fallible' and as having 'produced meaningful acts' in committing crimes (p. 232) might have been deepened by early modernist approaches to gaining greater access to perpetrators' subjectivities and the environment they operated in.

Fenemore is, nonetheless, fully aware of modern-day criticisms of police power, citing the murder of George Floyd as emblematic of how 'policing can also be an illegitimate expression of cruelty and disregard for life' (p. 2). However, Fenemore's Berlin police officers are generally admired as 'courageous' (pp. 23 and 49; see also p. 228). Moreover, it might have been more instructive to frame a study of post-war Berlin around the *German* police's (racist) history across Imperial, Weimar, Nazi, and post-war Germany[4]—a history marked by continuities which Fenemore points out (p. 41) but ultimately downplays in his claim that 'despite the all-too-real Nazi excesses, the Berlin police had a tradition of civilized policing that they could both be proud of and fall back on' (p. 230). A consideration of how crime

[3] Richard F. Wetzell, 'Introduction', in Richard F. Wetzell, *Crime and Criminal Justice in Modern Germany* (New York, 2014), 1–28, at 1.

[4] See Patrick Wagner, *Hitlers Kriminalisten: Die deutsche Kriminalpolizei und der Nationalsozialismus zwischen 1920 und 1960* (Munich, 2002).

was politicized under Nazism might have also helped deconstruct the concept of 'law and order' and enrich readers' understanding of why Berliners yearned for harsher punishments (see p. 46).

When thinking of how Berliners encountered policing and crime in day-to-day life, it is surprising that everyday policing does not occupy a more prominent position in a book whose introduction cites Alf Lüdtke and E. P. Thompson as inspirations for writing histories of 'mentalities' and everyday life from below (pp. 10–11). The crime statistics Fenemore reproduces show that robbery/looting and bodily injury were by far the most frequent crimes in 1946 and 1947 (p. 22). Yet when it comes to actual policing, Fenemore is more interested in broader political events and high-profile crimes. One book, of course, cannot do everything—and *Dismembered Policing* aptly highlights how policing provides an insight into many diverse histories. The book's key contribution is thus to demonstrate how policing played a crucial role in attempts to achieve Allied cooperation, but also in their breakdown. True to its subtitle, it exposes 'the limits of four-power government'.

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DAVID PAULSON, *Family Firms in Postwar Britain and Germany: Competing Approaches to Business* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2023), 362 pp. ISBN 978 1 783 27758 2. £24.99

David Paulson's monograph is a historical study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).[1] The book's focus, both comparatively and from a transnational perspective, is an analysis of the 'ecosystem', that is, the socio-economic structures in which SMEs were embedded during this period. As Professor of Practice in Management and Leadership at Queen's University Belfast, Paulson is an expert in the field of transnational business research. Prior to his academic career, Paulson completed his doctorate in business history at Cambridge University and was himself active in leading positions in various British SMEs, experiences from which the monograph benefits considerably.

In his study, Paulson analyses six SMEs, three each in the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. The book covers the decades after the Second World War, from 1945 to the late 1970s. Within this time frame, Paulson focuses on the southern German state of Baden-Württemberg and the West Midlands of England. The English SMEs are all located in West Bromwich, while the German companies are located in various towns in Baden-Württemberg. This research design suggests that the regions are comparable. Paulson also focuses on three regional sectors—the paper, steel, and automotive industries—and compares one German and one English company from each of these in turn: Chr. Wandel KG in Reutlingen and Kenrick & Jefferson Ltd (paper); Julius Schneider GmbH & Co. KG in Ludwigsburg and Braithwaite & Co. Ltd (steel); and RECARO GmbH & Co. in Stuttgart and Jensen Motors Ltd (automotive).

Translated by Marielle Sutherland (GHIL).

[1] In Germany, SMEs are usually abbreviated as KMUs (*kleine und mittlere Unternehmen*). Classification as a micro, small, or medium-sized enterprise in Germany today is based on the European Commission in accordance with EU Recommendation 2003/361/EC, whereas in the UK it is defined by the British government. The definition can vary depending on the context and purpose, but it is usually based on the number of employees (under 250 in both countries) and the annual turnover or balance sheet total.

The concept of the *Mittelstand* is fundamental to Paulson's analysis of the 'ecosystem' of these companies, especially the German case studies. The term originally referred to a 'middle class' of entrepreneurs and business owners, but it now means the privately owned small and medium-sized firms that form the backbone of the German economy. The *Mittelstand* emerged in the post-war period as a result of the economic and political upheavals that accompanied the 'economic miracle'. The decentralization of the economy associated with the *Mittelstand* and the democratization of business in the Federal Republic after 1945 contributed to the development of a diverse landscape of SMEs. At the time, these companies were seen as playing an important role in the Federal Republic's economic upturn, which is why they received state support in the form of tax breaks, loans, and other financial incentives.[2]

Paulson's study is therefore based on the similarities in corporate culture that are often ascribed to German SMEs: the emotional connection to a family that founded, runs, and owns the company; the patriarchal culture within the family business; an identification with, and rootedness in, the surrounding region; an independent mindset; and the development of high-quality, specialized products. First, Paulson asks whether these principles still hold true today, and whether they were actually applied even back then. Second, he asks how German SMEs differed from British SMEs, as no comparable *Mittelstand* emerged in Britain. He concludes that although the potential for a British *Mittelstand* existed, British companies were generally less well managed, and operated in a less supportive external environment (pp. 290–302).

Paulson bases his arguments on a wide range of qualitative and quantitative primary sources: these include the internal minutes of the SMEs, company training programmes for employees, German and British university enrolments, and documents relating to 'master craftsman' training in the Federal Republic. In a nuanced and differentiated analysis, Paulson weaves the primary sources into the chapters, which is particularly useful in the case studies. It must be emphasized that limitations in the source base are due more to accessibility

[2] On the *Mittelstand*, see Hartmut Berghoff, 'The End of Family Business? The Mittelstand and German Capitalism in Transition, 1949–2000', *Business History Review*, 80/2 (2006), 263–95. On the 'economic miracle', see Axel Schildt, *Die Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1989/90* (Munich, 2007).

problems than to inadequate research by the author. Paulson states, for example: 'Unfortunately, no company's archive contains much material on bank relationships, but it is evident that all the companies got access to some finance' (p. 59). Such difficulties are not uncommon in historical corporate research. The fact that the author addresses these limitations shows that he is at pains not to conceal any blind spots, thereby making his arguments more persuasive.

The source material is integrated into the argument in a structured way. The study is divided into two parts, with the first setting out the methodological and theoretical framework and the second comprising the case studies. The conclusion of the book, which refers to both parts, concentrates on various themes and questions, such as 'interfirm' and 'industrial relations', employee relations, management logic in the individual companies, the role of the founding families, and the significance of the German '*Mittelstand* model' in today's world.

Part one is divided into chapters on 'Culture, Community, and Continuity', 'Banking', and 'Recruitment and Training'. This structure follows the main themes, the aim being to compare the two countries' 'ecosystems'. The individual chapters are dedicated in turn to West Germany and Great Britain, highlighting national differences and similarities. After an overview of the regions at the beginning of the period under investigation (1945), the chapters show how the SMEs reflected political and cultural specificities of the respective regions. In each case, these factors influenced the management logic, the employees, and the corporate culture. The book benefits from the lucidly structured historical context of the first part, which offers a clear categorization of the relevant processes of change. In particular, readers who are engaging with issues in European corporate history in the post-war period for the first time will find the introduction very helpful.

The findings from part one are applied to the case studies in part two, continuing the argument clearly and logically for the reader. In six chapters, one for each case study, Paulson analyses the corporate cultures of the SMEs. Due to the varied quantity, quality, and scope of the available sources, the chapters are not always exact parallels of each other, but are rather based on the specific developments at the individual companies. The structure of each chapter therefore differs depending on the source material, but the individual chapters all share

the same basic structure. Paulson begins each chapter with an examination of the company's development since its foundation, then refers to its financial performance and management culture up to the 1970s, and usually concludes with a nod towards what came next, often up to the 1990s. At the same time, he not only includes the social backgrounds of the founding families and employees, but also shows how they were intertwined with other, larger companies, such as Porsche or Volvo.

Running through the individual chapters (in both parts of the book), and substantiated by the sources, is a continuous narrative: German and English SMEs have different 'ecosystems', leading to different corporate cultures. Paulson tries to avoid 'Made in Germany' stereotypes which imply that German companies are inherently higher quality. Nevertheless, he concludes that SMEs in Germany were more strongly supported by external influences, while those in the UK had to contend with less favourable conditions. In Baden-Württemberg, SMEs were supported by local, regional, and national institutions. In particular, the education system and the network of regional *Sparkassen* (savings banks) provided an infrastructure that enabled long-term financing and growth. The German SMEs therefore took a more long-term, socially responsible approach to business. In contrast, the SMEs in West Bromwich received less institutional support until the late 1970s and had access to fewer qualified staff overall. The British SMEs were therefore more focused on short-term profits.

Paulson also analyses various other aspects, such as the importance of family ownership for SMEs. He argues, for example, that family ownership can be a 'driver of long-term commitment and creativity' in both nations, but is not absolutely necessary (p. 298). However, the emotional connection between business owner and company is more characteristic of German firms than British ones.

Finally, Paulson identifies the essential difference between the business cultures of the two countries as one of long-term versus short-term thinking in Germany and Britain respectively, which is reflected, for example, in significantly later than average flotations of German companies on the stock market.[3] Paulson identifies 'two Varieties of

[3] Paulson points out that German companies only went public after fifty-five years on average (p. 41).

Capitalism' in the two nations (p. 290). In so doing, he aligns with the arguments made by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, according to which the UK and the USA have a 'liberal market economy', which favours markets and hierarchies, while Germany has a 'coordinated market economy', which strives for non-market, longer-term relationships.[4] According to Paulson, this external context leads to systematic differences in company strategies and behaviour.

Although Paulson's study has a coherent structure and skilfully integrates the source material, the transnational framing is not as convincing. The necessity of a German–British comparison is not sufficiently justified against the background of the overarching research question. The author's attempted explanations, which cite, for example, British political and business voices striving for a 'British *Mittelstand*' (pp. 3-4),[5] do not go far enough. In addition, although Paulson refers to older comparative research, such as that of Alfred D. Chandler, it would be useful to explain in detail why the comparison specifically between German and British regions is historically instructive.[6] Paulson portrays the regions of Baden-Württemberg and the West Midlands as economically similar, only to then present their different 'ecosystems' as a distinguishing factor. Would the results of the study be different if one of these regions were replaced with another? Would studies of other industries in the same regions lead to the same results in terms of national 'ecosystems'? Apart from the author's biographical connection to the Midlands, it remains unclear why these specific regions and industries were chosen. Whether or not the study's findings can be taken as exemplary of wider trends therefore remains up for debate.

Nevertheless, Paulson's book is a significant contribution to German–British business historiography. Not only are its thorough research and detailed analysis impressive, but its arguments are

[4] Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, 'An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism', in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (New York, 2001), 1–68.

[5] One example Paulson cites (p. 47) is Helen Power, 'Britain's Forgotten Army of Firms Must March like Germans, Says Cridland', *The Times*, 24 Oct. 2011.

[6] Alfred D. Chandler, *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA, 1994). Chandler conducted a comparative analysis of modern (post-1970) companies in Germany, Great Britain, and the USA.

mostly convincing and it distinguishes clearly between the national specifics of the SMEs. In this sense, the book benefits noticeably from its author's theoretical knowledge and practical experience. By using SMEs as a basis for analysing socio-economic processes of change from 1945 to the late 1970s, Paulson succeeds in demonstrating that corporate cultures may differ nationally, and are not static but change over time in response to structural conditions.

All in all, *Family Firms in Postwar Britain and Germany* is an interesting reference work for scholars and students in the fields of twentieth-century economic and social history, management studies, and economics. The transnational comparison encourages further discussion between, and research on, European companies, and emphasizes the uniqueness of German SMEs as the backbone of the country's economy in the decades after the Second World War, even if the wider applicability of the study is debatable. The book highlights the continuous contribution of SMEs to the economic prosperity of the Federal Republic, as well as their influence on international discourse (p. 300). Especially against the background of today's international networks, business history studies that look beyond national borders play an important role in providing interpretations relevant to the present, and a historical understanding of how differences evolved between the cultures of economic actors.

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LAUREN STOKES, *Fear of the Family: Guest Workers and Family Migration in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Oxford Studies in International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 304 pp. ISBN 978 0 197 55841 6. £27.99

In her book, Lauren Stokes describes how a political culture of fear of the foreign family became the basis of family policy in general in the Federal Republic of Germany. The seven chapters of her book take seriously German fears of foreign families, which in turn created fear within immigrant families (p. 2). She explores this culture of fear in relation to questions of family reunion—specifically grandparents moving to Germany for childcare purposes in the 1960s (ch. 1), the arrival of husbands (ch. 4), the age at which children could be brought to Germany (ch. 7, pp. 196–9), and their right of return in the 1980s (ch. 5)—and in relation to changes to nationality law in 2000 and 2014 (ch. 7, pp. 212–16). This sequence of legal changes could actually be told as a history of progress from tolerance to dual nationality, such as we find in the work of legal scholar Daniel Thym from 2010 onwards.[1] However, Stokes notes in several places in her book, and prominently in her introduction, that the German state's restrictive migration policy legitimized its own conservative, paternalistic, and ultimately racist societal structure—its 'master race' attitude (p. 6) towards foreign families. The fact that Stokes makes no distinction here and elsewhere between fear (affect) and political strategy (agency), or between paternalism (the father) and racism (the oppressor or exploiter), is a central methodological problem in this work, but more on this later.

In essence, as Stokes continues in her introduction, her book aims to provide 'four interrelated arguments' (p. 4) for her fundamental thesis—arguments that go far beyond accretions of fear in the context of migration. First, through its notions about foreign families, the German state 'enforce[d] its own ideas about the appropriate gendered division of labor' (p. 4). Second, this led to the category of family becoming 'a

Translated by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL).

[1] See Daniel Thym, *Migrationsverwaltungsrecht* (Tübingen, 2010); Daniel Thym, 'Migrationsfolgenrecht', *Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtler*, 76 (2017), 169–216.

key site for the production of ideas about racialized difference. In regulating family migration, West Germans thought in racialized categories without using the word "race"' (p. 4). Third, the fact that this racism was not openly addressed had to do with the German state's reluctance to dip rhetorically into the troubled waters of its Nazi past. Fourth and finally, the category of the family made it possible to pursue a neoliberal policy that conformed to the demands of the market and the economy, under which social responsibility was shifted from the state to families. Later in the book, Stokes also presents the last of these points as a forerunner of Germany's Hartz IV policy from the 2000s onwards (p. 142). The introduction to the book thus makes it clear that she intends to make a decisive intervention in the history of migration policy.

Stokes does not share other scholars' focus on the changing political and historical use of terms (as in Ulrich Herbert's *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland*), on a particular phase or the history of a particular group (as in the work of Karin Hunn and Rita Chin), or on the interplay between debates and political decisions (as in Karen Schönwälder's political science study of migration policy in Germany and Great Britain).[2] Rather, in her study of psychological and social phenomena and problems—of fear (affect) and the family—she is far more interested in the much broader relationship between people who immigrate and the societies that do or do not accept them. As such, her focus is not simply on questions of how German governments regulate migration on the basis of legislation and court decisions (as in Daniel Thym's work), or how politicians have negotiated this discursively (as in Karen Schönwälder's book). The broad and methodologically undifferentiated framing of fear and family means that her work centres not on specific issues, but on the far more general inference that fear of the foreign family determined the migration policy of the Federal Republic of Germany from the 1960s, and continues to determine

[2] Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge* (Munich, 2001); Karin Hunn, *'Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück . . .': Die Geschichte der türkischen 'Gastarbeiter' in der Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen, 2005); Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge, 2007); Karen Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren* (Essen, 2001).

it today; moreover, that this fear should not be dismissed as mere xenophobia, as has been the case up to now, but should be clearly labelled as racism (pp. 6–7 and 142–3, among others).

Yet Stokes makes no further attempt to delineate or define either 'fear' or 'racism'. Furthermore, the relationship between the two terms remains completely unclear throughout the book's 226 pages. The affect that stands at the heart of her study is given no analytical foundation, whether cultural, socio-psychological, or psychological. This inevitably raises the question of whether the arguments Stokes sets out in her introduction can be reliably demonstrated on such a precarious definitional basis—one made up more of assertions than clearly elucidated terms. The standard distinction made in cultural theory and social psychology between concrete and abstract fear is not mentioned in Stokes' book; nor is the axiom of cultural history that phenomena such as fear must be situated within specific historical and cultural contexts.[3] But before I overtax the methodology behind *Fear of the Family*, I would first like to describe the history of fear that Stokes has presented in her book and consider the extent to which it is a history at all.

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, her work is divided into seven chronologically organized chapters. Chapter one, 'The "Market-Conforming Family" in the Era of Labor Recruitment', focuses on the guest worker recruitment phase between 1955 and 1973. Here, Stokes draws attention to an interesting political contradiction between the West German interior and labour ministries. While the former ruled out permanent residence for citizens of the Eastern Bloc and non-EEC countries, such as Yugoslavians, Portuguese, Turks, and Spaniards, the latter was interested in workers who would prove their worth to the economy in the long run. Therefore, according to Stokes, families in the first decade of labour migration were seen 'as a solution rather than as a problem' (p. 25). The inclusion of grandparents in labour migration gave a boost to guest workers who were parents. Indeed, when the 1961 labour recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany was revised in 1964, restrictions on contract length were eased and the first family reunions were made possible. However, instead of breaking down the tensions of this situation in detail, as

[3] Lars Koch (ed.), *Angst: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch* (Stuttgart, 2013), 31.

Karin Hunn has done in her work, Stokes fixates on stereotypes—for instance, that German social workers are said to have warned German women against marrying guest workers—without providing broad source evidence (p. 36). She also sees the interior ministry's refusal to grant permanent residence to people from the Eastern Bloc or to non-EEC citizens as clear proof of 'racism of the bureaucracy' (p. 22). Given the political context at the time—namely, a newly formed EEC made up of only six European states (1957), the de facto inner-German division caused by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the most intense phase of the Cold War, and the guiding West German political principle of integration with the West—this claim is at the very least open to question. In fact, the word 'integration' was understood primarily in economic terms in the 1960s and early 1970s.[4] In any case, Stokes does not provide a comparable outline of the political and cultural environments of this period that would serve as a historical frame.

Instead of detailing this cultural historical context, Stokes extends the racism narrative to the labour market by interpreting the increased recruitment of female guest workers in the mid and late 1960s as a policy of not letting 'the German woman' work in order to preserve the 'conservative familial welfare state' (p. 26). But she also provides an alternative explanation by noting that West Berlin had the largest number of female guest workers at this time 'because of its electronics and textile industries' (p. 39). It can be assumed that Berlin was no exception in this regard, and that such companies were also the reason for the recruitment of female workers in other cities. Indeed, this is reflected in works of literature.[5] Yet instead of outlining this complex political and occupational reality, Stokes concludes very firmly that 'while the idea that German and Southern families were mutually incomprehensible might appear benign when used to promote policies

[4] Valentin Rauer, 'Integrationsdebatten in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit (1947–2012): Ein umstrittenes Konzept zwischen "region-building" und "nation-saving"', in Özkan Ezli et al. (eds.), *Die Integrationsdebatte zwischen Assimilation und Diversität: Grenzziehungen in Theorie, Kunst und Gesellschaft* (Bielefeld, 2013), 51–86; Özkan Ezli, *Narrative der Migration: Eine andere deutsche Kulturgeschichte* (Berlin, 2022).

[5] Emine Sevgi Özdamar, *Die Brücken vom Goldenen Horn* (Cologne, 1998); Bekir Yıldız, *Türkler Almanya'da* (Istanbul, 2012).

favorable for family unity, the pervasive assumption of different family values was a form of racialization that could be turned against the best interests of migrants' (p. 26). Stokes' claims are flatly contradicted by the fact that the 1960s and 1970s in particular are associated with many reforms in German family law, introduced under both liberal–conservative and liberal–social democratic governments—including the liberalization of marriage and divorce law.

Yet for Stokes, left–liberal forces were by no means free of racism, as they too 'argued that guest workers came from cultures where the family was particularly important' (pp. 23–6; quotation on p. 25). In addition to German social workers, Stokes also refers to the Italian-born social worker Giacomo Maturi, who saw his compatriots as more emotional than the sober and rational Germans (p. 26). The problem with Stokes' understanding of racism is that every form of stereotyping is treated as racist. From this perspective, the body of literature written in the 1970s and 1980s by guest workers and their descendants would also have to be declared racist, as it produces just as many stereotypes about Germans. The central question about stereotypes, however, is how do they relate to social practices? Are they tools of degradation, unequal treatment, and oppression, or are they motivated by a desire to get to know and understand the other? The last of these impulses generates socio-psychological movements that generally lead, and have led, to the breaking of stereotypes and thus ultimately to a reduction in fear.[6]

The equivalence between stereotyping and racism continues seamlessly into the second chapter, 'The Racialization of Space: Family Housing and Anti-Ghettoization Policy'. Stokes initially attributes the racialization of public space to two political directives relating to guest workers: first, the rule that stipulated a minimum amount of living space in the 1970s in order for any family members to be brought to Germany;

[6] One example from everyday life is the emergence of the Intercultural Weeks in 1975, which are still organized today and involve five thousand events in five hundred cities. The breaking and negotiating of stereotypes in the context of migration are also central themes in literature and film. On the former, see Özkan Ezli, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit: Gegenwart und Geschichte der 'Interkulturellen Woche'. Eine vergleichende kulturwissenschaftliche Untersuchung zu den Mittel- und Großstädten Gera, Jena, Konstanz und Offenbach*, Expertise im Auftrag des Sachverständigenrats für Integration und Migration für das SVR-Jahresgutachten (Berlin, 2021); on the latter, see Ezli, *Narrative der Migration*.

and second, anti-ghettoization measures from the mid 1970s onwards, implemented primarily in Berlin, which were designed to prevent the emergence of highly concentrated nationally and ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods, like Harlem in New York (pp. 48 and 58–9). The first of these measures was a problem for guest workers not so much because of the existence of standoffish or sometimes outright xenophobic German landlords, but because the guest workers either could not afford higher rents or did not want to pay them, preferring to save their hard-earned money for their return to Turkey, Portugal, or Italy. By the time recruitment was stopped in 1973, two-thirds of the guest workers who had immigrated between 1955 and 1973 had returned to their countries of origin. It was not only the German government that saw the recruitment of guest workers as temporary, but also the guest workers themselves and, in particular, the nations they came from. From the 1970s onwards, labour migrants from Turkey made up the largest group of foreigners in Germany—over one million people—and among this population, the slogan *nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück* ('next year we'll go back') retained its force until the 1990s. After all, they wanted to invest their hard-earned money in their own futures back in their countries of origin, whose governments were also very interested in an influx of cash. In the meantime, if it was possible to move to a neighbourhood whose residents spoke the same language, so much the better.

However, Stokes does not acknowledge this larger motivational context. Instead, she concentrates on the unquantifiable phenomenon of the 'unreported foreign child' (p. 55) in cases where guest workers lacked space in their homes and were afraid that their landlords might report them. This is certainly not a negligible aspect of the issue, but it can hardly be taken as representative of the period as a whole. This is shown simply by the fact that after recruitment stopped, the number of foreigners rose from 2.7 million to 4.5 million by the early 1980s as a result of family reunions.[7] These figures go unmentioned in Stokes'

[7] Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität*, 628; Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, *Heimat Babylon: Das Wagnis der multikulturellen Demokratie* (Hamburg, 1993), 340; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 'Soziale Situation in Deutschland: Ausländische Bevölkerung', *kurz&knapp*, 1 Jan. 2022, at [https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61622/auslaendische-bevoelkerung], accessed 15 Aug. 2024.

book. In contrast, the phenomenon of the 'unreported child' is linked to a report from a meeting at the labour ministry on March 1972 whose problematic phrasing, in Stokes' view, reflects the true basis of German immigration policy: 'Creating space [*Lebensraum*] for the foreign workers who stay would mean limiting the space [*Lebensraum*] of the other people who live in the Federal Republic' (p. 58). Here Stokes draws particular attention to the report's use of a National Socialist term.

Stokes then moves on to the second measure she considers important in the 1970s—namely, anti-ghettoization. In 1975, Berlin became the first federal state to ban foreigners from moving to particular neighbourhoods—specifically Kreuzberg, Wedding, and Tiergarten. The aim, as the author notes, was 'to prevent the creation of "American-style" ghettos' (p. 63). For Stokes, the problem with the measure was that, unlike similar bans elsewhere in Germany, it affected not only the immigration of guest workers' extended families, but also their spouses and children. Stokes refers to just one source here. However, a simple internet search reveals that exceptions could be made in cases of hardship, as reported in the *Berliner Morgenpost*.[8] In fact, 46 per cent of residents in these districts were foreigners. The ban, which remained in place until the early 1980s, could therefore also be seen as societally integrative; indeed, similar arguments have been made for the decentralized distribution of refugees since 2016.[9] But Stokes interprets it differently. Whereas 'the "adequate housing" requirement supposedly protected foreigners from living in flats that were too small', the real motivation for anti-ghettoization is clear: it 'protected foreigners from living with their family members so that society would not see them as a threatening mass' (p. 67).

It is true that the Federal Republic of Germany did not see itself politically as a country of immigration, and also acted restrictively

[8] 'Gescheitert: Zuzugssperre gegen Ghettobildung', *Berliner Morgenpost*, 6 Mar. 2003, at [https://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/berlin/article102204468/Gescheitert-Zuzugssperre-gegen-Ghettobildung.html], accessed 18 July 2024.
[9] Jürgen Friedrichs, Felix Leßke, and Vera Schwarzenberg, 'Sozialräumliche Integration von Flüchtlingen: Das Beispiel Hamburg-Harvesthude', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (2017), at [https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/251223/sozialraeumliche-integration-von-fluechtlingen-das-beispiel-hamburg-harvestehude], accessed 15 August 2024.

with regard to the consequences of labour migration. But it is also true that measures were adopted which to an extent acknowledged the new reality of immigration. For instance, a rule was introduced in Berlin 'that publicly subsidized housing associations must allocate to foreign citizens 15 per cent of the homes they renovate or build in what at the time were peripheral areas, such as Britz, Buckow, Rudow, the Märkisches Viertel, Mariendorf, and Lichtenrade.'[10] Another example is the establishment in 1975 of the Intercultural Weeks, an accessible cultural event whose main aim was to pose an enlightened counterpoint to the polarizing debates surrounding immigration.[11] These positive, social aspects go unmentioned by Stokes. Instead, government restrictions and support alike are subsumed under the effects of structural racism—a thread that runs through the book until the final chapter, and also shapes the epilogue.

This is emphatically demonstrated in the fifth and longest chapter, '"Foreign Parents Violate the Rights of the Children": Restricting Child Migration in the Name of Child Welfare', which focuses on the 1980s—a period labelled in many works as the lost decade of integration.[12] With the foreign population rising from 2.7 to 4.5 million, the Federal Republic became a de facto country of immigration. At the same time, the 1980s were the decade in which the dictum that the Federal Republic was not a country of immigration was most strongly articulated politically. Evidence of this can be seen in the 1983 law promoting the decision to return (*Gesetz zur Förderung der Rückkehrentscheidung*), with which Chancellor Helmut Kohl sought to halve the number of foreigners in Germany. Yet in contrast to the recently reported 'remigration plans' of the Alternative für Deutschland and the right-wing extremist Martin Sellner, there was no obligation to emigrate; instead, individuals opting to return were given a one-off payment of up to 10,000 Deutschmarks. Very few foreigners took up the offer, however.

[10] 'Gescheitert: Zuzugssperre gegen Ghettobildung'.

[11] Ezli, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit*, 33.

[12] Klaus Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880–1980* (Berlin, 1983); Klaus Bade, *Migration – Flucht – Integration: Kritische Politikbegleitung von der 'Gastarbeiterfrage' bis zur 'Flüchtlingskrise'. Erinnerungen und Beiträge* (Karlsruhe, 2017).

In fact, the discourse in the 1980s was marked by religious national ascriptions and self-descriptions, for cultural essentialism did not solely emanate from the German side; many Turks did not want to become German citizens either. This is reflected in the founding of religious and nationalist associations on the one hand, and the increase in Turkish coffee-houses and grocery shops as a self-imposed form of cultural essentialism on the other.[13] But here, too, Stokes unfortunately only sees cultural ascriptions from the German side at work, and she links these very closely with family law issues, such as the two-year waiting period for newly arrived children and young people (p. 117). The fact that this waiting period was tied to preparatory classes, which many participants described as important for getting settled in Germany,[14] is hinted at by Stokes, but not meaningfully considered. Concrete, positive statements like these play no role at all; instead, Stokes writes once again of xenophobia and ultimately racism disguised as humanism in the spirit of Western values (p. 142). The subtitle of the fifth chapter forcefully demonstrates how Stokes hammers home her core claim that the Germans have always seen themselves as a 'master race'.

This disregard for historical specifics in favour of abstractions and sweeping statements also comes up when Stokes addresses the topic of the second generation. Here, she accuses the authors Achim Schrader, Bruno W. Nikles, and Hartmut M. Griese, like Germany's government and politicians before them, of making racist arguments without once using the word 'racism' (p. 144). It is certainly true that the three sociologists contrasted the 'foreign' with the 'German', and viewed the former term as carrying some stigma. However, their actual focus was on socialization processes, such as facilitating contact with Germans and promoting language acquisition. They understood stigmatization as a product of social interactions—as being connected to a process, and

[13] Rauf Ceylan, *Ethnische Kolonien: Entstehung, Funktion und Wandel am Beispiel türkischer Moscheen und Cafés* (Wiesbaden, 2006).

[14] Consider e.g. the Turkish immigrants who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s whom I interviewed for my current project 'Gefühlskulturen in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft zwischen Verweigerung und Teilhabe' (2021–5), in partnership with Levent Tezcan and funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research.

possible to overcome. In their work, 'German' is a placeholder for a linguistic and social mode of acquiring the public lingua franca.[15] Stokes at no point acknowledges the difficulties that arise when a child or young person is uprooted from their familiar surroundings and arrives in another country where they are unfamiliar with the language and customs. Immigrants do not stand at the centre of her work; instead, she focuses on what Germans said and what they really meant by it.[16]

In the process, Stokes often indiscriminately mixes legal texts with political discourse, as with the protracted debates about the maximum immigration age for children and adolescents in the 1980s. Although the idea of reducing the age limit to six was never brought into law, it plays an unduly prominent role in the second third of the book (pp. 159–201). This is probably because two of her central theses converge here: first, she sees the idea as confirming the German fear of foreigners, and especially of their children; and second, she posits that it revealed the true racist attitude of the Federal Republic, because this and other legislative proposals have always been justified as being in the best interests of the child or the family. However, the supposedly decisive role played by fear as a political emotion is undermined by the fact that no such law was ever passed.

Indeed, Stokes' book is consistently distant from reality and everyday life. This is also evident in the sixth chapter, 'Marriage, Deportation, and the Politics of Vulnerability'. Although the topic of violence by male Turkish guest workers against their wives is touched upon here with reference to women's shelters, her conclusion, as in the previous chapters, is: 'All of these women experienced West German migration policy, not Turkish culture, as an obstacle to their self-fulfillment' (p. 176). Yet, after carrying out more than seventy qualitative interviews, I have found that the majority of first- and second-generation women with a Turkish or Arab background say the exact opposite: their problem was not the German state, but rather the

[15] Achim Schrader, Bruno W. Nikles, and Hartmut M. Gries, *Die Zweite Generation: Sozialisation und Akkulturation ausländischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik* (Kronberg, 1976), 194.

[16] The voices of immigrants remain marginal; see e.g. Aras Ören, *Die Fremde ist auch ein Haus: Berlin-Poem*, trans. Gisela Kraft (Berlin, 1980), or Şerif Gören's 1979 film *Almanya Aci Vatan* ('Germany, Bitter Homeland').

'imported Turkish groom [*ithal damat*]' who substantially restricted their lives in Germany.[17]

In the last part of her book, Stokes again addresses the fact that prior to the amendment of the law on foreigners (*Ausländergesetz*), immigrants could bring their spouses to Germany after eight years of residence, but not their children if they were over 16 (p. 202). Stokes sees both the immigration age limit of 16 and the right of children of guest workers to return to Germany between the ages of 18 and 21 (the latter established with the 1990 amendment) as restrictive. In other words, a measure tending in the opposite direction and giving young people the opportunity to *return* to Germany within a three-year window is presented as another form of restriction. Stokes explains that the right to return removes children from their parents and thus 'irrevocably split[s] the family within migration policy' (p. 215). However, this option can also be understood quite differently: as a means of recognizing foreign adults who have spent time living in Germany as children, and of legally granting them the opportunity to make a decision rather than depriving them of it. Although Stokes mentions this autonomy, in the same sentence she turns it into a negative and links it to the theme of her book by emphasizing that 'Children who used the "return option" were unable to sponsor their parents or siblings for family migration' (p. 215).

Stokes concludes with a similarly problematic and decontextualized discussion of the changes in nationality law between 1999 and 2014—from *jus sanguinis*, via the option model, to dual citizenship (pp. 207–16). Here, the acquisition of a residence permit by an 18-year-old in 1981 is treated as equivalent to the attainment of dual citizenship in 2014. This dismissal of critical developments in migration and nationality law, which form the basis for the 2016 integration act (*Integrationsgesetz*) and the new naturalization act passed in 2024, is reiterated in Stokes' conclusion. There, she writes about the treatment of Syrian refugees: 'while many politicians have insisted that their actions since the summer of 2015 have been reactions to an unprecedented "refugee crisis", *Fear of the Family* has shown that these lawmakers are in fact drawing on a repertoire of arguments that has existed for decades' (p. 225).

[17] Ezli and Tezcan, 'Gefühlskulturen in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft zwischen Verweigerung und Teilhabe' (2021–5).

If this is Stokes' core claim, can we really call *Fear of the Family* a work of (cultural) history? Unfortunately, we cannot. Rather than a nuanced study that cleaves close to facts and context, it should be seen as an activist one that substitutes certainty for complexity, and paints a picture of stasis and restriction instead of dynamic change. This book supposedly shows that German political culture has liberalized and westernized, 'but . . . that this process entailed adopting the exclusions of gender and race inherent to liberalism' (p. 217). But Stokes does not show us how racism and freedom are connected; how legal reliefs for foreigners and their children, the replacement of *jus sanguinis* with options for dual nationality, and the introduction of anti-discrimination laws at federal and state level are fundamentally racist and sexist; or how all this is linked to fear of the family. The history of structurally democratic developments suggests rather the opposite—namely, the overcoming of xenophobia and racism. When these sentiments do emerge, such as in the National Socialist Underground or at the Potsdam meeting in November 2023, it is for different reasons: these actors fear and hate not only immigrants, but also the German democratic state.

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LINDA MCDOUGALL, *Marcia Williams: The Life and Times of Baroness Falkender* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2023), 304 pp. ISBN 978 1 785 90752 4. £25.00

The first woman to wield political power from 10 Downing Street was, in the eyes of many contemporary observers, not Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s but, one and a half decades earlier, Marcia Williams (or Lady Falkender, as she was officially known after her ennoblement in 1974). As a close confidante of Harold Wilson, she was widely known for her extraordinary influence on the Labour prime minister of the 1960s and 1970s, and equally widely feared for her extremely confrontational manner. Male members of Wilson's staff hated her fervently, and in the end, media investigations into her many scandals ruined her public reputation—and a good deal of Wilson's as well. Now, the journalist and television producer Linda McDougall has written the first biography of Williams, who died in 2019. *The Life and Times of Baroness Falkender* is a book that explicitly 'seeks to rescue Marcia . . . from the patronising, misogynistic and dismissive verdicts of various male enemies and to suggest a more nuanced . . . understanding of her actions' (p. xi).

The book is also explicitly not 'academic'. The author does not provide footnotes, and she has not bothered much with archival sources or academic literature either. Instead she relies mainly on interviews and her personal recollections. Since McDougall was married to the late Labour MP Austin Mitchell and knew many of her protagonists personally (though not Lady Falkender herself), her narrative is very much an insider's story, as evidenced by her frequent use of first names: it's not only Marcia, it's Harold, Joe, and so on. From an academic standpoint, this very subjective approach has more than a few shortcomings. But the author is certainly right in calling for historiography to tell 'more women's stories—the good, the bad and the mundane' (p. xiii)—and it is not her fault that academic historians have so far largely ignored the infamous 'Marcia saga'.

In the better parts of her book, the author's non-academic approach actually allows her to see some aspects more clearly than is usually the case in the methodologically still rather old-fashioned political historiography in Britain. This is certainly true in relation to

'gender', but partly also in relation to 'class'. More than other authors, she emphasizes what an unorthodox figure the down-to-earth Yorkshireman Harold Wilson still was at the top level of British politics when he first became prime minister in 1964—and not just from the perspective of the upper-class Tory establishment but also from that of the upper-middle-class 'Gaitskellites' in the Labour Party. Marcia Williams, born in Northamptonshire in 1932 and therefore sixteen years his junior, shared Wilson's background in the aspirational lower middle classes (characteristically, her mother had told her children that she was an illegitimate daughter of King Edward VII). Having attended grammar school on a scholarship, Williams went on to study history at Queen Mary College in London. Among McDougall's very few genuine archival discoveries are Williams' reports as secretary of the student Labour Society at Queen Mary. After graduating, Williams gained further qualifications at a secretarial college. From 1956, she worked as a secretary at Transport House, the headquarters of the Labour Party, where she first met Wilson, then shadow chancellor. The two soon formed a working partnership that, according to McDougall, had never been seen before in British politics 'between a man and a woman at the top of the political ladder' (p. xi). This, of course, ignores the important role of Frances Stevenson as a close confidante of David Lloyd George. Unlike Stevenson, however, Williams entered Downing Street in 1964 not as the prime minister's secret mistress (although there may have been a short-lived affair in the late 1950s), but as his senior political adviser.

Working in the newly created role of political secretary to the prime minister, Williams had to fight the civil service very hard to gain access to government documents, let alone proper office space in 10 Downing Street. McDougall is certainly right to attribute much of the resistance to Williams in Whitehall to misogynistic attitudes within the upper echelons of the civil service, which in those days still operated much like an informal gentlemen's club. Williams herself had always explained her experiences in this way. However, there was also a more systemic side to the conflict. The civil servants in the private office at Number Ten had always been accustomed to monopolizing access to the prime minister in order to ensure the consistency of government activities. Williams' new role was the first official

acknowledgement of the fact that the prime minister also remained a party leader and needed to communicate with his base. For Whitehall's mandarins in the 1960s and to some extent still in the 1970s, Labour's 'politicization' of the core executive through special advisers was seen as anathema to the much vaunted tradition of civil service impartiality. That curtailing the mandarins could indeed hamper the government's efficiency was demonstrated by the tragic case of Michael Halls, a relatively junior civil servant whom Wilson, because of his personal loyalty, promoted—against the advice of the head of the civil service—to the role of his principal private secretary, a job that proved to be far above his capabilities. When he died from a heart attack in 1970, overstrained and overworked, his widow sued the government for damages, accusing Williams of having harassed her husband to death.

Williams' manner of constantly harassing, bullying, shouting, and screaming at everyone in the office, first and foremost Wilson himself in front of all his staff, has been documented in detail in the memoirs and diaries of two of Wilson's other senior advisers: his press spokesman Joe Haines and Bernard Donoughue, head of the Downing Street Policy Unit. However, McDougall rightly points out that their accounts portraying Williams as a hysterical woman mainly cover Wilson's last term in office from 1974 to 1976—a period when Williams was clearly in a troubled and unstable state of mind—but do not extend back to the 1960s, when she was unanimously recognized as an efficient political operator. Williams' obvious mental decline in the 1970s is explained quite convincingly by the author as due to her increasing addiction to all manner of pills at a time and in an environment that, from today's perspective, were dangerously tolerant of drug use. To cope with her workload, Williams frequently took amphetamines ('purple hearts') and then combined them with tranquillizers prescribed by Wilson's doctor Joseph Stone (who, Haines reports, at one stage suggested '"dispos[ing]" of Marcia . . . in the interest of freeing Harold from the burden'; p. 264), as well as too much alcohol at the almost daily receptions at Number Ten. As McDougall sharply observes, it is a remarkable failure by Haines and Donoughue that, obsessed as they were with Williams' strange behaviour, they at no point in their books seem to wonder *why* she

behaved so strangely, or whether she might in fact have been in desperate need of help (p. 150).

Williams became even more unstable in 1974 when the press began investigating her personal affairs, whether it was dubious property deals involving her family, or the revelation that she had had two children in the late 1960s following an affair with a married *Daily Mail* political correspondent—a 'scandal' that had been kept secret for many years with threats of legal action by Wilson's lawyer Arnold Goodman. At the height of the media intrusion into Williams' private life, Wilson (as McDougall aptly puts it) 'raised two fingers to the press' (p. 178), and, to the complete surprise of everyone in Westminster, elevated his confidante to the House of Lords. She chose the title 'Baroness Falkender' because in the fairy tale her mother had told her, Falkender had been the name of the 'aide-de-camp' who covered for the king by claiming to be her father. Here, McDougall misses the politically more relevant point that by the time Wilson gave Marcia her peerage, Whitehall's proverbial 'corridors of power' had been shaken by the frightful rumour that the prime minister's real plan was to make Williams, the most critical of all civil service critics, a Lords minister for civil service reform (a rumour that turned out to be unsubstantiated).

The infamous 'Marcia saga' reached its climax in 1976, when Wilson resigned from government and, in his last act as prime minister, destroyed much of his reputation with a resignation honours list—allegedly handwritten by Lady Falkender on purple paper and therefore dubbed the 'Lavender List' by the press—that handed out knighthoods and peerages far too generously to cronies of both Wilson and Lady Falkender. Significantly, the latter never denied that she had written the list, but was later at pains to point out that the lavender-coloured paper had not been her own, but simply happened to be lying around the office. Lady Falkender lived another forty years after leaving Downing Street, but these are only sketched in a few paragraphs in this biography. The Lady never made her maiden speech in the upper house, but humiliated herself by sending begging letters to her fellow Lords when she ran out of money in old age. As late as 2006, she successfully sued the BBC to suppress the docudrama *The Lavender List*. At one point in the book, McDougall

also mentions the BBC comedy series *Yes Minister* (p. 112), but she seems unaware that Falkender—along with Donoughue, ironically—was a primary source for the writers of this ultimate satire on the politics–administration dichotomy, and that the character of Dorothy Wainwright was modelled on her.

McDougall's interest in Marcia Williams is primarily, if not exclusively, centred on her role as a pioneer for women at the top of British politics. It has to be said that, in order to emphasize this, the author repeatedly falls into the amateur trap of overinflating her protagonist's importance. Reading her account of the 1964 general election, for example, one might get the impression that Williams won it more or less single-handedly for the Labour Party, which is of course nonsense. It should also be made clear that even at the height of her influence, Williams never exercised any real power in government. Her brief in Downing Street was always limited to party matters, and she had little to do with the key policy decisions of the Wilson governments, be it devaluation, applying for entry to the Common Market (which she personally strongly opposed), or the 'social contract'.

It is also unfortunate that McDougall fails to take a closer and more systematic look at Williams' other, at least equally important pioneering role, namely that of the first modern 'special adviser'. Since the days when Williams first entered Downing Street in 1964, special advisers have undoubtedly become some of the most powerful informal players in British politics. Andrew Blick dubbed them 'people who live in the dark' in the title of his early analysis of the spad phenomenon in 2004.[1] But since at least the day Dominic Cummings tested his eyesight at Barnard Castle and was subsequently allowed to give a press conference in the rose garden of Number Ten, everyone knows that quite the opposite is true. Special advisers are constantly in the public eye and were so right from the start, as proven by the hundreds of press photos of Williams, Haines, Donoughue, and all their successors up to the days of David Cameron walking just a few paces behind their respective ministers. By contrast, in the case of civil servants, one struggles to find a single photograph showing even the most legendary Whitehall

[1] Andrew Blick, *People Who Live in the Dark: The History of the Special Adviser in British Politics* (London, 2004).

figures together with their political masters. Edward Bridges and Norman Brook, Britain's most influential civil servants in the 1940s and 1950s, were pictured 'together' with Winston Churchill only once, and that was when they followed his coffin up the steps of St Paul's Cathedral. In contrast, Marcia Williams, as the first modern special adviser, was already a well-known public figure, and one who was already surrounded by political scandals, too.

And one more characteristic feature of the spad phenomenon can be traced right back to the Wilson years. Notwithstanding the territorial fights between special advisers and the civil service, a closer look at the Wilson governments reveals—and this lesson holds true for all succeeding governments up to the days of Boris Johnson and Liz Truss—that the most brutal confrontations always take place elsewhere, namely between the rival camps of the special advisers themselves. Unlike their equally unelected but at least constitutionally secured counterparts in the civil service, Williams and her kind had no other source of legitimation than the personal trust of the prime minister—and hence in Wilson's time we already see deeply bitter fights for this scarce resource among his 'kitchen cabinet'.

Limiting herself thematically to the gender aspects of her story, McDougall seems at times surprisingly unfamiliar with basic institutions of the British administrative system, for example confusing commonly known civil service ranks such as 'permanent secretary' and 'principal private secretary' (see for example p. 93). There are also some minor factual errors in the reconstruction of Marcia Williams' biography. Lady Falkender's interview with Judith Chalmers in 1984, for example, was by no means her only television appearance; she was also interviewed by the BBC on the night of the 1979 general election. Far more annoying, at least for the academic reader, is the author's emphatically personal and sometimes naive narrative style. Time and again, McDougall interrupts her real story to tell anecdotes from her own life in the 1960s and 1970s which often bear little relation to the topic of her book. The topic itself is without question very interesting and relevant—but overall, it could have been much better told.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Other Histories, Other Pasts. International conference organized by and held at ICAS:MP, New Delhi, on 4–6 December 2023. Conveners: Indra Sengupta (GHIL) and Neeladri Bhattacharya (Ashoka University).

How do we understand popular historical consciousness and the ways in which it constitutes political subjectivities? To grasp this, we need to move beyond academic history writing, the limitations of which in shaping wider political movements have become manifestly clear in recent times. In order to better understand the often mutually constitutive relationship between the production and practice of history and the larger world of the political, we need to track the processes that go into the making of notions of the past beyond the realm of academic history. This also means a shift away from the nation state-centred approach that has traditionally been associated with the growth in influence of the discipline as we know it since its modern, nineteenth-century appearance. It means looking at the framing of historical narratives and their political uses for the assertion of multiple identities which may not have engaged with the nation state or, if they did, did so in various, intricate ways that defy the framework of national or larger regional narratives of the past. To unpack these complicated framings of the past and grasp the way they shape political action, we need to look at the production, circulation, and consumption of historical narratives on smaller, local levels and at sites where the nation, the region, and other larger entities were reconfigured in ways specific to a place. This is the research agenda of 'Selling Histories', a sub-project of the 'History as a Political Category' research area of ICAS:MP, a 12-year Indo-German and international research project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and based in New Delhi, of which the German Historical Institute London is a

partner. The conference was the final one of the sub-project during ICAS:MP's main funding phase.

The conference was designed to explore research questions that were framed in relation to the popular historical tracts and tourist guides with small, localized circulation that had been collected from various sites in India as part of the 'Selling Histories' project. It thus focused on the world of what are generally called 'popular' histories that circulate in the public sphere outside the domain of academic history, and examined the ways in which such histories represent historical consciousness and political assertion. The objective of the conference was to explore how such narratives work, and the ways in which they are mediated by and constitute the political. The focus was mainly on India, but transnational comparative perspectives were included. The conference consisted of five thematic sessions, including a section based on the collection of sources assembled since 2018 under the ICAS:MP sub-project 'Selling Histories': 1) History and the Public; 2) Writing the Community; 3) Histories and Archives in the Digital Age; 4) Writing Caste; and 5) Collecting Popular Histories: A Panel.

Neeladri Bhattacharya introduced the intellectual agenda of the conference by unpacking some of its conceptual categories and highlighting some of the problems associated with history outside the academy. Focusing on the term 'other' in the title of the conference, he addressed some of the conceptual and methodological issues that arise when dealing with such 'imaginings of the past', the politics of such narratives, and the role of these narratives in mediating the public sphere or what he described as the 'public life of history'. In such conceptions of the past, he argued, the very idea of history, as historians (experts) practise it, is open to question. This point would be picked up by several of the papers that followed, which engaged with the question of audiences and consumers of such histories, the visions of the past that the narratives contained, and the strategies of narration that were employed. In particular, Bhattacharya focused on the term 'popular histories', which is commonly used to describe such narratives of the past. He emphasized the need to sharpen the definition of the terms and categories we use to analyse such narratives, drawing the lines between categories such as 'popular', 'other', 'local', and 'vernacular', which several papers would expand on. He

underlined the distinction between popular and populist histories, and what are often described as histories of 'the people'. What is the relationship between such narratives and academic histories of subjugation? How do these narratives challenge, even subvert, the protocols of academic historiography? What protocols of archiving apply to these histories? Who is the expert? What remains of the role of the academic historian as an expert? How are these histories entangled with official or academic ones? How can one grasp the entanglements between such popular histories and elite history writing? These were some of the questions that were flagged for discussion.

The first panel on 'History and the Public' (Chair: Berber Bevernage, Ghent University) went straight to the heart of the questions set out in the introductory remarks. Aparna Vaidik (Ashoka University) spoke on 'The Practice of Public History', focusing on ethics. She drew on her experience as a practitioner working closely with communities in India to question the intellectual authority of the historian, the official archive, the ethics of archiving, and the evidence-centric practice of academic history. In a provocative plea to historians to rethink their position as experts, Vaidik urged the decentring of the role of the specialist in producing history, emphasized the role of history and historians in building solidarities with the communities whose histories we write, and called for historians to focus on the *process of producing* history rather than the *product*, describing the practice of public history as a 'moral act'. In his paper on 'Histories at Risk', Jerome de Groot (University of Manchester) addressed similar issues. Basing his presentation on the work of the AHRC-funded Histories at Risk Network, de Groot spoke on public history both in the national context of Britain (especially in current debates on history and heritage) and on a global scale, and, like Vaidik, he drew attention to the role of the historian as an activist. In the final paper of the section, titled 'Birth of A Genre: The Local in Amateur Bengali Historical Writings and Identity Formation among Modern Bengali Hindus', Tanika Sarkar (Ashoka University) spoke about the writing of local histories in colonial provincial Bengal and the emergence in peripheral regions of a vernacular modernity, a sense of place, and a localized public sphere in the nineteenth century. These histories, she argued, were

distinct from the national histories written in Bengali that were prominent at the time.

The session on 'Writing the Community' (Chair: Andreas Gestrich, formerly Trier University) further developed the themes introduced in the previous section in relation to the formation of community identities (often geographically defined), their political claims, and the historical narratives that supported such claims. The two papers 'Narrating the German *Heimat* after 1945: Vernacular Histories in a Post-Fascist Democracy' (Martina Steber, Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History, Munich, and University of Augsburg) and 'Community History as Critique: Muslim Peshawar *Biradaris* and the Politics of Contestation in Colonial India' (Soheb Niazi, International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden) engaged with the writing of non-professional, vernacular histories that were fundamentally linked to the formation and politicization of communities. In her presentation, Steber dwelt on the genre of *Heimatbücher* that was widely popularized in Germany, and especially in Bavaria, until the end of the twentieth century. In these books, the idea of the *Heimat* (homeland) and a selective focus on historical events were used to construct the idea of a harmonious community with a continuous history that by and large glossed over the tumultuous events of the twentieth century. Soheb Niazi analysed local, community histories (*tarikhs*) produced by upwardly mobile, but non-elite, Muslim groups in colonial North India and argued that these were essentially a contestation of traditional Muslim elites and their historical claims to higher social status. In his paper 'Tracts of the Gita Press and the Making of Hindu Nationalism: *Adarsh Nari* and the Ideal Male Child', Akshaya Mukul (independent, Delhi) explored the world of the Gita Press, which produced tracts seeking to shape the moral world of Hindu women in North India from the 1920s onwards.

The two papers in the session on 'Histories and Archives in the Digital Age' (Chair: Ravi Vasudevan, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi) reflected the growing importance of new media and non-official archives in the production and circulation of history today. In her paper 'Archival Traffic: Crowdsourcing History in South Asia', Mallika Leuzinger (GHIL) analysed the citizen memory projects that have witnessed a remarkable surge in the age of the internet and social media. The problems associated with the official archive in South

Asia resulted in a boom in crowdsourced history and the rise of the citizen historian. This itself was not unproblematic, she argued, especially in view of the involvement of large corporations in such projects and the capitalist mode of financing that underpinned such ostensibly citizen-driven enterprises. Ronie Parciak's (Tel Aviv University) paper 'New Oral Traditions: Historical Narratives in the Digital Age' dwelt on Sufi visual narratives of the history of Sufism in India and showed that such forms of historical production were intimately linked to the political situation today. She argued that these representations indicate attempts by the Sufi community to negotiate their closeness to political power, on the one hand by assimilating Hindu styles and symbols to indicate the Indianness of Sufism, and on the other by referencing the sacred geography of Islam outside India.

The session on 'Writing Caste' (Chair: Indra Sengupta) focused on the self-produced histories of particular caste groups that reflect their significant use of caste-based claims to history and thereby to political recognition. Deepasri Baul (Asian University for Women, Chattogram) in her paper 'An Aversion to Progress: The Cultural Habitus of North Indian Caste Histories' and Neeladri Bhattacharya in his presentation on 'Recovering the Lost Self: Brahman Histories and the Politics of Hegemony' focused on upper-caste/Brahman anxieties surrounding a perceived lost status in present histories, and consequent attempts to restore honour by invoking the past to make truth claims. Both presenters emphasized the long tradition of such truth claims, which can be traced back to the late nineteenth century and the early stages of anticolonial nationalism in India. Baul spoke of attempts to present the vision of a harmonious nation untroubled by social conflict, as opposed to the problem-oriented historical analyses of professional historians, which these upper-caste writings often tend to dismiss as divisive. This kind of history, she argued, resonates with the corporate-produced self-help books on self-esteem and positive thinking that are present in the book market in India today. Neeladri Bhattacharya highlighted the importance of the internet, digital media, and technology in circulating images of male Hindu historical figures. These, he argued, were recast through the use of digital technology as the embodiment of virility in an attempt to reclaim for Brahmans their perceived loss of honour in the present. He focused

in particular on Brahman and upper-caste non-professional historians and writers in the Indian diaspora in the West who are actively engaged in producing such historical representations both within the diaspora community and in India. In her paper 'Another History? Dalit Dissent and the Genre of *Anchalik Itihas* and Archaeology in Coastal Bengal', Neha Chatterji (Manipal Academy of Higher Education) demonstrated the link between caste histories and claims to regional identity and political assertion by focusing on histories produced by lower-caste groups in the Sundarbans, a region perceived as being on the margins of Bengal. She highlighted the ways in which local, lower-caste, Dalit writers made demands for recognition of the particularity of their region and its culture by producing historical narratives that used archaeological discoveries to lay claim to historical antiquity.

The conference ended with a final session on 'Collecting Popular Histories: A Panel' that presented research conducted by the early-career scholars associated with the 'Selling Histories' sub-project. The research was based largely on the source collection of the same name that had been assembled in a period of around seven years by a team of early-career scholars led by Neeladri Bhattacharya and Indra Sengupta. The collection consists of around 1,400 texts in five Indian languages, including English—mostly tracts and pamphlets produced cheaply by local presses, enjoying limited circulation, and written by authors of no particular distinction. The collection was presented by Neeladri Bhattacharya and Indra Sengupta. Deepasri Baul, Soheb Niazi, Ufaque Paiker (ICAS:MP), and Paulami Guha Biswas (Panchla Mahavidyalaya, Howrah) presented their early research findings. The presentations were followed by comments by Ravikant (CSDS, Delhi), Martina Steber, and Aparna Vaidik. The discussion raised questions about the usefulness of such a collection and debated whether it can be described as an archive, since in many ways it does not conform to the protocols of modern day archiving as established by institutions rooted in the Western academy. It also returned to the research agenda of the conference by engaging with questions such as: what constitutes an archive? What is the role of state power as reflected in archival holdings? How can one distinguish between 'popular' and academic history? What is the role of place and the 'local' in the

production and circulation of these texts? What notion of the public is implicit in such collection drives? What is popular history, and what remains, or should remain, of the authority of the professional historian and of academic history? What is, or should be, the wider, public culture of history? A final summing-up of the conference was then presented by Shail Mayaram (CSDS), Berber Bevernage, and Andreas Gestrich.

Indra Sengupta (GHIL)

Gender Regimes in Modern History. Workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London; Royal Holloway, University of London; and the University of Duisburg-Essen. Held at Senate House, London, 18–19 December 2023. Conveners: Sylvia Walby (Royal Holloway, University of London) and Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL). Supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Anneliese Maier Research Award granted to Sylvia Walby.

This workshop brought together a small group of sociologists and historians who are currently working towards a special issue of a journal on the topic of gender regimes in modern history. Sociology theorizes patterns of gender relations and gender inequality as gender regimes, and has linked their change over time to macro-developments such as the rise of modernity, democracy, capitalism, and colonialism. Walby theorizes the transition from a 'domestic' gender regime—marked by limited female political participation, gendered public/private spheres, and no regulation of domestic violence—to different varieties of a 'public' gender regime, in which women are active members of the paid workforce and politics, and domestic violence is criminalized. History as a field has been relatively slow to put the concept to wider use. The interdisciplinary workshop asked how a focus on gender regimes could change and enrich historical metanarratives and periodizations, and conversely, how the social sciences and their theories of gender regimes might benefit from taking up historical research even more than they currently do.

The two-day interdisciplinary dialogue raised theoretical and methodical questions about different evidence regimes and macro-level narratives in the two disciplines. It was based on pre-circulated contributions—some historical, some sociological, all with a macro-historical perspective—to facilitate in-depth discussion. All papers engaged with case studies in different national or comparative global settings and were theoretically focused on the development of different varieties of public gender regimes (neoliberal, social democratic, or authoritarian) in countries during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and their respective pathways from domestic to public gender regimes. Three contributions dealt with Germany in the twentieth century, one with the United

Kingdom in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, one with the European Union since 1957, and one with a comparative global database from 1975 to 2015.

Sylvia Walby analysed historical changes in the regulation of gendered violence in the United Kingdom's gender regime since the introduction of female suffrage in 1918 and 1928. She traced the intersection of legal changes and feminist projects, including the removal of the marital rape exemption and the extension of welfare support to victims. She proposed using gender regime theory to address historical processes, including critical turning points in path-dependent trajectories and complex spirals of gender restructuring that resulted from civil societal waves. The debate threw up questions of uneven development and the historically typical simultaneous presence of more and less gender-equal practices and norms.

Isabel Heinemann (University of Bayreuth) presented on parliamentary women's networks and the patriarchal family in the early Federal Republic of Germany. She scrutinized how informal parliamentary women's networks and women's political organizations lobbied during the 1950s and 1960s for democratic rights and political participation within a gender regime that privileged male economic and political agency. The transition from domestic to public gender regimes was slow, contradictory, and moved along by actors who would not have called themselves feminists. The discussion centred on the presence of critical turning points, the different meanings of 'emancipation' and 'feminism', and the incremental layering of gains in the four different domains of the gender regime—the polity, the economy, civil society, and violence.

S. Laurel Weldon (Simon Fraser University) based her contribution on her new global dataset, the Feminist Mobilization Index, which goes back to 1975. She explored the relationship between feminism and different varieties of democratic gender regimes in established democracies with advanced industrial economies, contrasting the pathways of neoliberal and social democratic gender regimes. The social democratic gender regimes were stronger at addressing inequality between men and women in general, but weaker in addressing the racialized elements of gender inequality that are of particular concern to intersectionally marginalized groups such as migrant domestic workers.

Again, the role of turning points was discussed—for instance, the turn to carceral feminism, and the rise of anti-feminist movements—as was the question of whether there were specificities to European, including socialist Eastern European, feminisms.

The European Union as an actor moved centre stage in Emanuela Lombardo and Lucrecia Rubio Grundell's (Complutense University of Madrid) paper on transformations in the European Union's gender regime over time. The EU's gender regime has undergone significant changes since its inception in the mid 1950s via Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, and the organization has made more progress towards gender equality than many national states. Lombardo and Rubio Grundell emphasized the role of historical legacies and turning points, such as EU treaties and global economic crises. Participants in the ensuing debate asked how to integrate decolonization processes, the end of the Cold War, and historiographical narratives and periodizations more broadly into the argument.

Older women's agency in West Germany's gender regime from the 1950s to the 1990s was the topic of Christina von Hodenberg's paper. She challenged assumptions that over-60-year-old women resisted the shift towards public gender regimes and stressed the ways in which single women and married women with children nurtured gains in female autonomy in everyday settings. The audience engaged with the meaning of the terms autonomy, emancipation, and feminism; the intersectional differences among over-60-year-olds; and the ways in which marital status correlated with predictable patterns of attitudes toward modern gender regimes.

The workshop also considered the contribution by Jane Freeland (Queen Mary University of London), even though she could not take part in person. Adopting Walby's theory of different types of gender regimes, Freeland's paper mapped the similarities between gender relations and norms across the various iterations of the German state through the entire twentieth century. Examining the institutional domains of violence, the economy, the polity, and civil society, she considered the extent to which German states transitioned from a 'domestic' to a 'public' gender regime. Arguing that this transition took place not in the 1970s (the era most closely associated with social liberalization and sexual revolution) but rather in the 1990s, she challenged

periodizations of modern German history that have failed to consider the role of gender and sexuality in societal transformation.

Altogether, the workshop trialled the use of Walby's theory of gender regimes as a tool of historical macro-narratives. It critically engaged with the different varieties, and the four domains, of gender regimes, and the varied pathways of temporal transformation, including non-simultaneity, layering, restructuring, waves, and turning points of development. Particular attention was paid to the link between gender regimes and democracy, dictatorship, violence, and forces of change such as feminist mobilization, activism 'from below', reform 'from above', and generational relations. Participants asked to what extent the micro- and meso-elements of historiographic writing could fit within this framework, and how different types, languages, and intersectional variations of feminism related to it.

Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL)

Medieval Germany Workshop. Organized by the German Historical Institute London, the German Historical Institute Washington DC, and the German History Society. Held at the GHIL on 12 April 2024. Conveners: Len Scales (Durham University) and Marcus Meer (GHIL).

In April 2024, the Medieval Germany Workshop once again saw doctoral students and early career scholars from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland gather in London to celebrate their shared interest in medieval German history. In keeping with previous years, the organizers were also fortunate to welcome two professors, invited from Germany, who offered their expertise both by commenting on the presentations and contributing talks of their own to the wide range of topics explored by the workshop.

The first to do so was Andrea Stieldorf, who currently holds the Chair of Ancillary Sciences and Archival Studies at the University of Bonn. Her insights on the iconography of portraits on coins in the twelfth century focused in particular on double portraits of rulers and their wives. Stieldorf emphasized that although the role of women was conceptualized as subordinate to that of their husbands, portraiture on coins points to an understanding of medieval power that very much expected a partnership between ruling couples. Thus wives, often perceived in the Middle Ages as another 'asset' of elite status and claims to power, featured as part of rulers' insignia. Continuing the theme of communication, Marcel Singer (University of Marburg) turned to the media and networks that promoted participation in the third crusade. Focusing on Latin and Middle High German songs, Singer showed how papal crusading calls were (or indeed were not) transmitted to wider audiences, and how, in the process, ideas were adapted to make them more appealing to circles beyond the Curia. Heresy was at the heart of the talk by Tina Druckenmüller (University of Cologne), who situated the monk and presumed heretic Gottschalk of Orbais's thought on the origins of souls within wider social networks by investigating his letters and short theological treatises. Druckenmüller argued that the fact that Gottschalk engaged with the dominant creationist viewpoint only after his confinement in Hautvillers Abbey clearly showed that even convicted heretics could still

participate in intellectual debates on theological issues. Turning to auditory matters, Hannah Potthoff (Chemnitz University of Technology) searched historiographical texts and courtly literature in order to carve out a vivid account of the soundscapes associated with war and warlike encounters, such as tournaments, in the medieval period. In the process, Potthoff identified the diverse meanings and narrative functions which the phenomenon of 'noise' acquired in accounts of both war and courtly life.

Franz-Josef Arlinghaus, Professor of Medieval History at Bielefeld University, inaugurated a session concerned with urban history. Posing the question of what drove the formation of guilds, fraternities, and similar associations popular in towns, his analysis of sources from Cologne suggests that a desire to derive social status from membership of such groups was a decisive motivational factor in their foundation. Rather than being inflexible, premodern society established innovative ways to distribute and demarcate social status. Laura Bitterli (Universität Zürich) explored the activities of one group often at the helm of such associations—the elite of Zurich—and its role in establishing and extending urban influence over neighbouring and even more distant domains. Her work adds substance to the emerging awareness of the intricate connections between city and countryside which, rather than being socially opposed and neatly distinguished, more often than not overlapped in complex social and political ways. Rural and local elites often had to carefully negotiate their status between the conflicting priorities of service to the Habsburgs and obligations to the Zurich commune.

Social and political interactions between groups also marked two other contributions. Jan Lemmer (University of Cologne) analysed the extent to which imperial vicars took an active role in controlling lords and influencing laws, trying to identify changes in applied and imagined conceptualizations of their role. Using Rainald of Dassel as an example, he showed how the study of imperial vicars can fundamentally change our understanding of how political interaction in the Empire was shaped and played out in the High Middle Ages, beyond the dominant narratives of 'rule by consensus' (*konsensuale Herrschaft*) and the 'rules of the political game' (Gerd Althoff's *Spielregeln der Politik*). Anna Someya Messer (University of Tübingen) then

presented her research on the Counts Palatine of Tübingen, in which she similarly investigated the means, both material and immaterial, by which those in power sought to expand their grasp over their territories. She also highlighted the significance of the ruling Hohenstaufen dynasty in enabling the counts to expand their (local) sphere of influence. As important as good relations with the top level were, the Counts Palatine also fostered an extensive network encompassing members from both the *ministeriales* and the lower nobility in order to further secure their position.

Aspects of intellectual history and the interconnections of written culture emerged as another thematic strand of the workshop. Vedran Sulovsky (University of Cambridge) painstakingly traced the written style of imperial notary and bishop of Worms Heinrich of Maastricht, and suggested that a continuation of the *Annales Aquenses* for the years 1169 to 1191 and one of the earliest known manuscripts of the famous twelfth-century *Vita Sancti Karoli Magni* both stem from Heinrich's pen. Connections such as these, tentative as they may seem, are also important for our understanding of the political sphere, as Sulovsky showed with regard to the prominent position Aachen-trained clerics apparently held in the imperial chancery. Diarmuid Ò Riain (University College Cork) provided insight into his work on the dissemination of Irish hagiographies in Southern Germany in the twelfth century, where the significance of the *Schottenklöster* as a bridge between Irish- and German-speaking monastic textual traditions have yet to be explored in full. By meticulously reconstructing the transmission history of a now lost hagiographical collection, the Regensburg *Vitae sanctorum Hiberniae*, Ò Riain made a case for the integration of Irish monasteries into broader regional monastic networks.

For the first time, the Medieval Germany Workship also featured a session dedicated to the public communication of history and its sources beyond academic circles. Alison Ray and Matthew Holford from the Bodleian Library at Oxford introduced the attendees to the projects 'Manuscripts from German-Speaking Lands', which is a British–German collaboration between the Bodleian and the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolffenbüttel, funded by the Polonsky Foundation, and 'Manuscripts from the Mainz Charterhouse', funded by the

Fritz Thyssen Foundation.[1] Both projects provide profound and easily accessible resources for further research, and both Ray and Holford encouraged scholars working on this material to get in touch to help them contextualize the corpus. Dirk Hoffmann-Becking (independent, London) introduced attendees of the workshop to the challenges and rewards of podcasting as a medium for public history, using his show, 'The History of the Germans', as an example.[2] In addressing issues such as formats, intended audiences, and the ever-growing market of (competing) history podcasts, he especially drew attention to the vital issue of finding a niche not already (or at least not extensively) covered.

In their concluding remarks, the organizers of the event from the German Historical Institute London and the German History Society looked forward to its next iteration in 2026, when the Medieval Germany Workshop will once again set out to show the thematic breadth and innovative paths that research on medieval Germany continues to create. This year's speakers have certainly done so impressively.

Marcus Meer and Stephan Bruhn (GHIL)

[1] For more information see [https://hab.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/en] and [https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/collections/mainz-charterhouse-manuscripts], both accessed 17 July 2024.

[2] See [https://historyofthegermans.com], accessed 17 July 2024.

Afterlives of Empire: How Imperial Legacies Shaped European Integration. Conference organized by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and the German Historical Institute London, held at the GHIL on 12–14 June 2024. Conveners: Alexander Nützenadel and Heike Wieters (HU Berlin).

The European integration processes in the second half of the twentieth century coincided with the dissolution of global empires. These developments were co-dependent, as an increasing body of literature shows.[1] In particular, this historiography underlines the fact that the trajectory of integration cannot merely be understood as ever-closer cooperation between formerly isolated nation states. Transnational networks and identities rooted in imperial legacies strongly shaped the character of the European institutions and their policies.

The conference sought to amplify, substantiate, and contextualize these emerging research findings, uniting scholars of various regional specializations. As Alexander Nützenadel emphasized in his opening remarks, the focus on imperial legacies combines five new historical perspectives on the history of European integration. First, historians should investigate structural, long-term path dependencies from (de)colonization to integration. Second, they should consider overlapping territorial arrangements and forms of integration based on imperial traditions, which interacted with the integration model on the European continent and often came into conflict with it. Third, studying imperial legacies allows for new research on national strategies in the European context to compensate for the loss of empires; and this research can refer, fourth, to narratives and self-perceptions within post-imperial metropoles, which shaped specific national attitudes towards the European Community. In this vein, fifth, new research in integration history seeks to discuss whether the EU itself is functionally equivalent to an empire—one based on soft power, multiple identities, and decentralized political structures.

[1] e.g. Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London, 2015); Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986*, trans. Richard R. Nybakken (Oxford, 2012); Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union* (Oxford, 2006).

Florian Wagner (University of Erfurt) opened the first panel on persisting structures with a presentation on the legacies of transimperial corporatism. He argued that the liberal concept of functional governance—that is, the organization of international cooperation based on specific functions and needs rather than borders and ideologies—originated in the practices of colonial rule. In particular, the International Colonial Institute, founded in 1894, served as a transimperial network for businesses and administrations, and as a testing ground for corporatist governance under fascism. After the EEC became a member in 1958, some African leaders supported the institute's utility, but many also emphasized its role in circumventing democratic rule in the newly independent states. Wagner thus emphasized the continuity of the institute's work through the various disruptions from the nineteenth to the late twentieth century, despite a superficial rebranding in 1946.

In the second paper, Borut Klabjan (University of Ljubljana) showed how collective memories of the Habsburg Empire were reactivated in Cold War Europe during the 1950s and 1960s and became instrumental to regional integration in the transnational Alps–Adriatic region. This process facilitated formalized regional cooperation during the 1970s, as well as the conceptualization of *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe) as a common cultural area during the 1980s. In the 1990s, awakening nationalist movements utilized the Habsburg ideal to emancipate themselves from previous entanglements with the Yugoslav state, which had been founded amidst the interwar turmoil that followed the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. While the Habsburg heritage did not necessarily mean the same thing in each individual state, the example underlines the fact that empires and nation states are not fixed categories, but have specific pre- and afterlives that can be reactivated if needed.

Tonio Schwertner (HU Berlin) closed the panel with a presentation on the role of imperial legacies within business cycles, referring to the example of the rubber industry. When rubber became a key material for everyday economic life, European empires organized its production in their equatorial colonies. As these regions gained independence after the Second World War, companies such as Pirelli feared losing access to vital areas of cultivation. Only cooperation at the European

level, the companies argued in a coordinated manner, could guarantee sufficient supplies of raw materials for stable production and offer protection against emerging American competition. Thus support for the European integration of the rubber industry transcended the borders of the continent and was related to the former imperial era. The presentations collectively showcased how long-term structures survived from the colonial to the integration period and were even reactivated during times of rupture. These structures were not only institutional but also conceptual and economic in nature, and included state, regional, and socio-economic actors.

Following this discussion, Sara Lorenzini (University of Trento) closed the first conference day with a keynote lecture on breaks and continuities in Europe's 'civilizing missions' in Africa. Development as a key policy concept enjoyed a long trajectory from the imperial world to the 1960s. This legacy continued in the form of environmentalism from the Stockholm Conference of June 1972 onwards. For politicians and environmentalists such as Sicco Mansholt and Barbara Ward, the European Community had become the torchbearer of a civilizing moment, representing a more ethical, social, and political vision of the economy against ecological degradation. In their view, the EC was an engine for change and the common market a model for Africa. This idea was even shared by US diplomats like George Kennan. Representatives of the so-called Third World, however, did not accept responsibility for global pollution by adapting to European models of development. They engaged with the industrial North mostly as an act of goodwill. Moreover, as the 'polluter pays' principle became more dominant, the role of a 'civilizing mission' became less salient. Only in the 1980s did the Brundtland report mark a shift, introducing the concept of sustainable growth on a global scale. As the EU became a global partner for sustainable development, 'civilized growth' rhetoric resurfaced and led to a partial comeback of older habits.

Frank Gerits (Utrecht University) opened the second panel on conflicting integrations. He emphasized the agency of African leaders who positioned their countries within a wide and contingent spectrum of European–African relationships, and he argued that EEC association projects with African nations were more diverse than the 'Eurafrica' model might suggest. This variety broadly evolved in

three phases: during the 1950s, 'Eurafrican' concepts were still dominant, but alternative views on the rising agency of (post-)colonial Africa started to become influential. In the 1960s, European integration served as an (often negative) example for pan-African ideas and initiatives for regional cooperation. Finally, during the 1980s, pleas for an African single market were bolstered by concessions from economic giants like the EC. In this context, African leaders repeatedly presented their projects to Brussels officials without constituting a uniform voice. Gerits' research showed that the consideration of imperial legacies is relevant not only for the history of integration on the European continent, but also for understanding various African developments.

Algeria offers a unique example in this regard. In her presentation, Megan Brown (Swarthmore College) analysed its special status as an integral part of the colonial metropole, which French authorities emphasized during the original EEC negotiations. The Treaty of Rome specifically exempted Algeria, as France feared other European partners would have an increasing influence on its colony. But even after Algeria's independence in 1962, the French government tried to preserve its particular affiliation to its former *département*. In 1976, when the EEC's relationships with various Maghreb countries were harmonized, France still insisted on extensive cooperation with Algeria, including labour migration.

In the third presentation, Sven van Mourik (formerly New York University) delved into another aspect of the transformation of European–African relationships. As the public debt of African nations skyrocketed during the 1970s, the 'unconditional aid' principle of the Lomé Agreements came to an end. Instead, the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF now involved harmful budget cuts with ramifications for social and economic development. In this context, van Mourik argued, the EC's role was paradoxical: while insisting that African countries repay their debt, thus supporting the IMF and the World Bank in their efforts, the Community increased spending on development aid to mitigate the effect of adjustment programmes. By the 1990s, therefore, the Eurafrican networks were included in the global Washington consensus and, at the same time, maintained a special relationship via the dynamics of development aid. The panellists

thus highlighted overlapping territorialities and global orders that were shaped by (post-)imperial entanglements.

The third panel compared strategies of compensation after the loss of an empire. First, Almuth Ebke (University of Mannheim) examined the conceptual complexities of imperial and European identities during the reforms of British nationality law in the 1970s and early 1980s, interpreting the history of legal rules as an example of 'internal decolonization'. After the 1948 British Nationality Act, most (post-)colonial migrants to Britain were actually 'Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies' or possessed the status of a 'Commonwealth Citizen'. The restrictive regulations of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, however, introduced a contradiction between citizenship and immigration rights. The UK's accession to the European Community and associated mutual migration rights further complicated the picture. Eventually, the Conservative government elected in 1979 adopted a three-tier concept of nationality based on the 'closeness' of the respective country to the United Kingdom, favouring citizens from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand over those of all other former colonies. More than being a legal issue, the reform debates thus led to a reconfiguration of mental maps vis-à-vis the former empire, the British nation state, and the emerging European space.

In the second paper, Philipp Müller (Hamburg Institute for Social Research) explored the changing roles of agents from the public and private sectors in decolonization processes, using the example of Mozambique. The Portuguese colony underwent substantial industrialization programmes while under direct imperial rule. During the 1960s, the colonial administration used the support of private international companies to boost the legitimacy of such investments. This transnational social field of actors remained intact even after official independence in 1975 and Mozambique's turn to socialism; however, their roles changed. The country's planning commission now assumed a leading position, while European companies served as quasi-delegates of EC states for on-the-ground cooperation. The scope of entrepreneurial action was re-emphasized following the Mozambican Civil War, the 'neoliberal turn', and Mozambique's inclusion in global markets. Industrial endeavours in the decolonization process,

Müller thus showed, were shaped by path dependencies as well as changes in economic thinking and global political hierarchies.

The third panellist, Elizabeth Buettner (University of Amsterdam), returned to the themes of identity and belonging by examining the perceptions of multiculturalism in European societies. As she argued, the many histories of migration from outside and within Europe have largely been written separately: intra-European migration due to fascist persecution, labour migration from Southern and Eastern Europe and North Africa during the *trente glorieuses*, and post-colonial migration to the former metropoles are still understood as independent phenomena. In fact, they interacted, dynamically changing perceptions of belonging and identity and leading to changes in concepts of Whiteness, Europeanness, and cultural closeness. This facilitated the inclusion or exclusion of different migrant groups at different points in time. Moreover, these processes unfolded in the context of increasing cross-border integration of societies and economies, so that national migration histories were entangled with those of other European countries. The examples in these talks all demonstrated that the legacies of colonial rule were highly present not only in former colonies, but also in Europe. Significantly, the decolonization processes shaped and reshaped mental maps and geographical configurations of, for example, economic relationships, migration, and identity.

While the first three panels dealt with persistent legacies of empire during integration, the two presentations of the fourth panel aimed to study how new narratives, policies, and practices shaped by imperial pasts emerged during European integration processes. Restitution claims for ethnographic objects collected in colonial times, Susan Legêne (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) argued, are a case in point here. In particular, the ratification (or otherwise) by Western European UN members of the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property led to intra-state and intra-European discussions on how to deal with demands to restore spoliated objects. From the outside, 'Western Europe' was increasingly perceived as a region with a shared history and responsibility towards the cultures of former empires. This view was rejected by French, British, Dutch, and other officials. Nevertheless, a common position on restitution

claims from the UN or third states was negotiated within the European Council and communicated via its presidency. In other words, European cooperation took place even though officials disregarded the European dimension as an issue of debate.

Legêne's co-panellist Robin de Bruin (University of Amsterdam) offered yet another perspective on European post-war policies through the lens of reconfigured imperial self-perceptions. Since the nineteenth century, de Bruin showed, decision-makers in the Netherlands had assumed a distinctive position in the global imperial order by favouring free trade policies between empires and by inviting foreign investments in its Indonesian territories, where it believed it was pursuing a form of 'ethical colonialism'. This exceptionalist idea not only inspired the colonial aspects of the interwar 'pan-Europe' concept propagated by thinkers such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, but it also served as a blueprint for Dutch support of free trade between EEC countries and their former colonies during the negotiations on the 1963 and 1969 Yaoundé Treaties, which clashed with more protectionist ideas put forward by French officials. The Dutch example thus underlines how self-perceptions and national roles within the global imperial order were reactivated in the European Community setting, and shows that ideas of decolonization and European integration were more differentiated than the 'Eurafrica' concept suggests.

De Bruin's paper already hinted at the intersection of colonial and post-colonial political practices, and the last panel focused on this junction more closely, looking at economic legacies. The first speaker, Véronique Dimier (Université libre de Bruxelles), investigated the continuation of European colonial entrepreneurship in the context of African post-independence development efforts. To undertake big and often useless infrastructure or industrialization projects, African leaders relied on the support of European capital and expertise. Because of this dependence, Dimier argued, structures of indirect rule continued to exist well into the post-colonial period. In particular, French and Belgian companies utilized prevailing experiences and networks in their respective post-imperial spheres to win calls for tender via bribes, or because projects were technically designed in their favour. The European Development Fund, led by Jacques Ferrandi (1962–75), a former colonial official, helped to set up this neo-patrimonial system,

urging European companies to adapt to African cultures and contexts. This created tensions with competitors from other EEC countries who demanded equal access. However, rather than being abolished, the patrimonial system was opened to and adopted by other European companies.

In the last paper of the conference, Felix Römer (HU Berlin) presented his research on the epistemic practices and statistical legacies of knowledge creation for social policy after 1945. In the post-war decades, international organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the European Communities endorsed the expansion and harmonization of social indicators on a global scale. However, these initiatives were often met with national scepticism as they would have created a global equivalent space that allowed for intercontinental comparisons and thus fuelled demand for social development aid. As the British example shows, national officials initially wanted to prevent the intrusion of international organizations into global statistical knowledge creation, as harmonized indicators would have highlighted the dismal results of colonial rule for the local population compared to the industrial North. Only by the 1980s and 1990s did advances in harmonization trump the post-imperial and neoliberal aversion to comparative discussions about inequality and standards of living. Overall, the economic perspective thus underlined how imperial legacies were reshuffled in the context of intra-European cooperation, thereby shaping political practices vis-à-vis the post-independence world.

In a final discussion, the participants reviewed the main conference outcomes. Fundamentally, it was agreed that many imperial legacies continued despite formal decolonization. However, the presentations showed that these persistent structures were not straightforward forms of modern imperialism. Instead, they were characterized by various competing projects, overlapping concepts, and ambiguous ideas. European integration, including its various enlargement rounds, created a platform for the negotiation of such legacies and was itself shaped by persistent imperial structures.

Beyond these findings, the conference also highlighted the need for further research. First, it was pointed out that a more precise definition of 'empire' is needed to further substantiate the discussion. As it

stands, the term encompasses too many processes, concepts, and associations, complicating a clear distinction between imperial legacies and other developments. The same is true of the term 'integration' and its different phenomena—even more so if the EU itself is to be understood as functionally equivalent to an empire. Second, a history of European integration through the lens of imperial legacies should consider that the countries that joined in different rounds of enlargement each brought new historical experiences to bear on the process. For instance, while most of the conference papers focused on the legacies of Western European overseas empires, a stronger emphasis on the Continental European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have led to different results. Finally, the contributions showed that considering empire and integration together leads to different chronologies to those found in the standard historiographies of each topic. In that sense, imperial history did not fade away in the post-war decades, and the prehistory of the European Union did not only start in 1945 or with the Treaties of Rome. A planned book project based on this conference will pick up these lines of thought.

Tobias Scheib (HU Berlin)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the German Historical Institute London

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research grants to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to undertake research in the UK. Scholarships are awarded for a period of up to three months, depending on the requirements of the research project. Scholarships are advertised at [https://www.hsozkult.de] and on the GHIL website. Applications should include a curriculum vitae, educational background, list of publications (if any), and an outline of the project, together with a reference from a supervisor confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research. Applications should be sent to stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. **Please refer to the scholarship guidelines for further information.** If you have any questions, please contact stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. German scholars present their projects and initial research findings at the GHIL Colloquium during their stay in the UK and write a report on their visit for the GHIL Blog.

In the second round of allocations for 2024 the following scholarships were awarded:

Frauke Ahrens (LMU Munich): Akteur*innen—Narrative—Strategien: Konstellationen einer transnationalen Folklore-Forschung, 1875–1905
Florian Balbiani (University of Erfurt): Swahili erforschen: Afrikanistische Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Ostafrika, 1843–1945
Anna Elisabeth Gehl (FU Berlin): Female Gentlemen: World War One, Shell Shock, and the Women who Volunteered
Lisa Hellriegel (University of Bremen): Sexualisierte Gewalt in der Stadt: Wandel und Kontinuität in der Rechtspraxis zu Fällen sexualisierter Gewalt, 1900–1935
Philipp Höhn (MLU Halle-Wittenberg): Maritime Gewalt, Marginalisierung und Markt im spätmittelalterlichen England

Maya Kreiner (Leibniz Institute for Jewish History and Culture—Simon Dubnow): Mandatory Subjects: Self-Government and Empire in Palestine, 1917–1948
Shaul Marmari (Leibniz Institute for Jewish History and Culture—Simon Dubnow): The Global Front: The Zionist Underground Organizations Abroad, 1944–1949
Olivia Mayer (University of Kassel): Magieanschuldigungen und -anklagen gegen adlige Frauen im spätmittelalterlichen England und Frankreich
Bodo Mrozek (IfZ Munich): Der Duft der Anderen: Eine Geruchsgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts
Daniel Müller (University of Bonn): 'Arming the natives and inspiring them to resist German influence': Funktionen von Religion in kolonialer Herrschaft und indigener Resistenz am Beispiel deutscher und britischer Kolonialismen in Deutsch-Ostafrika und Tanganjika (1885–1961)
Katharina Troll (Hamburg Institute for Social Research): European Integration Rewoven: British and West German Textile Employers' Associations and European Integration, 1958–1980
Fabian Weber (Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg): Mobilisiertes Mitleid: Die 'Schächtfrage' in Deutschland 1945 bis 2015
Constanze Weiske (Leipzig University): The German Slave Trade in the Dutch Atlantic, *c.*1598–1863: A Global History
Felix Wessel (FU Berlin): From Guilds to Trade Unions: The Transformation from Craftsmen's Guilds to Workers' Unions in Syria, 1870–1946
Karolin Wetjen (University of Göttingen): Skalierungen von Raum und Zeit: Klimawissen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

Visiting Scholars at the German Historical Institute London

The GHIL is delighted to welcome five visiting scholars this autumn.

Professor Paul Nolte from the Freie Universität Berlin was appointed the Gerda Henkel Visiting Professor for the academic year 2024/5. He is the sixteenth incumbent since the inception of the visiting professorship, a joint project of the Department of International History

at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, and the GHIL. During his time in London, he will teach at the LSE and also work on a major book project: A New German History, *c.*1500 to the Present.

On 1 October *Dr Almuth Ebke* (University of Mannheim) started her six-month Visiting Postdoctoral Research Fellowship, which is awarded by the GHIL in cooperation with the Institute of Advanced Studies at University College London. Each academic year, the fellowship offers one outstanding early-career scholar from a German university the opportunity to pursue independent research in the stimulating intellectual environment of the two host institutions. Dr Ebke will devote her time to research for a project exploring the interplay between religion and society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Professor Chitra Joshi from the University of Delhi (retired) is a founding member of the Association of Indian Labour Historians and will be a Senior Visiting Fellow from 15 October–14 December 2024. The India Research Programme (IRP) regularly invites senior scholars from India through its Visiting Fellowship programme. The fellowships are meant for scholars who are working on our areas of research or are project partners in our research networks in India, such as ICAS:MP, and consist of a short-term residency at the GHIL. The scholars will conduct research in UK archives and libraries and contribute to the intellectual life of the GHIL, usually by giving a talk in the Institute's lecture series or at similar events and taking part in research network meetings on joint projects. Senior visiting fellows are also an integral part of the IRP's collaborations with research partners in Germany.

Dr Samira Junaid (Azim Premji University) and *Dr Jolita Zabarskaitė* (formerly Heidelberg University) are the inaugural IRP Tandem Fellows and are collaborating on a project on 'Greater India' from the perspective of South India and Malaya from the late colonial period to the early 1960s. They were at the GHIL in London in June–July 2024 and will continue their research in India (Delhi, Bengaluru, Kolkata) from October–December 2024. The Tandem Fellowship is a

new programme of the IRP that started in 2024. It is a collaborative programme run jointly by the GHIL/IRP and the Max Weber Forum for South Asian Studies, New Delhi. The fellowship is open to early-career scholars (postdocs/no later than 6 years from completion of PhD) from India and Germany whose research is situated in the broad field of the history of the British Empire and colonialism. Transcolonial perspectives are welcome. The programme aims to bring together one scholar from each of these countries to meet and exchange ideas in London and New Delhi. It offers scholars from these two countries the opportunity to spend three months in the UK and India to work on a joint research project or sub-project. The fellowship is usually advertised in June of the year preceding the start of the fellowship.

Library Newsletter

If you are interested in receiving more detailed news about the GHIL Library's activities and recent acquisitions, as well as new open access monographs and databases that can be accessed from anywhere, you can subscribe to the Library's monthly newsletter at [https://www.ghil.ac.uk/library-newsletter-subscription].

PhD Conference 2025

The GHIL's twenty-ninth Postgraduate Research Students' Conference will take place on Thursday 9 and Friday 10 January 2025. The conference is intended for postgraduate research scholars working on German history from the Middle Ages to the present at a UK or Irish university, and aims to give participants the opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss their research with other students working in the same field. PhD students at all stages are encouraged to apply. All participants will be expected to briefly present their research projects, but if capacity is limited, preference will be given to second- and third-year students.

A course on German palaeography is planned for the first day of the conference. Should you wish to take part, please indicate your

interest in your application. Please note that places will be assigned on a first-come, first-served basis.

Application Details
If you are interested in attending, please send an email to PGconference @ghil.ac.uk by Friday 15th November 2024, and you must include the following:

- full contact details—name, address, email address, and telephone number
- the exact title of your PhD project
- the date you started your PhD project (and whether you are enrolled part- or full-time)
- the name, address, email address, and phone number of your university and supervisor
- an indication of whether you have undertaken research in Germany
- an indication of whether you wish to participate in the palaeography course scheduled for the morning of 9 January 2025

The GHIL will arrange accommodation for participants from outside the Greater London area.

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Nutzen und Nachteil von Längsschnittdaten für die zeithistorische Forschung. Workshop of the Arbeitskreis Sozialdaten und Zeitgeschichte, to be held at the Werner Reimers Foundation, Bad Homburg, on 18–19 November 2024. Conveners: Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL), Kerstin Brückweh (Leibniz Institute for Research on Society and Space), Sabine Reh (HU Berlin), and Christian Marx (IfZ Munich).

Archives, Authenticity, Authorship. Workshop of the ICAS:MP Thematic Consolidation Group 'Constructing Alternative Pasts: (New) Sources and Methods', to be held at the GHIL on 12–14 March 2025. Conveners:

Mallika Leuzinger (GHIL) and Mohamed Shafeeq Karinkurayil (Manipal Centre for the Humanities).

The past few decades have witnessed a new kind of archive fever. Claims to the past are being made at a remove from institutionally verified or domiciled histories, with all kinds of historical materials now circulating in the public sphere and effective in forming communities of hurt and/or hope. These developments push us to expand both our catalogue and understanding of archives, even as we broadly take the term to mean records of the past that impinge on our imaginaries of the present and the future. This workshop brings together scholars working on a range of media across spaces including the internet, the street, the cinema, and the home, to explore this construction and transformation of the archive.

In attending to the archive as a site of political, and certainly creative, activity, we are interested in claimants such as the scholar, the fan, the entrepreneur, the migrant labourer, the returnee, the citizen, the devotee, the revolutionary, and the activist. We invite speakers to focus on the strategies, practices, scripts, and aspirations these claimants develop, and to think especially about the relationship between archives, authenticity, and authorship.

Trans Sainthood in Translation. International conference to be held at the GHIL on 22–23 May 2025. Conveners: Mariana Bodnaruk (Masaryk University), Stephan Bruhn (GHIL), and Michael Eber (University of Oxford).

Trans saints—*monachoparthenoi*, saints who are initially described as female by their hagiographers, but transition to a male (often monastic) identity—are present in every late antique and medieval Christian tradition. The textual and artistic renderings of these figures offer a comparative key to conceptualizing trans bodies and trans souls across geographical and chronological boundaries. Following the insights of the 'performative turn' in queer and trans studies, which underscores the enactment and negotiation of gender identity through lived experiences, social practices, and narratives, this conference explores

gender and sexuality in medieval textual traditions. Taking seriously the connectivity of the Latin West, the Orthodox East, and the Islamic World in the Middle Ages, the conference adopts a transcultural and comparative approach. Highlighting both the ubiquity and multivalence of premodern trans monks is urgent work, not least to counter historically inaccurate rhetorics driven by modern-day transphobia.

Public Lectures and Round Tables

Everyday Lives of Indian Labour. A panel organized by the India Research Programme of the GHIL, to be held at the GHIL on 5 November 2024, at 5.00–7.00 p.m. Speakers: Chitra Joshi (University of Delhi), Arun Kumar (University of Nottingham), Amanda Lanzillo (University of Chicago), and Nitin Varma (HU Berlin). Convener: Indra Sengupta (GHIL).

In the 1980s and 1990s, historians of labour in India began to pay closer attention to the quotidian in the lives of India's labouring poor. This was inspired in no small part by Alf Lüdtke's concept of *Alltagsgeschichte*, or the everyday histories of the labouring classes. Chitra Joshi, Senior Visiting Fellow at the GHIL from October to December 2024, is a leading historian who since the 1990s has engaged with Lüdtke's approach, taking his argument and analysis beyond its German and Western European moorings and examining how such a perspective, applied to the study of Indian labour under colonialism, can yield deeper insights into the history of labour in colonial India and labour history in general. By using sources beyond the official archive, such as oral narratives and popular literature, her work (see, for example, her 2005 book *Lost Worlds: Indian Labour and its Forgotten Histories*) has opened up new ways of understanding the everyday worlds of the working class both at work and within the community. Her research has, in turn, inspired newer generations of scholars to explore the everyday worlds of Indian labourers and thereby substantially stretch the possibilities of the approach.

Our panel consists of scholars who have worked on quotidian histories of the labouring classes in colonial India, engaging thereby with

Chitra Joshi's work and making significant contributions to newer, innovative approaches to the history of labour under colonialism. Arun Kumar has examined the everyday lives and aspirations of the industrial working class in India through education; Amanda Lanzillo has explored the ways in which North Indian Muslim labourers have adapted religious cultures and practices to negotiate shifting industrial regimes and forms of economic authority; and Nitin Varma has engaged with the world of domestic labour, thus focusing on a space where the world of work and the world of the home merge.

The panel will bring Chitra Joshi, Arun Kumar, Amanda Lanzillo, and Nitin Varma together to discuss the everyday in the history of work and the working classes in colonial India from the perspective of their own research. The panel aims to achieve three goals: 1) to trace the trajectory of *Alltagsgeschichte* as an approach to the history of labour from its European origins to its use in Indian labour history; 2) to trace the evolution of the approach within the historiography of Indian labour from Chitra Joshi's early work to the present; and 3) to throw light on the ways in which the historiography of Indian labour can sharpen our understanding of labour history in general.

A Weak Reich? European Perspectives on Medieval Germany in Conversation. Panel discussion with Nora Berend (University of Cambridge), Klaus Oschema (GHI Paris), and Jörg Peltzer (Heidelberg University), and chaired by Miri Rubin (Queen Mary University of London), to be held at the GHIL on 12 November 2024, at 5.30 p.m.

Royal Historical Society Lecture at the German Historical Institute London. Lecture by Roland Wenzlhuemer (LMU Munich), to be held at the GHI on 23 January 2025, at 5.30 p.m.

Interreligious Communication and Decision Making: Historical Perspectives, Modern Practices. Round table jointly organized by the GHIL and RELCOM: Interreligious Communication in and between the Latin-Christian and the Arabic-Islamic Sphere (Durham University/

University of Tübingen), funded by the UK–German Funding Initiative in the Humanities (AHRC/DFG), to be held at the GHIL on 5 February 2025, at 5.30 p.m.

How do Jewish, Christian, and Muslim leaders make legal decisions? How do they look upon the religious 'other' and interact with them from the perspective of their religious laws? This round table brings together practising religious professionals, jurists, and scholars to hear how they deal with modern legal issues whilst considering and integrating historical legal sources.

Winners and Losers? Britain and Germany after the Second World War. Special event as part of the MWS series 'The Ends of War', to be held at the GHIL on 18 February 2025, at 5.30 p.m.

How do historical narratives and memories shape our understanding of national identity and collective memory? Join us for an evening with Lucy Noakes (University of Essex) and Frank Trentmann (Birkbeck, University of London) as they reflect on how the Second World War has shaped Germany and Britain since 1945. The conversation will offer insights into the ways in which the two nations navigated the aftermath of the war and redefined their identities and roles in the contemporary world.

Um Goethe betrogen: Über die anhaltende Wirkung des kulturpatriotischen Klassik-Begriffs. Wilkinson-Willoughby Lecture organized by the English Goethe Society and given by Stefan Matuschek (Friedrich Schiller University Jena), to be held at the GHIL on 8 May 2025, at 6.00 p.m. (in German).

In contrast to its European neighbours, who considered Goethe the leading Romantic, scholars of German studies in Germany treated him as a classicist against the backdrop of Romanticism. This was not for scholarly but for patriotic reasons, for the term 'classicism' in German studies only ostensibly denotes an epoch; in actual fact, it

expresses an ethos intended to elevate Goethe above all contemporary literature and turn him into a specifically German cultural pinnacle. This has been the subject of much discussion in the history of ideas. What has received less attention is the confusion this patriotic concept of classicism still creates today. Even if its political intentions are a thing of past, it continues to distort our understanding of Goethe.

Thinking with Blind Men and Elephants: A Dialogue on Personhood, Empires, and Unknowable Things. The sixth Thyssen Lecture, to be given by Professor Helen Tilley (Northwestern University) on 19 May 2025 at the GHIL and on 20 May 2025 at Durham University.

This talk uses the South Asian parable of 'The Blind Men and the Elephant' as its point of departure to explore different fault lines in the science/knowledge divide in global history. I hope to prompt debate about the nature of empires and the blind spots they produce. At the heart of the talk are pressing concerns about planetary health and human values. It builds upon comparative work in Iberian, British, Belgian, and French empires and their links to African history in order to take up points relating to languages and translation, ontologies and unknowns, and personhood and legal fictions. Some of the talk uses two works in progress as examples: an English translation of a 1910 Yoruba reference book on healing—*Ìwé Ìwòsàn* by Joseph Odùmósù (1863–1911)—and a nearly complete book exploring the global history of traditional medicine as a legal and ethnographic construct. Because students of empire must train deeply and teach broadly, the talk will invite participants to think about how to trespass across disciplines and continents judiciously. I would like to generate deeper dialogue about different kinds of human conflict and consciousness that are often overshadowed in venues of global governance, but deserve more attention from those who seek to build a more just world.

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