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

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NATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE: THE MEDIA, GLOBAL NEWS COVERAGE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF HIGH IMPERIALISM

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Ten years ago, when I studied 'newspaper wars' as a way of exploring interaction between the emerging mass press and foreign policy in the quarter century before the First World War, I concentrated on British–German relations, which seemed to me particularly suitable for such an analysis:

> For diplomatic friction due to hostile newspaper articles, critical press commentaries, or caricatures seen as insulting, played a crucial role between Germany and Britain. . . . At the same time the assertion that there was actually no conflict of interests between the two countries, and that these unfortunate 'press feuds' were solely responsible for political discord, became the standard argument of all those seeking to improve relations.[1]

One aspect that struck me when I was researching that book, and that has become even clearer since, is that those 'press wars' and the friction caused by the rise of the press as an actor in international politics cannot adequately be described solely through a bilateral British–German lens. The paradigm of the 'Anglo-German antagonism' has long prevailed not least because it reflected the outlook of the Cold War era and transposed its bipolar and Eurocentric perspective onto the more multilateral international order before 1914.[2]

This article is based on my inaugural lecture as Gerda Henkel Visiting Professor 2016/17, delivered at the London School of Economics on 29 Nov. 2016. A podcast is available on the German Historical Institute London's website at <https:// breaker. audio/e/17196641>, accessed 26 June 2017.

[1] Dominik Geppert, *Pressekriege: Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen 1896–1912* (Munich, 2007), 475.

[2] The single most influential study within this school of thought was Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London, 1980).

By now it has been replaced by more varied modes of explanation with a more global reach. This is why I would like to revisit, in this article, some of the material collected for my book on the press wars ten years ago and confront it with more recent historiographical trends and findings.

Within the new paradigms the British and German cases are only pieces in a bigger jigsaw puzzle. Part of that puzzle has to do with the scope and intensity of the media revolution at the turn of the century. It also concerns the relationship between the media and politics and the way in which the media and political actors adapted to each other's needs and characteristics—a process that has been termed the 'mediatization' of politics.[3] Another part of the story focuses on the effects the media revolution had on the expectations of national audiences as well as on the build-up of global or transnational infrastructure, in other words, on the connection between jingoism and transnationalism, between dynamic nationalization and a growing global interdependence.

Historians of globalization have argued convincingly that the two phenomena, nationalization on the one hand and globalization or transnationalization on the other, should not merely be seen as temporally overlapping—the 'global' or 'transnational' twentieth century replacing the 'national' nineteenth—but rather as closely interrelated. In this reading, the progress of globalization does not simply increase the frequency and ease with which national borders are crossed. Counter-intuitively, these transnational interactions are also understood to have aided the formation and consolidation of those very boundaries. Seen in this light, nation-states are not just the precondition and protagonists of exchange, but in at least equal measure also the products of global circulation. The increase in transnational interrelationships, as Sebastian Conrad states, 'can thus be seen as one of the most important factors contributing to the consolidation of national categories'.[4]

It is not the nation-state that ceases to exist, Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzelhuemer have stressed, 'but a certain perspective on

[3] Jesper Strömbäck, 'Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics', *International Journal of Press / Politics*, 13/3 (2008), 228–46, at 230–5.

[4] Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2010), 5.

the nation state which can no longer be upheld'. Löhr and Wenzelhuemer then proceed to ask a series of pertinent questions. How does the nation-state fit into the

> opposing and at the same time closely connected interplay between globalization and fragmentation? How did the state and non-state actors handle problems with a transnational reach? Who were the driving forces that either strengthened or slowed down processes of exchange and interconnection? Which aims and interests did the main acting groups pursue? Did a certain international and organizational framework develop so as to legalize and standardize interactions across national borders and make them more predictable? And how did the nation states react toward the flows of information, technology, knowledge, commodities or capital, which did not stop at their borders?[5]

This article attempts to give some tentative answers to these big questions by analysing a small, but not unimportant aspect of globalization, namely, the foreign news coverage within Europe's mass media between 1880 and the First World War. It will concentrate on three elements that deserve particular attention in this respect: first, European news agencies such as Reuters, Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau (WTB), and Agence Havas of France. Privately run concerns, they functioned as intermediaries that retailed political and economic news not only to the press but also to banks, insurance companies, and business people.[6] Secondly, it will look at the new popular press, which was an expression of the profound transformation of the media that had implications for the ownership and power structures

[5] Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzelhuemer (eds.), *The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Heidelberg, 2013), 1, 5.

[6] The standard reference for the history of Reuters is Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters* (Oxford, 2nd edn. 1999); WTB is covered by Dieter Basse, *Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau 1849 bis 1933: Agenturpublizistik zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft* (Munich, 1991); as there is no comparable scholarly study of Havas, we must still refer to Pierre Frédérix, *Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles: De l'agence d'informations Havas à l'Agence France Presse (1835–1957)* (Paris, 1957).

both of newspaper publishers and the financial foundations of the press, for the content and tone of its reporting, and for its relationship with politics.[7] Thirdly, it will examine foreign correspondents, whose very profession necessitates the crossing of frontiers and mediation between different national audiences.[8]

To explore the working conditions and impact potential of the press in the age of high imperialism, this article will first analyse the internationalization of the media as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth. It will then contrast the tendencies of internationalization and transnationalization with the increasingly national bent of news reporting within the context of the commercialization of the press and the growing national orientation of foreign correspondents. In a third step, it will look at the interaction between the two processes in two case studies: (1) the phenomenon of the press congress that became a firm part of the new internationalism towards the end of the nineteenth century; and (2) the professional organizations set up from the late 1880s onwards by foreign journalists in the capitals of Europe.

The sources available for dealing with these topics are rather patchy. The private papers of various British journalists, editors, and newspaper proprietors as well as some business and editorial records (for example, from Reuters and *The Times*) have survived.[9] The minute books of the Foreign Press Association (FPA), the association of foreign correspondents stationed in London, can be consulted for the years 1912 to 1914.[10] In Germany, no comparable sets of docu-

[7] See e.g. the recent overview by Frank Bösch, *Mass Media and Historical Change: Germany in International Perspective, 1400 to the Present* (New York, 2015), 77–86.

[8] Norman Domeier and Jörn Happel, 'Journalismus und Politik: Einleitende Überlegungen zur Tätigkeit von Auslandskorrespondenten 1900–1970', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 62 (2014), 389–97; Dominik Geppert, 'Ambassadors of Democracy: British and German Foreign Correspondents in the Age of High Imperialism', in Frank Bösch and Dominik Geppert (eds.), *Journalists as Political Actors: Transfers and Interactions between Britain and Germany since the late Nineteenth Century* (Augsburg, 2008), 35–55.

[9] Reuters Archive, London (hereafter RA); News UK Archive, London (hereafter NUKA).

[10] The minute books are still in the possession of the FPA which exists to the present day.

ments exist. Almost all business records of newspaper proprietors, along with editorial correspondence, were lost in the Second World War. As German journalists tended to be lower down the social scale than their British counterparts, they did not keep private papers or write memoirs. Historians of the press have to make do with government files, especially those of the German Foreign Office, which contain useful material documenting contacts between officials and the media.[11] The archive of the Berlin equivalent of the FPA, the Verein Ausländische Presse, was taken to Stockholm by the Swedish press attaché in 1944, where it has recently been rediscovered in the Rijks Archive; most of the surviving documents, however, date from the period after 1918–19.[12]

Although large parts of the empirical material for this article are drawn from German and British contexts, it should become clear that these are developments that apply to European foreign reporting more generally. Further research concerning Austria-Hungary will have to come to grips with a situation very similar to the one prevailing in Germany: the researcher has to consult government sources kept in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and in the Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv in Vienna.[13] With regard to France, some papers of the Paris association of foreign correspondents, the Syndicat de la presse étrangère, have survived in the archives of the French Parliament, the Assemblée Nationale.[14] In the United States, there are the rich holdings of the Associated Press Corporate Archives in New York.

One good thing about press history is that when the press as an actor was involved, it tended to write rather lavishly about itself. This means that International Press Conferences were widely covered in the international media. The professional organizations set up by the

[11] Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (hereafter PA-AA).

[12] Sonja Hillerich, 'Der Verein der Ausländischen Presse zu Berlin: "Ritter der Feder" oder "nichtamtliche Diplomaten"?', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 62 (2014), 398–410.

[13] See, for a slightly earlier period, the study by Dominik Feldmann, *Von Journalisten und Diplomaten: Die Entdeckung der Presse für die Außenpolitik in Preußen und Österreich 1849–1879* (Berlin, 2016).

[14] See now Sonja Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational: Deutsche Auslandskorrespondenten in London, Paris und Wien (1848–1914)' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Essen-Duisburg, 2016).

foreign correspondents did not feature as prominently. They have, however, left sporadic footprints on newspaper pages and can, accordingly, be traced in press archives today.

I. *Transnational Infrastructure*

Jürgen Osterhammel has reminded us that the globalized production and dissemination of news along with the standardization of reports and the ideology of 'objectivity' were distinctive features of the 'transformation of the world' in the nineteenth century.[15] A crucial ingredient in this process was the dominance of the British Empire over the global traffic in communications. Towards the end of the nineteenth century it at least rivalled Britain's maritime dominance. London was the uncontested news capital of the world. Reuters, the leading British news agency, had a considerable competitive edge over its continental and North American competitors. The dominant position of British companies in the international news and wire business was not least due to the fact that Britain, as the biggest world and trading power, had a particular interest in the expansion of telegraphy, with commercial as well as military and strategic motives coming into play. Since the 1860s private companies such as the Eastern Telegraph Company had been busy laying underwater cables connecting Europe, North America, India, and Africa. The following decades saw the construction of additional connections with China, South America, and Japan. The British government methodically connected its colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific to the British mainland via overhead and submarine cables.[16]

Reuters collaborated with the two other big European news agencies, to the mutual benefit of all concerned, by establishing exclusive areas of operation that largely mirrored the colonial empires and informal spheres of influence of the respective powers. In January 1870 WTB, Reuters, and Havas signed a cartel agreement in which each agency secured exclusive rights for itself. They also agreed to exchange news content for which the recipient would have to pay

[15] Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, 2014), 37–9.

[16] Cf. Paul M. Kennedy, 'Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914', *English Historical Review*, 86 (1971), 728–52.

only the telegraph fee. This meant that Reuters could only offer its customers news content from Germany which it had received directly from WTB, and vice versa.[17] In this way, Europe's Great Powers divided up large parts of the globe for colonies. In much the same way Reuters, WTB, and Havas, and later also the Associated Press in the USA, colonized global news by establishing limited-access territories: Reuters won exclusive rights in South Africa, the Far East, the rest of the British Empire, and the Netherlands and its colonies. Havas received the Romance-speaking part of the Mediterranean and France with its colonies. Germany, Scandinavia, St Petersburg, and Moscow went to WTB. The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Belgium were shared between Reuters and Havas. All other regions —especially Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and the Danubian principalities—were neutral and open to all three contracting parties without restrictions.[18]

Germany had comparatively few international business links. This is why WTB was initially content merely to strengthen its dominant position in central, northern, and eastern Europe, leaving almost all of the regions outside Europe to the French and British agencies. The only exceptions were the few German colonies acquired in the mid 1880s. In two additional agreements signed in 1874 and 1876 respectively, Reuters and Havas settled the distribution of their respective spheres of influence for the rest of the globe: China, Japan, and Constantinople went to Reuters, while Havas secured South America and all of the Mediterranean with the exception of Greece and Egypt, which both parties agreed to share for their exclusive use.[19] In the journalistic sphere, these separate arrangements anticipated by three decades the deal over colonial politics that was closed with the signing of the Entente Cordiale—if not in all of the territorial details, then certainly in the thrust of the agreements.[20]

[17] One copy of the agreement signed on 17 Jan. 1870 in Paris is in RA 1/8818001; a later list of the contractual terms can be found in PA-AA, Europa Generalia 86, R 533.

[18] Cf. Terhi Rantanen, *Foreign News in Imperial Russia: The Relationship between International and Russian News Agencies, 1856–1914* (Helsinki, 1990), 37–46; see also Basse, *Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau*, 48–53.

[19] Agreement of 1/5 May 1874 in RA 1/890503; Agreement of May 1876 in RA 1/8818001. Cf. Rantanen, *Foreign News*, 42–3.

[20] For a re-evaluation of the Entente Cordiale fitting this picture see Paul W.

The allegedly global reach of the news agencies may have been an important element of their advertising strategy. It was not, however, an adequate description of their real operating range. Large parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America were blank areas with regard to both the appropriate telegraphic infrastructure and a network of local correspondents necessary to feed it with news.[21] Moreover, as most of the telegraphic traffic was either transatlantic or followed the sinews of the British Empire, a region as strategically and economically important to Britain as South Africa was considerably closer to London in terms of communications than, say, Romania, which in terms of geography and physical distance was so much nearer.[22]

As telegraphic agencies altered the speed of dissemination and the range of news, the popular press changed its tone and business model. Since their first appearance in the 1880s, popular newspapers had fundamentally transformed the media landscape in many European countries. The most powerful publishers headed media empires that operated internationally and published newspapers in several countries; publishers often had business interests on more than one continent. Lord Northcliffe not only owned numerous papers in England and the Empire, but also published a Paris-based European edition of his tabloid *Daily Mail*. A German edition based in Berlin was planned for 1913. It did not survive the experimental stage only because of the outbreak of the First World War. In order to secure an independent supply of paper, Northcliffe bought huge tracts of forest in Canada. He continued his drive to establish co-operations with popular newspapers in other countries: an agreement with August Scherl, publisher of the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, provided the *Daily Mail*'s Berlin correspondent with access to the proofs of the final edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger* and vice versa, ensuring Northcliffe and

Schroeder, 'International Politics, Peace, and War, 1815–1914', in T. C. W. Blanning (ed.), *The Nineteenth Century*: *Europe 1789–1914* (Oxford, 2000), 158–209, at 195–7.

21 Volker Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten: Wissensproduktionen globaler Nachrichtenagenturen 1835–1939' (unpublished manuscript, Cologne, 2016), 326.

22 Frank Bösch, 'Entgrenzungen? Transnationale Medien und regionale Kommunikation seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert', in Alexander Gallus, Axel Schildt, and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Deutsche Zeitgeschichte: Transnational* (Göttingen, 2015), 223–40, at 227.

Scherl had a competitive advantage over their national competitors in terms of access to national news.[23]

It was not least the representatives of the new popular newspapers that swelled the number of foreign correspondents at the turn of the century. In order to compete with the foreign reporting of the traditional party-aligned broadsheets, the commercial popular papers needed to send correspondents into all the major European capitals. Exact figures and statistics are notoriously hard to come by but the underlying trend is quite clear: traditionally, only a few papers with a nationwide circulation maintained their own permanent representatives in other capitals. In the 1890s, they were joined by some of the more successful papers of the second rank. In the last years before the outbreak of the First World War numerous tabloids and regional newspapers sent their own representatives abroad.

As their number grew, so did the confidence of the foreign correspondents. In 1898, the eminent English journalist Thomas W. Stead claimed: 'The newspaper correspondent is the ambassador of democracy. He manufactures the opinion to which it is the function of the regular ambassador to give effect. It is difficult to overestimate his importance or to measure his influence for weal or for woe.'[24] A quarter of a century later, the Berlin correspondent of the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*, Gorińsky, expressed the same sentiment when he wrote: 'These days, the reporter from a foreign newspaper is treated as the "ambassador of public opinion" all over the world.'[25]

II. *National Expectations*

Until the end of the nineteenth century it had been common practice, not least for financial reasons, for journalists to write about their own countries for foreign papers. As late as 1891 the then Berlin corre-

[23] Cf. Dominik Geppert, '"The Foul-Visaged Anti-Christ of Journalism"? The Popular Press between Warmongering and International Cooperation', in id. and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity* (Oxford, 2008), 369–89.

[24] Thomas W. Stead writing in *Review of Reviews*, Apr. 1898, 429.

[25] Gorińsky writing in *Rzeczpospolita*, no. 160, 14 June 1923 (morning edition). A German translation ('Die Leiden der Auslandspresse') is available in PA-AA, Press Department, Journalists P27, Generalia, vol. 1, R 121602.

spondent of *The Times*, a Scot called Charles Lowe, remarked disapprovingly that most of the London papers in Berlin and Vienna were represented by German or Austrian Jews.[26] Foreigners generally came to be seen as less and less suitable to fill the position of foreign correspondent. The conviction grew that the work of a foreign correspondent had a patriotic dimension, so that only men of a proven patriotic disposition could be trusted to report back from foreign countries.

Lowe believed it was positively dangerous to send non-Britons abroad to represent British papers. In his memoirs he stated that it was just as unwise 'to entrust an alien with a prominent post in our journalistic army as to appoint one to a high position in either branch of our militant services'.[27] In Germany, the editor Fritz Walz stipulated in 1906 that every foreign correspondent needed 'national instinct and a sense of duty', while Hermann Diez, director of WTB, declared that 'especially in questions of international affairs an excessively critical attitude of the press' towards the government had to be avoided because it 'only strengthened the position of foreign countries and thereby harmed its own nation'; another journalist at the time demanded that every foreign correspondent serve the interests of his paper 'like a diplomatic representative'.[28]

Changes to the composition and mentality of the corps of foreign correspondents were only part of a more general trend towards nationalizing news reporting across the European press. The business strategies of the commercial press were one of the chief causes of this: on the one hand, popular newspapers drove the internationalization of communications infrastructure, but on the other they came to rely more and more heavily on their patriotic appeal to their readers. Unlike the traditional broadsheets, which financed themselves through sales or donations from rich patrons and political parties, the tabloids counted on advertising revenue, which rewarded the highest possible print runs. They targeted not the traditional elites but the lower middle classes, who had gained enormously in both leisure and purchasing power in the decades before the First World War.[29]

[26] Charles Lowe, 'The German Newspaper Press', *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1891, 853–71, at 870.

[27] Id., *The Tale of a 'Times' Correspondent* (London, 1927), 98.

[28] All quotations from Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 44–5.

[29] Cf. Peter Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure, and Adrian Smith (eds.), *Northcliffe's Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896–1996* (Basingstoke, 2nd

There were, of course, exceptions, but overall a popular paper did better to steer clear of overly close party-political ties if it wanted to preserve its advertising business, and for this reason the tabloids found it difficult to address issues that were controversial domestically. National unity could be much more easily assumed in foreign and imperial questions.[30]

News agencies displayed similar nationalizing tendencies. During the Bismarck era, WTB, as the leading German telegraph bureau, had contented itself with Europe as its sphere of influence, just as the German Reich had done on the political stage. Bismarck's failed attempt in 1887–9 to create a triple alliance of German, Austrian, and Italian news agencies, modelled on the actual Triple Alliance, showed how much the wider European vision dominated his politics to the end.[31] This changed profoundly during the 1890s. Now that the German elites had decided that they, too, wanted to be involved in world politics, its territorial limitations and, above all, its dependence on Reuters increasingly irked them. In January 1898, a Berlin newspaper lamented that 'England's web of cables encompasses the world, and in the centre of the web lurks, like a gigantic spider, Reuters' bureau'.[32]

Britain's dominance of telegraphy and news reporting was not simply a problem for Germany. As early as 1885 France had noticed, first in its expedition to Tongking, then again in 1893 in the conflict with Siam, and another five years later in the Fashoda Incident, that its reliance on the British cable network could be potentially disastrous in a crisis, and had protested accordingly.[33] From at least the

edn. 2000); Hans-Dieter Kübler, 'Zwischen Parteilichkeit und Markt: Die Presse im Wilhelminischen Kaiserreich', in Werner Faulstich (ed.), *Kulturgeschichte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts: Das erste Jahrzehnt* (Paderborn, 2006), 23–46.

[30] Alan J. Lee, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855–1914* (London, 2nd edn. 1980).

[31] Cf. Michael Palmer, 'L'Agence Havas, Reuters et Bismarck: L'echec de la triple alliance télégraphique (1887–1889)', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 90 (1976), 321–57.

[32] 'Die Deutschfeindlichkeit des Reuter'schen Bureaus', *Berliner Herold*, 12 Jan. 1898, copy in PA-AA, Europa Generalia 86 no. 1, R 551.

[33] See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851–1945* (New York, 1991), 79, 84.

South African War onwards there was an unending series of complaints about reports by Reuters allegedly twisting or even explicitly falsifying facts. The flames were further fanned when the Russian government blocked the Siberian telegraph line to East Asia during the Russian–Japanese War, with the result that all of Europe's news traffic from the Far East had to run via the British Reuters cable network.[34]

Accordingly, Britain's competitors on the stage of international politics grew increasingly preoccupied with the question of how to improve their position in international communications. The development of the global cable network had initially been driven by commercial impulses, but after the turn of the twentieth century, these were replaced by political, economic, and strategic reasons. This prompted the other European Great Powers, above all, France and Germany, 'to work towards achieving the exchange of news for the press not, as had hitherto been the case, via England, but by their own means, or at least via a route independent of England'.[35]

III. *The Interplay between Nationalization and Transnationalization*

The processes just outlined should not be imagined as contradictory. The transnationalization of communications and the nationalization of news reporting were developments that existed in conjunction, indeed, they frequently overlapped and even mutually reinforced each other. This can be illustrated by looking more closely at two areas where the overlapping and reinforcing of nationalizing and transnationalizing tendencies can be observed particularly clearly.

The first example is the phenomenon of the press congress, which became a firm part of the new internationalism towards the end of

[34] The French press published these dispatches with the sceptical addition: 'de source Anglaise'; cf. Report on the French Press, 21 May 1906, The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), FO 371/166, 99–105.

[35] Max Roscher, 'Das Weltkabelnetz', *Archiv für Post und Telegraphie* (June 1914), 373–89, at 375, copy in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4701/16362. For more details concerning the German Foreign Office see now Martin Wroblewski, *Moralische Eroberungen als Instrumente der Diplomatie: Die Informations- und Pressepolitik des Auswärtigen Amtes 1902–1914* (Göttingen, 2016).

the nineteenth century.[36] Probably the best-known case in point is the Imperial Press Conference of 1909. It was attended by journalists from all over the British Empire who went to London to discuss issues of shared interest: from the high cost of sending telegrams and the monopoly of private cable firms to the role of the press in strengthening the cohesion of the Empire.[37] The conference in London was not the only one of its kind: the media of other countries organized similar events, so that, between 1894 and 1914, representatives of European newspapers met almost annually at international press congresses. The governments and heads of state of various European countries saw these events as important enough to dispatch high-level welcoming committees to greet the media representatives: in Lisbon in 1898 King Carlos and his wife Maria Amelia were in attendance; in Paris two years later it was President Émile Loubet. In Berlin as in London the foreign secretaries did the honours, while Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow also insisted on inviting attendees to a garden party in his Chancellery.[38]

The topics discussed grew out of the increased transnationalization of reporters' working conditions. They included demands for a uniform tariff for press cables, international standards for authors' rights and copyright, improvements in the legal status of journalists' contracts, and the establishment of an international committee of publishers.[39] Speeches stressed the importance of internationalism. There was talk of 'world journalists', of the 'cosmopolitan role of the press', of 'brotherhood and camaraderie' across all borders. The editor of the *Daily Telegraph* described the task of international press events thus: 'Their mission was humanity, the welfare, the culture, the progress of humanity. The sun rose on a better world every day;

[36] Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001).

[37] *Proceedings*: *Imperial Press Conference* (London, 1909); John Wesley Dafoe, *The Imperial Press Conference: A Retrospect with Comment*, privately printed (Winnipeg, 1909).

[38] For more details see Dominik Geppert, 'Zwischen Nationalisierung und Internationalisierung: Europäische Auslandsberichterstattung um 1900', in Ute Daniel and Axel Schildt (eds.), *Massenmedien im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 2010), 203–28.

[39] Cf. Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 53.

human society was ever being lifted upward. . . On the world of the Press the sun never set.'[40]

Closer inspection, however, revealed undertones that hinted at the virulence of nationalist modes of thought and behaviour. Discussions about politics, religion, or race were banned altogether from conferences, as the organizers apparently feared their potentially explosive consequences. There were calls for an international journalistic tribunal of honour, patently in the hope of having an instrument with which to prosecute character assassination across national borders. At the same time delegates passed a resolution declaring that defamatory attacks on other nations or on foreign papers militated against the honour and dignity of the press; this, too, was apparently in response to current troubles.[41]

The tension between transnational professional co-operation on the one hand and national loyalties on the other had an impact on the work of foreign correspondents in the capitals of Europe. As their numbers increased, representatives of foreign media experienced not only a corresponding growth in professional solidarity, but also a need to organize collectively in organizations that would be better able to act on common concerns.[42] From the 1880s onwards foreign correspondents set up their own societies on the model of Paris and Vienna (in 1883). The Foreign Press Association (FPA) in London was founded in 1888. A few years later similar organizations were formed in Rome and Berlin (in 1906).[43]

These associations soon became important forums for networking. They initiated glamorous society events. The FPA opened an

[40] All quotations from *The Times*, 21 Sept. 1909.

[41] Geppert, 'Auslandsberichterstattung', 220.

[42] Other journalists had felt the same need, and had begun to form professional associations in the last decades of the nineteenth century. For Germany see Jörg Requate, *Journalismus als Beruf: Entstehung und Entwicklung des Journalistenberufs im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1995), 222–42; for Britain see Christopher Underwood, 'Institute of Journalists', in Dennis Griffiths (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the British Press 1422–1992* (Basingstoke, 1992), 646–7.

[43] Cf. Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational'; the German association is also analysed by Liane Rothenberger, *Aus Deutschland berichten: Entwicklung, Arbeitsweise und Mitgliederstruktur des Vereins Ausländische Presse in Deutschland* (Münster, 2009).

office in London's exclusive West End which provided access to maps, reference books, address books and writing materials, so that members could use it like a club, as a place to socialize as well as to work. The association organized public lectures on political and cultural topics and several charity dinners a year, with proceeds usually going to a fund for destitute foreign artists and journalists in London. In March of 1914, the traditional spring reception of the Verein Ausländische Presse in Berlin's fashionable Esplanade hotel was attended by over 700 guests from the worlds of politics, diplomacy, business, and the arts.[44] The chief *raison d'être* of the press associations was to improve professional collaboration and help correspondents to network socially. Overcoming the obstacles which many foreign reporters faced in gaining admittance to the press galleries of the parliaments in the capital cities where they worked became a chief priority for many press bodies.[45]

All of this confirms the picture of an increasingly international media landscape where the professional common ground was seen as more important than different national backgrounds. At the same time, however, the forces of a growing nationalization made themselves felt. In order to avoid the domination of their association by members of a single nation, the Verein Ausländische Presse laid down a rule that allowed only one representative per country to sit on its board.[46] Amongst other things, this clause was designed to counter accusations of cliquishness of the kind that had been raised at the founding of the FPA, five of whose nine board members had initially been French.[47] Later, many German correspondents believed the FPA was a mere plaything in the hands of its Russian president Gabriel de Wesselitzky, whom they accused of steering the association into anti-German waters.[48] As a consequence, most German reporters decided to join a counter-organization, the Society of

[44] *New York Times*, 29 Mar. 1914, C2.

[45] Cf. Dominik Geppert, 'The Public Challenge to Diplomacy: German and British Ways of Dealing with the Press, 1890–1914', in Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008), 133–64.

[46] Communication Goldmann to Bülow, July 1906, PA-AA Deutschland 126 vol. 3, R 1481.

[47] Hermann Pollak, *Foreign Press Association in London* (London, 1893), 3.

[48] The German Foreign Office in Berlin regarded Wesselitzky as a Tsarist in-

Foreign Journalists. The rift was only healed in the spring of 1911 after Wesselitzky had left the FPA. The two clubs merged, and a German, the London representative of WTB, joined the board of the FPA as vice-president.[49] As late as the spring of 1914, the representative of *Le Figaro* as president was balanced by two German vice-presidents. The treasurer was Dutch; the secretary another Frenchman.[50]

At times of war, nationalist upsurges tended to overshadow the international character of the press associations. In December 1899, soon after the beginning of the South African War, Hermann Pollak, then chairman of the FPS, deplored that 'jealousy, envy, rancour, bitterness and other uncharitable qualities which have always more or less existed amongst foreign journalists in London, are now playing their disintegrating part in the Association, causing mutual estrangement and weakening all comity and *ésprit de corps* between members'.[51] During the First World War the warring nations expelled enemy correspondents. But the remaining representatives of allied and neutral states also experienced harassment. Even journalists with German-sounding names came under pressure.[52] Antisemitic prejudices against naturalized Jews of German or Austrian extraction often played a part.[53] The FPA adapted its statutes to reflect the new circumstances. 'No journalist of German, Austrian, Bulgarian or Turkish origin', ran the relevant passage at the end of the war, 'should be eligible for membership of the Association.'[54] Something similar happened in other countries.[55]

Media transnationalism had been replaced by a reflection of the warring power blocs. The minutes of an FPA meeting from December 1917 recorded the observation that the war—and, even

fluence; cf. e.g. communication Bernstorff to Bülow, 18 May 1903, PA-AA, England no. 78, R 5682.

[49] Communication Plehn to Mantler, 21 Apr. 1911, PA-AA, England Press no. 73, R 5638.

[50] *The Times*, 24 Apr. 1914.

[51] Quoted in Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 68.

[52] Cf. minutes of the meetings on 12 Nov. 1914 and 4 June 1915, FPA Archive, London.

[53] Minutes, Oct. 1914, FPA Archive, London.

[54] Minutes, 24 Sept. 1918, FPA Archive, London.

[55] German embassy to AA, 9 Dec. 1922, PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 1, R 121602; communication Tucher to Blockzyl, 31

more, the methods of warfare—had changed the situation to the extent

> that there does not seem to be any possibility for years to come of a complete International Association in our profession, and that being the case, we must reconstruct an association which will be as much International as possible and will comprise only the Allies—and by this we mean only the Allies who will remain true to their compact till the end—and the Neutral Association who elect to throw their lot with us after peace is signed, and who contain no member of German or Austrian origin.[56]

The idea of an international community of journalists had become a casualty of war; it remained unthinkable for a long time to come.

IV. *The Media, Global News Coverage, and International Relations*

What does all this tell us about the questions asked at the beginning of this article? First of all, it sheds new light on the differentiation and interconnection between the national, international, transnational, and global aspects of news coverage. News coverage was global in its aims and ambitions though not yet in reality. Large parts of the globe remained *terra incognita* on the map of international news flows, with scarcely any telegraph connections and few correspondents scattered over vast stretches of land. Journalists co-operated in international organizations and faced transnational challenges in their workaday life. However, this did not prevent them from seeing themselves not merely as reporters but as semi-official representatives of their home countries. A process of increasing economic, technological, and cultural integration across national borders co-existed with continuing political and ideological antagonisms, or rather, this process did, in fact, reinforce national interpretative paradigms as points of orientation in an increasingly complex world of interconnected media.

Dec. 1923, PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 2, R 121603.

[56] Minutes, 4 Dec. 1917, FPA Archive, London.

Moreover, far from being the helpless victims of globalization or transnationalization, nation-states and national governments reasserted themselves as powerful actors in a world of increasing cross-border media co-operation. The ways in which they did this varied from country to country. In some countries, such as Germany or France, the state actually owned the telegraphic networks on which the news agencies depended. This meant they needed official permission to send and receive telegrams. But even in the USA, where telegraph wires were owned by private companies, Associated Press was heavily reliant on good relations with the state, not least because government provided it with exclusive news that gave AP a competitive edge over rival news agencies. Governments in other countries acted in a similar way, using the big news agencies as compliant transmitters of government information. Particularly at times of crisis or war, national interests trumped the commercial considerations of news agencies or the media generally. If we look beyond the First World War, it is striking that from the mid 1920s on state control of news agencies intensified even further. Interestingly, that was true not only of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Spain, and Japan, or totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany, but also of France and the Weimar Republic.[57]

In addition, the media and its global news coverage had implications for international relations. To be sure, the media phenomena described in this article did not, by themselves, have a negative impact upon foreign affairs. It would be wrong to overemphasize the confrontational aspects of international press relations. None of the products of the communications revolution necessarily, by itself, intensified international tensions. News agencies profitably worked together, and the same goes for leading papers of the commercial mass press like the *Daily Mail* and the Berliner *Lokal-Anzeiger*. The press was often just the scapegoat politicians and diplomats turned to when they had to explain how international tensions and crises had come about. In any case, the outbreak of the First World War was certainly not the culmination of ever intensifying media tensions. In fact, whilst previous crises in great power relations such as those over Morocco in 1905 and 1911 had taken place in the glaring light of publicity and had been at least partly driven by the media, the crisis

[57] Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 296.

of July 1914 was a typical example of secret diplomacy. Until the very end of July, 'British newspapers were short of information' because events in the Balkans were the subject of secret diplomatic meetings and even the British Cabinet was kept in the dark by Sir Edward Grey.[58] Much the same could be said about the other countries involved.[59]

On the other hand, however, extensive media coverage helped to emotionalize international relations. The media contributed to the development of simmering resentments which any politician who raised the temperature of the national discussion could bring to the boil. The media mirrored and reinforced diplomatic relations. The Entente Cordiale, for example, had a restraining effect on British press coverage of French affairs. Many British newspaper correspondents in Paris did not dare to criticize France too severely for fear of damaging the Entente, whereas British correspondents in Berlin were not under the same constraints.[60] The same could be said of German reporting on Austrian and British affairs respectively. It is part of that picture, then, that the FPA was at pains to ensure that the composition of its board should reflect the constellations of European great power politics.

Apart from that, there were certain parallels or connections between media developments and international relations. News flows did indeed often (but not always) mirror international relations, and media institutions did imitate or adapt to political arrangements. Some examples have already come up in the course of this article, the cartel agreements between Reuters and Havas, for instance, which in some ways anticipated the Entente Cordiale by several decades. One could also think of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. When it was about to be concluded in 1882 and again in 1887, when it was to be renewed,

[58] Adam James Bones, 'British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914', *International History Review*, 35 (2013), 975–92, at 988.

[59] Georg Eckert, Peter Geiss, and Arne Karsten (eds.), *Die Presse in der Julikrise 1914: Die internationale Berichterstattung und der Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg* (Münster, 2014).

[60] They felt free to criticize every aspect of the German—or, more often, Prussian—life they abhorred; cf. 'Germany and the British Press', *New Statesman*, 30 May 1914.

Bismarck toyed with the idea of merging the German, Austrian, and Italian news agencies to weaken French influence, particularly on the Italian press. However, nothing came of the plan.[61]

After the end of the First World War the world of the media remained separated into victors and vanquished. The French foreign press associations remained closed to German and Austrian journalists into the late 1920s. In Rome, the statutes were revised in 1923. The FPA began to re-admit German members in 1926. In the early 1920s the German Foreign Office doubted whether 'the affiliation of foreign journalists is desirable'; it urged avoidance of all steps that 'must lead to a closer integration of foreign correspondents in Berlin'.[62] Along with its colonies, Germany lost its submarine cables. To be sure, Reuters and Havas immediately revived their exchange system with WTB. But the German agency was confined to its own national territory. It was treated as a junior partner and had to pay 50,000 Mark annually for the world news service provided for it by Reuters and Havas.

There even was a media equivalent to the League of Nations in the shape of the Agences alliés founded in 1924 with headquarters in the Havas main office in Paris. It was designed to regulate the exchange of news and provide a platform to discuss technical developments as well as problems of news production. One of its aims was to set up guidelines for trustworthy news, which after the experience of all-encompassing censorship in the Great War was deemed crucial for a stable peace order. The Agence alliés, however, soon faced accusations of corruption and French hegemony.[63] Across the Atlantic, the rise of the USA as a world power was neatly mirrored by the rise of the American news agency AP. Originally not part of the international cartel of the big European agencies, it was able to elbow in later and by the late 1920s, early 1930s had become strong enough to feel itself no longer bound to adhere to the principle of exclusive areas of news coverage. In 1934 that spelled the end of the exchange system the news agencies had successfully practised over nearly seven decades.[64]

[61] Rantanen, *Foreign News*, 44; Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 102.
[62] Undated memorandum by Müller-Heymer [Oct. 1920], PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 1, R 121602.
[63] Cf. Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 224–59.
[64] Ibid. 296–324.

Finally, if we take a bird's eye view of the long twentieth century from the 1880s to today, it becomes quite clear that the First World War ended an era marked by a high degree of international integration, in the media as well as in other sectors, of an intensity that would not be achieved again for half a century. In terms of globalization of the mass media, the twentieth century comprised two transformative periods separated by a deep trough: the first in the years around 1900; the second beginning with the revolutions in communications technology from the 1970s to the 1990s comprising the advent of cable television, the explosion of TV shows, live transmission of data and images via satellites, the emergence of wireless telecommunications, and the global use of the internet. Only with these kinds of technological innovations and the new practices that went with them did media coverage truly become global.

In both cases, however, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as a hundred years later, the logic of the mass media drove not only internationalization and transnationalization, but also processes of nationalization. David Reynolds has reminded us of the role played by satellite television in the national penetration and standardization of the media in Asia's vast territorial states, beginning with Soviet state propaganda in the 1970s, and taken up soon after by countries such as India, China, and Indonesia.[65] Satellites both internationalized and nationalized television as a mass medium in the last third of the twentieth century. I suppose a similar point could be made with regard to the impact of the internet in the present. It provides the quintessential transnational infrastructure. But it is still intensely interrelated with national interests and power structures. Moreover, some of today's biggest transnational media corporations, such as the Murdoch empire, strike particularly nationalist tones in the way they cover news and comment on them. In this respect, the world of Northcliffe is not so far away from the world of Fox News or the *Sun*.

What is different, though, is the importance of truth—or perhaps more accurately, objectivity—as a guiding principle for news coverage. Volker Barth has demonstrated convincingly how crucial the alleged objectivity of their news was for agencies such as Reuters,

[65] David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London, 2000), 501–3.

Havas, and WTB. Objectivity guaranteed the quality of their products and maximized the number of potential customers. The claim to objectivity was 'at the core of their business model, it facilitated their working practices, and helped to optimize their processes of production'.[66] It would be difficult to say the same of today's blogosphere or news platforms in the internet.

[66] Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 333.

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