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PRUSSIA AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 1700–40

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Constitutions and Culture

Our understanding of the Holy Roman Empire has been transformed in the last fifty years. The older, 'Borussian interpretation' dismissed the Empire in its last two centuries as moribund and doomed to be supplanted by dynamic, centralizing 'power states' like Prussia.[1] A succession of historians since the 1960s have identified how imperial institutions performed important coordinating functions, repelled external attacks, resolved internal conflicts, and safeguarded an impressive and surprisingly robust range of individual and corporate rights for ordinary inhabitants.[2] More recently, some have suggested this positive reappraisal presents the old Empire as a blueprint for the German Federal Republic or the European Union. Others prefer to characterize the Empire as, at best, only 'partially modernized' and still defective in comparison with most other, especially western European countries.[3]

I would like to thank Andreas Gestrich, Michael Schaich, and Thomas Biskup for their helpful suggestions and comments on this article.

[1] A view still expressed by some today, e.g. Heinrich August Winkler, *Germany: The Long Road West*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2006), i. 4–46.

[2] This positive view of the Empire is presented succinctly by one of its prominent proponents, Georg Schmidt, 'The Old Reich: The State and Nation of the Germans', in R. J. W. Evans, Michael Schaich, and Peter H. Wilson (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806* (Oxford, 2011), 43–62. See also Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, *Das Alte Reich 1648–1806*, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1993–7); Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 1495–1806*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2012).

[3] Examples of these critiques in Matthias Schnettger (ed.), *Imperium Romanum – irregulare corpus – Teutscher Reichs-Staat: Das Alte Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der Historiographie* (Mainz, 2002).

This debate remains unresolved, but clearly focuses on the traditional German historical themes of state and nation-building. These topics will no doubt persist, and can probably only be resolved through more extensive comparisons with other European states and societies.[4] The focus on institutions and identity has been supplemented recently by a partially separate discussion of political culture, inspired by the 'linguistic turn' in the humanities and by anthropological studies of ritual and communication. The new constitutional history developing since the 1960s countered the Borussian interpretation by re-examining the activities of imperial institutions in the fields which nineteenth-century historians considered important: war and diplomacy, legislation, the judiciary, and economic coordination. By contrast, the new cultural approach addresses a key reason why earlier historians believed the Empire to be irrelevant. Anyone reading the ponderous deliberations of the *Reichstag* (imperial diet) and other imperial institutions will soon see that these were indeed much preoccupied with matters of status, precedence, and posturing. The difference is that, whereas earlier historians dismissed such concerns as irrelevant to 'real' history, modern culturalists argue they are central aspects of symbolic communication and political legitimation through performance.[5]

One obvious conclusion is that the Empire remained ambiguous and cannot be defined by examining its formal structure alone. However, it is one thing to point out that the Empire 'was not an objectively established fact; it did not lead an independent existence beyond the actions, perceptions, and attributions of contemporaries'.[6] It is quite another to claim that this means the Empire was

[4] For steps in this direction, see R. J. W. Evans and Peter H. Wilson (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire, 1495–1806: A European Perspective* (Leiden, 2012).

[5] The cultural approach is also known as the 'Münster school' after its origins in a major research project at that university. Its theoretical basis and its development can be found in Jason P. Coy, Benjamin Marschke, and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire Reconsidered* (New York, 2010). See also Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, 'On the Function of Rituals in the Holy Roman Empire', in Evans, Schaich, and Wilson (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire*, 359–73.

[6] Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Des Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des alten Reiches* (Munich, 2008), 249.

'essentially fictive'.[7] It is legitimate to ask whether any human institutions have an independent existence beyond those who inhabit or interact with them. When pushed to its logical conclusion, however, the culturalist approach risks unwittingly reviving the Borussian presentation of the Empire as irrelevant to 'real' history. It perpetuates the distinction between the wider imperial framework, represented by institutions like the *Reichstag*, and the territorial states, like Bavaria and Hanover, which collectively composed the Empire. The Empire is reduced to 'a society of princes and nobles' which 'was not an authority present in [the] daily world' of ordinary subjects.[8] This misses the key insight from the new constitutional history which identifies the complementary character of the Empire in its exercise of authority and political functions on several levels.[9] The history of the individual territories cannot be divorced from that of the Empire; both must be read together to appreciate how each functioned.

We need to combine the broad reinterpretation of the Empire's institutional history with the cultural approach's reappraisal of ritual as integral to imperial political culture. The former demonstrates the Empire's relative effectiveness in material terms: money raised, troops mobilized and deployed, judicial verdicts passed and enforced. These outcomes clearly impacted on daily lives and made the Empire 'real' to at least some of its ordinary inhabitants. However, the largely positive reassessment of imperial institutions often presents a schizophrenic picture, as participation and compliance was far higher amongst the smaller territories concentrated in the south and west than in the larger ones of the north and east. The cultural approach helps explain why the Empire endured despite these spatial, as well as chronological variations in coherence. Regardless of size and ambition, all territories legitimized their claims and aspirations in similar ways. This common political culture sustained the Empire, whilst simultaneously curtailing its effectiveness in material terms, and limiting the options of its political actors. This insight is an important corrective to the more enthusiastic proponents of the

[7] André Krischer, 'New Directions in the Study of the Holy Roman Empire: A Cultural Approach', in Coy, Marschke, and Sabean (eds.), *Holy Roman Empire Reconsidered*, 265–70 at 267.

[8] This distinction is claimed by Krischer, 'New Directions', 269.

[9] An argument developed by Georg Schmidt, *Geschichte des Alten Reiches: Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 1999).

Empire's reappraisal who tend to over-emphasize modernity in institutional forms, rather than recognizing pre-modernity in political behaviour.

This article will illustrate this by examining Prussia's relations with the Empire between 1700 and 1740.[10] There are several specific reasons for selecting this example and timeframe. Writing on Prussia still routinely ignores the fact that over half of its subjects still lived within the Empire even after its political centre of gravity shifted eastwards with the three partitions of Poland.[11] The history of Prussian *Reichspolitik*, or political relations with the Empire, remains largely unwritten.[12] When covered, it is usually presented through the classic dualist model focusing on Austro-Prussian antagonism, and prematurely reducing the rest of the Empire to a passive 'third Germany'; an object rather than autonomous actor in military and political affairs.

Within this, the period 1700–40 remains perhaps the most neglected.[13] Usually, historians treat Prussia as an independent kingdom, either already from the acquisition of a royal title in 1700, or,

[10] A good overview of this period is provided by Whaley, *Germany*, ii. 105–83.

[11] Relations to the Empire are missing from Wolfgang Neugebauer's general history, *Die Hohenzollern*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 2003). Karin Friedrich's *Brandenburg-Prussia, 1466–1806* (Basingstoke, 2012) is an important reappraisal of the Polish dimension to Prussian history, but unfortunately says little on its place in the Empire.

[12] As noted by Sven Externbrink, 'State-Building Within the Empire: The Cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Savoy-Sardinia', in Evans and Wilson (eds.), *European Perspective*, 187–202, at 191.

[13] The period before 1700 is discussed by Anton Schindling, 'Kurbrandenburg im System des Reiches während der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts', in Oswald Hauser (ed.), *Preußen, Europa und das Reich* (Cologne, 1987), 47–64. For post-1740 see Volker Press, 'Friedrich der Große als Reichspolitiker', in Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), *Friedrich der Große, Franken und das Reich* (Vienna, 1986), 25–56; Peter H. Wilson, 'Prussia's Relations with the Holy Roman Empire, 1740–86', *Historical Journal,* 51 (2008), 337–71; id., 'Frederick the Great and Imperial Politics, 1740–56', in Jürgen Luh and Michael Kaiser (eds.), *Friedrich 300: Eine perspektivische Bestandsaufnahme* (2009), online at <http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/>, accessed 17 Feb. 2014. A further review of the literature can be found in Frank Kleinehagenbrock, 'Brandenburg-Preußen und das Alte Reich ca.

more often, after 1713 when this title received wide (though incomplete) international recognition.[14] That recognition coincided with the accession of Frederick William I (1713–40), the famous 'soldier king', whose deliberate 'break in style' ended preoccupation with what his son and successor, Frederick II (1740–86), disdainfully dismissed as 'empty titles', in favour of concentration on military and fiscal power.[15] Prussia emerged as exemplar for the supposedly rational and modern process of state-building that Borussian historians argued was inevitably destined to supplant the Empire.[16] Prussia's relations with the Empire are treated as an extension of those with Habsburg Austria. The usual conclusion is that Frederick William, 'after a short vacillation, pursued a completely pro-imperial policy', fulfilling his obligations and not challenging the emperor.[17] This acquiescence is explained by references to the king's personality and to Austrian bribery of his ministers, rather than as a consequence of the strength of imperial institutions and political culture. Frederick William's apparent timidity or (misguided) loyalty to the emperor has become a historical convention used to emphasize the more aggressive policies of Frederick II after 1740.

1650–1806', in Wolfgang Neugebauer and Frank Kleinehagenbrock (eds.), *Handbuch der preußischen Geschichte*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 2009), i. 854–931.

[14] The royal title was granted by Emperor Leopold I in November 1700, but many historians date it only from the lavish coronation in January 1701. It is customary to refer to the composite Hohenzollern state as Brandenburg-Prussia until the acquisition of the royal title, and Prussia thereafter. The crown treaty is printed in Theodor von Moerner (ed.), *Kurbrandenburgische Staatsverträge von 1601–1700* (Berlin, 1867; reprint 1965), no. 443. The most recent account of the crown's acquisition is Frank Göse, *Friedrich I. (1657–1713): Ein König in Preußen* (Regensburg, 2012), 202–60.

[15] The quotation comes from Frederick's Political Testament of 1752; Otto Bardong (ed.), *Friedrich der Große* (Darmstadt, 1982), 228.

[16] This view is deeply embedded in historical and political science studies of state formation and persists in more recent writing too: Wolf D. Gruner, 'Preußen in Europa 1701–1860/71', in Jürgen Luh, Vinzenz Czech, and Bert Becker (eds.), *Preussen, Deutschland und Europa* (Groningen, 2003), 429–460, at 438–9.

[17] Peter Baumgart, 'Friedrich Wilhelm I: Ein Soldatenkönig?', in id., Bernhard R. Kroener, and Heinz Stübig (eds.), *Die preußische Armee zwischen Ancien Régime und Reichsgründung* (Paderborn, 2008), 3–36, at 21. See also Walther

The period is also an important one in the Empire's history. The four decades after 1680 saw major changes in the Empire and its component territories. By doubling its territory between 1683 and 1718, Austria emerged as a European great power distinct from its possession of the imperial title. Several German dynasties, the Hohenzollerns included, acquired royal crowns associated with land outside the Empire. These families also emerged as 'armed princes', creating permanent armies which grew in size by 250 per cent between 1670 and 1710. Given the presence of so many powerful, ambitious political players, it is fair to ask what held the Empire together and prevented it from descending into warlordism like China after 1911.[18]

Beyond the intrinsic interest in reappraising Prusso-imperial relations, there is the more fundamental issue of Prussia as a test case for the culturalist approach to political history. Older views of Prussia as exemplary 'power state' have been deconstructed as part of the general rejection of monolithic models of absolutism.[19] However, no one has yet characterized the Hohenzollern state as 'essentially fictive'; it remains 'real' to both conventional 'blood and iron' political history, as well as to studies of the lives of its inhabitants.[20] This 'real' actor cannot be ignored in any reappraisal of the Empire through the culturalist approach.

Space precludes discussion of what Prussian subjects thought of the Empire.[21] It is nonetheless telling that Frederick II felt obliged to

Hubatsch, 'Preußen und das Reich', in Oswald Hauser (ed.), *Zur Problematik 'Preußen und das Reich'* (Cologne, 1984), 1–11.

[18] For overviews of China's warlord period, see Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989* (Abingdon, 2011), 149–77, and James E. Sheridan, *China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912–1949* (New York, 1975). The pioneering study of Chinese warlordism by Ch'i Hsi-sheng stresses the significance of a shared political culture in holding the provincial warlords within a common national system, even at the height of internal conflict: *Warlord Politics in China 1916–1928* (Stanford, Calif., 1976), 179–95.

[19] For this, see Peter H. Wilson, *Absolutism in Central Europe* (London, 2000).

[20] E.g. William W. Hagen's monumental study of agrarian relations clearly demonstrates how the Hohenzollern state affected relations between landowners and serfs: *Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500–1840* (Cambridge, 2002).

[21] This topic has scarcely been investigated. Historians have routinely allowed a handful of noted intellectuals such as Kant or Hegel to speak for

prohibit the customary prayers for the emperor throughout his lands in 1750. It is clear that ordinary inhabitants across the Empire usually possessed at least minimal knowledge of the imperial constitution and could locate their community within it.[22] This matched the Empire's character as a mixed monarchy in which power was distributed along a complex hierarchy of territories, allowing each to develop its own administration and identities. These arrangements were obviously very different from those in more centralized monarchies like England or France, but this did not make them any less 'real' for their inhabitants.[23]

Rather than examining identity, this article will explore political behaviour. The first two sections will argue that the Empire's political culture was sustained by both formal institutions and established socio-political practices like dynasticism. The third part will explain how these patterns of behaviour were strained by the competition for royal titles amongst the prominent princes, including the Prussian Hohenzollerns. The final section will indicate that Prussia nonetheless continued to adhere to commonly accepted norms in its dealings with even the smallest imperial Estates after 1700.

Part I: *Formal Frameworks for Interaction*

By exploring the full extent of Prussia's constitutional position we can begin to see how deeply embedded it remained in the Empire

all Prussians on this topic. Important contributions to the debate on German identity include Georg Schmidt (ed.), *Die deutsche Nation im frühneuzeitlichen Europa* (Munich, 2010), and Len Scales, *The Shaping of German Identity: Authority and Crisis, 1254–1414* (Cambridge, 2012).

[22] Ralf-Peter Fuchs, 'Kaiser und Reich im Spiegel von Untertanenbefragungen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts', in Stephan Wendehorst and Siegrid Westphal (eds.), *Lesebuch altes Reich* (Munich, 2006), 48–52; Stefan Ehrenpreis et al., 'Probing the Legal History of the Jews in the Holy Roman Empire', *Jahrbuch des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts*, 2 (2003), 409–87, at 442–3, 483.

[23] For the strength of emotional attachment to the Empire, see Wolfgang Burgdorf, *Reichskonstitution und Nation: Verfassungsreformprojekte für das Heilige Römische Reich deutscher Nation im politischen Schriftum von 1648 bis 1806* (Mainz, 1999); id., *Ein Weltbild verliert seine Welt: Der Untergang des Alten Reiches und die Generation 1806* (2nd edn. Munich, 2009); and Scales, *German Identity*.

despite its royal title. Certainly, Frederick I (1688–1713) and his successor Frederick William I emphasized their new status and tried to free their lands from some formal restrictions.[24] In this, however, they differed neither from their direct predecessors, nor their contemporaries in the Empire. Indeed, what is more surprising is how they remained engaged in all formal constitutional levels and institutions. The Hohenzollerns were as much lords of Ravenstein as they were newly minted kings in Prussia. They jealously guarded all their privileges, refusing to forgo even comparatively minor advantages and certainly doing very little to replace the complex, multi-layered relationship between their possessions and the Empire with a uniform pattern framed by monarchical sovereignty. Moreover, in retaining the advantages of existing relations, they accepted the price of remaining within established behaviour, and even in military matters, as we shall see, they avoided a breach with the Empire.

The imperial constitution exercised a powerful influence over the interaction between the numerous territories comprising the Empire. Fundamental to this constitution was the distribution of rights and privileges in a formal hierarchy which was never clearly nor logically related to material factors, like size of territory or population. The crucial division was the status of 'immediacy' under the emperor (*Reichsunmittelbarkeit*), distinguishing the rulers (usually called 'princes') of the Empire's numerous component territories (called the 'imperial Estates', or *Reichsstände*), from the 'mediate' nobles and other subjects within those territories.[25] Those enjoying immediacy were themselves ranked in a hierarchy which had evolved since the thirteenth century into an increasingly complex and rigid structure. Various emperors exerted influence by adjusting this structure to favour loyal or compliant princes. Such alterations became increasingly difficult as the Empire developed more permanent institutions after 1480. By 1654 it was impossible for the emperor to make any significant change in the status of one prince without the agreement of the others, usually through the *Reichstag*.

[24] Frederick was known as Frederick III until his coronation as king in 1701. To avoid confusion, this article will identify him by his royal, rather than electoral number.

[25] The Empire's structure is notoriously complex and full of anomalies. For a short introduction, see Peter H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806* (2nd edn. Basingstoke, 2011).

While stabilizing the Empire, these changes frustrated individual princely ambition. The only way for a princely family to improve its status was to acquire more territory, bringing additional rights and privileges. It is important to note that, with a few exceptions, the German princes did not use force to do this, unlike the early twentieth-century Chinese warlords who employed their provincial armies to conquer territory and to compel the weak central government to shower them with promotions and new administrative titles.[26] Rather, German princes obtained additional land through dynastic inheritance or purchase. Acquisition required recognition from the emperor, whose assent was also necessary to legitimate normal transitions in hereditary rule. The arrangements underscore the feudal character of the Empire's constitutional hierarchy. By early modernity, emperors could not prevent sons following fathers in the hereditary principalities, but they could still delay formal enfeoffment, and thereby restrict the full exercise of territorial rights.[27] Moreover,

[26] It might be argued that the threat of intervention from other European powers rather than the potency of imperial political culture constrained the German princes from using force. Certainly, through the Peace of Westphalia Sweden and France acquired formal, though in practice relatively weak, powers to intervene to preserve the constitutional status quo. There were long periods, however, when their ability to intervene was curtailed by domestic or other foreign problems and it was only after 1763 that France, Russia, and other major powers became more equally committed to preserving the constitution as a means of preventing either Austria or Prussia from dominating the Empire: see Eckhard Buddruss, *Die französische Deutschlandpolitk 1756–1789* (Mainz, 1995). In China's case, the distraction of the Great Powers in the First World War was certainly a factor in the emergence of warlordism around 1916, but was outweighed by internal issues, notably the decentralization of financial and military authority in the late Qing era before 1911. Thereafter, Japan, Russia, and to a lesser extent other powers influenced events, but warlords were far from being the foreign puppets represented in western media of the 1920s. See e.g. O. Y. K. Wou, *Militarism in Modern China: The Career of Wu P'ei-Fu, 1916–39* (Canberra, 1978), 147–260; Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928: China, Japan, and the Manchurian Idea* (Canberra, 1977), esp. 95–100.

[27] Jean-François Noël, 'Zur Geschichte der Reichsbelehnungen im 18. Jahrhundert', *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, 21 (1968), 106–22. For an interesting case of imperial feudal jurisdiction over Hohenzollern possessions see Tobias Schenk, 'Reichsgeschichte als Landesgeschichte', *Westfalen*, 90 (2012), 107–61, at 144–58.

inheritance disputes and other feudal matters were reserved to the *Reichshofrat* (Imperial Aulic Council), a court depending directly on the emperor, unlike the Empire's second supreme court, the *Reichskammergericht* (Imperial Cameral Court), where the emperor shared control with the imperial Estates and which adjudicated disputes between territories, and between their rulers and subjects.[28]

Brandenburg-Prussia followed the general trend among larger principalities in securing incremental exemptions from the jurisdiction of both imperial courts. This process began in the mid fourteenth century, well before the Empire's judicial framework consolidated around 1500. Brandenburg was fully exempt from the *Reichskammergericht*'s jurisdiction after 1586, while less complete rights were secured for the Hohenzollerns' other lands in 1702.

However, these privileges had to be negotiated afresh for each subsequent acquisition, and while they prevented Prussian subjects prosecuting their king in the imperial courts, they also required the monarchy to establish its own court of appeal. Imperial law did not apply directly, but Prussia remained within the Empire's legal culture, and its judiciary did not escape public comment, as Frederick II discovered in the furore generated by his intervention in the famous miller Arnold case.[29] Exemptions from imperial jurisdiction were useful, but their main significance to Prussian monarchs was as a way to match the privileges enjoyed by the Habsburgs.[30]

As relatively powerful rulers, the Hohenzollerns enjoyed judicial autonomy beyond formal privileges. Prussia's first king, Frederick I, exploited the *Reichskammergericht*'s breakdown between 1704 and 1711 to restrict appeals from those parts of his monarchy which

[28] Leopold Auer, 'The Role of the Imperial Aulic Council in the Constitutional Structure of the Holy Roman Empire', in Evans, Schaich, and Wilson (eds.), *Holy Roman Empire*, 63–75. For examples of intervention in territorial affairs by the *Reichshofrat*, see Siegrid Westphal, *Kaiserliche Rechtsprechung und herrschaftliche Stabilisierung: Reichsgerichtsbarkeit in den thüringischen Territorialstaaten 1648–1806* (Cologne, 2002).

[29] David M. Luebke, 'Frederick the Great and the Celebrated Case of the Miller Arnold (1770–1779)', *Central European History*, 32 (1999), 379–408.

[30] See Peter Rauscher, 'Recht und Politik: Reichsjustiz und oberstrichterliches Amt des Kaisers im Spannungsfeld des preußisch-österreichischen Dualismus (1740–1785)', *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, 46 (1998), 269–309, at 279–80.

lacked full exemption.[31] His successor, Frederick William I, at one point faced forty cases in the *Reichshofrat*, including from nobles protesting against his tax policies. His angry efforts to hinder the court prompted Emperor Charles VI (1711–40) to accuse him of seeking a 'statum in statu' and severed diplomatic ties in 1721.[32] A coincidence of interests in other areas improved relations by 1728 when the king promised to follow the Habsburg line in imperial institutions. He now switched to less confrontational methods, including bribing judges. However, neither he nor Prussia's other eighteenth-century kings were inherently hostile to the courts, which were useful to legitimize Prussia's own claims against others. Frederick I and Frederick William I consistently backed their own subjects involved in cases against other rulers, and Prussia was permanently represented in Wetzlar, where the *Reichskammergericht* was based. Frederick William's ministers advised him in 1731 to abandon cooperation with other princes against the *Reichshofrat* because Prussia no longer had any complaints against it.[33]

Representation in imperial institutions was another important indicator of status. Brandenburg qualified as an electorate for membership in the senior of the three 'colleges' in the *Reichstag*, and a privileged position in the various associated assemblies, or 'deputations'.[34] The *Reichstag* was the Empire's supreme legislative organ and took decisions binding on all imperial Estates, subject to the

[31] He also repeatedly suspended his share of the regular financial contribution to the court's maintenance. See Rudolf Smend, 'Brandenburg-Preußen und das Reichskammergericht', *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte*, NF 20 (1907), 161–99, esp. 192; Sigrid Jahns, 'Brandenburg-Preußen im System der Reichskammergerichts-Präsentationen 1648–1806', in Hermann Weber (ed.), *Politische Ordnungen und soziale Kräfte im Alten Reich* (Wiesbaden, 1980), 169–202, at 179.

[32] H. E. Feine, 'Zur Verfassungsentwicklung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches seit dem Westfälischen Frieden', *Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung*, 52 (1932), 65–133, at 109. See also Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Imperial Aulic Council in the Reign of Charles VI* (Woodbridge, 1988), esp. 62 n 9.

[33] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Dahlem, I HA, Rep. N, Nr. 303, Fasz. 92: Borcke and Podewils to Frederick William I, 20 June 1731, concerning the proposed renewal of the 1716 treaty with Württemberg.

[34] Anton Schindling, *Die Anfänge des immerwährenden Reichstags zu Regensburg* (Mainz, 1991).

emperor's approval. The electors were allowed to hold their own assemblies, but this privilege lost its relevance once the *Reichstag* remained permanently in session in Regensburg after 1663. Acquisition of a royal crown further eroded the utility of an electoral title for Brandenburg. This, indeed, was the crown's purpose, since the Hohenzollerns wanted to match their Saxon Wettin rivals, who had become kings of Poland in 1697. The subsequent elevation of the Hanoverian Guelphs to British royalty in 1714 further undermined the previously cherished electoral collegiality. All three Protestant electors now had crowns, while the two Catholic secular electors of Bavaria and the Palatinate had failed to obtain one, despite considerable expenditure of blood and treasure during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14). The three Catholic ecclesiastical electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier were ineligible because of their clerical status, and though the Catholic Habsburgs were represented in the electoral college through the kingdom of Bohemia, their parallel imperial status placed them in a very different category to their nominal colleagues.[35] Internal tensions and resentment at Prussia's growing power dissuaded the electors from backing the Hohenzollerns' proposed constitutional amendments intended to enhance Prussia's privileges in the Empire in 1711, and again in 1745.[36]

Territorial acquisitions in 1648 and 1680 gave Prussia the largest block of votes in the *Reichstag*'s second college, the college of princes, but it could not dominate debates there because the range of members and interests was even greater than in the electoral college.[37]

[35] There were further tensions over Hanover's elevation to electoral status, which had only been fully accepted in 1708, as well as a long-running dispute between Bavaria and the Palatinate over their relative ranking within the electoral college. For these and the development of the college generally in this period, see Axel Gotthard, *Säulen des Reiches: Die Kurfürsten im frühneuzeitlichen Reichsverband*, 2 vols. (Husum, 1999). The relative decline of electoral status for Prussia did not diminish its attraction for other princes further down the imperial hierarchy: see Ludolf Pelizaeus, *Der Aufstieg Württembergs und Hessens zur Kurwürde 1692–1803* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000).

[36] Gerd Kleinheyer, *Die kaiserlichen Wahlkapitulationen* (Karlsruhe, 1968), 109–10.

[37] These acquisitions were part of the Westphalian settlement ending the Thirty Years War. See Peter Baumgart, 'Kurbrandenburgs Kongreßdiplomatie und ihre Ergebnisse', in Heinz Duchhardt (ed.), *Der Westfälische Friede*

Other possessions acquired in 1609 raised the prospect of a share in the collective vote awarded to the Westphalian counts in 1654.[38] This claim was not pressed until 1705, indicating that Prussia's elevation to royalty did not end interest in the Empire. On the contrary, acquisition of parts of the Orange inheritance in Westphalia in 1702 intensified efforts to assert Prussia's status relative to comparatively minor imperial Estates. The Westphalian counts strongly opposed Prussian claims, regarding the Hohenzollerns as powerful outsiders whose admission into their association would wreck its utility as a vehicle for their own interests. It was not until 1732 that the counts grudgingly accepted that the Hohenzollerns could share their collective vote, but only on behalf of the county of Tecklenburg which Prussia had acquired in 1707.[39]

Prussia's representation in the Empire's regional framework of ten *Kreise* (imperial circles) was also contested. The territorial gains of 1609/48 gave the Hohenzollerns votes in the Westphalian and Lower Saxon *Kreise*, in addition to that enjoyed by Brandenburg in the Upper Saxon *Kreis*. The *Kreise* were interposed between the imperial Estates and 'national' institutions like the *Reichstag* to coordinate regional action. Each *Kreis* had a coordinating directory, held by between one and three local princes, balanced by an assembly of all those with qualifying territory. Representation of imperial Estates in the *Kreis* assemblies was much broader than in the *Reichstag* with, for instance, the counts and prelates enjoying full votes.[40] Reform of the

(Munich, 1998), 349–59. The Hohenzollerns obtained full votes in the college of princes for Eastern Pomerania and the secularized ecclesiastical principalities of Halberstadt, Cammin, and Minden in 1648, plus another for the former archbishopric of Magdeburg in 1680. It should be remembered that Prussia itself lay outside the Empire and had no formal rights within it.

[38] The Hohenzollerns acquired Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg as part of the disputed Jülich-Cleves inheritance in 1609. The Empire's 90 or so secular and ecclesiastical principalities each had full votes, but the 140 or so prelates and counts had to share six collective votes, the final one of which was agreed in 1654.

[39] Johannes Arndt, *Das Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichsgrafenkollegium und seine Mitglieder (1653–1806)* (Mainz, 1991), esp. 22–4.

[40] Several relatively large imperial Estates, such as the Hohenzollern possessions of Mark and Cleves, were represented at *Kreis* level, but not in the *Reichstag*. The *Kreis* structure was established in 1500–12, but in most cases

Empire's mechanisms for collective security in 1681–2 enhanced the *Kreise's* significance, but affected each differently depending on their composition. *Kreis* institutions offered larger principalities the chance to dictate the affairs of their weaker neighbours, but also raised the prospect of those smaller territories exerting influence through collective action. The balance between large and small imperial Estates in each *Kreis* generally determined which path was followed.

In Prussia's case, any prospect that it might subvert the Upper Saxon *Kreis* for its own ends was blocked by Saxony which held the regional initiative as *Kreis* Director and its web of unequal treaties with the smaller members. Prior to 1697, Brandenburg policy was one of obstruction, intended to prevent Saxony from using the formal structure to dictate regional policy. The conversion of the Saxon elector to Catholicism in 1697—to assist his election as Polish king—allowed Brandenburg to mobilize the weaker Protestant members in a bid to seize the formal directory of the Upper Saxon *Kreis*. The Hohenzollerns backed the emperor's request that the *Kreis* mobilize troops in the War of the Spanish Succession, turning the tables on Saxony, which refused to cooperate because it needed its own troops in Poland. Saxony nonetheless retained the directory, forcing Prussia to resume its previous obstruction by 1718.[41] The episode shows that Prussia's relations to the Empire were determined by far more complex factors than purely its relationship to Austria.

Acquisition of Magdeburg in 1680 gave Brandenburg a share in the Lower Saxon *Kreis* directory, but all efforts to use this were blocked by resolute Hanoverian opposition.[42] By contrast, the absence of a single local rival created more opportunities in Westphalia, where Hohenzollern possession of Cleves and Mark brought a share in the directory with the Palatinate and the bishop of Münster.[43] Brandenburg and the Palatinate were regarded locally as

was only fully effective after the mid sixteenth century. See Winfried Dotzauer, *Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383–1806)* (Stuttgart, 1998).

[41] Thomas Nicklas, *Macht oder Recht? Frühneuzeitliche Politik im obersächsichen Reichskreis* (Stuttgart, 2002), 315–30.

[42] Georg Schnath, *Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neunten Kur und der englischen Sukzession 1674–1714*, 5 vols. (Hildesheim, 1938–82), ii. 292–3, iii. 548–9.

[43] For the details see Alwin Hanschmidt, 'Kurbrandenburg als Kreisstand im Niederrheinisch-Westfälischen Kreis vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum

outsiders whose core territories and interests lay elsewhere. Their Westphalian possessions were scattered and vulnerable, given their proximity to the Netherlands, which formed the principal battleground of most major western European wars. Though fairly small, the Westphalian possessions were comparatively densely populated and valuable in fiscal terms. Both Brandenburg and the Palatinate came to see the *Kreis* structure as a convenient framework to manage their Westphalian interests, particularly once they patched up their long-standing dispute over conflicting territorial claims in the 1670s. Nonetheless, as will become more apparent below, local opposition continued to thwart Prussia's ambitions in the region.

The recent culturalist approach has shifted attention beyond these formal institutional structures to examine the behaviour of those who composed and interacted with them. One of the most important findings has been to identify the growing importance of written culture in early modernity. This spread rapidly during the fifteenth century and assisted the consolidation of the Empire's constitution around 1500. The constitutional and legal frameworks were never codified, but they became objects of professional study, known as *Reichspublizistik*, while imperial institutions and princely governments generated mountains of paper records. Written culture evolved to assist the established use of precedent in determining political legitimacy. As the religious reformers discovered during the Reformation, writing things down could make differences clearer and hinder consensus. Nonetheless, written agreements were thought to reduce disputes and thereby remove the friction inhibiting collective action within the Empire's large and complex framework.[44]

Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg', in Hauser (ed.), *Preußen, Europa*, 47–64. Palatine rights rested on the duchies of Jülich and Berg, which were ruled by the separate Pfalz-Neuburg line from 1609. This branch acquired the Palatinate itself in 1685.

[44] My argument here follows Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's analysis in her *Kaisers alte Kleider*. For the development of a 'public sphere' in the Empire, see Wolfgang Behringer, 'Core and Periphery: The Holy Roman Empire as a Communications Universe', in Evans, Schaich, and Wilson (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire*, 347–58; Susanne Friedrich, *Drehscheibe Regensburg: Das Informations- und Kommunikationssytem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700* (Berlin, 2007).

The ambiguities of written culture are amply demonstrated through a brief analysis of Prussia's military policy, which concludes our survey of its place in the imperial constitutional order. First, attempts to compel powerful imperial Estates like Brandenburg to contribute their share of defence by fixing their responsibilities in formal agreements had unintentionally produced complex military arrangements that allowed the powerful to dodge their own obligations whilst bullying the weak into contributing more. Yet, Prussia's broad adherence to constitutional norms confounds expectations. This, I will argue, is less corroboration for claims for the strength of the formal constitutional structure than for the significance of the Empire's political culture.

Prussia's rise as a military power is well known; its army grew by over 400 per cent between 1670 and 1740, compared to the overall increase in troop numbers across the Empire of 107 per cent in the same period.[45] By 1700 Prussia already had the second largest army in the Empire after Austria. However, it did not use its troops to pursue objectives directly by force, unlike Saxony, which was a full belligerent in the Great Northern War (1700–21), or Bavaria, which joined France in opposing the Empire in the War of the Spanish Succession.[46] Prussia hired large numbers of troops to Britain and the Dutch Republic in return for political backing and recognition of its royal title. Providing auxiliaries to foreign powers was scarcely unusual, nor contrary to imperial law or interests, since these forces were fighting the French.[47] Moreover, Prussia took care to be seen to fulfil its parallel obligations to the Empire.

[45] Prussia's relative increase is even more marked if the total of 99,446 soldiers from December 1740 is used, rather than the 76,278 men Frederick II found on his accession seven months earlier. For a more detailed breakdown of the growth in German army size, see the tables in Peter H. Wilson, *From Reich to Revolution: German History, 1558–1806* (Basingstoke, 2004), 226–7.

[46] Cologne and Mantua also opposed the Empire, while Gotha and Brunswick were disarmed before they could act. Prussia did join the Great Northern War briefly in 1715.

[47] Prussian policy in this period is summarized by Linda and Marsha Frey, *Frederick I: The Man and His Times* (Boulder, Col., 1984), 184–243. See also Klaus-Ludwig Feckl, *Preußen im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* (Frankfurt am Main, 1979). For general German practice, see Peter H. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806* (London, 1998), 101–49.

Imperial collective security required each imperial Estate to contribute soldiers to the common imperial army (*Reichsarmee*) according to quotas agreed by the *Reichstag* and *Kreis* assemblies. Prussia was supposed to provide troops to the collective forces of each of the *Kreise* where it held territory. However, it was far from clear exactly how many men should be sent, since each *Kreis* adjusted its own quotas, often without full approval from the *Reichstag*. It was also possible for imperial Estates to substitute additional infantry for the more expensive cavalry, or vice versa. Several *Kreise* also used their constitutional right to mobilize additional collective forces, such as Westphalia which sent units to protect the imperial city of Cologne in 1702.[48] Finally, important rulers like the Hohenzollerns were also providing additional regiments as auxiliaries to the emperor or his allies.

Prussia exploited the inevitable confusion, at times temporarily designating auxiliary or other troops as contingents with the imperial or *Kreis* forces.[49] The aim was to harmonize military deployment with political goals, rather than simply dodge imperial obligations. Like its rivals among the more important principalities, Prussia wanted to keep its troops together under its own generals. A prince represented at the front by a large, consolidated body of troops was visibly more important than one whose units were dispersed in obscure garrisons. He could also influence coalition policies and possibly extract additional political concessions by threatening to withdraw his force, or withhold it for an entire campaign, as in 1708, when the elector Palatine put pressure on the emperor.[50] These methods were difficult to use successfully. The Empire and its components were locked into a grand European coalition fighting France in

[48] Landesarchiv Münster (hereafter LAM), A101, Nr. 7: City of Cologne to the bishop of Münster, 12 Dec. 1701.

[49] Details in Curt von Jany, *Geschichte der preußischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914*, 4 vols. (Osnabrück, 1967), i. 432–528. Other major territories did the same, e.g. the Palatinate: Oskar Bezzel, *Geschichte des Kurpfälzischen Heeres*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1928), ii. 64–173.

[50] Details in Georg Wilhelm Sante, 'Die Kurpfälzische Politik des Kurfürsten Johann Wilhelm vornehmlich im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg, 1690–1716', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 44 (1924), 19–64; Charles Ingrao, *In Quest and Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy* (West Lafayette, Ind., 1979), 14, 72–4.

the Netherlands, Rhineland, Italy, and Spain. Non-cooperation risked alienating the other allies and could provide excuses for the emperor to deny the very concessions that a prince sought. Like the British and Dutch, the emperor deliberately structured his agreements with German princes to keep their contingents dispersed and used the Empire's regionally organized defence system to assist in this.[51]

Prussia met most of its obligations to the Empire by hiring troops from other, less powerful princes, to create greater flexibility in the deployment of its own forces. This practice of subcontracting also enhanced Prussia's influence as a patron of weaker princes. Gotha, for example, contracted to provide 2,400 men to substitute for part of Prussia's contingent after 1702. In addition to paying for the troops, Prussia won influence in Gotha through brokering an imperial pardon for that principality's previous pro-French stance.[52] Frederick William I planned to continue this practice after 1713 should Prussia be required to provide troops to the Empire again. He included promises to hire the necessary men in his treaties with Württemberg which were signed as part of wider efforts to extend influence into southern Germany.[53] These arrangements were ignored when the Empire mobilized during the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), because Emperor Charles VI allowed Prussia to send its own troops

[51] For Frederick I's failure to consolidate his forces into a single command, see Arnold Berney, *König Friedrich I. und das Haus Habsburg (1701–1707)* (Munich, 1927), 54–5, 73–4, 120–1. This situation was bemoaned in the older, nationalist historiography which condemned the Empire for keeping Germany weak. For instance, Max Braubach described Frederick's subsidy agreements as reducing Prussia to 'vassalage': *Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* (Bonn, 1923), 106–7.

[52] The agreements are printed in Viktor Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge aus der Regierungszeit König Friedrichs I.* (Leipzig, 1923), 19–22. See also Hans Patze and Walter Schlesinger (eds.), *Geschichte Thüringens*, vol. v: *Politische Geschichte der Neuzeit* (Cologne, 1982), 408. For the attractions and pitfalls of subcontracting for the weaker partner, see Peter H. Wilson, 'The Holy Roman Empire and the Problem of the Armed Estates', in Peter Rauscher (ed.), *Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen: Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740* (Münster, 2010), 487–514, at 505–7.

[53] Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter HSAS), A202, Bü.1206: treaties of 18 Dec. 1716 and 17 Sept. 1731.

as a single, consolidated contingent in 1735.[54] Nonetheless, Frederick II renewed the arrangement with Württemberg in 1744 and intended hiring soldiers from smaller principalities should Prussia ever be obliged to contribute in a future war.[55]

Fulfilment of obligations to the Empire and foreign powers required Prussian troops to march across land belonging to other imperial Estates. This was necessary even in peacetime, as units changed garrison between Prussia's own possessions, especially the isolated enclaves in Westphalia. Troop movements became a serious problem during the Thirty Years War, when soldiers frequently took what they needed. One minor prince described the imperial army behaving as if his land was 'a self-service inn'.[56] A primary motive behind imperial defence reform in 1681–2 was to ensure that powerful 'armed princes' did not exploit the resources of their unarmed neighbours. Imperial legislation required each imperial Estate to notify others in advance of troop movements. Soldiers had to keep to prescribed routes and to pay for accommodation, food, and transport, with those failing to follow the rules liable for punishment.

Prussia adhered quite closely to these requirements. For example, the necessary notifications (*Requisitoriales*) were sent to the relevant Westphalian territories in both the wars of Spanish and Polish Succession.[57] Transit imposed a considerable burden on minor territories. Nearly 22,000 Prussians passed through the county of Rietberg, equivalent to three times its population, during the War of the

[54] Jany, *Preußische Armee*, i. 664–77. However, this failed to achieve the political concessions Frederick William I desired.

[55] HSAS, A202, Bü.1206: treaty of 31 Jan. 1744. It should be remembered that the Württemberg treaty was concluded whilst Prussia was allied to the Wittelsbach Emperor Charles VII and the prospect of mobilizing the imperial army was not wholly unrealistic. For the idea of hiring contingents later, see Frederick II's Political Testament of 1752, in Bardong (ed.), *Friedrich der Große*, 223.

[56] For these problems see Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: The Thirty Years War* (London, 2009), 399–407 (quotation from 406).

[57] LAM, A295 Nr. 264 notifying the abbot of Corvey during the War of the Spanish Succession, and A230 Nr. 77, 18 Nov. 1734: general notification of the imminent transit of the 10,000 strong contingent in the Polish Succession War.

Spanish Succession.[58] Nonetheless, Prussia notified the Rietberg authorities and refunded much of the cost, unlike the Austrians and Saxons, who failed to pay anything.[59]

Part II: *Informal Frameworks for Interaction*

Established social practices, like dynasticism, supplemented the Empire's institutions in shaping political culture. Dynasticism was strongly influenced by the Empire's hierarchical structure, which determined the status of princely families. All families played the same game, seeking advantageous marriages to continue their lineage, establish claims to additional territory, and, ideally, enhance their status through kinship with a more prestigious partner.

The Hohenzollerns were no exception, but they were relatively unsuccessful compared to their better-connected rivals in Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover. Unlike even some comparatively minor families, like the Brunswick Guelphs, the Hohenzollerns had never provided a medieval German king or emperor. Their electorate of Brandenburg was a political backwater in the sixteenth century, while their family's status was only marginally improved through the inheritance of the duchy of Prussia, outside the Empire, from a junior branch in 1618. Desire to safeguard Prussia influenced the dynastic marriage with King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1620, but apart from the 'Great Elector' Frederick William's (1640–88) marriage with a princess from the Dutch House of Orange in 1646, the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns were usually reduced to marrying their Franconian relations in Ansbach and Bayreuth, or their own junior branch of Brandenburg-Schwedt.[60] Other marriages were contracted

[58] LAM, A250 III Akten Nr. 180. A further 1,612 passed through in 1715–16 during movements associated with Prussia's involvement in the Great Northern War, with another 1,325 in changes of garrison in 1720 and 1723.

[59] Prussian notifications in LAM, A250 III Akten Nr. 181 and 185. The numbers of troops are recorded in Nr. 180 with payments in Nr. 187.

[60] The Swedish match is covered by Veronica Buckley, *Christina Queen of Sweden* (London, 2004), 12–25, 54–64, 81–4. See also Ulrike Hammer, *Kurfürstin Luise Henriette: Eine Oranierin als Mittlerin zwischen den Niederlanden und Brandenburg-Preußen* (Münster, 2001). The importance of dynasticism to the Hohenzollerns' self-perception is emphasized by Volker Wittenauer, *Im*

with neighbouring families, notably in Pomerania (before 1637) and Mecklenburg, to forge inheritance claims should their indigenous rulers die out. Both Frederick I and Frederick William I married Hanoverian princesses, partly to foster friendship with this powerful neighbour. After Prusso-Hanoverian relations hit a low point, Prussia switched to Hanover's local rival, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in 1732.[61]

Prussia also used dynastic marriages to extend influence into parts of the Empire where it lacked territory. The junior Brandenburg-Schwedt branch provided a convenient 'reserve' of relations who could be married into second-rank princely families. Henrietta Maria of Brandenburg-Schwedt was married to the Württemberg crown prince in 1716 to consolidate the renewal of Prussia's alliance from 1709. Württemberg firmly remained the junior partner, and Henrietta Maria was obliged by Frederick William I to renounce her claims to Hohenzollern territory.[62]

The Schwedt family held land in Brandenburg, but without the status of imperial immediacy. Their attractiveness as marriage partners stemmed solely from their relationship to the Hohenzollern main line. Prussia contained few other nobles who could be employed in a similar manner to advance interests across the Empire. Only the Burgraves of Dohna were recognized as immediate, though none of their extensive possessions in Prussia, Bohemia, Lusatia, and Silesia qualified for representation in the *Reichstag*.[63] Their immedia-

Dienste der Macht: Kultur und Sprache am Hof der Hohenzollern vom Großen Kurfürst bis zu Wilhelm II. (Paderborn, 2007). The Brandenburg-Schwedt line stemmed from the Great Elector's second marriage and lasted from 1688 to 1789.

[61] The treaty is printed in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 417–32. The agreement was sealed by the marriage of the future Frederick II to a Brunswick princess. For this and the other marriages, see Karin Feuerstein-Praßer, *Die preußischen Königinnen* (Munich, 2003). Prusso-Hanoverian tension is covered by Heinrich Schilling, *Der Zwist Preußens und Hannovers 1729/1730* (Halle, 1912).

[62] HSAS, G219, Bü.1–4. For the 1709 alliance, see Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 105–7.

[63] Volker Press, 'Das Haus Dohna in der europäischen Adelsgesellschaft des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts', in Andreas Mehl and Wolfgang Christian Schneider (eds.), *Reformatio et Reformationes: Festschrift für Lothar Graf zu Dohna* (Darmstadt, 1989), 371–402.

cy made them acceptable partners to the status-conscious imperial counts whom Prussia was keen to cultivate in the later seventeenth century. Prussia encouraged marriages between the Dohna and comital families like the Solms, Wied, and Wittgenstein who were active in the regional politics of Westphalia and the Rhineland.

However, the Hohenzollerns were unable to attract counts or princes to their court. Georg Friedrich of Waldeck stands out in the court of the Great Elector not only through his ability as a statesman, but as one of the very few imperial nobles who moved to Berlin.[64] Even Frederick I's lavish court was only adorned by two imperial counts: Kolbe von Wartenberg and August von Sayn-Wittgenstein. Polish recognition of Prussian independence allowed the elector of Brandenburg to ennoble in his capacity as sovereign duke of Prussia after 1660, but such titles lacked prestige or full recognition in the Empire because the duchy of Prussia was beyond the imperial frontier. The Hohenzollerns began ennobling in their other lands after 1675, but Frederick I was obliged to void all these new titles in 1700 as one of his many concessions to the emperor to secure his royal crown. Elevation to royalty allowed Frederick to grant higher titles and the first Prussian counts were created at his coronation on 18 January 1701. However, even these still lacked the status of imperial nobility. Meanwhile, the *Reichshofrat* received a flood of petitions from Hohenzollern subjects seeking imperial recognition for titles awarded since 1675, but which were now exposed as illegitimate. Frederick William I again ignored the formal hierarchy and created his own nobles after 1713, but these still lacked full legitimacy until Frederick II secured imperial recognition of Prussian titles throughout the Empire in 1742.[65]

Prussia remained less attractive than the Habsburg monarchy, which contained numerous wealthy families who had acquired the status of personal immediacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[66] Not only were these families acceptable partners for imperial counts and minor princes, but their desire to consolidate

[64] Gerhard Menk, *Georg Friedrich von Waldeck 1620–1692* (Arolsen, 1992).

[65] Tobias Schenk, 'Das Alte Reich in der Mark Brandenburg', *Jahrbuch für brandenburgische Landesgeschichte*, 63 (2012), 19–72, at 60–1.

[66] See Petr Mat'a, 'Bohemia, Silesia and the Empire: Negotiating Princely Dignity on the Eastern Periphery', in Evans and Wilson (eds.), *European Perspective*, 143–65.

their own status encouraged them to seek such marriages. A good example is the Kaunitz family which climbed from the ranks of Bohemian knights by acquiring the county of Rietberg through marriage in 1699, obtaining first Rietberg's share in the Westphalian counts' collective vote in the *Reichstag*, then elevation to the personal status of imperial prince (1764), and finally a full princely vote (1803).[67] The Habsburgs promoted these marriages, along with appointments in their larger, more extensive court, army, and administration, as ways of extending influence throughout the Empire.[68] Prussia could not compete, despite its new royal title. Its court and administration remained staffed primarily by its own nobility. Even in the army, the proportion of German nobles serving as colonels or generals was only 22 per cent across 1650–1730, and most of these were barons or untitled nobles.[69] Prussia remained the least transnational of the German monarchies formed by 'personal unions' (discussed below), with no major immigrant group joining its elite after the influx of Huguenot refugees in the 1680s.

Prussia was also constrained by the religious dimension to imperial politics. Officially, the Empire had three legal faiths: Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. Supervision of religious observance, clergy, and churches had all been devolved to the imperial Estates under powers known as the 'right of Reformation' (*ius Reformandi*). The Peace of Westphalia curtailed these powers by fixing the confes-

[67] Alwin Hanschmidt, 'Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg als Landesherr der Grafschaft Rietberg 1746–1794', in Grete Klingenstein and Franz A. J. Szabo (eds.), *Staatskanzler Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg 1711–1794* (Graz, 1996), 416–40; G. J. Rosenkranz, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Landes Rietberg und seiner Grafen 1075–1807* (Münster, 1853), 89–108.

[68] Volker Press, 'The Habsburg Court as Center of the Imperial Government', *Journal of Modern History*, 58, supplement (1986), 23–45, and id., 'Patronat und Klientel im Heiligen Römischen Reich', in Antoni Maczak (ed.), *Klientelsysteme im Europa der frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 1988), 19–46.

[69] Peter-Michael Hahn, 'Aristokratisierung und Professionalisierung: Der Aufstieg der Obristen zu einer militärischen und höfischen Elite in Brandenburg-Preußen von 1650–1720', *Forschungen zur brandenburgisch und preußischen Geschichte*, NF 1 (1991), 161–208; Peter Bahl, 'Die Berlin-Potsdamer Hofgesellschaft unter dem Großen Kurfürsten und König Friedrich I', in Frank Göse (ed.), *Im Schatten der Krone: Die Mark Brandenburg um 1700* (Potsdam, 2003), 31–98; Arndt, *Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichsgrafenkollegium*, 307–12.

sional character of each imperial Estate as it had been in 1624. Rulers were no longer able to compel their subjects to change faith, while minorities were given legal protection. The adjustment was intended to stabilize the constitutional balance between Catholics and Protestants. In the longer term, this worked well, channelling religious conflict into less fundamental disputes over legal rights and jurisdictions which could be settled in the imperial courts.[70] Rulers were relatively free to go beyond the constitutional minimum and extend toleration to other groups, and the Hohenzollerns were among the most prominent rulers who did this, largely to attract immigrants and repopulate their lands after the Thirty Years War.[71]

However, the religious dimension of political behaviour remained circumscribed. Ruling families were expected to keep the faith of their forefathers. This restricted the choice of marriage partners to co-religionists; something which further reduced the Hohenzollerns' options. Though their conversion to Calvinism in 1613 did not preclude later marriages to Lutherans, it ruled out Catholics, including foreign Catholic royalty. Prussia acquired three former church lands through the Peace of Westphalia, but this treaty prohibited further secularization, while, as Protestants, the Hohenzollerns were personally ineligible for positions in the still Catholic imperial church. Though individually small, the church lands collectively comprised about a seventh of the Empire and exercised 39 of the 110 electoral and princely votes in the *Reichstag*.[72] The Bavarian

[70] Ralf-Peter Fuchs, *Ein 'Medium zum Frieden': Die Normaljahrsregel und die Beendigung des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 2011). For this and the debate on its effectiveness, see the summary in Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy*, 758–69.

[71] Useful summary of Hohenzollern toleration in Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947* (London, 2006), 122–4, 139–44. For the general situation, see Joachim Whaley, 'A Tolerant Society? Religious Toleration in the Holy Roman Empire, 1648–1806', in Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter (eds.), *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2000), 175–95.

[72] There were 3 ecclesiastical electors and 34 princely votes held by the archbishops, bishops, and prelates in 1708. With 3 secular electoral and 22 princely votes, the Catholics had 62 votes in these 2 colleges, to the Protestants' 3 electoral and 44 princely votes. There were 13 Catholic and 32 Protestant imperial cities, plus 5 bi-confessional cities. In addition, the bishopric of Osnabrück alternated between Protestant princes and Catholic bishops.

and Palatine Wittelsbachs extended their influence by promoting their younger sons as ecclesiastical princes.[73]

Rather than losing interest in confessional politics, or simply ignoring the constraints, however, Prussia conformed to the general pattern within the Empire of seeking advantage through its formal religious rights and influence through less formal structures. Prussia had little to gain from pursuing the politics of religious radicalism which, in any case, had been discredited by the Thirty Years War. The Peace of Westphalia addressed Protestant concerns at the in-built Catholic majority through an arrangement known as *itio in partes*. This allowed the *Reichstag* to reconvene in two confessional blocks, or *corpora* (*corpus Catholicorum* and *corpus Evangelicorum*), rather than the three hierarchical colleges where the Protestants could be outvoted.[74] The Catholics never used this option, but even many Protestants were lukewarm, distrusting 'parties in the commonwealth' (*partes in republica*) as divisive and to be avoided after the horrors of civil war.[75] Despite its continued significance for individuals, religion did not override concern for status or political ambition, both of which repeatedly encouraged cross-confessional cooperation and prevented the Empire polarizing exclusively over faith.[76] Defence of religion had become part of each imperial Estate's concern for its status and privileges. Saxony, for example, only accepted leadership of the *corpus Evangelicorum* in 1653 because refusal would alienate the numerous weaker imperial Estates who traditionally looked to it to defend

[73] Klaus Jaitner, 'Reichskirchenpolitik und Rombeziehungen Philipp Wilhelms von Pfalz-Neuburg von 1662 bis 1690', *Annalen des historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 178 (1976), 91–144; Rudolf Reinhardt, 'Zur Reichskirchenpolitik der Pfalz-Neuburger Dynastie', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 84 (1964), 118–28.

[74] Klaus Schlaich, 'Majoritas—protestatio—itio in partes—corpus evangelicorum', *Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung*, 107 (1977), 264–99, 108 (1978), 139–79.

[75] Id., 'Corpus Evangelicorum und Corpus Catholicorum', *Der Staat*, 11 (1972), 218–30, at 226–8.

[76] Despite the recent trend to emphasize the importance of religion after 1648: Dieter Stievermann, 'Politik und Konfession im 18. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, 18 (1991), 177–99. See, more generally, Jürgen Luh, *Unheiliges Römisches Reich: Der konfessionelle Gegensatz 1648 bis 1806* (Potsdam, 1995).

their religious rights. In addition, the newly formed corpus immediately adopted the existing status hierarchy whereby each representative spoke in the same strict sequence determined by the fixed seating arrangements in the *Reichstag*.[77]

In political terms, however, the corpus had little practical power. The permanence of the *Reichstag* after 1663 removed the need for a Protestant right of self-assembly, since their envoys could easily confer in Regensburg. Their corpus was only empowered to discuss 'religious issues' and most observers, Protestants included, believed it had no authority to act unilaterally, and that all disputes should be referred to the imperial courts. Yet the corpus remained more than simply a forum to assert status, as suggested by one culturalist analysis.[78] Its significance was revealed when Prussia challenged Saxony for control of the corpus's directory following the conversion of Elector Augustus the Strong (1694–1733) to Catholicism in 1697. The elector's conversion was intended to advance his bid for the Polish crown, but occurred during heightened tension over the Catholic elector Palatine's disregard for the rights of his Protestant subjects.[79] Augustus realized that losing the directory would cost Saxony prestige in the Empire and risk alienating Protestant powers, like England and the Dutch Republic, whose support was necessary for his Polish ambitions.[80]

Keen to avoid being eclipsed by Saxony's acquisition of the Polish crown, Prussia saw control of the directory as a way of undermining Saxony within the Empire and, possibly, displacing it as spokesman for the smaller north German Protestant principalities. The prospects appeared promising, because the succession of a Catholic line in the

[77] Andreas Kalipke, 'The *corpus evangelicorum*: A Culturalist Perspective on its Procedure in the Eighteenth-Century Holy Roman Empire', in Coy, Marschke, and Sabean (eds.), *Holy Roman Empire*, 229–47, at 236–7.
[78] Ibid. 239.
[79] For the background see Meinrad Schaab, 'Die Wiederherstellung des Katholizismus in der Kurpfalz im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 114 (1966), 147–205. For Augustus's conversion, see Tony Sharp, *Pleasure and Ambition: The Life, Loves and Wars of Augustus the Strong* (London, 2001), 137–40.
[80] Jochen Vötsch, *Kursachsen, das Reich und der mitteldeutsche Raum zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 49–161. For the following see also Aretin, *Altes Reich*, ii. 272–95.

Palatinate in 1685 had removed this electorate from the ranks of leading Protestant imperial Estates, leaving only the new Hanoverian elector as a realistic rival to Prussia's bid.[81] However, the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession obliged Prussia to moderate its criticism to avoid appearing partisan at a time of common danger. Prussia rallied Protestant support by adopting the Palatinate's former programme of religious parity in imperial institutions, but then compromised in March 1704, when this programme risked alienating the emperor and Catholics. Prussia secured parity in appointments to the imperial general staff in return for persuading the Protestants to drop this demand for other institutions.[82] The arrangements required equal numbers of Protestant and Catholic generals in each rank. Since this practice was adopted by several *Kreise* for their own staffs, Prussia was able to extend its influence by cooperating with smaller Protestant princes to fill the new positions.[83] Nonetheless, the controversy about the directory tainted the practice of *itio in partes*, discouraging its use until 1727; an experiment only repeated three times during the eighteenth century.

Prussia's ambition for the directory was not helped either by Frederick I's resolution of the Palatine religious dispute in 1705. He alienated Lutherans because he only secured safeguards from the Palatine elector for Calvinist rights.[84] Again, Prussia secured one objective (in this case, alliance with the Palatinate), at the cost of hindering another (corpus directorship). Cooperation with the Palatinate over a dispute in Nassau-Siegen further illustrates the difficulty of playing the religious card in imperial politics. Prussia and the Palatinate wanted the small Westphalian principality to pay its share

[81] The duchy of Calenberg (usually known after its capital as Hanover) was raised to an electorate in 1692, but this status was only fully accepted by its peers in 1708.

[82] *Neue und vollständige Sammlung der Reichsabschiede*, 4 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1747), iv. 201–7; Arnold Berney, 'Der Reichstag zu Regensburg (1702–1704)', *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, 24 (1929), 389–442.

[83] Examples in Peter H. Wilson, 'Militär und Religiosität in Württemberg, 1677–1797', in Michael Kaiser and Stefan Kroll (eds.), *Militär und Religiosität in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Hamburg, 2003), 71–96, at 79–84.

[84] The Prusso-Palatine treaty of 21 Nov. 1705 is printed in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 73–4. Further details in Aretin, *Altes Reich*, ii. 163–72.

of imperial war taxes, since these were being redirected to pay their own troops.[85] Prussia additionally wanted to discredit Prince Wilhelm Hyacinth who challenged Hohenzollern claims to the Orange inheritance. The prince had alienated both his Calvinist and Catholic subjects who appealed to the *Reichshofrat* against his arbitrary rule. The court deposed him in July 1707, placing the principality under an imperial commission. The local situation became increasingly fraught as some commissioners connived with the prince's officials, who revived persecution of the Calvinist population. Prussia lost credit when its new king, Frederick William, crassly threatened reprisals against his own Catholic minority. Meanwhile, Prusso-Palatine cooperation collapsed as the War of the Spanish Succession ended, leaving the imperial commission split down confessional lines by 1715. The emperor revoked its powers and transferred administration of Nassau-Siegen to the elector of Cologne in 1723.

Inability to balance multiple interests also finally thwarted Prussia's bid for the Protestant directory. The conversion of Augustus' son and heir to Catholicism in 1717 gave Frederick William the chance to renew Prussia's leadership bid and, within a year, Saxony was prepared to concede a co-directory. At this point, however, Sweden sued for peace in the Great Northern War (1700–21). Despite its considerable military power, Prussia was too weak to negotiate without Saxon and Hanoverian cooperation. Meanwhile, Frederick William needed the emperor's approval of his retention of part of Pomerania which his troops had conquered from the Swedes in 1715.[86] Catholics disputed the legality of the *corpus Evangelicorum* but, if it had to exist, preferred Saxon leadership. Imperial support for Saxony became so obvious that Augustus feared it was counterproductive. Protestant opinion, meanwhile, demanded a speedy resolution to the disputed directory because the elector Palatine had resumed persecution of his Lutheran subjects in 1719. Prussia and Hanover tried to outbid each other in their extremism, but merely alienated the smaller Protestant imperial Estates. In particular,

[85] LAM, A411 Nr. 19b.25 to 19b.28. The dispute is explained in greater detail by Werner Trossbach, 'Fürstenabsetzungen im 18. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, 13 (1986), 425–54, and Patrick Milton, 'Intervening against Tyrannical Rule in the Holy Roman Empire During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *German History*, 32 (2014) forthcoming.

[86] Aretin, *Altes Reich*, ii. 255–62.

Frederick William's bluster and threats contrasted with Saxon discretion and success in presenting Protestant demands through the courts in a form acceptable to the Habsburgs. Intervention from the *Reichshofrat* resolved the Palatine crisis in 1722, while Emperor Charles VI secured Hanoverian and Prussian acquiescence by delaying investiture of their territorial gains from Sweden.[87]

Another abortive attempt to displace Saxony as director in 1725 finally compelled Frederick William to try a different approach during renewed confessional tension following the expulsion of 20,000 crypto-Protestants by the prince–archbishop of Salzburg in 1731. This time, Prussia downplayed religious aspects, making only perfunctory protests through the Protestant corpus and rejecting calls to take reprisals against its own Catholic subjects. Instead, Frederick William agreed the 'Salzburg transaction' with Charles VI, who was keen to prevent Prussia defecting to a new Franco-Bavarian alliance. The king preserved his Protestant credentials by welcoming the Salzburg emigrants, who provided a useful influx of settlers to plague-ravaged eastern Prussia.[88] Charles VI dropped opposition to Prussian-sponsored legislation in the *Reichstag*, which now issued new guidelines for guilds and craft manufacture designed to promote state economic management, control migrant labour, and crush journeymen's organizations.[89] In return, Prussia acknowledged the Pragmatic Sanction permitting female inheritance in the Habsburg lands, and subsequently dropped its bid for the Protestant directory as part of a broader alliance with Austria, Saxony, and Russia at the outbreak of the War of the Polish Succession in 1733.[90]

[87] Karl Borgmann, *Der deutsche Religionsstreit der Jahre 1719–20* (Berlin, 1937). The wider diplomatic context is covered by Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire* (London, 2009), 145–52, and Andrew Thompson, *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest* (Cambridge, 2006), 62–87.

[88] Mack Walker, *The Salzburg Transaction: Expulsion and Redemption in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 1992), 70–141.

[89] Printed in Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State and General Estate* (2nd edn. Ithaca, 1998), 435–51.

[90] Prussia's declaration of 26 June 1731 is printed in Viktor Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge aus der Regierungszeit König Friedrich Wilhelms I.* (Leipzig, 1913), 397–9. See also J. L. Sutton, *The King's Honor and the King's Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession* (Lexington, Ky., 1980), 36–9.

Part III: *Relations with Powerful Imperial Estates*

The next two sections shift the focus from the framework for interaction to the parties involved, beginning with Prussia's relations with those at the top of the imperial status hierarchy, before examining its involvement with minor imperial Estates. The perspective must be broadened initially beyond Prussia to see how its elevation to royalty contributed to the intensification of competition amongst the Empire's elite around 1700. The discussion lends weight to the cultural approach by revealing status as both an object of this competition and as a marker of shifts in material and military power. This provides a corrective to traditional narratives presenting the 'rise of Prussia' in fiscal–military terms in contrast to the alleged vanity of other German princes and their concern for 'empty' titles.

The most important structural shift in central European politics around 1700 was not Prussia's assumption of a royal title, but the dramatic growth of the Habsburg monarchy, underway since 1683 and completed by the capture of Belgrade in 1717. The Habsburgs now held more than one and a half times as much land outside imperial jurisdiction as within it, while the total size of their dynastic possessions and population were almost equal to those of the Empire.[91] Austria's growth alarmed other European powers, especially around 1711 when it looked as if it might acquire the entire Spanish succession. Even closer cooperation with Spain in 1725 threatened to make it 'more formidable to the rest of Europe than ever Charles V was'.[92] Austrian expansion could be accommodated within the Empire's hierarchy, because this already gave the emperor the senior position, while the Habsburgs had long used their hereditary possessions to support their imperial role. Moreover, Habsburg rule in Hungary predated the evolution of more modern concepts of sovereignty, which slowly displaced the medieval ideals of universal monarchy.[93]

[91] These statistics are set out in more detail in Peter H. Wilson, *From Reich to Revolution: German History, 1558–1806* (Basingstoke, 2004), 308, 310, 364–77.

[92] Charles Townsend, quoted by Simms, *Three Victories*, 183.

[93] Franz Bosbach and Hermann Hiery (eds.), *Imperium – Empire – Reich: Ein Konzept politischer Herrschaft im deutsch-britischen Vergleich* (Munich, 1999); Peer Schmidt, *Spanische Universalmonarchie oder 'teutsche Libertät': Das spanische Imperium in der Propaganda des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Stuttgart, 2001).

However, it was becoming clearer that Habsburg power rested on their own territorial empire, rather than their formal position as Holy Roman emperor.

These changes posed two threats to the imperial Estates. First, their political status was intimately connected to the Empire, which was visibly declining within the evolving European order. Second, Austria's growth as a distinct great power made it less dependent on German assistance and, consequently, less open to pressure from the imperial Estates. The electors and senior princes had pushed for recognition as semi-regal since their engagement with other European monarchs at the Council of Basel (1431–49). The Westphalian peace congress of 1643–8 established broad parity of diplomatic ceremonial between sovereign monarchies, heightening anxieties amongst the imperial Estates that they risked reduction to the status of mere aristocrats. The result was 'an epidemic of desires and aspirations for a royal title'.[94]

Unfortunately, the parallel development of fixing the imperial hierarchy with ever greater precision made it difficult to introduce new royal titles in the Empire. Bohemia had been elevated to a kingdom in the twelfth century at a time when the Empire included not only a German, but also Italian and Burgundian royal titles. The Italian and Burgundian titles fell out of use by the fourteenth century, while Bohemia's regal status became part of its privileged position *within* the Empire, rather than a basis for a *separate* existence.[95] Any potential conflict with the imperial hierarchy was minimized by Bohemia's possession by the Habsburgs since 1526. Likewise, the dynasty rejected the possibility of raising Austria to a kingdom in the 1620s on the grounds that their imperial title always trumped a royal one.[96]

It was unclear which areas qualified as potential new kingdoms, beyond a general assumption that these should be a respectable size and, ideally, have some past association with royalty. This explains

[94] A. Waddington, *L'acquisition de la couronne royale de Prusse par les Hohenzollern* (Paris, 1883), 43.

[95] Jaroslav Pánek, 'Bohemia and the Empire: Acceptance and Rejection', in Evans and Wilson (eds.), *European Perspective*, 121–42.

[96] Georg Wagner, 'Pläne und Versuche der Erhebung Österreichs zum Königreich', in id. (ed.), *Österreich von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein* (Vienna, 1982), 394–432.

why the royal ambitions of the Bavarian and Palatine Wittelsbachs centred on the Netherlands and Lower Rhine with the tradition of the early medieval Burgundian crown and the subsequent autonomy of much of this region through its special association with Spain after 1548.[97] It was also far from clear whether the emperor had the power to create new royal titles, since his ability to promote individual imperial Estates had become subject to the approval of their peers assembled in the *Reichstag*.[98] Emperor Leopold I (1658–1705) unilaterally raised Hanover to an electorate in 1692 and conferred semi-regal status on Savoy four years later, all in return for military backing. France exploited the disappointment of rival princes to split the Empire and offered backing to Bavarian, Palatine, and Württemberg royal ambitions. Bavaria accepted the bait in the War of the Spanish Succession and while the Palatinate refused, Württemberg opened serious negotiations in 1711–12.[99]

These problems encouraged German princes to seek crowns outside the Empire. The elector Palatine initially considered Armenia, before dreaming of a Mediterranean kingdom including Sicily, Sardinia, Majorca, and Minorca.[100] Savoyard ambitions centred on Cyprus, but eventually settled for Sardinia in 1720. A Sardinian royal title did not challenge the Empire's internal hierarchy, because the island was outside imperial jurisdiction, while Savoy itself enjoyed considerable autonomy and no longer participated in imperial institutions after 1714.[101] Dynastic ties of German princes to the Scandinavian monarchies could also be accommodated. The Danish and Swedish monarchs were already imperial vassals through their

[97] Nicolette Mout, 'Core and Periphery: The Netherlands and the Empire from the Late Fifteenth to the Early Seventeenth Centuries', in Evans and Wilson (eds.), *European Perspective*, 203–16; Reginald de Schryver, *Max II. Emanuel von Bayern und das Spanische Erbe* (Mainz, 1996).

[98] Thomas Klein, 'Die Erhebungen in den weltlichen Reichsfürstenstand 1550–1806', *Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte*, 122 (1986), 137–92.

[99] Bernd Wunder, 'Die französisch-württembergischen Geheimverhandlungen 1711', *Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte*, 28 (1969), 363–90. See generally Pelizaeus, *Aufstieg*.

[100] Klaus Müller, 'Kurfürst Johann Wilhelm und die europäische Politik seiner Zeit', *Düsseldorfer Jahrbuch*, 60 (1986), 1–23, at 13–14.

[101] Robert Oresko, 'The House of Savoy in Search for a Royal Crown in the Seventeenth Century', in id., G. C. Gibbs, and H. M. Scott (eds.), *Royal and*

possession of Holstein and Pomerania respectively, while their new German-born monarchs entrusted their home principalities to relations.[102]

The acquisition of Poland and Britain by Saxony (1697) and Hanover (1714) established a very different kind of 'personal union', directly combining rule of powerful kingdoms with leading German principalities.[103] Prussia's royal title introduced another, still more toxic kind of union.[104] Whereas Saxony and Hanover were joined to much larger kingdoms, Prussia itself was half the size of the other Hohenzollern possessions. It was Berlin, in the electorate of Brandenburg, which developed as the 'royal' capital, not Königsberg in Prussia, which was only used for the coronation in 1701.[105] Prussia had long been a Hohenzollern possession, whereas neither the Saxon Wettins nor Hanoverian Guelphs had close connections to their new

Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1999), 272–350; Matthias Schnettger, 'Das Alte Reich und Italien in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 79 (1999), 344–420.

[102] Oldenburg was left under a junior line when its ruling family became Danish monarchs in 1440. Its status as an imperial Estate remained unaltered during direct Danish rule 1667–1773. The Pfalz-Kleeburg family entrusted their principality to relatives while they were Swedish monarchs 1654–1718. This practice was followed by Landgrave Friedrich I of Hessen-Kassel who succeeded them in 1720–51.

[103] Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History 1714–1837* (Cambridge, 2007); Rex Rexheuser (ed.), *Die Personalunionen von Sachsen-Polen 1697–1763 und Hannover-England 1714–1837* (Wiesbaden, 2005); Adam Perlakowski, 'The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Electoral Saxony in the Early Eighteenth Century', in Evans and Wilson (eds.), *European Perspective*, 281–92.

[104] Peter Baumgart, 'Die preußische Königskrönung von 1701, das Reich und die europäische Politik', in Hauser (ed.), *Preußen*, 65–86; Ernst Hinrichs, 'Die Königskrönung vom 18. Januar 1701', in Matthias Weber (ed.), *Preußen in Ostmitteleuropa: Geschehensgeschichte und Verstehensgeschichte* (Munich, 2003), 35–61; Johannes Kunisch (ed.), *Dreihundert Jahre preußische Königskrönung* (Berlin, 2002).

[105] The Berlin palace was quadrupled in size, and court expenditure remained high even after the much publicized economies of 1713: Wolfgang Neugebauer, 'Hof und politisches System in Brandenburg-Preussen', *Jahrbuch für die Geschiche Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands*, 46 (2000), 139–69.

kingdoms. More significantly, the Prussian title was a novelty, in contrast to the Polish and British crowns, which were accepted by all as valid. In short, the creation of the Prussian monarchy affected the established imperial hierarchy more directly than the other personal unions.

Frederick I received his title from Emperor Leopold, but crowned himself in a deliberately ostentatious coronation which was not repeated. His two successors' well-known 'antipathy to courtly spectacle' was clearly one reason for this abstinence.[106] However, it was not unusual. The Habsburgs dispensed with a coronation when they assumed a separate Austrian imperial title in 1804.[107] Bavaria and Württemberg likewise refrained from formal ceremonies when they received their royal titles from Napoleon in 1806.[108] The circumstances were indeed different in each of these elevations, but a common theme was the difficulty of fitting them into the established political order in central Europe.

While most European powers accepted the Prussian title by 1713, several still objected.[109] Poland's protests only seem irrelevant with hindsight, since it was still an important power in 1701. Moreover, by claiming that Prussia was still under Polish suzerainty, it struck at the basis for a fully sovereign Prussian crown. Poland's decline during the Great Northern War rendered its protests less significant, but it only dropped them in 1764 under pressure from Russia, then allied to Prussia.[110] The Teutonic Order protested in September 1700, two months ahead of Leopold's grant of title to Frederick I. The Order had never accepted the conversion of its base in Prussia into a secu-

[106] Christopher Clark, 'When Culture Meets Power: The Prussian Coronation of 1701', in H. M. Scott and Brendan Simms (eds.), *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2007), 14–35, at 30.

[107] Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Titel und Wappen, Karton 3.

[108] Michael Kaiser, 'A Matter of Survival: Bavaria Becomes a Kingdom', in Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson (eds.), *The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806* (Basingstoke, 2009), 94–111.

[109] For international recognition, see Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrich Wilhelms I.*, 8–15, 25–6.

[110] Karin Friedrich, *The Other Prussia: Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569–1772* (Cambridge, 2000), 161–5; ead. and Sara Smart (eds.), *The Cultivation of Monarchy and the Rise of Berlin: Brandenburg-Prussia 1700* (Farnham, 2010), 1–3, 10–19.

lar duchy under Hohenzollern rule in 1525. Backed by the papacy, the Order also complained that Prussia's elevation disturbed the confessional balance within the Empire to the disadvantage of Catholics. Though reduced to the tiny principality of Mergentheim, the Order possessed some influence through its choice of leading German princes as its grand masters, some of whom were also electors.[111] Their objections prevented Prussia from using the Teutonic legacy to underpin its new royal status. Few imperial Estates accepted the Order's argument that Prussia was still part of the imperial church lands, but the controversy provided a convenient excuse for the *Reichstag* to block Prussia's request that its new possessions of Neuchâtel and Valangin fall under imperial jurisdiction (and thus, protection) during the War of the Spanish Succession. Prussia had to settle for a Swiss declaration including them in their neutrality.[112] The papacy dropped its objections in 1787, but the Order persisted, creating yet another issue which could be raised by those wishing to delay other Prussian measures in the *Reichstag*; for example, in the negotiations for recognition of Prussian possession of Silesia after 1745.

Most electors accepted the Prussian title by 1703, with Bavaria and Cologne doing so in 1714 in return for Prussian support for their restoration after they lost their lands in the War of the Spanish Succession.[113] Recognition eased but did not solve the problems surrounding Prussia's status in the Empire. Leopold I had only made Frederick king 'in' Prussia, meaning he was still merely an elector in

[111] The Order's objections are covered in Johann Jacob Moser, *Neues teutsches Staatsrecht*, 20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1766–75), i. 121–33. Successive grand masters were chosen from the Palatine (1685–1732) and then Bavarian Wittelsbachs (1732–61). The post counted as a church office and the incumbents 1729–32 and 1732–61 were also electors of Mainz and Cologne respectively.

[112] Neuchâtel and its associated principality of Valangin had been acquired as part of the Orange inheritance in 1707. They remained personal possessions of Prussian kings until 1857. See also Moser, *Neues teutsches Staatsrecht*, i. 140; Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 96–7.

[113] Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrich Wilhelms I.*, 1–3, 41–3; Richard H. Thompson, *Lothar Franz von Schönborn and the Diplomacy of the Electorate of Mainz* (The Hague, 1973), 165–6; Eduard Ichon, *Die Verhandlungen über die Anerkennung der preussischen Königswürde am Reichstage zu Regensburg (1701)* (Heidelberg, 1907).

imperial politics. While this was formally true of Saxony and Hanover as well, their possession of 'real' crowns gave them an edge over Prussia.

Determined to assert Prussia's superiority over its German rivals, Frederick I sought to redefine his relationship to the emperor, initiating a policy which Frederick II pushed to the logical conclusion of ceremonial parity with Austria. The Hohenzollern court no longer accorded special status to the Austrian ambassador as an imperial envoy after 1701, largely to match how other European monarchs were treating the Habsburgs. The dispute escalated into a full breach of diplomatic relations by 1707, despite continued Austro-Prussian military cooperation against France.[114] Meanwhile, Prussia broke ranks with the other electors, abandoning their long-standing demand for recognition as regal and instead asserting the superiority of kings.[115] This behaviour contributed to the speculation that Frederick harboured ambitions of becoming emperor. Internal discussions clearly indicate that he saw himself as a worthy candidate, but neither he nor Frederick William I wanted to pursue the idea.[116]

An important factor in their decision was knowledge that the Hanoverian electors were also potential candidates. Michael Kaiser has aptly characterized Hohenzollern-Wittelsbach relations as 'hidden competition', and the same term can be applied to relations with Hanover and Saxony: in each case convergence of interest was never sufficient to overcome the underlying antagonism.[117] Circumstances might encourage cooperation, as between Prussia and the Palatinate during the War of the Spanish Succession, but the persistence in

[114] Berney, *König Friedrich I.*, 216–20; Ingrao, *In Quest and Crisis*, 60–8; Klaus Müller, *Das kaiserliche Gesandtschaftswesen im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden (1648–1740)* (Bonn, 1976), 125, 130, 133.

[115] Andreas Pečar, 'Symbolische Politik: Handlungsspielräume im politischen Umgang mit zeremoniellen Normen. Brandenburg-Preußen und der Kaiserhof im Vergleich (1700–1740)', in Luh, Czech, and Becker (ed.), *Preussen, Deutschland und Europa*, 280–95, at 286, 289.

[116] Waddington, *L'acquisition*, 391–2; Heinz Duchhardt, *Protestantisches Kaisertum und Altes Reich* (Wiesbaden, 1977), 255–65, 282.

[117] Michael Kaiser, 'Die verdeckte Konkurrenz: Bayern und Preußen 1701–1871', in Luh, Czech, and Becker (ed.), *Preussen, Deutschland und Europa*, 90–127. A similar ambivalence is noted for Prusso-Hanoverian relations by Schnath, *Geschichte Hannovers*, iii. 543–606.

viewing politics as hierarchical left all electors locked in competition. Moreover, none of them saw the present situation as definitive. The military balance shifted markedly in Prussia's favour after 1714 and by 1740 it had more men than its four rivals combined.[118] However, Hanover and Saxony were linked to powerful kingdoms with additional resources, whereas Prussia was on its own. The disparity in troop numbers was partially obscured by the continued splendour of the Bavarian, Palatine, and Saxon courts. The Saxons continued to regard Prussia more as a junior partner than a serious rival. That Prussia had 'no desire to bite' seemed confirmed by Saxony's success in retaining the directories of both the Upper Saxon *Kreis* and the Protestant corpus, as well as the failure of Frederick William's efforts to cause trouble for it in Poland.[119] Saxony continued to prioritize relations with Russia as more important for its own position in Poland.

Likewise, the British viewed Prussia's military potential as unremarkable prior to the victories of Frederick II.[120] Prussia's rise also appeared less dramatic than Hanover's, which already doubled in size through incorporation of Celle in 1705. Hanover obtained the largest slice of Sweden's German territories, thanks to British support, whereas Prussia was forced to return most of its conquests in the peace of 1720. Through Britain, Hanover had the ability to thwart Prussia's plans, for example, lancing an attempt to join the Triple Alliance of Britain, France, and the Dutch Republic in 1717.[121] Unsurprisingly, Frederick II still regarded Hanover and Saxony as his most dangerous opponents after Austria as late as 1752.[122]

[118] Strengths in summer 1740: Prussia 77,000; Saxony 29,000; Hanover 20,000; Bavaria and the Palatinate about 9,000 each.

[119] Quotation from a Saxon military observer in 1727, Otto Krauske (ed.), *Die Briefe König Friedrich Wilhelms I. an den Fürsten Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau 1704–40* (Berlin, 1905), 19. See also Vötsch, *Kursachsen*, 161–5 and generally Frank Göse, 'Nachbarn, Partner und Rivalen: Die kursächsische Sicht auf Preußen im ausgehenden 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', in Luh, Czech, and Becker (ed.), *Preussen, Deutschland und Europa*, 45–78.

[120] Mark Wishon, 'Interaction and Perception in Anglo-German Armies 1689–1815' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2011), 83–95.

[121] Ragnhild M. Hatton, *Diplomatic Relations Between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic 1714–1721* (London, 1950), 160–2.

[122] Bardong (ed.), *Friedrich der Große*, 208–9, 223–4.

Two important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of Prussia's relations with those at the top of the imperial hierarchy. First, titles and other symbolic markers of status mattered in 'real' politics, affecting, for instance, strategic calculations about potential rivals and allies, as well as intensifying competition amongst the leading militarized territories in the Empire. Second, the foregoing underscores the need to consider Prussia's relationship to the Empire as broader than its relationship with Austria. Prussian ambitions and methods were not fundamentally different from those of its rivals in Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and the Palatinate.

Part IV: *Relations with Minor Imperial Estates*

Discussions of Prussia's rise relative to the other German principalities conventionally concentrate on its internal development, especially under Frederick William I, who is usually credited with providing the means by which Frederick II successfully challenged Austria by conquering Silesia in 1740. Prussia's continued interest in the minor German territories has gone largely unnoticed. This interest was already strong in the 1690s, when acquisition of additional land in the Empire was seen as a way to present the Hohenzollerns as worthy of a royal title. Prussia's land hunger continued unabated after 1700, but the methods used to satiate it indicate how the Hohenzollerns remained within conventional imperial politics, despite joining the ranks of European royalty.

The scope of their ambitions is already striking. The lands of their Franconian relations in Ansbach and Bayreuth topped the list of desirable additions, along with the smaller principalities of their Swabian relations in Hohenzollern and Haigerloch, plus the extensive Orange inheritance left by the death of King William III (1689–1702).[123] Additional targets included the north German principalities of East Frisia and Mecklenburg, plus Hanau (near Frankfurt) and Mömpelgard (south-west of Basel). Prussia still wanted Jülich and Berg in Westphalia, despite frequent agreements assigning these

[123] Prussian claims derived from the Great Elector's marriage to William III's aunt, Luise Henrietta. Prussia eventually obtained Moers, Lingen, Upper Geldern, and Neuchâtel.

to the Neuburg branch of the Palatine Wittelsbachs. Less well known are Prussia's designs on other Westphalian lands, including Limburg and Tecklenburg, as well as the imperial abbeys of Essen, Werden, and Herford, and the imperial city of Dortmund. Prussia also wanted the cities of Nordhausen and Hildesheim in Lower Saxony, the counties of Mansfeld and Wernigerode plus the abbey of Quedlinburg in Upper Saxony, and the Franconian counties of Limpurg-Speckfeld and Geyer.

These lands were not necessarily insignificant. Bayreuth, Ansbach, Mecklenburg, and East Frisia all had populations of over 100,000, while Frederick I estimated the lands of the Orange inheritance were worth 60 million taler and would produce 400,000 taler additional annual revenue.[124] The imperial city of Nordhausen was strategically located near the extensive silver mines of the Lüneburg region. Prussia relied heavily on men from across the Empire to sustain its inflated military establishment after 1713 and saw acquisition of even small enclaves as useful in extending its recruitment net.[125] However, material factors alone do not explain why Prussia targeted particular territories, or why it invested so much effort in what were often minor pieces of real estate.

The Lutheran character of most of these lands was noted positively by Prussian officials, but Prussia was also interested in Catholic lands like Jülich, Berg, Hohenzollern, Haigerloch, Essen, and Werden.[126] Dynasticism was far more significant, not only in establishing viable claims, but also for status. Frederick I was keen to assert his position as Hohenzollern family patriarch and wrote this into his agreements with his Swabian and Franconian relations in 1695 and 1707.[127] Failure to assert claims could undermine prestige. Frederick I's desire to secure his share of the Orange inheritance was a major factor in his involvement in the War of the Spanish

[124] Schnath, *Geschichte Hannovers*, iii. 563. This was equivalent to over 12 per cent of Prussia's revenue in 1700.

[125] Peter H. Wilson, 'The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany', *English Historical Review*, 117 (2002), 536–68.

[126] The fact that the Limpurg population was predominantly Lutheran was noted positively by Frederick I's advisers: Rudolf Endres, 'Preußens Griff nach Franken', in Duchhardt (ed.), *Friedrich der Große*, 57–79, at 60–1.

[127] Moerner (ed.), *Kurbrandenburgische Staatsverträge*, 607; Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 81–3.

Succession.[128] His third marriage to a Mecklenburg princess established claims there which encouraged Prussian involvement in that duchy's increasingly turbulent internal affairs.[129] However, dynasticism does not explain why Prussia was interested in territories where it had no such ties.

Some lands offered a way to improve Prussian influence in the Empire's institutions and regions. Acquisition of Moers brought an additional princely vote in the *Reichstag*. Prussia wanted more votes, and agreed to cooperate with Württemberg to lobby for this.[130] The prospect of acquiring Swabian or Franconian land might bring further princely votes (in the case of Ansbach and Bayreuth), and extend Prussian influence in two *Kreis* assemblies where it lacked representation. Far from wanting to detach from the Empire, Prussia pushed for even its smallest gains to be represented in imperial institutions. This met strong local opposition, as we saw above in the case of the collective vote of the Westphalian counts. Likewise, the Franconians kept Prussia out of their *Kreis* assembly by denying representation to the county of Geyer, which Frederick I bought in 1710.

Acquisition of Geyer was opportunistic. Prussia persuaded its last count to sell his inheritance in 1696 in return for interim rights of usage and assistance against his numerous creditors in cases before the imperial courts.[131] Elsewhere, Prussia used rights associated with one possession to claim others. For example, firm possession of Cleves by 1648 gave Prussia that duchy's network of treaties with minor Westphalian territories like Essen and Herford. Likewise, acquisition of Magdeburg in 1680 brought feudal jurisdiction over neighbouring Mansfeld and Wernigerode. Prussia became more aggressive in asserting these rights as the competition intensified among the electors around 1700. Thus, just as Prussia was reaching into the realm of European power relations, it was also becoming more deeply embedded in imperial politics. It could not afford to

[128] As argued by Frey and Frey, *Frederick I*, 191, 200–10, 217.

[129] Treaty with Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1708 in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 92–6. More detail in Göse, *Friedrich I.*, 177, 181–5.

[130] In their treaties of 1716 and 1731, Prussia promised to back Württemberg's bid for a vote for its duchy of Teck, in return for Württemberg support for a princely vote for Neumark, the part of Brandenburg east of the Oder.

[131] Moerner (ed.), *Kurbrandenburgische Staatsverträge*, 612; Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 32–3, 71–3.

give ground in the Empire, even on comparatively minor issues, whilst its own international influence and status remained in flux. Significantly, Prussia's targets were all along fault lines with Hanover, Saxony, or Habsburg clients like Bamberg in Franconia. For example, Prussian military occupation of Nordhausen in 1703 was a direct response to Hanoverian success in pre-empting it in Hildesheim a few weeks earlier.[132]

The conventions of imperial politics also shaped how Prussia pursued these objectives. Political legitimacy remained defined by the imperial constitution. Prussia could not use its military superiority without compromising the very claims it sought to advance. For example, Prussian intervention in Nordhausen was legitimized by invoking protectorate rights over the city already purchased from Saxony in 1697, while the city's continued autonomy was guaranteed in a treaty with its council.[133] Careful preparations preceded intervention in Bayreuth in 1705 to secure Prussia's inheritance claims. Not only did Prussia obtain permission from Bayreuth, but it sent a battalion hired from Nassau-Dillenburg rather than one of its own units.[134] Similar arguments were used to justify a military presence in Geyer and East Frisia.[135] Prussia also secured peacekeeping mandates from the *Reichshofrat* for its troops in East Frisia in the 1720s, and for its intervention in Gotha in 1703 which was intended to balance Hanover's occupation of Brunswick.[136]

[132] The intervention in Hildesheim was actually carried out by Celle, but advanced Hanoverian interests. See Heinz Josef Adamski, *Der welfische Schutz über die Stadt Hildesheim* (Hildesheim, 1939), 95–8; Hans Silberborth, *Preußen und Hannover im Kampf um die Reichsstadt Nordhausen 1697–1715* (Nordhausen, 1936).

[133] Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 30–1.

[134] Ibid. 62–3, 77. For the Dillenburg unit, see LAM, A411 Nr.1a.28 (4 vols.).

[135] For the latter, see Bernd Kappelhof, *Absolutistisches Regiment oder Ständeherrschaft? Landesherr und Landstände in Ostfriesland im ersten Drittel des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Hildesheim, 1982), esp. 19, 77–86, 243. The Prussian presence in East Frisia guarded the European base of the Brandenburg African Company.

[136] The operations in 1703 were to prevent Brunswick and Gotha joining France during the War of the Spanish Succession. See Georg Schnath, 'Die Überwältigung Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttels durch Hannover und Celle zu Beginn des Spanischen Erbfolgekriegs, März 1702', *Braunschweigisches Jahrbuch*, 56 (1975), 27–100.

Troops were useful in pre-empting rivals and adding pressure in negotiations, but Prussia did not yet see naked force as a viable means to achieve its goals. Despite its reputation as the impoverished 'sandbox of the Empire', Prussia was rich relative to most of the much smaller German principalities. It was able to pay 250,000 taler to buy out the last count of Tecklenburg in 1707, and give Saxony 300,000 taler for its protectorate rights over Quedlinburg and Nordhausen in 1697. Generous payments bought off rival claims to Geyer, where the last count's widow received a Prussian pension, while the Orange inheritance dispute was finally only settled in 1732, when Prussia paid Nassau-Dietz to drop its rights.[137] Prussia also traded its own claims, abandoning a bid for Mömpelgard in return for Württemberg's support over Limpurg-Speckfeld in 1709. Eleven years later, Frederick William even proposed exchanging Neuchâtel with the count of Mansfeld.

Saxony had long opposed Prussian designs on Mansfeld and backed Emperor Charles VI who made the dispute a test case against Prussian influence in northern Germany, forcing Frederick William to return the land to its count in 1716. The count died five years later, while his successor proved an inveterate gambler. Using the excuse of financial mismanagement, Frederick William seized the count's last assets, bluntly telling him 'to kiss my arse'.[138] However, Prussia's action rested on a strong legal basis, including well-established rights to much of the county already. Moreover, like Saxony, Prussia claimed feudal jurisdiction over Mansfeld, denying that it was a fully immediate territory. In short, Prussia was employing methods entirely typical of imperial politics to advance goals by exploiting legal and constitutional ambiguities, rather than direct force.

The case of the Westphalian imperial abbey of Herford illustrates this further. Prussia's acquisition of Cleves in 1609 allowed it to claim a protectorate over Herford on the basis of a treaty between the duchy and the abbey from 1485. Protectorates had long been a way of extending domination over small territories, because the stronger

[137] See the agreements in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrich Wilhelms I.*, 83, 404–17.

[138] Quoted in Elisabeth Schwarze-Neuss, 'Untersuchungen zur Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgeschichte der Grafschaft Mansfeld, insbesondere der magdeburgisch-preußischen Hoheit', *Sachsen und Anhalt*, 18 (1994), 525–49, at 538.

partner frequently assumed responsibility for discharging the weaker one's imperial obligations. Brandenburg had already annexed the town of Herford in 1652, claiming it was not a full imperial Estate.[139] Whereas the Great Elector had blockaded the inhabitants until they agreed, Frederick I was not prepared to risk harming his prestige by using violence. Instead, he abused his position as co-director of the Westphalian *Kreis* to stop inviting the abbess to the *Kreis* assembly after 1697 on the grounds that, as a protectorate, the abbey was not a full imperial Estate.[140] With no territory beyond the abbey itself, Abbess Charlotte Sophie might be expected to have been crushed by the Prussian behemoth. Yet her response showed the continued efficacy of the imperial constitution in protecting its weakest elements. She produced lists of *Kreis* members in 1599 and 1648 to prove precedent for her representation in the assembly, and published imperial mandates forwarded to her by the imperial chancellory to demonstrate her status as imperial Estate.[141] When this failed, she prosecuted Prussia in the *Reichshofrat*, which obliged Frederick I to accept the abbey as fully immediate in return for the abbess' confirmation of the protectorate.[142]

Prussia suffered numerous, more substantial setbacks. Having being forced to withdraw its troops from Bayreuth in 1707, Prussia was compelled by Charles VI in 1722 to annul a favourable inheritance treaty it had negotiated with its Franconian relations in 1703.[143] Meanwhile, the claims which had been so expensively established in Geyer and Limpurg-Speckfeld were successfully contested by the heiresses of both counties in the imperial courts. Prussia resigned its claims to Ansbach in 1729 and disengaged from Franconia, where its influence rested tenuously on the Prussian wives of the two Franconian Hohenzollern princes.[144] Prussia was defeated in Lower

[139] Rainer Pape, *Sancta Herfordia: Geschichte Herfords von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Herford, 1979), 207–19.

[140] LAM, A230 Nr. 90, esp. complaint from the abbess of Herford, 7 Mar. 1702.

[141] LAM, A230, Nr. 98.

[142] The agreement from 20 Oct. 1705 is printed in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrichs I.*, 69–71.

[143] Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrich Wilhelms I.*, 45–8, 62–3.

[144] Cletus Weber, *Die äussere Politik des Markgrafen Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Brandenburg-Ansbach 1729–1757* (Erlangen, 1909).

Saxony, where Hanover obliged it to sell its protectorate over Nordhausen in 1715. Hanover, meanwhile, blocked Prussian influence in Mecklenburg, thanks to backing from Charles VI into the 1730s.[145] By contrast, Hanover retained a permanent garrison in Hildesheim after 1711.

The outcome in Upper Saxony was more favourable to Prussia. Count Stolberg accepted Prussian overlordship over his county of Wernigerode in May 1714, while Prussia retained rights over Mansfeld, though only secured physical possession on the death of the last count in 1780.[146] Prussia's position in Westphalia improved with its relations to Austria after 1728, and it finally acquired Tecklenburg once Charles VI dropped his support for a rival claim from Bentheim.[147] The emperor also mandated a Prussian military presence in Mecklenburg as imperial peacekeepers after 1733, as well as a briefer occupation of the imperial city of Mühlhausen in 1733–5 on the same grounds. However, he did not abandon the lesser territories altogether. The abbess of Herford ignored Frederick William's letters as hereditary protector, and refused to pay Prussia to provide her imperial contingent in the War of the Polish Succession.[148] Other than East Frisia, the other lesser Westphalian territories repudiated long-standing agreements with Prussia in 1715 and either provided their own troops in future, or contracted less threatening territories like Münster instead.[149]

Far from lessening Prussia's engagement with the smaller territories, the process of acquiring and consolidating the royal title increased the Hohenzollerns' appetite for comparatively minor advantages across the Empire. In pursuing its goals, Prussia used its significantly greater political and material resources, including applying coercion, but was not more aggressive than its rivals amongst the electors. Nor did it seriously breach accepted norms, unlike Bavaria, which openly defied the emperor during the War of

[145] Details in Hughes, *Law and Politics.*

[146] The agreement over Wernigerode is printed in Loewe (ed.), *Preußens Staatsverträge Friedrich Wilhelms I.*, 58–67.

[147] Ibid. 384–91.

[148] LAM A230 Nr. 1084.

[149] Kurt Hüsgen, 'Die militärische Vertretung des Stifts Essen durch Brandenburg-Preußen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Stadt und Stift Essen*, 30 (1909), 1–92.

the Spanish Succession and besieged the imperial city of Ulm. This underlines the general point about imperial political culture conserving the Empire, whilst inhibiting change and limiting the options of its components. Prussia's reluctance to transgress obliged it to accept repeated setbacks at the hands of comparatively minor territories, and to forgo both material and symbolic advantages. However, compliance with imperial mandates and court verdicts at least enabled Prussia to minimize damage to its prestige by demonstrating respect for the established order.

Conclusion

Acquisition of a royal crown changed how Prussia interacted with the Empire, but did not affect the radical departure that the revolution of 1789 had on French behaviour.[150] Unlike the revolutionaries, Prussia craved recognition of its new status within the Empire and Europe and avoided actions liable to be judged illegitimate by conventional standards.[151] It was not free to pursue policies towards the Empire after 1700 as a fully independent kingdom, but remained embedded in existing formal and informal patterns of interaction with the Empire as a whole, and continued to engage with the entire range of its territories from Austria to the abbey of Herford.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the traditional interpretation should not simply be replaced by one claiming a stronger Empire and weaker Prussia. Prussia was growing stronger in conventional terms of military and institutional power, and this, together with Austria's more substantial expansion and the increasing internationalization of imperial politics through phenomena like personal unions, all weakened the Empire's coherence and efficacy. The cultural approach helps explain why the Empire continued to cohere despite these shifts in 'real' power. However, this approach only gains real value when integrated into a discussion of power politics to reveal how

[150] Sidney Seymour Biro, *The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy During the War of the First Coalition 1792–1797* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

[151] E.g. the Hohenzollerns followed established norms in the exchange of diplomatic gifts: Jeannette Falcke, *Studien zum diplomatischen Geschenkwesen am brandenburgisch-preußischen Hof im 17. und 18 Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2006).

beliefs about acceptable behaviour influenced choices and actions. The empire did not exist purely on the pages of the *Reichspublizisten* or in the speeches at the *Reichstag*. It lived through the interaction of all its components in a way that affected 'hard' politics, like who gained possession of which land.

Prussia's position in this complex interaction cannot be adequately measured purely through its dealings with formal institutions, and certainly should not be reduced to a footnote in its rivalry with Austria. Indeed, the partial contraction of Prussian influence in the Empire after 1713 coincided with mounting problems in the Habsburg monarchy which grew more pronounced during the War of the Polish Succession and the Turkish War of 1737–9. Frederick William's ambitions in Franconia and elsewhere were checked less by the emperor's military power than the continued resilience of imperial politics and the general antipathy towards Prussia's bullying tactics. The key change in 1740 was not a shift in the 'real' political–military balance between Austria and Prussia, but the accession in Frederick II of a man who held the imperial constitution in contempt and refused to be bound by its rules.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

HOW TO DOMESTICATE THE HISTORY OF A KING: REFLECTIONS ON THE 'FRIEDERISIKO' PROJECT

ECKHART HELLMUTH

STIFTUNG PREUSSISCHE SCHLÖSSER UND GÄRTEN BERLIN-BRANDENBURG (ed.), *Friederisiko*, i. *Friedrich der Grosse: Die Ausstellung*; ii. *Friedrich der Grosse: Die Essays* (Munich: Hirmer Verlag, 2012), 420 pp. + 340 pp. ISBN 978 3 7774 5141 1. €65.00 for both volumes together

SAMUEL WITTWER, *Der Modeaffe: Eine szenische Promenade durch das Neue Palais. Zum Leben erweckt von Isabelle de Borchgrave*, a special publication of the Stiftung Preußische Schlösser und Gärten Berlin-Brandenberg for the exhibition 'Friederisiko', Potsdam, Neues Palais (Berlin: Hirmer Verlag, 2012), 128 pp. ISBN 978 3 7774 5551 8. €24.90

JÜRGEN LUH, *Der Große: Friedrich II. von Preußen* (Munich: Siedler, 2011), 288 pp. ISBN 978 3 88680 984 4. €19.99

DEUTSCHES HISTORISCHES MUSEUM (ed.), *Friedrich der Große: Verehrt. Verklärt. Verdammt*, exhibition catalogue (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012), 244 pp. ISBN 978 3 515 10123 3. €24.00

Historical exhibitions—apart from the permanent collections of museums—are fleeting events. They last for a few months, as a rule, and are then dismantled. The exhibits return to their original locations, disappearing back into the storerooms of public and private collections, installations are disposed of, and unsold catalogues remaindered. But despite their ephemeral nature, historical exhibitions do have an effect. With their objects suggesting authenticity and elaborate settings, they attract visitors in large numbers. Press releases, catalogues, and interviews all help to make historical exhibitions events with a large public impact. But these exhibitions are often more than just events; they also represent large-scale academic enter-

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

prises. During years of preparation, curators and historians develop a flurry of research activity. Books are published and symposiums are held to sound out the territory and push forward the debate. Often it is claimed that the exhibition is breaking new scholarly ground.

All this applies to one of the biggest and most important historical exhibitions to be held in Germany in recent years. In 2012, the Stiftung Preußische Schlösser und Gärten (Foundation Prussian Palaces and Gardens) Berlin-Brandenburg put on the exhibition 'Friederisiko: Frederick the Great' to commemorate the tercentenary of this Prussian monarch's birth. With this rather bizarre name, the organizers wanted to make clear that 'risk-taking was one of Frederick's essential character traits' (Jürgen Luh). Of the countless exhibitions that were dedicated to Frederick's life in 2012, 'Friederisiko' was undoubtedly the most expensive and elaborate. The press, radio, and television reported it extensively, and 'Friederisiko' certainly pulled in the crowds. Over the six months that the exhibition was open, 350,000 visitors flocked to Potsdam to learn more about this central figure of German history. The five years of preparation were accompanied by an ambitious academic programme. Among other things, five conferences were held from 2007 to 2011. Their aim, according to the organizers, was 'to set the points permanently for a changed reception of this king'.[1] Under the overall title 'Friedrich300', early career historians in particular worked on the following topics: 'Frederick the Great: A Perspectival Stocktaking'; 'Frederick the Great and the Court'; 'Frederick and Historical Greatness'; 'Frederick the Great: Politics and Cultural Transfer in a European Context'; and 'Frederick the Great and the Hohenzollern Dynasty'. Even before the exhibition, the proceedings of these conferences were published on the internet.[2] In addition, the most important contributions were collected in a volume of essays published in parallel with the lavishly

[1] Jürgen Luh and Michael Kaiser, 'Einleitung', in eid. (eds.), *Friedrich der Große – eine perspektivische Bestandsaufnahme: Beiträge des ersten Colloquiums in der Reihe 'Friedrich300' vom 28./29. September 2007* (Friedrich300–Colloquien, 1), online at: <http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/friedrich300-colloquien/friedrich-bestandsaufnahme/luh-kaiser_einleitung>, published 27 Oct. 2008, accessed 13 Mar. 2014.

[2] Online at <http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/friedrich300-colloquien>, accessed 6 Mar. 2014.

produced exhibition catalogue. This publication is unusual in that it does not, as is often the case, merely contain a list of the objects displayed with a brief commentary on each. Rather, it brings together more than thirty essays, most of which aim to create a new image of Frederick. This is also the intention of the biography of Frederick by Jürgen Luh, the curator and academic director of 'Friederisiko'. Luh's work, *Der Große: Friedrich II. von Preußen*, was not part of the official documentation of the exhibition, but undeniably left deep traces on its concept. The ambitious revisionism expressed in the exhibition and associated publications demands critical appraisal. Looking back from a certain distance in time, we will ask whether the perspectives that the project 'Friederisiko' opened up on Prussian history are sustainable and original.

There is a tradition of exhibitions on Frederick the Great. In 1986 both East (in Potsdam)[3] and West (in Berlin-Charlottenburg)[4] commemorated the bicentenary of the Prussian monarch's death. Just a few years earlier, in 1981, the exhibition 'Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz' (Prussia: An Attempt to Take Stock) had presented the history of the Hohenzollern state to a large audience for the first time since the end of the Second World War.[5] In just four months, 450,000 visitors made their way to the Gropius-Bau, originally the Berlin Museum of Applied Arts, where this event was held. (None of the exhibitions that followed was ever to achieve these sorts of visitor numbers.) 'Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz' presented an overview of the whole of Prussian history, but the eighteenth century and Frederick the Great in particular loomed large. Tellingly, Frederick was the only individual featured in the exhibition to have a whole room devoted to him. As one knowledgeable observer noted, this room was pervaded by 'a touch of ice . . . which emanated from

[3] For this see Generaldirektion der Staatlichen Schlösser Potsdam-Sanssouci (ed.), *Friedrich und die Kunst: Ausstellung zum 200. Todestag*, exhibition catalogue (Potsdam, 1986).

[4] For this see Friedrich Benninghoven, Helmut Börsch-Supan, and Iselin Gundermann, *Friedrich der Große: Ausstellung des Geheimen Staatsarchivs Preußischer Kulturbesitz anlässlich des 200. Todestages König Friedrichs II. von Preußen*, exhibition catalogue (Berlin, 1986).

[5] On this see Gottfried Korff (ed.), *Preußen. Versuch einer Bilanz: Eine Ausstellung der Berliner Festspiele GmbH*, exhibition catalogue (Hamburg, 1981).

Prussia's genius and was felt through all posthumous attempts to domesticate Old Fritz'.[6]

Even before its opening, the 1981 exhibition sparked a heated debate about Prussia and its history. Nostalgic sympathy for the Hohenzollern state competed with a stringent rejection of the Prussian legacy. But it was mainly the way in which the past was staged in the Gropius-Bau that exercised people's minds. The main person responsible for the exhibition's design was Gottfried Korff who, much to the annoyance of historians, was not one of them, but hailed from the Ludwig Uhland Institute for Empirical Cultural Science in Tübingen. This had grown from roots in ethnography to become the intellectual powerhouse of the study of modern mass culture and the culture of everyday life. In the Gropius-Bau, Korff and his staff put on display not only authentic artefacts, but supplemented these with reconstructions, replicas, and elements of stage design. The decision to show objects that were not original was only partly explained by the fact that the resources of museums in the GDR and the People's Republic of Poland were not available to the exhibition curators for political reasons. There was, in fact, more behind it, namely, the intention to make visitors to the exhibition think. Ten years after the exhibition 'Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz', Korff reflected on the specific opportunities for imparting knowledge that museum exhibitions offer. Among other things, he spoke in this context of the 'opportunities for combining things, for creating unusual, bold, inspired, and disturbing arrangement of objects'. 'Confronting and juxtaposing things', he continued, 'gives rise to conversations, contradictions and reciprocal illuminations, it relativizes and creates frictions which can emit sparks of significance and meaning.'[7]

Although spoken in a completely different context, these sentences seem like an echo of what took place in 1981 in the Gropius-Bau. The room dedicated to the Enlightenment in the Frederican age,

[6] Bodo-Michael Baumunk writing in a highly informative article, published in the *Berliner Zeitung* of 26 May 2001, in which he recalled the exhibition of 1981 and the associated controversies.

[7] Gottfried Korff, 'Paradigmenwechsel im Museum: Überlegungen aus Anlass des 20jährigen Bestehens des Werkbund-Archivs', lecture delivered on 27 May 1993 at the Gropius-Bau. The text is available online at: <http://www.museumderdinge.de/institution/selbstbild_fremdbild/g_korff.php>, accessed 14 Mar. 2014.

for example, offered food for thought in this sense. A glass pyramid with sharp edges rose up out of the middle of the room, referencing the architectural vocabulary of the period. According to the catalogue, its 'transparency and crystalline form' were intended to point to the 'illumination and intermingling of world and life contexts' to which the Enlightenment movement aspired.[8] In the glass pyramid and display cases, the exhibition curators impressively recreated the Zeitgeist, among other things by presenting a breath-taking quantity and variety of published material, ranging from the peaks of contemporary philosophy to a 'treatise about teeth, containing methods of keeping them clean and healthy, making them more beautiful, and replacing those that have fallen out'. Objects were displayed that would not necessarily be expected in this context, but which demonstrated how far the eighteenth-century will for reform and innovation reached. These included a feeding bottle for infants, a flea trap, obstetric forceps, and a rough piece of wooden water pipe dating from 1760. The inspiring and contemplative atmosphere which characterized the exhibition 'Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz' was not created by the installations in the exhibition rooms alone. The building itself, still displaying traces of Second World War damage, and its location also contributed. In the early 1980s, the Gropius-Bau lay in an inner-city wasteland, just a few metres from the Berlin Wall. The former Prussian Landtag peeped out from behind it, and it was within sight of where the Gestapo headquarters had been. A cornfield, real but artificial, had been planted in the middle of this urban desert to remind visitors that Prussia had been an agrarian state.

How different was the setting for 'Friederisiko': not a building marked by war and in an urban no-man's land, but the biggest palace built in the second half of the eighteenth century. As the site for its ambitious undertaking, the Foundation Prussian Palaces and Gardens selected the Neue Palais in the western part of Sanssouci park. This building, which was erected in the quickest possible time between 1763 and 1769, is generally regarded as the last big Baroque palace built in Germany and exemplifies Frederick the Great's passion for building. The internal and external design of this monumental palace largely reflects his taste, based on early eighteenth-century models. As soon as it was finished, it already seemed like an anachro-

[8] Korff (ed.), *Preußen. Versuch einer Bilanz*, exhibition catalogue, 257.

nism. With its 200 rooms, four banqueting halls, and Rococo theatre, it was not, as could be assumed, intended to be a royal residence. Frederick himself only used the building occasionally. It primarily served to accommodate guests of the Prussian court, especially members of the dynasty, but it was much too big for this purpose. The Neue Palais was, in fact, more than the court's guest house. In its monumentalism it was a gesture of triumph, a sign that in the Seven Years War, Prussia had asserted it status as a European great power.

The Neue Palais was not just the setting for 'Friederisiko'; it was also the exhibition's biggest and most important exhibit, in parts painstakingly restored for the event. What visitors saw (and still currently see) are rooms of unrivalled opulence and luxury. Frederick spared no expense in the case of the Neue Palais: precious chandeliers and mirrors; elaborate lacquerware; silk, damask, and brocade wallpaper; wall and ceiling paintings by renowned French artists; coloured marble and fine woods from all over Europe, North America, and Indonesia. Frederick dictated every detail of the facade, floor plan, interior decoration, furnishings, and the hanging of paintings. Much (some would say, too much) space is devoted to the history of this monumental building in the catalogue and volume of essays. Thus the reader discovers a great deal about the materials (precious stones, glass, porcelain, textiles, and so on) that were used in the building. It becomes clear that Frederick, with an iron will, forced his architects to execute his ideas, and that his ambitions in matters of building were not necessarily matched by his expertise (see the essay by Volker Thiele). In an illuminating essay Alfred P. Hagemann demonstrates the role of quotation and copy in Frederick's building programme. In the case of the Neue Palais, English models proved to be the main the source of inspiration (Vanbrugh's Castle Howard for the overall conception, and Hampton Court for the facade).

The Neue Palais is undoubtedly a spectacular building, but it is unsuitable as the setting for an exhibition devoted to the life of Frederick the Great. This is not only because old palaces whose rooms were laid out for the use of a court are difficult to adapt to the needs of a museum. The real problem lies deeper. Exhibition buildings have their own, unique aura. When the exhibition 'Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz' opened it doors in 1981, the literary critic Peter Wapnewski wrote a review, still worth reading, in which he dis-

cussed the Gropius-Bau as the setting for an exhibition: 'As one enters, the whole enormous cube appears to float, it vibrates with internal tension, it is as if the pillars and stones are giving voice, as if one is stepping into an opera.'[9] Visitors to 'Friederisiko' were largely spared these sensations. Nothing 'vibrated'; rather, the atmosphere was that of a stolid museum of applied arts. Parts of the exhibition seemed like a showcase for eighteenth-century Prussian arts and crafts. The section entitled 'Im Wettstreit' (In Competition) did not present Prussia's rise to become a European great power, but displayed exquisite porcelain, intricately designed furniture, precious silks, and clocks that had been manufactured for the Prussian monarch's palaces and homes. The message that the curators were sending with these displays was that Frederick the Great loved luxury. He was not an ascetic, as he is often portrayed; courtly life and culture were of central importance to him. The curators drove this message home to such an extent that it became irritating. The section entitled 'Tagesgeschäft' (Daily Business) conveyed almost nothing about Frederick the Great's affairs of state. Instead, the rooms of the King's Apartment were used to display some of the treasures on which Frederick spent vast sums from his private purse: snuff-boxes inlaid with diamonds, crystal chandeliers, cherries for which he paid a Taler each, oysters, champagne, and burgundy wine. Parts of the exhibition descended into courtly folklore. For example, the rather trivial comedy, *Der Modeaffe*, written by Frederick in 1742, was reanimated in the form of life-sized figurines made of paper. This project by the Belgian artist Isabelle de Borchgrave occupied eleven rooms. The whole thing was pretty to look at, but devoid of any epistemological value. The same applied to the section 'Dynastie' (Dynasty), which consisted of a tiresome succession of aristocratic portraits. To avoid misunderstandings: it undoubtedly makes sense to bring the court and dynasty back into Prussian history of the eighteenth century, as the work by Thomas Biskup, Frank Göse, Daniel Schönpflug, and Karoline Zielesko in the catalogue and volume of essays demonstrates. But we should careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

In 1981, in his review for *Die Zeit* mentioned above, Peter Wapnewski made the following general comments on the nature of a

[9] *Die Zeit*, issue 36, 1981.

historical exhibition: 'It is an artefact which builds up something that has never existed in this form before, it combines and assembles and attempts to give an abstract image a concrete shape. A delicate and risky undertaking.' How delicate and risky was amply demonstrated by 'Friederisiko'. Important themes were either not treated at all, or marginalized. Thus land and people, as it were, the context and setting of Frederick the Great's policies, made no appearance. How the Frederican regime functioned was another area that remained largely in the dark.[10] Two small cabinets with a few exhibits were devoted to the Prussian military, although the military apparatus devoured 70 to 80 per cent of the state's budget. The section on 'Entwicklungspolitik' (Development Policy) contained only two thematic fields: tolerance and religion; and science and Enlightenment. In the latter, visitors saw a microscope, a quadrant, a telescope, a fish preserved in alcohol, some scientific illustrations, and a small selection of Enlightenment writings. Members of the older generation remember with nostalgia the brilliant presentation, described above, of the Prussian Enlightenment in the Gropius-Bau in 1981.

Visitors who wanted to know more about the thematic fields mentioned here had to take the trouble to consult the catalogue and volume of essays. There we find solid information, for example, about the Frederican military apparatus (see the essays by Marcus von Salisch, Daniel Hohrath, and Bernd A. Windsheimer), or the Enlightened scientific milieu (see the essays by Michael Eckert and Iwan-Michelangelo D'Aprile). Tobias Schenk undoubtedly offers something new in his essay, 'Friedrich und die Juden: " . . . den hier muß ein jeder nach seiner Fasson selich werden"? Zur Rolle der Juden im Denken Friedrichs des Großen'. This essay is not only about Frederick's well-known hostility to Jews. Something else is important to Schenk. He wants to show that Frederican officialdom's Jewish policy was by no means as rational and enlightened as is often assumed. Rather, he argues, it was arbitrary and shaped by ruthless fiscal interests. Little remains of the myth of a tolerant Prussian state

[10] Another, considerably smaller, exhibition held at the same time, 'Homme de lettres—Federic: Der König am Schreibtisch' (organized by the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz and the State Library Berlin) contained an outstanding section on the working practices of the Prussian monarch, presenting highly interesting documents, but the Neue Palais had only a blank space to offer in his respect.

that promoted the emancipation of the Jews, something that Schenk has already thoroughly undermined elsewhere.[11]

If we look at the 'Friederisiko' project as a whole, we notice that there are significant gaps. For example, there is nothing on the fiscal system, nothing on social and economic life, nothing on bureaucracy and the staff that was available to Frederick. It can be argued that these are all highly conventional topics. But what are the alternatives? Does 'Friederisiko' have anything original to offer, apart from the discovery, or re-discovery, of court and dynasty? The answer is: it brings back the historiographical categories of 'fame' and 'historical greatness'. Like Wagnerian leitmotifs, these two concepts permeate the literature accompanying the project. To start with, it addresses the frequently asked question of when and why Frederick's name was linked with the epithet 'the Great'. Michal Kaiser ('Friedrichs Beiname "der Große": Ruhmestitel oder historische Kategorie') and Marian Füssel ('Friedrich der Große und die militärische Größe') attempt to provide new answers. Secondly, the motives behind the Prussian monarch's actions are up for debate. Here Jürgen Luh's book, *Der Große: Friedrich II. von Preußen*, comes into play. This is not a biography or biographical sketch in the traditional sense, but more a psychological portrait of the Prussian monarch. Using this map of Frederick's personality, however, Luh ventures on to methodically tricky terrain. What can be used as the empirical basis for this sort of study of a monarch's inner life? Luh's diagnosis is based on countless extracts from Frederick's writings and letters, and the frequency with which they appear does not make for easy reading. Luh also seeks to understand the monarch's motives from his actions, but he is on shaky ground here, as the text's frequent descent into speculation shows. Yet Luh does not hesitate to identify a 'thirst for fame' as the overriding motive for Frederick's actions. According to Luh, Frederick designed his entire life to be seen by contemporaries and posterity as 'great'. This was the aim of his military campaigns, his work as a writer and philosopher, his support for the arts, and his building activities. Frederick appears

[11] Tobias Schenk, *Wegbereiter der Emanzipation? Studien zur Judenpolitik des 'Aufgeklärten Absolutismus' in Preußen (1763–1812)* (Berlin, 2010); id., 'Die Religionen Müßen alle Tolleriret werden . . .?', in Bernd Sösemann and Gregor Vogt-Spira (eds.), *Friedrich der Große in Europa: Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 2012), ii. 67–79.

here as someone for whom being seen as 'great' became an obsession, whose thirst for fame was stronger than personal loyalties, even dynastic interests. Whether Luh, who regards research since the publication of Reinhold Koser's four-volume history of Frederick the Great[12] as 'stagnating', provides a sustainable paradigm for the future with this sort of psychohistory is an open question, but it may be doubted. It cannot be overlooked, however, that many of the authors involved in the 'Friederisiko' project, like Luh, examine the Prussian monarch's self-presentation and operate with the categories of 'greatness' and 'fame'.

This applies to a relatively broad range of subjects. Thus Franziska Windt analyses the painting collections in the Neue Palais, while Ulrich Sachse investigates how Frederick wanted his death to be staged. Andreas Pečar and Katrin Kohl look at the monarch's self-presentation in his philosophical and literary works. Some of this is illuminating; some of it is strained, especially when, as in the case of Pečar, a pseudo-original jargon is used (he sees the French men of the Enlightenment as the 'ratings agencies for greatness, glory, and prestige', with Voltaire handing out the 'triple As'). Overall, it is difficult to avoid the impression of a certain one-sidedness. After all, in the eighteenth century 'fame' and 'greatness' were not only the product of monarchical self-presentation, but were also decided by forces that lay outside the monarch's control. (This is hinted at only in the essay by Michael Kaiser and Frauke Mankartz, 'Die Marke Friedrich: Der preußische König im zeitgenössischen Bild'). Ever since Linda Colley's classic essay 'The Apotheosis of George III',[13] we have been aware of the social, commercial, and intellectual forces involved in this process, and how complex it is. In fact, one wonders why the curators of 'Friederisiko' were not prepared to look beyond the confines of Prussian history more often, and to be more open to a comparative perspective. Although the portraits of the other European monarchs were hung in the section 'Europa und die Welt' (Europe and the World), no closer look was taken at these figures. Perhaps this would have put some of what was said and shown about Frederick into perspective.

[12] Reinhold Koser, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Großen*, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1912–14).

[13] Linda Colley, 'The Apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, Royalty and the British Nation 1760–1820', *Past and Present*, 102 (1984), 94–129.

No other historical figure has been the repository of so much of German society's anxieties as Frederick the Great. The cultural practices employed in this were illustrated in the German Historical Museum's exhibition 'Friedrich der Große: verehrt, verklärt, verdammt'. This exhibition also made clear the extent to which Frederick had been instrumentalized for political purposes in the past, and that the debate about him was inspired largely by political hopes and fears. These times are thankfully past. But is the necessary consequence that Frederick must decline into a figure of 'cultural-historical amusement' (Jens Bisky)? Are there no more exciting, controversial stories to tell about this monarch and his regime? The conclusions drawn by the organizers of 'Friederisiko' could easily convey this impression. A certain complacency and helplessness seems to predominate:[14] nobody really knows where the journey should end. Perhaps it would help if Frederick and his history were read from the perspective of the end of the eighteenth century. As for most European powers, the end of the 'century of Enlightenment' brought disaster for Prussia, culminating in the defeats at Jena and Auerstedt. What collapsed was largely the system that Frederick had left as a legacy to his successors. From this point, the history of Frederican Prussia was one of looming crisis and a dysfunctional system, the story of a parvenu whose position in the circle of European powers would always remain precarious because of a lack of resources. How these themes can be realized in museum practice is another story, but certainly not, as in 'Friederisiko', by creating a section entitled 'Blütezeit' (Blossoming). This was not meant metaphorically, as could be assumed, but literally. The subject was landscape gardening and the cultivation of fruit at the court of Frederick the Great.

[14] On this see Michael Kaiser and Jürgen Luh (eds.), *Friedrich der Große – eine Bilanz: Beiträge des siebten Colloquiums in der Reihe 'Friedrich300' vom 24. Januar 2013* (Friedrich 300-Colloquien, 7), online at: <http://www.perspectivia.net/content/publikationen/friedrich300-colloquien/friedrich-bilanz>, accessed 14 Mar. 2014. In this concluding colloquium, tellingly, there was little discussion of how 'Friederisiko' might stimulate future research. Instead, other questions came to the fore, such as, for example, whether Frederick was a 'marketing magnet'. The conversation conducted on this topic between Jürgen Luh and the agency Ketchum Pleon's head of campaigns, who was responsible for the exhibition's communication strategy, in part verged on the satirical.

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BOOK REVIEWS

KATRIN BEYER, *Witz und Ironie in der politischen Kultur Englands im Hochmittelalter: Interaktionen und Imaginationen,* Religion und Politik, 2 (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2012), 304 pp. ISBN 978 3 89913 882 5. €42.00

The aim of this study is to investigate the role of humour and irony as constitutive elements of the political culture of medieval England from the Norman Conquest through to the later thirteenth century. The set of case studies chosen for close reading are, in the main, historiographical and epistolary texts, and Katrin Beyer situates her approach to them somewhere between a strictly literary line, which would understand humour and irony in these works as particular rhetorical devices operating within the formal constraints of their genres, and a naive reading that would assume them to be direct reflections of a historical reality. The stated aim is instead to understand the position of humour and irony within the broader structure of medieval political communication: '[die] Freilegung der Erwartungshaltungen und Verhaltensweisen im Gespräch auf der Grundlage von normativen Darstellungen, Redeszenen und Briefen, um auf diesem Wege Aussagen über Konventionen und Verhaltensnormen jener Zeit treffen zu können' (to uncover the inherent expectations and forms of conduct in spoken discourse on the basis of normative representations, literary dialogues, and letters, in order to draw conclusions in this way about conventions and norms of conduct in this period) (p. 21). In the main, Beyer achieves this balancing act quite well, even if one notes that at some points, what she (and her readers) would really have liked to investigate is whether an acerbic display of wit presented in a particularly charged situation actually occurred in the manner the sources would have us believe.

The first three central chapters deal with *facetiae* and the *facete dictum*—witty tales and clever wordplay—as a constituent element of *urbanitas*, an ideal of the new courtly culture emanating from northern France, of which English (or rather: Angevin) curial writers of the period understood themselves to be part. The political deployment of

the *facete dictum* in order to de-escalate conflict and defuse fraught situations went beyond a rhetorical trope, as we are shown through case studies of the well-documented relationships between Henry II and the Carthusian Hugh, bishop of Lincoln (d. 1200), and the king's cousin Roger, bishop of Worcester (d. 1179), respectively. Yet it is also clear that the success of a *facete dictum* in such circumstances depended on the prior personal acquaintance and, indeed, friendship with the king on the part of figures who were already heavyweight politicians, voices heard seriously at court. The *facete dictum* in this political context was the exception, not the norm, and if deployed inappropriately, or by an individual without the necessary personal standing, reflected badly upon the speaker. The ability to tell witty stories (*facetiae*) effectively, by contrast, was a quality prized more broadly as a mark of distinction for a courtier. As a social rather than an ethical quality, it was not necessarily a mark of character, and so can be found ascribed to individuals otherwise held in poor repute. Skill in the delivery of *facetiae* was taken by some twelfth-century authors as a distinctive feature of national identity—of Britishness, Englishness, or, in the case of Gerald of Wales, Welshness—and they could also be deployed to political effect. Gerald and Walter Map both presented *facetiae* in which a positive connotation lent to the frugality of the Capetian kings was intended to contrast only semi-implicitly with the power-hungry ambition of Henry II, to the latter's discredit; inverting thereby the original direction of these *facetiae*, which Beyer argues had begun life as orally circulated tales that poked fun at the relative poverty and somewhat feeble territorial jurisdiction of the twelfth-century kings of France.

In the second set of three chapters, Beyer turns to three different spheres of life and thought: law, letters, and satirical literature. The first of these (law) is long and difficult, and starts with the proposition that Anglo-Norman justice saw the death penalty as inappropriate for nobles, even in cases of treason (though not, one might note, for everyone else). Instances in which a treacherous nobleman was put to death at the order of a ruler had, therefore, to be especially legitimized in some way by subsequent narrators of the events. Beyer appeals to the idea of punishments that 'mirrored' the crime they addressed, the 'spiegelnde Strafe', as part of those strategies of legitimation, and which contemporary historians signalled by the introduction of (invented) ironic statements. Thus, to explain the execu-

tion of the Mercian nobleman Eadric Streona (d. 1017) by Cnut, later historians like William of Malmesbury and Henry of Huntingdon made him responsible for the murder of Edmund Ironside, and then attributed to Cnut an ironic statement towards Eadric of the 'and now you will get your just rewards' type. This turns out to be the latter's execution, with Cnut presented as a man who hated treachery, even when it had worked to his advantage. Eadric was thus 'deceived' by Cnut's irony, just as he himself had 'deceived' Edmund Ironside. William of Malmesbury (again) and Orderic Vitalis attribute a similar ironic statement to the future Henry I in the year 1090, having him declare 'All this will be yours' to his captive, the rebel leader Conan Pilatus, whilst gazing out from a tower upon the city of Rouen, before hurling Conan violently from said tower to his death, the 'reward' for his treachery. What was in reality a usurpation of the juridical authority of Henry's older brother Robert Curthose, then Duke of Normandy, an act of dubious legality, and a display of distasteful cruelty on the part of a man who had since become king, was then turned into a 'spiegelnde Strafe' by Henry's apologists through their inclusion of this ironic phrase (both were careful to state that it was uttered *per hironiam*, lest their readers fail to grasp the point). In the context of Beyer's work, this legal perspective is then placed alongside studies of irony in the works of Matthew Paris, where irony serves to characterize others negatively (especially the French), and of the mockery and scorn that could occur on the battlefield—or require prevention, in the prosecution of successful peace negotiations. All three are taken together as types of 'agonale Redeszenen', dialogues in situations of sharp conflict (the adjective *agonal* is a neologism derived from the Greek *ἀγών*, without a direct English equivalent), but as an analytical category, it lacks much in the way of useful coherence here.

The final two chapters, on letters and satirical writing, take us more firmly into the literary territory of crafted rhetoric. We learn how jocularity could maintain friendships by letter despite physical separation, but that irony could also be used in letters to stage verbal assaults and shape cutting arguments with which to belabour one's correspondent. The effect in the latter case was heightened by the ingenuity required successfully to communicate ironic statements on a purely textual level, without the assistance of gestures, expressions, or changes in the tone of voice (or the lame recourse to the declara-

tion that a given statement was meant *ironice*). Walter Map's *De nugis curialium* and the *De invectionibus* of Gerald of Wales are then examined as examples of satirical prose, in which irony was used as one rhetorical device amongst many to defame opponents. Both are really examples of formal invective, but whilst Walter seems to have been a clever satirist of the new Cistercian movement, Gerald comes across as an embittered and vituperative individual who sought to cast blame on others for his failure to secure the bishopric of St David's. Beyer detects in Gerald's purple prose traces of the rhetorical strategies by which the case will have been presented and debated at the papal curia, and so establishes a contemporary political dimension to a work that is otherwise very much a product of literary, indeed textual, craft and of the evident inheritance of classical learning.

The Latin texts are quoted at length in the footnotes, which helpfully allows the reader to examine the exact wording of the statements under discussion. It is clear that Beyer has an eye for detecting the ironic, but one would like to know how the episodes singled out for particular examination were chosen, on what grounds the material basis was selected, and why the study was conceived as it is. It is not easy, after the chapters dealing with *facetia*, to grasp the integral coherence of the study, or always to understand whether the features identified are exceptional to particular works, or are representative of broader trends in contemporary political culture. The sharp expression of conclusions and the treatment of the tension between literary technique and historical reality suffer somewhat at the hands of the considerable body of detail marshalled in this study. How Beyer's conclusions change our existing understanding of the nature of political, and thus courtly, culture in twelfth- and thirteenth-century England is a matter that readers are required to work out for themselves. This reviewer is unconvinced by the contention, outlined in the introduction, that the high status accorded to wit and humour in English society is a historical constant, and so England (or the Angevin Empire) was different in this respect from the rest of Europe, because a comparative angle is never opened.

What, then, of the quality of the humour and wit presented in this study? Beyer notes that scholars of medieval literature have focused more on laughter than on humour, and that few historians have touched on either. The political dimension of much of the humour

that comes to light in this study, however, often only worked through the mechanism of laughter. The examples of humorous *facete dicta* uttered in order to reinforce a collective identity or create a group loyalty work by singling out an other for scorn, generating laughter at the expense of a third party. One begins to see what the long-standing ecclesiastical distaste for laughter was getting at. *Facetiae* are more genuinely witty, and one can further admire the oratorical skill and literal quick-wittedness of a Hugh of Lincoln. But with the exception of certain outstanding individuals—those like Walter Map, who gave real thought to constructing humorous episodes—the wit and irony on display is, in itself, often not very sophisticated. The statement accorded to the future Henry I whilst casting Conan to his death, regardless of whether he actually said it, may well be part of an ingenious legalistic strategy to legitimize the act, but it is pretty grim all the same. The courtly milieu of urbane jocularity competes here with a sense of humour inherited from the early Middle Ages, of which Chris Wickham noted recently that 'what was funny to them (largely mockery and dreadful puns) by no means makes them seem closer to us; they used irony, but it was usually pretty savage and sarcastic'.[1]

[1] Chris Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000* (London, 2009), 552.

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JOHN R. DAVIS, STEFAN MANZ, and MARGRIT SCHULTE BEERBÜHL (eds.), *Transnational Networks: German Migrants in the British Empire, 1670–1914* (Leiden: Brill 2012), viii + 188 pp. ISBN 978 90 04 22349 3. €89.00

How British was the British Empire? How German was it? Or, to put it in less politically volatile terms, to what extent and in what sense was the colonial structure built up and controlled by England/Britain a shared European undertaking? Setting the indigenous populations aside, it is obvious that with individuals and groups from all over Europe as well as other parts of the world in a more or less constant flow of migration and transmigration, colonialism was more than just the relationship between one 'metropolis' and the periphery on which it acted. How did migrants from different countries and backgrounds act and connect? How and why did they introduce or influence what was at work in various geographical settings over two centuries? This is the issue at the heart of this collection of essays, which singles out the German minority and their relevance for British imperialism. The more recent concepts of networking and transnational entanglements offer an inroad into the as yet largely uncharted territory of the role played by non-British subjects within the British Empire.

To explore empire as a multifaceted, multicultural, multidimensional undertaking, a process of interaction and exchange of individuals rooted in diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, is not new. Nevertheless, interactions between individuals, groups, and institutions beyond national or cultural boundaries, the effects of stage migration and seeing an empire work, and the repercussions of these on more than one metropolis have not yet been studied systematically. This is surprising in the light of the fundamental nature of colonialism and the function of empire, especially the British Empire, as a facilitator of migration, which is, after all, the basis of all—direct—interaction and exchange. It is this shortcoming that this collection of essays on networks and entanglements, a follow-up to an earlier volume by the same group of authors on migration, seeks to redress.

In fact, the eight case studies aim high. Their intention is to show 'the contribution of immigrants to making the Empire work' and, in so doing, to 'shed new light on the dynamics which made Britain a world power' (p. 5). It is always difficult to create a narrative out of a

few case studies, even more so in the case of a group of actors whose numbers might have been 'substantial' (p. 17), a rather vague description, but whose relevance can only be properly assessed in light of a similar evaluation of contributions by other groups. A more modest goal is to offer a 'repository of information and argument calling into question preconceived notions' (p. 17). It is more easily achieved since by looking at the activities of non-British individuals within the British Empire each essay in itself succeeds in exposing the diversity of backgrounds, motives, and actions of those involved. It is in showing how these factors were interlinked and affected the already heterogeneous expansion process that the essays come into their own. However, the articles vary in respect to the depth of entanglement they present.

Germans moved to the British Empire and within it for various reasons. The main one was the economic motive or pull factor of an Empire providing the infrastructure for trade or jobs inaccessible to inhabitants of city-states, princedoms, duchies, or kingdoms on the European Continent without possessions overseas. Four essays in this collection focus on the Germans who migrated to the British Empire and transmigrated within it primarily for economic reasons. One of them describes four types of merchants emerging from the business activities of German-speaking migrants in the eighteenth century: investors in land developments and settlement projects and entrepreneurs enticing German craftsmen from the iron- and glass-making trades to transplant their trade and knowledge to workshops across the Atlantic. They assumed the role of transatlantic travellers or 'newlanders', whose more or less regular journeys established a specific kind of link. Or, like the Herrnhuter (Moravians), they acted as Protestant businessmen, using their denominational ties for commercial networking. Individuals of these four types played an interesting part in bringing the Atlantic world closer together, creating ties not only between German-speaking countries and Britain and its overseas colonies, but also between these and other colonial powers, such as Spain, France, the Netherlands, and their possessions. The essay identifies these groups and indicates the great variety of their activities and the existence of a lively transfer. What is absent, however, is the actual transfer, the entanglement beyond the fact of individuals or goods moving to, and perhaps from, the British Empire. The same applies to the overview of the commercial activities of

German merchants in the transatlantic textile, tobacco, and fur trades. The immediate influence of networks becomes more tangible in the biographies of chain migrants who moved to London as sugarbakers and ended up as farmers in New Zealand, and in the collective biography of five immigration agents in Canada, who wanted to promote German immigration to the country. Even here, however, one senses that there is much more to the story.

Two case studies are based on just one individual, a potentially easier approach to the workings of transnational networks in practice. Both individuals left their mark on Britain and the Empire as knowledge-producers, that is, as a scientist and explorer respectively. One deals with Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig Leichhardt, the Prussian explorer who went to Australia, and his most cherished project, through transnational networks of scientists. His greatest ambition was to cross the Australian continent from east to west. His expeditions to achieve this goal and their media resonance have made him a prominent figure in the Australian collective memory to the present day. The essay unexpectedly devotes a great deal of space to Leichhardt's reception in the twentieth century, for example, in Patrick White's novel *Voss*. The other case study is of Friedrich Max Müller, German philologist and Professor of Modern Languages at Oxford, who went a long way in raising the appreciation of ancient Indian culture in Britain, Europe, and America. The embodiment of the stereotypical absent-minded, metaphysical German professor, he advanced to the position of a full professor at Oxford through the mediation of the Prussian Ambassador to London, Baron von Bunsen, another key promoter of Anglo-German intellectual entanglement. As well as Müller's contribution and postcolonial criticism of his idealized description of Indian culture, it would have been interesting to learn about how contemporaries received his ideas, to what extent they actually integrated his teachings into their own views, or how and why they modified them.

Two more essays address potential links between British and German imperialism. In the context of the impact of transatlantic networks, it is highly relevant to investigate how the experiences of Germans in Britain and the British Empire in the nineteenth century might have impinged upon the development of a specifically German type of expansionism. The cursory glance at the Central League for German Navy Clubs Abroad that carried tensions

between Britain and Germany overseas, and the overview of interests of Germans in Britain in the mid nineteenth century both only offer the basic facts of this story. A total of 30,000 Germans in London and Liverpool were strongly influenced by transmigration. How exactly? Germans in Anglo-German business partnerships adapted to British patterns to facilitate business. How did they achieve and assess the steps they took to blend in? Explorers such as Heinrich Barth and August Petermann provided expertise useful for British expansionism. Did the British undertaking acquire new facets in the process or was knowledge free of bias—which, as the sociology of science tells us, it is not? Both essays and the overviews they offer demonstrate once again that to 'refer only to the vaguely defined category of the network' does not suffice. Nor does a mere glance at 'the large variety of forms of interactions and adaptation' (p. 78). These forms deserve systematic and in-depth analysis.

The activities of migrants in the British Empire and beyond were indeed multifarious. So were the links, transfers, and levels of entanglement created in the process. The essays take an important first step in pointing this out. Very often, though, they do not go further than stating ways in which Germans appeared within the context of expansionism. Since this has not yet been done systematically, this first step is to be welcomed and appreciated. But more is to follow, very likely in a larger and considerably more comprehensive study that will focus less on migration itself than on its effects, transnational interactions, and exchanges at the level of values, assessments, ideas, and mentalities. Then we may be closer to finding an answer to the question of the Britishness or Europeanness of the British Empire.

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AVI LIFSCHITZ, *Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xii + 231 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 966166 4. £60.00

Intellectual historians generally trace the linguistic turn, the insight into the inextricable interrelationship between language, thought, and the world, back to Wilhelm von Humboldt. It has been extensively studied by scholars from Bruno Liebrucks to Jürgen Habermas, Jürgen Trabant, and many more.[1] Isaiah Berlin described this turn towards language as an explicitly anti-Enlightenment movement. Johann Gottfried Herder's and Johann Georg Hamann's thinking about language, he argued, drew attention away from the universalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment and focused instead on the limits of reason, the irrational, and the culturally relative and plural.[2] Here Berlin was reformulating older assessments and canonizations of German national historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—such as contrasting an 'unGerman Enlightenment' with a supposedly romantic and irrational German national culture—in a way that had momentous consequences for the Anglophone world, and is still controversial today.[3]

Arguing against Berlin's thesis, Avi Lifschitz rehabilitates the Enlightenment's thinking on language and demonstrates impressively that not only was language one of the main themes of the discourse of the European Enlightenment, but that it was already seen as having a knowledge- and world-constituting significance. Herder stands wholly in the tradition and the debates of this Enlightenment thinking about language, and something similar could also be said of Humboldt. According to Lifschitz, two main features are common to

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

[1] Bruno Liebrucks, *Sprache und Bewußtsein*, 7 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1964–79); Jürgen Habermas, 'Hermeneutische versus analytische Philosophie: Zwei Spielarten der linguistischen Wende', in id., *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung: Philosophische Aufsätze* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999); Jürgen Trabant, *Traditionen Humboldts* (Frankfurt am Main, 1990).

[2] Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder* (Princeton, 2000); id., 'The Counter-Enlightenment', in id., *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas* (Princeton, 2001), 1–24.

[3] See Joseph Mali and Robert Wokler (eds.), *Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment* (Philadelphia, 2003).

all the language theories of the Enlightenment from Condillac to Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Michaelis, and Herder, and distinguish them both from the older view of language as a tool or an image of thought which dominated from Aristotle to Descartes, and from theological explanatory models. First, building on Leibniz's insight into the nature of human thought as inevitably sign-bound, language is ascribed a constitutive role in cognition and the construction of social realities. In contrast to physical phenomena, institutions such as private property or forms of government are constituted by language. Herder contributed this insight to the image that language had created cities and transformed deserts into gardens. Secondly, the language theorists of the Enlightenment, building on the models of Epicurus and Lucretius from Antiquity, developed a naturalistic theory of the evolution of human language. Lifschitz demonstrates that historical naturalism was central for the *Aufklärer*, even if they had different ideas about God, because a scientific explanation could only appeal to internal and natural phenomena, while the method of conjectural history that they developed was understood exclusively by analogy with the natural sciences (p. 5).

Lifschitz's argument draws its persuasiveness from the fact that, unlike Berlin, he does not operate purely within *Geistesgeschichte* or the history of ideas. Rather, he contextualizes these debates in the history of institutions, thus placing forms of discourse in relation to social forms of knowledge. The Berlin Academy of Sciences in particular was a centre of the European discourse on language around the middle of the eighteenth century. All the authors discussed were associated with it, and the debates focus on it. Crucial to the question of language here was the Berlin Enlightenment's nature as a multilingual and multi-confessional 'melting-pot' (p. 65), an exciting constellation that was reflected in the Academy. Apart from the French *Aufklärer* patronized by Frederick II, including such notorious ma-terialists as La Mettrie and Maupertuis, president of the Academy, the Class in Speculative Philosophy formed a centre for Wolffianism in the tradition of Leibniz and the early Enlightenment. Between these two poles there were a number of Swiss scholars such as Merian and Sulzer, while the French-speaking Huguenots around the Academy's permanent secretary, Jean Henri Samuel Formey, defended the positions of Protestant orthodoxy and Wolffianism conveying a moderate Enlightenment.

Through the medium of essay prize contests, the Academy also played a crucial part in the Enlightenment discourse in the German language. These contests, which had been held since Frederick's reform of the Academy in 1746, attracted not only many of the great Parisian *philosophes*, but also the best known German *Aufklärer*, such as Moses Mendelssohn, Immanuel Kant, Christian Garve, and Herder, who had been crowned three times. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, no other subject provided the topic for these competitions as frequently as the question of language: in 1759 the topic was the reciprocal influence of language on opinions; in 1771 the origin of language; in 1784 a European universal language; in 1794 a comparison between Europe's main languages; and in the same year again, the chances of perfecting the German language. In addition, there were further questions relating to logical connections between language and thought, such as that of 1763, won by Mendelssohn ahead of Kant, on the difference between mathematical and metaphysical certainty.

The main focus of Lifschitz's study is the prize contest of 1759 on the connection between opinion and language, which he identifies as the intersection between early Enlightenment theories of the dependence of thought on signs as in Leibniz, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Baumgarten, and later theories of the evolution of language and human civilization. This prize question crystallized the various positions and it also allowed a surprising alliance to emerge between the two real heroes of Lifschitz's book, the prize-winner Johann David Michaelis, and André Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval, a French *Aufklärer* who had fled to Berlin and had conceived the question. He later conducted an intensive correspondence with Michaelis, and his translation of Michaelis's prize-winning essay turned it into a European success. This contest, therefore, brought together two partners who, at first glance, could hardly seem more different: on the one side a German Orientalist with a Pietist background, who had been sponsored in Göttingen by Albrecht von Haller, and whose invectives against what he saw as the atheistic and materialistic machinations at the Berlin Academy were preserved in many forms; on the other a radical French *Aufklärer* who embodied pretty much everything that Haller rejected.

Lifschitz meticulously documents how Michaelis gradually approached a naturalistic view of language, culminating in his prize-

winning essay of 1759 in which he argued that there was no (divine) universal language, but that languages had evolved. Beyond this, he suggested, they represent a paradigm of democracy in which 'the will of the majority' is expressed in each language community. Thus in language, the whole population is the sovereign lawmaker, and women as the main reading public and men of letters play a special role. According to Lifschitz, the main factor in this remarkable change in Michaelis's view of language was his study of the debates about Hebrew vowels and his reading of Robert Lowth's interpretation of the Mosaic texts and Hebrew poetry which, like Homer's poems, were regarded as manifestations of natural languages.

In the case of Prémontval, the prize question he formulated for the 1759 competition was part of a comprehensive campaign waged against an affirmative Wolffianism, against which Prémontval, like Voltaire later in *Candide*, brought sceptical and anti-providential arguments to bear. Prémontval's insistence on contingency and openness to the future in human history forms part of his evolutionary and naturalistic view of language. The extent to which Prémontval's question is situated in the Berlin context is shown by his *Préservatif contre la corruption de la langue françoise*, which was written at the same time as, and in close connection with, the prize question. In this polemical book, which was immediately banned by the Prussian censors, Prémontval does not, as the title might suggest, defend French language purism. On the contrary, it makes a passionate plea for linguistic diversity. Prémontval accuses the French Huguenots in Berlin of using old-fashioned and bad French, associated with a courtly elitism, instead of perfecting their grasp of the national language, German. The book is peppered with attacks on Formey, secretary of the Academy, whom Prémontval sees as the chief representative of a conservative and orthodox Wolffianism. Thus starting from two quite distinct debates on specific empirical problems—Hebrew vowels and the question of privileged immigrant languages—Michaelis and Prémontval, long before Herder and Humboldt, arrived at the idea of language as a culturally relative phenomenon that constitutes thought and the world.

It is a special strength of Lifschitz's account that he lucidly shows the connections between the institutional field, specific problems and debates, and philosophical questions. Successfully combining the larger picture with thick description of local contexts, *Language and*

Enlightenment is a rich book that will be read with profit by those interested in the philosophy of language, the history of ideas, and cultural history alike. As in the case of Christopher Clark's book on Prussia,[4] it seems that it sometimes requires a view from outside to overcome outdated stereotypes and rigid canonizations in cultural history, and allow historical objects to appear in a new light.

[4] Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London, 2006).

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OLIVER ZIMMER, *Remaking the Rhythms of Life: German Communities in the Age of the Nation-State*, Oxford Studies in Modern European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xiv + 395 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 957120 8. £35.00

The aim of Oliver Zimmer's new book is ambitious. He is looking for a way to escape the master narratives of modernization and nationalization without paying the price of his account falling apart into unconnected stories. He enlists the concepts of journeys, place-makers, and rhythms to help him in this, but it is unclear whether their content is more analytical or metaphorical. A comment about research on nationalism from the book's conclusion may demonstrate this tension: 'As well as questioning the still common top-down perspective of nationalist inculcation, the conceptual metaphor of the dance shifts our focus towards nationalism as a collective practice, one in which people from different walks of life took part with varying degrees of intention and awareness' (p. 303).

However one may judge the overall success of the book in achieving its stated aim, it is true that the author has interesting stories to tell about changes in three medium-sized German towns in the second half of the nineteenth century. The selection of Ulm, Augsburg, and Ludwigshafen, three towns with very different socio-economic and confessional structures, for this purpose does not need to be discussed. It proves its worth in that the comparison facilitates the breaking up of all too homogeneous narrative patterns, which is the author's intention. And towns of this size, that is, those with more than 20,000 inhabitants but fewer than 100,000, shaped the everyday life of the majority of German city-dwellers until well into the twentieth century. It remains to be considered whether this limited size made them more manageable as well as giving them a special 'institutional density' which distinguished them from large cities such as Hamburg and Berlin.

In the first part of the book ('Journeys'), Zimmer analyses the economic development of his selected towns in the context of the wider southern German setting or, to be more precise, he examines the comments on this made by the classes that set the tone in each case. Here, as in the book as a whole, his method is to investigate revealing key controversies, such as the debate in Ulm about the establish-

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

ment of warehouses and storage facilities, which took place in the mid 1870s. This debate allowed large sections of local commerce and industry to voice the doubts which they had about the ambitions of transit and long-distance trade (especially in grain), an attitude that was reflected in attempts to hold on to traditional economic forms and status hierarchies symbolized by the museum for local crafts (*Gewerbemuseum*) which opened a few years later. Its only successful exhibition was a presentation of Japanese art, clear evidence that the visitors, who also came from outside the town, did not all share the highly developed localism of Ulm's petty bourgeoisie. This sort of mentality was not to be expected in a recently founded industrial town such as Ludwigshafen, and, indeed, was not observed there. Wholesale trade and large industry long dominated Ludwigshafen unchallenged. The textile town of Augsburg, finally, had a considerable industrial tradition, but its expansion took place on the city's periphery. This permitted the spatial co-existence of a commercial centre of small businesses and a periphery with a neglected infrastructure.

Where the journey was to end was a question not only of economic development. Progress required education, and this meant that the question of schools was of central importance. The issue of non-denominational primary schools was controversial. Their advocates could argue that the ability of teachers (and students) was crucial, not their religious affiliation. They were introduced only in Ludwigshafen, and while there were conflicts there about the church's influence on the inspectorate of schools, ultimately teachers were more concerned about the possible loss of reputation of colleagues who taught at schools near the chemical factories. Non-denominational schools were the ideal of the liberals who dominated local politics in Augsburg, but they remained a minority phenomenon in the face of confessional resistance. For the liberals, it was all the more important to retain control over the school inspectorate and to reduce the influence of the religious orders, who provided a number of teachers in the predominantly Catholic town. But in Ulm, with its Protestant majority, the inspection of schools was also at the heart of a number of debates, and it is a strength of this microhistory that it reveals the subtle strategies which the town used to gain influence over the appointment of an increasing number of Catholic primary school teachers.

The second part of the book ('Place-Makers') concentrates on the law of citizenship and residence based on community of origin (*Bürger- und Heimatrecht*) that clung on tenaciously for so long in southern Germany. While it is well known that this law was challenged after 1870 by Imperial laws, especially the Relief Residence Law, Zimmer's analysis of how it was implemented locally, and the mentalities behind this, breaks new ground. Ulm's city council complained, quite rightly, that the new regulations redistributed expenses to the disadvantage of the large towns. Until then, these had been able to pass on the social costs of an increasingly mobile population by sending the poor back to their communities of origin, which were obliged to support them. The city authorities now checked all the more carefully whether they could not deport those in need of assistance and their families after all, before they had been resident in the city for two years without claiming poor relief, which secured them the right to support in Ulm. And as late as the 1880s Ludwigshafen tried to collect fees for which the legal basis had been abolished in 1868 by threatening to withdraw the *Heimatrecht* in cases of non-payment. And Augsburg, finally, as late as the first half of the 1870s, used fees levied for granting the right of citizenship and the *Heimatrecht* to fund around 10 per cent of its annual outgoings on poor relief. Locally, therefore, progress towards freedom of movement was much bumpier than national legislation, or that of individual states, may make it seem.

Imperial legislation, however, not only placed a question mark over the traditional link between the right to poor relief and citizenship status in the community of origin, but also contrasted the right to vote in local elections, tied to local citizenship status, with the socially much more open male suffrage at national level. The discrepancy varied from place to place, and this is far less surprising than that the author occasionally hints that the socially most open community of municipal citizens (*Bürgergemeinde*) was in Ulm, which had the gravest doubts about economic innovations. Rapidly growing but primarily proletarian Ludwigshafen, however, was primarily interested in creating a *Bürgergemeinde* of this sort in the first place, while in Augsburg the local political privileges of an exclusive *Bürgergemeinde* were carefully defended. As late as the mid 1890s, applications from war veterans for citizenship rights to be granted without a fee were treated with reserve. This exclusivity was not broken down until the

turn of the century, with the rise of political Catholicism and Social Democratic associations, the *Heimat- und Bürgerrechtsvereine*. Taking the example of consumer cooperatives, Zimmer illustrates tellingly that these basic structures, which differed from locality to locality, also shaped other areas of life. He thus distinguishes between the type of consumer cooperative common in Augsburg and Ludwigshafen, and that found in Ulm: 'Rather than socio-economic integration for the sake of communal holism, its declared aim was the support of affordable consumer goods for those who could least afford them.' While this is clear, it is a moot point whether the next sentence provides additional insights: 'Rather than place-reinforcing, its socio-economic practices were place-transcending' (p. 167).

The third and longest part of the book ('Rhythms'), finally, in discussing urban hygiene and city theatres, treats areas central to communal activity. Looking at Sedan Day celebrations and Corpus Christi processions, it introduces areas in which local loyalties might come into conflict with larger ones. An outline of the different political cultures is indispensable background to this. Augsburg's unusually combative denominational nature had already become apparent during the *Kulturkampf*. In Ulm, by contrast, beyond all differences of opinion, political debates were much more about social cohesion, and in Ludwigshafen it was customary, until well into the twentieth century, to select candidates for local office so that all the most important areas of the local economy and society were represented. Consequently, only in Augsburg could the liberal call for a new town theatre be attacked as reflecting bourgeois class-interest, while Ulm's town council, in the controversy about high culture versus mass culture (circus versus theatre), argued for both, and Ludwigshafen, given the proximity of Mannheim's competition, declined to provide anything itself. Given the balance of power in communal politics it is no surprise that in 1863 Augsburg broke ranks with the Bavarian towns that had declined an invitation to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of the Nations in Leipzig. The Bavarian–Swabian town also distinguished itself in its celebration of Sedan Day, erecting a war memorial on the Fronhof, a town square. And finally, Augsburg celebrated on 2 September for the entire existence of the Kaiserreich, while in Ludwigshafen, which was similarly dominated by liberals and equally fun-loving, soon shifted the celebrations to the preceding or following Sunday.

The antagonistic political constellation in Augsburg during the *Kulturkampf* meant that 2 September never became a truly national holiday. Nor was it one in Ulm or Ludwigshafen, where, as elsewhere from the 1890s, it increasingly became an affair of the veterans' associations. But it was far less divisive there than in Augsburg. Although anti-Prussian democrats were strong in Ulm, the confessional component of the conflicts was not comparable with that in Augsburg, even when the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party increasingly questioned the liberal hegemony from the late 1880s. Rather, struggles took place behind closed doors, with the result that the Catholic community also held a commemoration, but at a place of its own choosing, and with special emphasis on the fallen soldiers. And in Ludwigshafen in 1895, the mayor's repeated request, made via the bishop, for the Catholic churches please to join in the ringing of the Protestant church bells, was at last successful. In the 1870s and early 1880s, the same diocese had had to exert enormous pressure on its clergyman in Ludwigshafen before he was prepared to take part in a Corpus Christi procession outside his own church. The right to hold such a procession, guaranteed by the Bavarian constitution, had been challenged by the liberal town council, which feared traffic disruption, but it took place for the first time in 1881 and was well attended. In the years that followed it evoked no further disputes. In Augsburg, the liberals would have liked to ban the processions, but in essence accepted the constitutional situation. Events in Ulm once again demonstrated the local actors' capacity for compromise. The right to process was not enshrined in the constitution there, but in the early twentieth century, when the regularly authorized procession expanded its route and threatened to obstruct access to the railway station, a solution was speedily found. Instead of rows of two people marching close together, the procession would now consist of rows of six, with large gaps between rows, making it possible for people to cross the procession. While the rhythms of religion and traffic could not be synchronized, they at least did not obstruct each other.

Zimmer does not treat Ulm as an exception. Rather, it seems important to him to reverse the standard question about tensions between national liberalism and Catholicism and to ask why, given the competition for the same public space and competing rhythms, deeper conflicts did not come about more frequently. His answer

relates on the one hand to urban societies, where mixed religious marriages were increasingly seen as normal, promoting tolerance, and on the other, to a non-denominational Christianity which made it possible for the Catholic population to participate in the nation below the threshold of a national religious transfiguration. Not all the evidence adduced in support of this hypothesis is necessarily convincing, for example, the common Christian anti-socialism of the 1890 Catholic Conference in Ulm, cited for its obvious rhetorical function. The anti-Jewish implications of this sort of non-denominational Christian nationalism could have been explored in greater depth, but the Jewish communities of the towns under investigation are not often mentioned. This may be because the period on which Zimmer concentrates and the themes which he analyses have, so far, been seen primarily from the perspective of a basic conflict between Catholicism and the liberal ideology of progress. His comparative case studies are able to make these dichotomies fluid. To what extent this is due to his concepts of journeys, place-markers, and rhythms remains to be seen. In any case, his comparative urban histories are stimulating, especially in their approach to local, regional, and national problems, and their relations with each other.

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PERRY MYERS, *German Visions of India, 1871–1918: Commandeering the Holy Ganges during the Kaiserreich* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), xiii + 259 pp. ISBN 978 1 137 29971 0. US $85.00. £55.00

This perceptive and penetrating new study examines the complex and multi-faceted German interest in India, held at the time by Germany's imperial rival, Great Britain. During this era of German militarism and colonial expansion, Germans nevertheless used India for a wide array of religious, political, cultural, and social purposes. A professor of German Studies at Albion College, author Perry Myers brings seasoned experience with German literature and Indo-German cross-cultural connections, having written a book on *fin-de-siècle* Germany's Rudolf Steiner and Max Weber, as well as articles on the Indian travels of Waldemar Bonsels, Ernst Haeckel, Joseph Dahlmann, and others. In this newest addition to his collection of Indo-German studies, he takes an interdisciplinary literary and historical approach, critically examining religious, travel, and other literary texts within their historical context.

Especially innovative ideas in this book include linking the German interest in India to domestic German concerns such as the Catholic response to the *Kulturkampf*, the role of German discourse about India in contemporary debates about science and religion, and the meshing of India with German imperial interests. The *Kulturkampf* was a failed attempt under Chancellor Bismarck to forge unity within the German Empire by forcing southern German Catholics into conformity with northern German Protestant society. During this north German cultural assault in Europe, beleaguered Catholic southern Germans displaced their religious struggle half a world away onto India, where they thought they had a promising foreign field on which they could better their confessional rivals (p. 78). In 1891 the German Jesuit and missionary Adolph Müller, fantasizing about the prospect of converting 'millions' in India, criticized the Portuguese, lamenting their inability to find many converts and to hold on to their Indian empire (p. 67). Myers helps to document how during the difficult *Kulturkampf* years German Catholics cast their missionary gaze on India, which served as a surrogate, replacing losses at home in Germany. This is an intriguing compensation argument, one that has a rough parallel in P. J. Marshall's *The Making and Unmaking of Empires* (2005), which shows how the loss of

American colonies in North America in the eighteenth century led to the elevation of India to become the greatest jewel in the British global empire's crown. While the German Catholics were unable to achieve what the British empire-builders did, exposing their ambitions provides insight into Germans of the early Kaiserreich.

Another issue Myers examines is India's role for Germans experiencing the developing rift between science and religion during the late nineteenth century. German interest in India came to fulfil a response to anxiety about the cultural despair that Fritz Stern examines in *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (1974) and the crisis the religious faced as they experienced competition from a growing body of evidence for biological evolution and other sciences that challenged traditional religious narratives. Buddhism emerged as a way to bridge religion and science for contemporaries such as physician and 'armchair Indologist' Paul Dahlke, who, unlike most contemporary university Indologists, visited India by making at least seven trips to Ceylon, built a Buddhist centre in a Berlin-Frohnau house that still is active,[1] and published several books on Buddhism (pp. 97, 103). Among his arguments, Dahlke made the claim that both biology and religion depended on an evolutionary process of progress to form knowledge (p. 100). On the other hand, adherents of traditional faiths such as Catholicism, like many religious Europeans of the era, hated and feared Buddhism. Nevertheless, this Asian interloper did serve the purpose of negative integration, a reviled 'other' against which Eurocentric xenophobes could rally (p. 114). Catholic Jesuit Peter Sinthern (born 1870), for example, wrote against the dangers of rising world religion in the 'Buddhification of Christianity through Theosophy', lamenting recent threats to what he saw as a Catholic universal mandate. Sinthern also took the opportunity to swipe at the old nemesis of Catholicism, Protestantism, for which he blamed the origins of Theosophy (p. 123). Yet Theosophy owed more to a global amalgamation of many traditions, with a large dose of South Asian religious traditions, as its founder Madame Blavatsky moved the organization's headquarters to India.

Permeating German national integration and the rise of science were questions about Imperial Germany's international place in the sun, its drive to acquire overseas colonies. Myers' analysis reiterates

[1] See <http://das-buddhistische-haus.de/pages/en>, accessed 31 Jan. 2014.

the pan-European links between Germans studying India and the British ruling over it at the time. Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, for example, viewed the Indians as poor but content under British rule, while in Europe, poverty-stricken classes were growing in power and dissatisfaction (p. 162). German travellers, fellow Europeans, believed the version of colonialism of their British hosts. The most critical of the German Protestant theologians, Bonn's D. Theodor Christlieb, for example, wrote an essay in 1877 that criticized the British opium trade and materialism, but nevertheless praised the 'significant steps' they had taken to reduce famine (p. 153). This German acceptance of pro-British civilizing mission arguments is noteworthy, as the British were vulnerable to much potential criticism. Mike Davis in *Late Victorian Holocausts* (2001) shows how Victorian bureaucrats such as Lord Lytton could organize an expensive Durbar in 1877 to celebrate Queen Victoria assuming the title of Empress of India while millions of ordinary Indians starved and died because of the free market systems the British had introduced into their colonial administration. Indians themselves, such as R. C. Dutt and Dadabai Naoroji in *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (1901), documented how the British were draining India of its wealth, hindering Indian industrial development. At the same time, however, as Myers argues, German criticism of British colonial rule took a less controversial cultural rather than material angle. Both Hübbe-Schleiden and Christlieb thought that Germans would provide better colonial administrators and spiritual guides, aligning themselves with the German colonial ambitions of the era. Hübbe-Schleiden thought that the prosaic British lacked the cultural powers of Germans to 'tap into India's most precious "jewel"—its deep spirituality', thus asserting a unique Indo-German connection (p. 165). Although Myers, like Suzanne Marchand in *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire* (2009), is dismissive of what he argues is Edward Said's overemphasis on power relations, he nevertheless does address and document the pro-colonial views of Germans such as Hübbe-Schleiden who used India to imagine their own imperial ambitions, even if illusionary.

Myers well understands the nuances of religious and intellectual currents of the era he examines, and develops these connections persuasively. For example, he notes the Pietistic roots of introspection, a peculiar Christian approach that in turn informed the German under-

standing of Buddhism (p. 93). The work does a discerning job connecting the figures and texts he picks to currents in German history such as the *Kulturkampf* and colonialism, as noted above. He is also aware and sensitive to counter-currents and figures cutting against the grain of the times (p. 90). He critically looks at Pfungst's biography of Schultze, noting Schultze's strong Protestant religious commitment that skews the work (p. 87). Myers spends ample time critically examining texts and introducing readers to their authors and the times and activities that shaped their thoughts.

One potential criticism concerns how representative the texts and figures he chose actually are. How do the authors he picks fit into wider fields? What other areas, scholars, popularizers, are worth examining? In his defence, these questions echo Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, reflecting an insoluble trade-off between depth versus breadth that any scholar faces in examining a topic. Myers resolves this dilemma by picking a handful of seemingly important, leading figures and examining their works in some detail. He helps to chart the trees in his chosen area carefully, while the overall forest outline of Indo-German studies, although clearer, remains shrouded—the venue for further exploration, as one book cannot capture the entire landscape into which others are venturing.

Myers' work sheds sustained light on a field that has enjoyed a bumper crop of Indo-German studies during the past decade, part of a larger emphasis on topics spanning world cultures in contact, transnational interaction, and globalization. Myers is responding to, and building upon, recent scholarly books on Indo-German connections.[2] These studies after the millennium, in turn, rest upon the shoulders of works largely responding to Edward Said's *Orientalism*

[2] These include, e.g.: Kamakshi P. Murti, *India: The Seductive and Seduced 'Other' of German Orientalism* (2001); Dorothy M. Figueira, *Aryans, Jews, Brahmins: Theorizing Authority Through Myths of Identity* (2002); Todd Kontje, *German Orientalisms* (2004); Indra Sengupta, *From Salon to Discipline: State, University and Indology in Germany, 1821–1914* (2005); Bradley L. Herling, *The German Gītā: Hermeneutics and Discipline in the German Reception of Indian Thought, 1778–1831* (2006); Tuska Benes, *In Babel's Shadow: Language, Philology, and the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (2008); Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn, *L'archive des origines: Sanskrit, philologie, anthropologie dans l'Allemagne du XIXe siècle* (2008); Jörg Esleben, Christina Kraenzle, and Sukanya Kulkarni (eds.), *Mapping Channels between Ganges and Rhein: German-Indian Cross-Cultural Relations* (2008); Nicholas A. Germana, *The*

(1978), including Patterson-Black's 1985 translation of Raymond Schwab's *Oriental Renaissance* (1950), William Halbfass's *India and Europe* (1988), and the collection by Breckenridge and van der Veer that contains an important article by Sheldon Pollock on the complicity of German Indology with Nazism, 'Deep Orientalism?'.[3]

Myers' study adds to this growing corpus of material by emphasizing religion, including Protestant and Catholic versions of Christianity, as well as Buddhism and Theosophy. This approach yields interesting insights, such as how German Catholics suffering cultural attacks under the programme of national unification in Germany helps to explain their later animosity to Indian nationalism and the Indian independence movement (p. 75). Myers makes good use of sources with in-depth readings of key texts that help to put their authors into their context, fleshing them out. Leipzig Indologist Ernst Windisch in his 1919 history of Indology looked at texts disembodied in time and context, as if the Orientalists themselves who wrote the works did not matter. Criticizing this decontextualized history of the discipline, Hamburg Indologist Albrecht Wezler in 1993 called for a team of scholars to reapply this stripped away flesh to the bare bones of Indology's history, to put it into the context of its social,

Orient of Europe: The Mythical Image of India and Competing Images of German National Identity (2009); Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (2009); Robert Cowan, *The Indo-German Identification: Reconciling South Asian Origins and European Destinies, 1765–1885* (2010); Peter K. J. Park, *Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780–1830* (2013); Joanne Miyang Cho, Eric Kurlander, and Douglas T. McGetchin (eds.), *Transcultural Encounters between Germany and India: Kindred Spirits in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (2013); and Veronika Fuechtner and Mary Rhiel (eds.), *Imagining Germany Imagining Asia: Essays in Asian-German Studies* (2013).

[3] Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, eds., *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia* (1993). Other notable works include those by Dorothy M. Figueira, *Translating the Orient: The Reception of Śākuntala in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1991); Dorothy M. Figueira, *The Exotic: A Decadent Quest* (1994); J. J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought* (1997); Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz (eds.), *Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies* (1997); and Roger-Pol Droit, *Le culte du néant: les philosophes et le Bouddha* (1997), translated by David Streight and Pamela Vohnson as *The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha* (2003).

historical, and contemporary intellectual life. Myers does an admirable job along these lines, adroitly examining the biographical detail of figures and relating them to their historical milieu. He also thoroughly examines the texts they have written, showing where the context informs the texts themselves. For example, it is important to understand the contemporary context of the positive response to Edwin Arnold's poem about the Buddha, *The Light of Asia*, to grasp German Jesuit Christian Pesch's vitriolic stream of five articles 'denouncing' and 'lambasting' Arnold's work, as it was threatening to spread interest and affection for Buddhism in Europe (p. 114).

Myers' book is an excellent place for scholars, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates to expand their knowledge about the relatively new and growing field of Indo-German studies. Like any good researcher, Myers explores other avenues for further examination, raises questions to develop, and opens veins well worth mining for more ideas. This volume should therefore spur on yet more fruitful work in the area of Indo-German interactions.

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DAVID S. BIRD, *Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler's Germany* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2012), xviii + 448 pp. ISBN 978 1 921875 42 7. AUD$44.00
ANDREW FRANCIS, *'To Be Truly British We Must Be Anti-German': New Zealand, Enemy Aliens and the Great War Experience, 1914–1919*, British Identities since 1707, 4 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012), ix + 299 pp. ISBN 978 3 0343 0759 8. £38.00

'The whole point about writing a history about a country is that we can liberate ourselves from the dead hand of the past. The whole point of knowing about the past of humanity in Australia is to prevent all of us, the Aborigines, the British, the Europeans, and the Asians, from being doomed to go on repeating the past.' These words from Manning Clark's Eric Johnstone Lecture, delivered in Darwin on 1 July 1987, are reprinted on the first page of David S. Bird's *Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler's Germany*. As recent studies in German by Johannes Voigt (2011) and Hermann Mückler, Gabriele Weichart, and Friedrich Edelmayer (2013) have reminded us,[1] it was some time before the former British dominions in the South Seas came to terms with the fissures, inconsistencies, and legends of their history, thereby trying, in Manning Clark's words, to liberate themselves from the dead hand of the past. Clark's words could therefore also have been put on the front of Andrew Francis's book on the treatment of enemy aliens in New Zealand, replacing 'Australia' with 'New Zealand' and 'Aborigines' with 'Maoris'. Both books deal with chapters of their country's history which forced them to give up ideas about themselves that they had grown accustomed to and that were dear to their hearts. The fact that there were enthusiasts for Hitler even as far away as Australia, and that New Zealand's dealings with enemy aliens in the First World War were no better than Australia's, as described in 1989 by Gerhard Fischer,[2] are some aspects of the past that the two nations would like to undo as much as possible in the present.

[1] Johannes H. Voigt, *Geschichte Australiens und Ozeaniens* (Vienna, 2011); Hermann Mückler, Gabriele Weichart, and Friedrich Edelmayer (eds.), *Australien: 18. bis 21. Jahrhundert. Geschichte und Gesellschaft* (Vienna, 2013).
[2] Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia 1914–1920* (St Lucia, Qld., 1989).

Bird's study deals with those Australians who were attracted to Nazi Germany and, to a varying extent, to National Socialist ideology after Hitler's seizure of power in 1933. The author's main aim is to write a history of the men and women he describes as 'well-meaning dreamers' or fellow-travellers—writers, poets, mystics, academic thinkers, and sometimes just tourists. Most of those who visited Germany in the 1930s, including members of government such as attorney-general Robert Menzies (who later denied it) were impressed by what they saw. They regarded the National Socialist leadership as of high quality, and the patriotism they observed as deep rooted. The German example was often taken as a model around which to construct new concepts of nationalism in Australia, whether in the form of imperial patriotism, extreme Australian chauvinism, or even a white 'Dreamtime', a bizarre concept that postulated an 'Aryan' aboriginality. This latter view 'accepted the aboriginal concept of "Dreamtime" (*Alcheringa*) as a fitting symbol in the hope that it could provide the key for a broader, white Australian "Dreamtime"' (p. 166).

Bird begins with a short overview of authoritarian, fascist, and National Socialist groups in Australia, pointing out that the different movements did not agree amongst each other about Australia's future political structure, or which foreign model to follow. At the beginning the main focus is on Eric Campbell's New Guard. Bird calls him a 'dictator with nobody to dictate to' (p. 15). Although one of the members of his organization managed to disrupt the official opening of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, Campbell's movement was not recognized by the leaders of fascist Italy or National Socialist Germany. Other Nazi enthusiasts in Australia, such as A. R. Mills, did not fare much better, but were nevertheless proud to call themselves 'National Socialists' (p. 31), at least for a while. Bird names a few men and women who later denied that they were Nazi enthusiasts or had spoken positively about Hitler's Germany. In five chapters Bird portrays the people who were, to a greater or lesser degree, part of a group of Nazi enthusiasts. Among them were W. J. 'Billy' Miles, the financial brawn and journalistic brain behind the ideas of the Australia First Movement (p. 54); P. R. 'Inky' Stephensen, a former Communist who became the main editor of the right wing *Publicist*; Adela Pankhurst Walsh and her husband Tom Walsh, who, however, always refused to accept anti-Semitism as an integral part

of National Socialism (pp. 92–7); writers such as Xavier Herbert, Rex Ingamells, and Miles Franklin; and Odinists such as A. R. Mills and Hardy Wilson. Bird describes their lives in a detailed but rather incoherent manner. Sometimes it might have been better for the author to look at what held these men and women together rather than providing such detailed accounts of individual lives and views. On the other hand, Bird provides interesting insights into the thinking of some important Australian academics and writers, such as Xavier Herbert, Ian Mudie, Alan Chisholm, Augustin Lodewycks, and the latter's well known son-in-law, Manning Clark. All of them—even if they never acknowledged it after the war—had shown some sympathy for National Socialist and/or Australia First ideas, although almost never openly. Clark was never an enthusiast for Hitler's ideology, but was impressed and inspired by Nazi architecture (pp. 208–13).

The second part of Bird's book, comprising chapters 8 to 12, deals with the Second World War period when it became more difficult to show sympathy for ideas of a 'Nazi Dreamtime'. Some of those who had been attracted to Nazi Germany, National Socialist ideology, and/or the ideas of Australia First began to distance themselves explicitly, as in the case of Manning Clark, whereas others, such as Melanie O'Loughlin, Hardy Wilson, and A. R. Mills became more radical. While their focus before the war had been on cultural and literary aspects, during the war the aims of Nazi enthusiasts became more political. In chapter 10 Bird looks in greater detail at poet Ian Mudie, who in July 1941 put forward Stephensen as the leader Australia so desperately needed, and tried to gain the support of fellow writers for a more political movement. In this context Mudie stressed that Australians were not Europeans. He claimed to be confident that a new Dreamtime was near, when sheep would give way to kangaroos and 'Europecentricity' [*sic*] would finally be overcome (pp. 281–7). It is a pity that Bird discusses these ideas only in regard to an 'Australian *völkisch* movement' (p. 286) and research on National Socialist ideology, and not against the background of recent postcolonial research and the concepts of global history.

In his final two chapters the author deals with the reticence of the Australian authorities in dealing with Nazi enthusiasts at the end of 1941 and early in 1942, and with the internment of some of the major figures of the Australia First movement in March 1942. Unfortunately,

Bird hardly discusses the issue of internment itself, focusing instead on Ian Mudie's loyalty to the interned Stephensen and the distance that Rex Ingamells tried to keep in order to protect his Jindywoborak Movement from the Australian authorities. In the last chapter Bird also includes information about four Australians who participated in the activities of the Nazi-sponsored British Free Corps, and Kay de Haas, an Australian woman who supported the Nazi propaganda effort during the war and was therefore banned from returning to her home country after 1945 until her brother's intervention finally allowed her to go back. These examples are not really linked to the rest of the book and therefore seem a little out of place. They confirm the impression that the author's main contribution has been to collect material on Nazi enthusiasts in Australia. This material is still waiting to be put into the context of a global history of enthusiasm for Nazi ideas before and during the Second World War. The lack of a conclusion is typical for a book which is more of a 'quarry' for further research than a thorough analysis of the Nazi Dreamtime.

Andrew Francis's study of dealings with enemy aliens in New Zealand during the First World War includes the global context to a much larger extent than Bird's study. It constitutes the long-awaited complement to Gerhard Fischer's 1989 work on the issue in Australia. Francis is also much more aware than Bird of recent research on pro-imperial sentiments and issues of citizenship and national identity within the British Empire. It is therefore a little surprising that the author begins with an uncritical and unreflected presentation of the enthusiasm for war in New Zealand, which he calls an 'extension of the European mood' (p. 1). Given that, according to Australian and European studies, the enthusiasm at the beginning of the war was to a large extent a constructed phenomenon of the middle classes, this reviewer would have expected the author to have been a little more critical on this issue. Francis continues with an analysis of immigration in New Zealand and the various laws governing this. Although the country was open to migrants from all parts of the world, British settlers always remained a large majority and minorities, especially those from China and the Dalmatian part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, often suffered prejudice, especially at times of war or economic crisis. Settlers of German origin were at first not affected by the worsening global relationship between Britain and Germany (Boer War, maritime build-up, German expansion into the South

Pacific), although the press became more critical of the Hohenzollern empire. What happened, however, was that issues of Britishness and loyalty to the mother country and the Empire became more and more important. The groundwork for the virulent anti-German campaign during the Great War was thus laid (p. 46).

Francis's second chapter deals with New Zealand's response to the outbreak of the war, which he describes as one of 'overwhelming enthusiasm' (p. 67) with only very few dissenting voices. Whether they were German troops in Belgium or German-born settlers in New Zealand, they at once became a problem that had to be dealt with. There was no differentiation, and settlers of Scandinavian or Swiss origin could not be sure of not becoming a target of anti-German activities. Naturalization, which had been handled in a very liberal manner in New Zealand before 1914, was no help at all. Right from the start of the war, but more so after the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the beginning of the Gallipoli campaign, which saw a rising number of New Zealand war dead, pressure from the press to do something about enemy aliens began to mount. As in Britain and Australia (Francis refers to the studies by Panayi and Fischer[3]), the New Zealand government took measures against men of enemy origin, both naturalized and not naturalized, mainly in response to these growing demands from the public and the press. Unfortunately, in this context Francis discusses only the years at the beginning and the end of the war, but has nothing to say about 1916, which in terms of the British Empire was significant in regard to the intensification of the war effort.

The author then looks at living conditions in the two main internment camps at Somes Island near Wellington and Motuihi Island close to Auckland, where German and Austro-Hungarian citizens, and later also naturalized settlers of German origin, were at first interned. Interestingly, Francis includes a map (opposite p. 152), on which he shows what parts of New Zealand were settled by immigrants from German-speaking Europe. On this map the author also includes Swiss and Polish migrants, about whom it would have been interesting to read more than just that many of the non-British settlers who were not German were mistaken as such and vilified in a similar manner (p. 16). In regard to the living conditions in the camps

[3] Panikos Panayi, *The Enemy In Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War* (Oxford, 1991); Fischer, *Enemy Aliens*.

Francis again focuses on press demands not to favour those who were better off. Here, too, it would have been interesting to find out more about life in the internment camps, perhaps something similar to Nadine Helmi and Gerhard Fischer's 2011 account of the life of German internees in Australia during the First World War.[4]

Francis then looks at a single case, that of George von Zedlitz, a German-born professor of modern languages at Wellington's Victoria College. Unlike other German residents, he was not dismissed from his post at the outbreak of the war, and therefore became the focus of anti-German feelings. The affair finally turned from an internal university matter into a national crusade. Zedlitz's offer of resignation was not accepted by the College Council, and he was finally dismissal under the terms of the Alien Enemy Teachers' Act, passed by parliament in 1915 in response to public pressure. In this chapter Francis is at his best, as he is able to show the inconsistencies of New Zealand's policy on enemy aliens. Zedlitz was dismissed—and not reinstated after the war—but received a year's salary as compensation and words of regret from the College Council (pp. 153–80).

In the following two chapters Francis links the policy on enemy aliens to economic warfare in the form of Imperial and New Zealand Trading with the Enemy legislation, and compares the New Zealand experience with that of Canada. Not surprisingly, many companies tried to profit from the war by accusing business rivals of being German. As across the Tasman Sea in Australia, measures were taken to displace German economic interests after the war. Unfortunately, Francis does not discuss the influence of the economic war conferences in Paris in 1915 and 1916 on New Zealand policy, the role of the country in the global economic war, or the impact of economic warfare on New Zealand's internal economy. This would probably have gone beyond the scope of this book. This critique, however, might encourage the author to undertake another study, looking at New Zealand's experience of economic warfare. Francis's penultimate chapter is more convincing, as it compares New Zealand's experience with that of Canada. Here he shows that alternatives were possible if New Zealanders had been as mature in regard to their sense of nationhood as Canadians, and had trusted their government to

[4] Nadine Helmi and Gerhard Fischer, *The Enemy at Home: German Internees in World War I Australia* (Sydney, 2011).

deal with things if necessary (pp. 247–9). The author, however, could have delved more closely into the issue of what greater maturity in regard to the sense of nationhood might mean.

Francis finishes his study by remarking that New Zealand was never more British than during the First World War, and that the press played a large part in conveying the hatred of Germans that was never as great during the Second World War as during the First World War. He ends with the words: 'Lessons, it seems, had been learnt' (p. 267). This brings us back to Manning Clark's words quoted at the beginning of this review, to the effect that the whole point of knowing about the past is to prevent us from being doomed to go on repeating it. For all their weaknesses, the two studies by Bird and Francis have the merit that they focus on aspects of the history of Australia and New Zealand that are not well known so far, at least in Europe, and that deserve greater attention from academics in a discipline that aims for a more global approach to its subject.

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BENJAMIN ZIEMANN, *Contested Commemorations: Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), xi + 315 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 02889 0. £60.00. $US99.00

One of the big themes of German historiography is the question of why the Weimar Republic failed, and what caused its failure. It has long been argued that its burdens were too heavy to bear, or even that it was a republic without any republicans, but recent research goes down different paths. It emphasizes the potential of German democracy, and has shown that the new system had many supporters who were committed to democracy symbolically as well as politically. The work under review fits into this research field. Taking as examples the veterans' associations Reichsbund der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegsteilnehmer und Kriegerhinterbliebenen (Reichsbund of War Disabled, War Veterans and War Dependants) and Reichsbanner Schwarz–Rot–Gold (Reichsbanner Black–Red–Gold), Benjamin Ziemann focuses on the republican part of contested commemorations in the Weimar Republic. The overwhelming presence of the First World War in Germany's political culture even after war's end underlines its far-reaching nature and shows that German society during the Weimar Republic was ultimately shaped by the consequences of war. Nonetheless, the republic did not face the growing right-wing nationalist movement without a chance, as the author stresses. The history of Weimar is not a tragedy but, he insists, must be regarded as open. The book convincingly argues that in the context of commemorating the war, left-wing forces played an important part, developing their own representations of the war with republican and moderately pacifist topoi.

Ziemann begins by outlining the years up to 1923 which, he argues, were shaped largely by criticism of the war and the Kaiserreich. Numerous recently founded organizations were able to bring tens of thousands of people on to the streets under the slogan 'Never again war'. A highly diverse and by no means only hardline left-wing journalism discussed the war from a republican point of view. The essential narratives that, until the 1930s, republicans

* Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

repeatedly brought up in relation to the First World War date from this time and shaped their culture of remembrance (which is why the author repeatedly comes back to them). They condemned the corruption and incompetence of the Wilhelmine elites who had caused the war and contributed to defeat. Thus they forcefully rejected the claim that the collapse had ultimately been the fault of left-wingers and democrats who had administered the infamous stab in the back. The imperial army was represented as a system of oppression that privileged officers and tormented common soldiers. The *Etappe* (rear area) in particular came to epitomize these conditions. The common soldiers at the front were seen as victims of war, something that must be avoided in future. Thus for many, Ziemann argues, it was an obvious conclusion to draw that 1918 was the year of liberation from both the Kaiserreich and war (chapter 1).

The beginning of the Weimar Republic's phase of consolidation, starting in 1924, witnessed the founding of the Reichsbanner Schwarz–Rot–Gold, whose institutional development and positioning in the politics of remembrance Ziemann investigates. (The Reichsbund is a little neglected by contrast.) Ziemann shows that the Reichsbanner created a public framework that structured individual memories of the war by connecting the discourses negotiated in the association's publications and at commemorations with experiences of war and milieu cultures (chapters 2 and 3). His investigation of the memorials and ceremonies underlines that the republicans by no means left the field of memory to right-wing forces, but appeared as actors in the political public sphere deep into the provinces. Nonetheless, they were only able to influence the design of memorials in communities where the SPD had a majority. Often the search for a commemorative symbol that all of Weimar's political camps could agree on failed, and this is why no Reich memorial was built in Germany. At local level, an alliance between the Church and the citizenry was able to implement its symbolic and political ideas, especially as the Reichsbund and its sympathizers tended to concentrate on the welfare of survivors in the early years of the republic. Although the Reichsbanner found it difficult to assert itself against a conservative consensus in the culture of remembrance, it developed its own rituals and took part in commemorations (chapters 4 and 5).

Not only commemorations, but also war journalism was increasingly contested. Martin Hobohm was one of the few historians sym-

pathetic to the republican cause in the Reichsarchiv, which was dominated by the old military elites. His example shows that moderate or critical accounts of the war were not welcomed by the official historiography, which, in fact, tried to prevent them. Its series Schlachten des Weltkrieges (Battles of the World War) ensured the Reichsarchiv's domination in the field of popular accounts of the war. The left had nothing to set against this national power of interpretation, as individual publications by pacifist and republican officers had no comparable impact and distribution. In the Reichstag's committee of enquiry, too, critical accounts of the army's collapse in 1918 did not go unchallenged (chapter 6). In the final chapter, Ziemann takes a more chronological approach and investigates the period 1928 to 1933 as a time when memories of the war were more strongly politicized and mediatized than before. As an example he takes Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, which appeared as a newspaper serialization, book, and film, and was hotly contested. As the republicans lacked their own popular accounts and the Nazis attacked democracy through Remarque's work, the republicans adopted it as their narrative of the war. They also used it to defend Weimar, although the book's complex statements did not necessarily coincide with their own set of values.

The main question that arises on reading *Contested Commemorations* concerns the scope of the narratives presented here. The author quite rightly relativizes the (nevertheless given) significance of the membership figures of the many veterans' associations, where the republicans were ahead by a whisker. Rather, he suggests, the strengths and weaknesses of the symbols and narratives employed were crucial (p. 269), and he constantly refers to them. Ziemann makes qualifications without succumbing to the temptation to grant the republican groups under investigation too much relevance. On the contrary, he constantly works out the limits of republican interventions and representations. Occasionally they lacked the institutional backing to advance their interpretations; in some arenas of remembrance they engaged too late; women played almost no part. A central problem that emerges is the victimization narrative. If, in the republican discourse, ordinary soldiers were considered victims of a war instigated by unscrupulous elites, there was no interpretation of the past that could integrate the ruptures and sufferings caused by the war positively into individual biographies, or instru-

mentalize them collectively for republicanism. The further debate about contested commemorations may perhaps look at whether memories of the war provide an example of left- and right-wing narratives and symbols temporarily coming closer to each other, or even overlapping. Ziemann rejects the argument that the Reichsbund's parades concealed the same sort of militarism that was visible in the Stahlhelm. He also provides much evidence to show that anti-militarism and internationalism were strongly anchored in the Social Democratic milieu both before 1914 and after 1918. Even if the discourse on the war was 'class-based' (p. 92), we know that leading Social Democrats during the Kaiserreich, such as August Bebel, were especially critical of folkloric forms of militarism and by no means rejected a militant patriotism in principle. Ziemann denies this for his period of investigation, although there is some evidence that patriotic or nationalist motifs played a part in republican memories of the war, at least temporarily, and that partisans of the left also approved of them.

Why did Weimar fail? Ziemann makes clear that the end of the republic cannot be explained in terms of contested commemorations alone. They are an example, however, of how republican values were undermined by the growing attractiveness of right-wing narratives of the war. Around 1930 they had achieved a position of hegemony for many reasons. At first the republicans were unable to position a broad palette of successful war narratives on a media mass market that was increasingly dominated by national, heroic, and romanticizing motifs. Narratives of this sort appealed to young people who had not taken part in the war themselves, and to sections of the labour force. The National Socialists fully backed such escapist narratives, which seemed to point a way out of the depression that had hit these groups hard since 1929. Memories of the war were also an area of confrontation in which ideas of political order were negotiated. Although Ziemann discusses the problem of images of the past and hopes for the future in the introduction, his later account says little about their significance in this context. By the crisis at the latest, left-wing narratives were probably less attractive than right-wing ones. This is about the only criticism that can be made of this important book. Taking largely unknown protagonists (Fritz Einert, Paul Freiherr von Schoenaich, Hermann Schützinger) and presenting convincing examples, it demonstrates the continuing presence of repub-

lican forms of remembering the war in German society until 1933. Weimar was not condemned to fail from the start, but had numerous and well-organized supporters. Ziemann traces its workings by presenting a stringent and differentiated argument that always stays close to the research and the sources. That the reader wants to know more about certain aspects of the investigation shows that this account will stimulate new research.

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MORITZ FÖLLMER, *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin: Self and Society from Weimar to the Wall*, New Studies in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), x + 312 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 03098 5. £65.00. $US99.00

Historians often present the twentieth-century history of Berlin as marked by a number of fundamental ruptures. Within less than fifty years, no fewer than five political systems ruled over the city. Experiences of war, persecution, and division further suggest that historical research has to divide Berlin's past into separate periods. By studying the history of individuality between the late Weimar Republic and the construction of the Berlin Wall, Moritz Föllmer's monograph *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin* questions this compartmentalization. Providing fascinating insights into the ways in which Berliners lived during these turbulent times, the book offers a more nuanced portrayal of the continuities and breaks in the city's history. Föllmer's study is therefore a valuable and inspiring contribution to German history in the twentieth century.

The book is chronologically split into three parts, each containing three chapters. In the first part, Föllmer demonstrates that claims about individuality were ubiquitous in public debates in Berlin between the late 1920s and Hitler's rise to power. Various contemporary novels and newspapers described capitalism and the economic hardships of the late Weimar years as engendering a crisis of individuality in the German capital. Föllmer compellingly shows how media depictions of dooming isolation and changed gender roles portrayed the need for a 'stable and controlled self' (p. 40) that was increasingly difficult to attain in the fast-paced environment of the city. At the same time, other contemporary accounts rendered a different, more positive relationship between the urban environment and the cultivation of individuality. Flexibility, authenticity, and consumption were portrayed as paving the way for individuality in Berlin during the late Weimar Republic. Instead of clinging to old gender roles, for instance, some tabloids argued that men could take a more flexible approach to relations between men and women and still stay 'true to themselves' (p. 51). Furthermore, following the example of outstanding *Persönlichkeiten* such as the pilot Elly Beinhorn was depicted as a pathway to becoming an individual, as was indulging in individualized consumption. According to Föllmer,

these competing claims about individuality proved difficult to integrate into liberal democracy and thus undermined progressive politics in the German capital. He shows that various political groups could use the focus on the individual in Berlin to attack the Weimar Republic as an impersonal and corrupt system.

The third chapter on Berlin during the Weimar Republic introduces the notion that Nazism did not simply pit the individual against the collective, but that it offered a particular understanding of individuality to non-Jewish Berliners. The possibilities of cultivating individuality under Nazi rule are further explored in the second part of the book. Föllmer argues that the Nazis introduced a distinction between *legitimate individuality* and *illegitimate individuality*. While he describes certain political claims as well as racial difference as having constituted illegitimate individuality, Föllmer illustrates that Nazism was oriented towards fulfilling the individual aspirations of a limited number of Berliners by fostering suburban housing, praising sport activities, or lauding individual leadership. It is a strength of this part of the book that it describes in detail how Jewish Berliners were at the same time deprived of the very means of maintaining their lives in the city. By analysing several individual life stories, Föllmer shows that the quest for individual agency under Nazi rule created a fundamental tension between selfhood and an obligation towards others for many of these city dwellers, thus raising new questions about their individuality. While the book pays much attention to the effects of Nazi persecution on the lives of a number of people, it is limited to the experience of Jewish Berliners, thus losing sight of other persecuted groups, such as homosexuals or Roma. Despite this shortcoming, Föllmer clearly illustrates that Nazism was not per se opposed to individuality in the city, but 'that "private aspirations and desires" were often couched in Nazi ideology and intimately linked to the Third Reich's success' (p. 103).

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, two separate political systems with differing positions on individuality emerged in Berlin. The third part of the book analyses this development throughout the 1950s. The immediate post-war years saw a focus on self-help in the eastern and western parts of the city that was conducive to claims of individuality. In the destroyed urban environment, a focus on individual achievement could help to overcome material hardship. At the same time, the emphasis on individuality made it easier for city-dwellers

to dissociate themselves from Nazism, which was mainly portrayed as based on a collective ideology. As the Cold War unfolded, the German Democratic Republic had to walk a fine line between catering to the individualist aspirations of a much needed skilled middle class consisting of doctors, engineers, and other professionals, and collectivist rhetorics. Föllmer demonstrates that the preferential treatment of this middle class led to the resentment of many working-class Berliners, whose individual expectations often remained unfulfilled. It is a central argument of this part of the book that the conflicts surrounding individuality ultimately led to more dictatorial politics in the eastern part of the city. In West Berlin, tension between an individuality based on material goods and a value-based individuality appeared during the 1950s. Föllmer shows that political actors such as the mayor of West Berlin, Ernst Reuter, called for the cultivation of immaterial values as a way of becoming an individual. This clashed with the more mundane priorities of some West Berliners for individualized consumption. Drawing on these debates, the third part of the book demonstrates that the continued coexistence of controversial claims about individuality, rather than the linear development of 'individualization', marked the history of West Berlin well into the 1960s.

Individuality and Modernity in Berlin renders classical accounts of the history of Germany during the twentieth century more complex. By demonstrating that the debate about becoming an individual in Berlin spanned the period from the late Weimar Republic to the divided city in 1961, Föllmer provides evidence against a history of 'liberalization' that portrays the post-war era in West Germany as the continued rise of individuality. His study is therefore in line with other works questioning some of the narratives that have long been seen as part and parcel of the 'success story' of the Bundesrepublik.[1] Furthermore, the book provides compelling insights into the urban history of Berlin. Föllmer analyses an impressive number and variety of sources, ranging from articles in the tabloid press to personal suicide notes. Drawing on these documents, his book provides a needed monograph on relations between the history of the city and its inhabitants. *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin* takes up many issues that have been addressed in other contexts as a history of the self or

[1] Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton, 2005).

a history of subjectivity. While the book thus offers an empirical study that can fruitfully be connected to a number of questions raised by current research, its analytical focus on individuality remains less convincing.

Föllmer grounds his analysis in well-established theories of individuality from philosophy and sociology. At first sight, taking issue with the concept of individuality might thus seem merely like a question of intellectual inclinations—a more or less opaque quarrel between, for example, structuralists and post-structuralists. The theoretical outline of *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin* carries, however, considerable weight for its empirical findings. Throughout the book it remains unclear whether there is a single, clearly circumscribed 'modern individuality', or whether this study is about a variety of 'multiple individualities', as both terms are used in the analysis. The problem with 'multiple individualities', on the one hand, is that much like the concept of 'multiple modernities', it risks becoming an empty signifier with little analytical value, bringing together diverse histories from medieval Japan, the Russian Revolution, or post-war Germany. Approaching individuality as a single characteristic of 'modernity', on the other hand, leads to highly universalistic claims that are fraught with the pitfalls of the concept of modernity itself. Föllmer states, for instance, that Berlin was a key site of the 'history of modern individuality'. But how is the German capital's past more instructive for such a history than the study of other places, such as Buenos Aires, Delhi, Tokyo, Moscow, or Münster? The answer that Föllmer's book provides, that Berlin occupies a special place because of its prominence in existing theories about individuality, simply reproduces the regional bias of these theories without historicizing or questioning them.[2] Drawing on the concept of a single 'modern individuality', furthermore, carries the risk of reiterating modernity's claims about 'universal man'—the dangers of which have so importantly been pointed out by critics of theories of modernity.[3]

Despite this critique, *Individuality and Modernity in Berlin* is a pioneering study and makes stimulating reading not only for historians

[2] Christine Hentschel, 'Postcolonializing Berlin and the Fabrication of the Urban', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (forthcoming).

[3] Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, 2005), 148.

of twentieth-century Germany, but also for scholars interested in the history of subjectivity and the self. Most importantly, Föllmer's study offers a useful perspective on the breaks and continuities in German history. As the author himself points out, the book can also advance the conversation about claims of individuality during the twentieth century. In doing so, it provides historians with insights into the opportunities and challenges of writing about concepts such as individuality or subjectivity.

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JOST HERMAND, *Culture in Dark Times: Nazi Fascism, Inner Emigration, and Exile*, trans. Victoria W. Hill (New York: Berghahn, 2013), xv + 278 pp. ISBN 978 0 85745 590 1. £50.00. US$80.00

Jost Hermand's book brings together three distinct strands of arts and culture during the Third Reich: the officially sanctioned and supported culture; the culture of 'inner emigration'; and the culture of those who were forced into exile. He discusses these strands in isolation, but also puts forward an intriguing argument which seemingly acts as a powerful link. Hermand asserts that between 1933 and 1945 'talk of indispensable cultural standards was ubiquitous and unrelenting', not only among Nazi officials but all other Germans too, including those in inner emigration and exile. Hermand asks why even some of the artistically most ambitious art forms were 'viewed as politically important' during the Third Reich (p. xii). He rightly identifies this struggle over high art as a fascinating research question, something that might seem paradoxical today, when all high art is marginalized in Western societies, as Hermand argues. Indeed, the question of how and why the different factions within German society held on to their claims to high culture and fought over cultural ownership of the same composers, painters, and playwrights, and why they regarded this as a debate of the utmost importance, raises interesting issues.

In the first part of the book Hermand turns his attention to official cultural politics. The Nazi regime successfully played to different agendas, and the fact that a coherent strategy for the arts remained elusive actually contributed to this success. Bourgeois audiences in particular were appeased by a continuation rather than an abrupt break in their cultural habits and practices. The 'night of the long knives', the socialist second revolution advocated by large sections of the SA, did not happen. On the contrary, the more radical views were silenced in June 1934. Bourgeois audiences were pleased to see classical drama and opera remain in theatre repertoires; major art exhibitions celebrate the 'masters' of the past; Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart continue to be performed by leading orchestras and conductors; and the literary canon published in lavish new editions. Similarly, the regime quite happily supported popular entertainment, and fostered the cinema and the radio in particular. Despite loud pronouncements about the need for a radically new *völkisch* cul-

ture (as put forward by the Rosenberg circle in particular), this never materialized. This was almost certainly the reason why Nazi cultural politics overall were so successful. They were radical in theory but quite pragmatic in practice.

This, however, held true only for the majority of Germans who were prepared to arrange themselves with the regime. For the politically, sexually, or racially persecuted the Nazi regime was anything but pragmatic—and it is in this area that Hermand's approach (and silence) is not quite convincing. Apart from the artists in inner emigration or exile, Hermand is not concerned with the victims of the regime in any great detail. The activities of the Jüdischer Kulturbund, for example, are mentioned only very briefly on little more than half a page (pp. 41–2). Important issues such as that works by Jewish composers and playwrights were immediately banned after the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, or the importance of the relentless persecution of Jews following the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 and their eventual deportation and murder after 1941 are hardly discussed in this study.

Also, Hermand too readily associates specific cultural practices with particular social classes, which is problematic. For example, it was not only the 'lower classes [who] surrounded themselves with the blare of popular music, went to see B movies, paged through magazines, danced the shimmy or the Charleston, or read bestsellers and dime novels' (p. 32); middle-class Germans enjoyed these pursuits as well. Similarly, it was not only the 'upper classes' who enjoyed 'aesthetic and spiritual pleasures in the theater', or read 'challenging literary works' (p. 32). When discussing the arts during the Weimar Republic, Hermand refers to the 'culture of the underclass [who] focused on unsophisticated entertainment needs', which stood in clear contrast to the 'educated middle classes [whose culture was] based chiefly on the classical artists of the German cultural heritage' (p. 34). These distinctions are too simplistic and do not take into account significant and successful attempts by trade unions to get workers into the bourgeois theatre (for example), and by so doing to influence cultural pursuits that pre-1918 seemed out of their reach. Equally surprising is Hermand's uncritical use of terms such as 'negroid' and 'negro' without quotation marks (pp. 73–4). In view of existing research in these areas, Hermand's claims seem anachronistic and unbefitting a study which otherwise arrives at some succinct conclusions.

Hermand is at his strongest when working out the struggles within the Nazi party and its main protagonists concerning a strategy towards the arts. He convincingly posits that the 'contradictions in Nazi concepts of culture were based both on lack of ideological clarity and on the fact that the party functionaries responsible for cultural policy held conflicting views' (p. 4). Although this is not a radically new finding and corresponds to existing research, it is certainly worth repeating in the context of this study. At various points throughout the book Hermand stresses that the Nazis' cultural policy was so successful precisely because there was none. Goebbels's pragmatic approach allowed different art forms to continue even if they did not wholly subscribe to *völkisch* ideals. Concert programmes, theatre repertoires, major exhibitions, as well as novels, magazines, and popular music continued almost as they had done during the Weimar Republic, even if some of the main protagonists (for example, in theatre and operetta) were no longer permitted to perform. Goebbels was keen to reach the masses, preferably through radio and cinema, and was quite happy to do so with unashamedly entertaining formats which seemed to have little to do with concepts of *Bildung* or cultural education. Ideas of an 'eternally German culture' (p. 34) were constantly put forward, but what this meant in reality was never fully explained. Defining 'enemy stereotypes' was much easier for the regime than stating its 'objectives'. In all art forms the revolutionary zeal of the early years of the Third Reich was quickly supplanted by a more traditional approach to aesthetics, as in painting, for example, where Hitler favoured a return to tried and tested genre painting (p. 65), or in the theatre, where the more radical approaches to open air performance (*Thingspiel*) gave way to a return to proscenium arch bourgeois theatre practices (pp. 105–6). In terms of architecture, too, plans for the massive reconstructions of whole cities such as Linz, Munich, and Berlin did not progress past the planning stage, and other, smaller-scale projects often avoided any obvious politicization.

In the second part of his book Hermand turns his attention to inner emigration. Hermand usefully introduces this chapter with a definition of inner emigration and the artists who were forced into it. He reminds us that we are speaking of only a tiny minority of artists who had never—not even during the Weimar Republic, and often quite deliberately—entered the mainstream. Even artists such as

Ernst Barlach, who are celebrated today and seem to exemplify a significant movement of artists in quiet opposition to the Nazi regime, never played any significant role during the Third Reich and were almost entirely sidelined. Instead of suggesting a powerful movement, they point to the futility of open opposition and the tragedy of losing any kind of public voice. The art of inner emigration, Hermand asserts, developed 'in that ideological gray area between aversion and accommodation' (p. 145), and had very different effects on different artists. Whereas the writers of the inner emigration had the most difficult time, largely because of strict censorship, composers found it a little easier, particularly if they concentrated on instrumental music. Painters and sculptors in inner emigration were often able to continue working as normal, although they had to forgo public exhibitions. They could, however, still sell their work privately. Hermand reminds us, therefore, that we cannot make generalizations in this area (p. 146).

In the third part of his book Hermand turns his attention to the artists in exile and rightly points to the fragmentation of the exile community, geographically as well as ideologically. As early as 1935 Wolf Franck lamented a situation in which different emigrant communities lived side by side seemingly without taking any notice of each other: 'Businessmen wanted nothing to do with politicians, social democrats wanted nothing to do with communists, those with connections wanted nothing to do with helpless aliens, and the rich definitely wanted nothing to do with their poor companions in misfortune.' Many artists found it difficult to find work, mostly because of language problems. Celebrated novelists got by writing for second-rate films, composers did likewise, and politically committed émigrés often had to throw their convictions overboard to find work. Kurt Weill, for example, wrote songs for the commercial theatre on Broadway. Only a minority were able to continue their artistic work, such as Brecht, who was fortunate enough to find financial backers almost everywhere he went in exile.

What is missing at the end of Hermand's illuminating volume is a proper conclusion returning to the fascinating question posed at the beginning concerning the struggle over cultural territories, especially in relation to high art. The volume ends with a postscript on the exile chapter, but this does not really bring the different strands together again. This feels very much like a missed opportunity.

Overall, Hermand's emphasis on particular cultural practices linked to specific social classes fails to convince. He also overplays the success of high art during the Third Reich. Despite official claims, high culture never entirely dominated theatre and opera repertoires, cinema programmes, and literature. The hunger for entertainment continued, and operetta, comedies, and musicals ruled. Despite these criticisms, Hermand is to be congratulated on successfully bringing together a significant amount of information in a study which covers a great deal of ground. The resulting book may not be ground-breaking and some of its theoretical underpinnings seem a little outdated, but it is nevertheless a tribute to Hermand's vast knowledge of the topic, and his ability always to be in control of his material. A worthwhile select bibliography rounds off a useful volume, which is further enriched by a number of fascinating illustrations.

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STEVE HOCHSTADT, *Exodus to Shanghai: Stories of Escape from the Third Reich,* Palgrave Studies in Oral History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xvi + 272 pp. ISBN 978 1 137 00670 7. £63.00 (hardback). ISBN 978 1 137 00671 4. £18.99 (paperback)
BEI GAO, *Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish Refugees during World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), ix + 185 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 984090 8. £45.00. US$31.69

Although the exile of European Jews in Shanghai is a well-known chapter in the history of Jewish escape from the death throes of Nazi Germany, covered by a number of eyewitness memoirs and documentaries as well as specialist monographs, new aspects are still coming to light. Both volumes under review here, despite vast differences in content and methodology, provide a fresh look at the topic.

Steve Hochstadt's *Exile in Shanghai* essentially provides an oral history of the Jewish sojourn in Shanghai, drawing on a collection of almost 100 taped interviews which the author himself conducted with former Jewish refugees who lived in Shanghai. The volume presents excerpts from thirteen of these interviews, representing the young generation who reached Shanghai mostly as teenagers or young adults. Although the eyewitness accounts are very much at the centre of the book, the author's role is crucial. Hochstadt has selected and rearranged passages to provide a coherent narrative and, in addition to a general introduction and conclusion, has written introductory comments to all of the excerpts, placing them in their historical context.

The excerpts are organized into nine chapters, tracing the lives of the narrators from the 1930s until well into the post-war era. The first chapter details the mounting anti-Semitic violence of the 1930s; the violence and humiliation during the pogrom of 9 November 1938 in particular convinced many Jews that it was time to turn their backs on Germany. Shanghai was not the refugees' preferred destination, but its international sectors were the only place where no immigration restrictions existed (they were only introduced in the summer of 1939). Nonetheless, the journey, described in chapter two, was presented by many as an exhilarating experience. Chapter three deals with the refugees' attempts to eke out a living in the bustling inter-

cultural metropolis of Shanghai. Although Jewish organizations cared for them from the day of their arrival, many experienced their sojourn as deprivation. The extent to which they adapted to their new circumstances was determined by individual ability, but also by generation—young people found it easier than the elderly. The fourth chapter describes the increasing hardship after the Japanese, who had occupied the Western enclaves in the city at the start of the Pacific War, concentrated all Jewish refugees in the 'designated area' of Hongkou in 1943. Chapters five and six deal with the immediate post-war situation, as the capitulation of Japan gave the Jews a greater feeling of security without removing at once their unstable situation and uncertain future. The following two chapters describe the circumstances under which the refugees left Shanghai and trace the often circuitous routes they took to settle in the United States. All of the thirteen interviewees went to the USA, one spent a lengthy stint in Israel, and only two eventually relocated to Germany. Other destinations of refugees from Shanghai are not represented in the volume. In the concluding chapter, the narrators give a general assessment of their time in Shanghai and the meaning they attribute to it now.

Although the individual life stories follow quite different trajectories, patterns do emerge. One is the almost constant confrontation with bureaucratic obstacles. Conflict with Nazi authorities was particularly painful and humiliating, but the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC)—the administration of the International Settlement—and even the consular authorities of post-war destinations were not particularly welcoming either, and occasionally downright anti-Semitic. Another pattern is the social isolation of the German and Austrian Jews. If anything, they sought for contacts within the 'Western' segments of Shanghai's population. Despite the crucial importance of Jewish organizations, there was not much intercourse with other Jewish groups, such as the Baghdadi and Sephardic Jews, or Jews from Eastern Europe, the latter being seen as culturally different on account of their Orthodoxy. Relations with the Chinese were equally complex. Except for children, few of the Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria bothered to learn the Chinese language (many more learned English than Chinese); yet many of the narrators noted growing Chinese nationalism and hostility, especially after the Second World War, when imperialism was finally liquidated and the

Republic of China regained full sovereignty over Shanghai. Rather unsurprisingly, the interviewees take Shanghai's cosmopolitanism for granted, and hardly ever delve into its morally questionable imperialist underpinnings.

Throughout the volume, Hochstadt, whose own grandparents took refuge in Shanghai, maintains a critical empathy with the interviewees. The emphasis is on the narrators' experiences, their suffering in Germany, and their attempts to cope with poverty, appalling sanitary conditions, sickness, uncertainty as to their future, and the shock of losing close relatives (in some cases entire families) as a result of the Holocaust. Yet Hochstadt is aware of the limitations of oral histories. He is careful to demonstrate how different people had varying degrees of knowledge about the same event (p. 237); and he also shows how individuals or incidents, such as the chicanery of one particular Japanese official, or the accidental bombing of Jewish residences by the Americans in July 1945, acquire a disproportionate importance in the memory of the interviewees, especially as '[m]ultiple deaths were uncommon' in the Shanghai ghetto (p. 165). It is interesting that the interviewees' retrospective assessment of their time in Shanghai is overwhelmingly positive. As suggested above, it is likely that as young people, they found it easier to cope with the hardship than did the older generations.

Gao Bei's slim monograph examines the same phenomenon from a diametrically opposed angle, providing a comprehensive survey of Chinese and Japanese policy towards Jewish refugees from Europe. As she states in the introduction, Shanghai's openness to European Jews when all other states had closed their borders was an immediate result of the Sino-Japanese War. While passport control had been exercised by Chinese National Government for the entire city before the war with Japan erupted in the summer of 1937, it broke down after the Japanese took control of the Chinese districts (p. 5).

Gao's investigation proceeds in three steps. She begins by taking a look at the Chinese side, examining various plans to settle Jewish refugees in the southwest (or, alternatively, the northwest) of China and then examining the Chinese Republic's visas policy. Plans for the settlement of Jews came from within the Nationalist government, or were suggested to that government by prominent Jews. From the Chinese perspective, such projects could help to enlist the support of the Western democratic powers, in particular the USA, in the war

against Japan. However, as well as being impractical, they eventually came to nothing because they threatened to alienate Germany, still nominally an ally of China. The Chinese government, however, directed its consulates to be liberal in issuing visas to Jewish refugees. The famous case of the consul-general in Vienna, He Fengshan (also mentioned in Hochstadt's book), who became one of only two Chinese 'Righteous among the Nations' acknowledged by Yad Vashem, was exceptional only in one particular respect. While disobeying his superior, the pro-German ambassador in Berlin, Chen Jie, he carried out the Foreign Ministry's instructions to the letter. According to Gao, the issuing of visas to Shanghai can be viewed as 'a vehicle to pursue the de facto, or even de jure, recognition by the Western countries of its claim to this "lost territory" ' (p. 55).

The remaining two substantive chapters are devoted to Japan's policy vis-à-vis the Jewish refugees, with the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy in September 1940 regarded as the crucial turning point. For early Japanese policy, Gao has identified the two 'Jewish experts', army colonel Yasue Norihiro and Inuzuka Koreshige, as the architects of the early policy formulations—a typical example of how the military shaped the political process. Yasue's and Inuzuka's recommendations were not to follow the German example, and to treat Jews living in Japan, China, and Japan's satellite state Manchukuo equally to other foreign nationals. In contrast to earlier studies, Gao disputes that these measures were in any way 'pro-Jewish' (pp. 6–9), pointing to their utilitarian character. Japanese policymakers saw the Jewish refugees as a means of attracting American–Jewish capital for the development of Japan's satellite state of Manchukuo, and of improving relations with the United States. Although the possibility of Jewish settlement in Manchukuo (again suggested by Jewish representatives) was discussed in 1939–40, the German–Japanese rapprochement sealed by the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 marked a turning point in Japan's attitude towards the Jews, in part because the 'Jewish experts' had lost out to pro-German groups within the military. While the Japanese authorities had acceded to the SMC's request to restrict the admission of Jews into Shanghai as early as mid 1939, its policy now grew harsher. As the Jews had ceased to be politically useful, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the beginning of the Pacific War, the Japanese decision-makers were now more pre-

pared to listen to German recommendations. About a year after Pearl Harbor, preparations began for the creation of the 'designated area'. The Japanese consul in the Lithuanian capital of Kaunas, Sugihara Chiune, who as late as 1940–1 enabled more than 2,000 Jews from Poland to emigrate to East Asia—a case analysed in detail by Gao but also mentioned by Hochstadt—was the solitary exception.

In its broad outline, Gao's argument is entirely convincing. She is no doubt right to emphasize that the rescue of the Jews was 'an accidental result' (p. 137) in the sense that policies vis-à-vis the refugees were determined by the international situation and by (arguably) overriding political concerns. She tends, however, to downplay the similarities between the Chinese and Japanese approaches, which both oscillated between an attempt to garner support in (or mend fences with) the United States, and the desire for an alliance with Germany. Gao sees a fundamental difference between the two policies in that the Japanese 'Jewish experts' 'regularly threatened' (pp. 55, 137) the Jews with violence if they refused to acquiesce in their assigned role, whereas the Chinese did not. However, the only substantial evidence to bolster this claim comes from an internal Japanese debate (pp. 103–4); no evidence is presented to show that such threats were made either towards the Jews or the Western democratic governments. The same goes for the influence of anti-Semitic ideas on the 'Japanese experts' (pp. 80, 91). Again, little systematic evaluation is offered as to just what ideas Yasue and Inuzuka picked up, apart from rather shallow stereotypes of Jewish influence on the US economy and public opinion, and how they influenced their policy formulations. Finally, Gao occasionally uses stock phrases from the lexicon of Chinese historiography, such as the notion that Japan 'contrived' the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 (p. 31), or that the rule of the Nationalists was marked by 'corruption and frequent ineptitude'—assertions that, in this form at least, are debatable.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Gao offers a valuable contribution to the field in for the first time presenting a synopsis of both the Chinese and Japanese policies towards Jewish refugees, and qualifying the assumption that the Japanese were 'much more accommodating to the refugees' than the SMC (as made by Hochstadt, p. 59). In the epilogue, Gao herself stresses the importance of the refugees' own perspective (p. 128). Overall, the two books reviewed here complement one another ideally, looking at the experience of the Jewish

refugees to Shanghai as well as the frameworks that made these experiences—and, however accidentally, the rescue of about 16,000 Jews—possible.

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CHRISTOPH LAUCHT, *Elemental Germans: Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls and the Making of British Nuclear Culture 1939–59* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xiv + 274 pp. ISBN 978 0 230 35487 6. £55.00

This book focuses on Rudolf Peierls and Klaus Fuchs, two physicists who emigrated from Germany in 1933 and had successful careers in Britain. While Fuchs's career broke off abruptly in 1950 when he was convicted as a spy for the Soviet Union, Peierls was one of the most influential and respected physicists in Britain until his death. In seven sections, the book traces the life stories of the two physicists, placing the main emphasis on the years of emigration from Nazi Germany to Britain and their integration into the scientific community of their host country, that is the 1930s and 1940s. The author is less concerned to assess their scientific achievements than to present the social context in which they lived and worked. Their life stories are connected by the author's hypothesis that 'Fuchs' and Peierls' ethnicity, their socialization and schooling in Germany along with their exposure to German culture before coming to the United Kingdom were instrumental in shaping nuclear culture in their host country' (p. 2).

This is an interesting approach, but it is not always coherently and consistently followed. For one thing, it is not entirely clear what the author means by 'nuclear culture', and for another, some of the biographical and historical premisses on which it is based do not apply, especially to Klaus Fuchs. Unlike Peierls, who arrived in Britain as a fully trained physicist with an established reputation in the scientific community, Fuchs was a student in the early stages of his studies when he left, and certainly not a 'junior scientist' (p. 33). He only finished studying in Britain, where he then entered the profession. It is thus questionable to what extent his 'German education' could have played an 'important role in establishing a new approach to nuclear science during the Second World War' (p. 2), especially as the author does not explain this further historically, but simply asserts it. Repeated references to the presumed 'close collaboration of theoretical and experimental atomic scientists' remain vague. This did not really represent a specifically German research tradition, and the German uranium project, for example, failed largely because of a lack

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

of precisely this sort of close collaboration. And the subtext of these chapters almost suggests that on the eve of the Second World War, Britain lacked a specific and highly developed 'nuclear culture', although physicists such as Ernest Rutherford, James Chadwick, and John Cockcroft, to name but a few, along with their students, were among the most important pioneers of modern nuclear physics.

Thus several aspects of the approach chosen by the author remain unclear, including his understanding of Big Science. Although he refers to important works by Peter Galison and others, he does not mention the fundamental German-language studies on this topic written in the 1980s and 1990s by Margit Szöllösi-Janze and Helmuth Trischler. These could, for example, have helped to answer the question of what distinguished the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (Harwell) and other recently founded British physics institutions from the established institutes, and to what extent they fulfilled the criteria for Big Science research institutions generally accepted in the history and theory of science. How Peierls and Fuchs (and others) influenced the development of their specific profile could also have been examined more closely, because the statement that 'the Los Alamos research culture of Big Science' was, as it were, exported to Britain after the Second World War by Fuchs and Peierls (pp. 68 ff.) is only half the story.

Laucht does not mention that while Fuchs was accepted as an excellent up and coming young scientist, he played a rather marginal role in the administration and making of science policy. Peierls's influence in this respect also needs to be scrutinized. What his specific contribution to the development of the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment was should be explained, and placed in relation to scientists such as James Chadwick and Patrick Blackett. Large-scale research was not only a requirement of nuclear physics. Its roots lay equally in the research programmes for aviation and radar that were also pursued extensively in Britain. These aspects would have profited from a more in-depth account.

Anyone who believes, on the basis of these criticisms, that this is an uninteresting and inconsistent book, however, is wrong. On the contrary, I would heartily recommend it, as it is written with historical expertise and rooted in archival research. Its strengths lie in the biographical detail it provides on the two protagonists and which, on a number of points, goes beyond what can be found in the existing

biographical literature on Fuchs and Peierls. This applies especially to Peierls and his role in the establishment and early history of the British atomic scientists' movement and its interaction with corresponding developments in the USA. The latter accounts for a good third of the volume, in which Peierls is the main focus. Laucht provides a detailed account of the life and work of this outstanding physicist, which naturally concentrates on his work in social policy while his scientific achievements are mostly dealt with summarily. This study does not provide a biography of Peierls in the strict sense, and thus does not close this particular research gap.

Because of his arrest and incarceration for spying, Fuchs is largely left out of the last third of the book, which deals with the social responsibility of scientists and Peierls's activities in this context. Yet Fuchs was also a physicist who asked himself these questions, not least after moving to the German Democratic Republic. The author could have reflected further on this within the concept of parallel biographies. He could have explored to what extent Fuchs's later commitment was to Communist orthodoxy, to the party of actually existing socialism and its *raison d'état* alone, or whether it also contained nuances based on his Anglo-American (or perhaps Protestant) experiences. This, however, would have required the author to immerse himself in the political history and culture of the GDR, which would have gone beyond the scope of the approach taken here.

But more detail could have been provided through a more thorough examination of the relevant secondary literature. For example, the author's statement concerning 'Fuchs' very low profile in the GDR' (p. 175) must be critically questioned. It should also be noted that political power and cadre organizations such as the SED, of whose central committee Fuchs was a member, and peripheral mass organizations such as the Society for German–Soviet Friendship, whose membership and activities in the GDR were of merely acclamatory significance, are named in the same breath without the necessary differentiation being made between them (p. 185). And Fuchs's stay at a curative spa near Moscow, at a home run by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (p. 175), was less a sign of favour for its former master spy than a reflection of his high position within the GDR's nomenklatura, whose health insurance probably paid for the cure. And finally, it should be pointed out that, in contrast to the author's opinion (p. 175), the Soviet Union never publicly acknowl-

edged its most important atomic spy, denying him any recognition for his achievements until his death in 1988. For Fuchs personally, this would have been very important.

These are, however, marginal criticisms which in no way detract from the significance and historical value of the book. This lies in its linking of the two biographies and its pursuit of the question of what influence scientific emigrants had on the science culture of their host countries. In this context it is astonishing, and should be the subject of further research, that two of the leading protagonists in the establishment of the British nuclear scientists' movement, Rudolf Peierls and Josef Rotblat, were emigrants. In this respect, the book is very stimulating and can be recommended to a wide readership, from political scientists to historians of science and physics, as well as physicists themselves.

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ANNE FUCHS, *After the Dresden Bombing: Pathways of Memory, 1945 to the Present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xiii + 275 pp. ISBN 978 0 230 28581 1. £55.00

This is not the first book about the bombing of Dresden in the Second World War. Nor is it the first study of the memorial culture that this cataclysmic event has spawned. But *After the Dresden Bombing* is a perceptive monograph that interweaves cultural history with literary criticism in order to analyse with great sensitivity the ways in which the destruction of the city on 13–14 February 1945 has found expression in photography, architecture, fiction, and film from the end of the war to the present. Anne Fuchs is Professor of German at the University of Warwick, and has published widely on the contested memory of the Second World War in contemporary Germany. Her familiarity with the general terrain and current trends in literary and cultural theory shows up strongly in the book. Fuchs's objectives are twofold. At one level, she is interested in the process by which the destruction of a German city at the end of the Second World War—one among dozens of others, in a country that for years had unleashed unprecedented violence upon the world—became a powerful symbol of the destructiveness of war in general, locally, nationally, and internationally. At another level, her aims are far broader: 'Dresden' is treated as a case study for what the author claims may well be a 'new mode of doing cultural history'.

To this end, Fuchs develops the twin concepts of 'impact event' and 'impact narrative'. 'Impact events' are defined as 'historical occurrences that are perceived to spectacularly shatter the material and symbolic worlds we inhabit' (p. 10). Because of their extreme violence, they defy easy integration into received cultural patterns and idioms. As Fuchs makes clear, however, 'impact events depend on impact narratives for their power to unfold' (p. 11), narratives which, just like myths, have the ability to adapt to changing circumstances while at the same time remaining stable at the level of their most basic meanings.

The study is organized in seven chapters, which form four thematic blocks, concerned with the visual, architecture, fiction, and film. Most attention is paid to the decade or so following the end of the war, when the memorial culture took shape, and the two decades after German unification in 1990, when Dresden managed to reinvent

itself as a city defined by both destruction and architectural splendour. The chapters on 'literary voices' in particular, however, also offer observations on developments in the 1960s and 1970s. As Fuchs demonstrates, it was above all writer Kurt Vonnegut's 'Vietnamization' of the bombing in his counter-cultural novel, *Slaughterhouse-Five* (1969), which helped to lift 'Dresden' out of a local context and turn it into a global icon.

For a theoretical framework that seeks to link narratives to events, Fuchs passes over immediate responses to the air raids of 13–14 February 1945 surprisingly lightly. She claims that the 'contemporary target audience' was taken by surprise by the bombing, and that the attack was perceived by the 'popular imagination' as an 'icon of gratuitous and excessive violence' (p. 6). Here, Fuchs may well be right, but the problem is that we cannot know unless we engage seriously with contemporary voices and develop some kind of typology. 'Popular imagination' and 'contemporary target audience', at any rate, are far too general terms to carry much explanatory power. Perhaps immediate responses were more varied than the idea of an impact event as 'excessive rupture' allows? (p. 13) For a committed National Socialist, for example, it is well possible that the world was not turned upside down by the bombing of Dresden, but rather that the event served to strengthen a view of the world which held that 'International Jewry' was bent on a war of annihilation against the German people as a whole.

These concerns notwithstanding, I think the concept is heuristically useful. It allows for the author to explore continuity alongside change in the memorial culture of the Dresden bombing. The widespread lament over the destruction of the city's architectural heritage, for example, could draw on a readily available 'template' that had long represented Dresden as a peaceful city of culture and architectural splendour that rivalled Florence in Italy (p. 5). At the same time, the concept puts emphasis on the very inadequacy of these templates in giving expression to events whose excessive nature in many ways defied the imagination (p. 13). Finally, the approach fully acknowledges that different genres tend to follow 'pathways' of their own, that is, that it will not do to treat the inscription on a monument as if it was an academic essay on cause and effect. In adopting the framework of 'impact event' and 'impact narrative', Fuchs manages to recentre the scholarly debate on the memory of the Dresden bombing

from the 'presentist' concern with politics that has come to dominate much of the current literature. This is an important achievement.

Yet, at the same time, the study betrays the limits of an approach that is very well-versed in the latest (and not so latest) theory, be this collective memory, trauma theory, the spatial turn, or reception theory, but appears to be rather dismissive of what the author calls 'traditional historical research' (p. xiii). While Fuchs is right to point out that military history as traditionally understood cannot account for the 'global iconicity' that the bombing of Dresden has gained in the 'post-war imagination', her own 'cultural–historical study' surely presents its own problems. It seems to me that Fuchs tends to analyse cultural artefacts without engaging closely enough, on the basis of archival evidence, with the circumstances in which they were produced, by whom and to what purpose. This is quite apart from the fact that there does exist, Fuchs' claim notwithstanding, a sizeable body of historical work not just on the conduct of the air war, but about the post-war memorialization as well.[1]

To give two examples: early on in her study, Fuchs introduces a statement by Gerhart Hauptmann as a 'first version of the Dresden impact narrative'. In it, the writer famously claimed that 'those who have forgotten how to weep will learn it again on the annihilation of Dresden'. While the text is quoted in full and interpreted as the expression of a 'double movement of expression and erasure', that is, as an attempt to put into words an experience that is, in fact, beyond verbalization, the specific circumstances in which it was produced and first used are referred to only in passing. We learn that Hauptmann's statement was broadcast on German radio on 29 March 1945 and that, despite its 'exploitation' for German propaganda, the text remained popular after the defeat of Nazi Germany, and has, indeed, continued to be so until the present day (p. 14).

But this begs as many questions as it answers. After all, the text was broadcast (and apparently written) six weeks after the bombing of Dresden, in circumstances that, arguably, were rather different from mid February. By late March, the Western Allies were crossing the Rhine while, for a brief interlude, it appeared as if the advance of

[1] See e.g. the important study of Hamburg by Malte Thießen, *Eingebrannt ins Gedächtnis: Hamburgs Gedenken an Luftkrieg und Kriegsende 1943 bis 2005* (Munich, 2007). See also Jörg Arnold, Dietmar Süß, and Malte Thießen (eds.), *Luftkrieg: Erinnerungen in Deutschland und Europa* (Göttingen, 2009).

the Red Army on the Eastern front had been slowed down. Why did Hauptmann make his voice heard at this point in time? Who prompted him? Did he need to be prompted? Furthermore, Fuchs gives only one version of the text, although there were, in fact, at least two. As an annotation in volume 11 of Hauptmann's Collected Works makes clear, the printed version, which was published in early April in three German newspapers, was abridged in such a way as to obfuscate Hauptmann's important caveat that there were 'good souls in England and America' who felt just as deeply about the destruction of the 'Florence on the river Elbe' as did the old writer himself.[2]

The same tension between theoretically informed analysis and a certain empirical looseness is evident in Fuchs's discussion of the second defining artefact of the Dresden bombing, Richard Peter's photo book, *Eine Kamera klagt an*, which contained, among other well-known photographs, the famous panoramic view of the devastated city with the allegorical figure of *Bonitas* in the foreground. I agree with Fuchs's assessment that the book transcends the Cold War context in which it was produced and that the central images defy the Socialist teleology into whose service the photographer and/or the publisher sought to press them. I also find the suggestion stimulating that the book's power derives in large part from an 'alliance between the beautiful and the melancholic', which draws on modes of representation and ways of seeing that ultimately hark back to early nineteenth-century Romanticism.

Yet, at the same time, the 'traditional' historian feels some unease when, in the section that opens the discussion of Peter's book, two factual statements are open to question. Fuchs writes: 'In 1949 . . . Richard Peter published . . . *Eine Kamera klagt an* with a print-run of 50,000 copies which quickly sold out' (p. 32). In fact, the book was not published in 1949, but in 1950, in the context of the first elections to the People's Chamber (*Volkskammer*) in the GDR, which were held on 15 October on the basis of a single list of candidates.[3] Nor did the initial print-run of 50,000 copies sell out 'quickly', as Fuchs claims.

[2] Gerhart Hauptmann, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Hans-Egon Hass, continued by Martin Machatzke, vol. xi: *Nachgelassene Werke / Fragmente* (Munich, 1974), 1205–6.

[3] Sylvia Ziegner, 'Der Bildband *Dresden – eine Kamera klagt an* von Richard Peter senior: Teil der Erinnerungskultur Dresdens' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Marburg, 2010), 73–87.

Indeed, in January 1952, one year after publication, the publisher decided to reduce the retail price from DM 8.50 to DM 6.50, an indication, perhaps, that actual sales had not met the high expectations, or alternatively, of a change of course in the memory politics of the SED state.[4] Does this matter? I think it does, both with regard to our understanding of the cultural reverberations of the Dresden bombing and to our ideas about 'doing cultural history'. It seems to suggest that in the timing as well as the marketing of *Eine Kamera klagt an*, politics loomed even larger than has commonly been assumed.

As *After the Dresden Bombing* demonstrates, a theoretically informed approach can yield rich insights into the workings of the cultural memory of the bombing and restore complexity to a subject that too often has been treated in reductionist terms, as a mere expression of Cold War antagonisms or of exculpatory tendencies. At the same time, there is a danger of prioritizing theory over empirical research when, in fact, both are needed in order to burst open new 'pathways' in the study of cultural memory.

[4] Ibid. 149.

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MIKE DENNIS and JONATHAN GRIX, *Sport under Communism: Behind the East German 'Miracle'*, Global Culture and Sport (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xiv + 261 pp. ISBN 978 0 230 22784 2 £55.00

In 1948 Erich Honecker, then chairman of the Free German Youth Movement (FDJ), declared that 'sport is not an end in itself, but the means to an end' (p. 18). This clear statement, pointing to a utilitarian and politicized understanding of sport, became the ideological backbone of GDR sports, and the starting point for the rise of a unique, state-controlled sports system. Much has been published in German on this particular sports system, and many of these books have come out of the Centre for the Study of Contemporary Sports based at the University of Potsdam (Arbeitsbereich Zeitgeschichte des Sports). Significantly less, however, has been published on GDR sport in English. This gap has now been filled with the study by Dennis and Grix on sport under the German Communist regime. The publication is primarily based on research produced by German colleagues enriched by additional source material.

The co-authors explain their approach as a unique mix of historical and political science-based analysis. They aim to show the links between the development of sport in the GDR and the character of national and international sports systems today. They attempt to deconstruct the myth of a 'well-oiled and harmonious system that thrived on the mutually supportive relationship between elite and mass sports, providing ample provision for both' (p. 3). Showing how contested the field of high-performance sport in the GDR actually was, they hope to reach wider conclusions about the functioning of the GDR dictatorship itself.

The nine chapters of the study look first at the establishment of the high-performance sports system (1–3) and the role of doping (4–5). Two chapters focus on the contested identity of the sports system, drawing on the examples of football and mass sports (6–7). The final two chapters embed GDR sports in a wider international/comparative context and present key themes and findings.

The study begins with a broadbrush picture of the different layers of the politicization of sport with particular focus on the role of international sporting successes in legitimizing the GDR in the eyes of its citizens and the international public. The following chapters present

two more detailed studies of the development of East Germany's elite sports system and of how young sporting talents were found and promoted.

The authors divide the evolution of the GDR as a sporting nation, developing from very difficult beginnings to become an athletic superpower, into five phases: anti-fascist, anti-militaristic sport, 1945–7; a Soviet-type state–socialist model, 1952–6; further centralization and the ascendancy of elite sports, 1957–67; key reforms in the elite sport sector 1967–9; and, finally, the crystallization of the standard elite sports model, 1969–74/5. The chapter introduces the structures of the GDR's elite sports system and key figures such as Manfred Ewald, one of the most powerful East German sports officials, and highlights conflicts of interests between the various bodies involved in the running of the tightly knit elite sports system. Yet the state exerted almost total control over the system by tracking numbers, keeping statistics, and implementing ever new planning mechanisms.

Apart from the structures of the elite pyramid training centres, special sports schools, and sport clubs, the authors discuss the key mechanisms of the talent-scouting system from the hosting of youth Spartakiades to the introduction of a broad talent-spotting system called ESA (Einheitliche Sichtung und Auswahl) in 1973. GDR school children were constantly measured and tested to spot athletic talent at a very early age. The authors make interesting points, but fall short in exploring these further, for example, the observation that ESA was part and parcel of 'everyday life at school for GDR children', which sounds worth exploring in further research on everyday life in the GDR. They also point to the high-powered performances at the Child and Youth Spartakiades, already explored by Molly Wilkinson Johnson in an important study.[1]

Chapters four and five look at what is probably the most widely discussed aspect of the GDR's high-performance system. Since the mid 1960s, state-controlled doping programmes were developed in interaction between state actors, sports officials, and what the authors call 'pressures from below' (p. 85). The authors demonstrate how contested the system actually was, marked by internal rivalries and a constant struggle for ever more resources and influence between its

[1] Molly Wilkinson Johnson, *Training Socialist Citizens: Sports and the State in East Germany* (Leiden, 2008).

key institutions, such as groups attached to party high commissions and ministries of state, industrial complexes, sports organizations, research institutes, and medical services.

The authors courageously blur the boundaries between assumed victims (athletes) and perpetrators (trainers, doctors, and sport officials). It was the combined 'greed' (p. 104) for prestige and financial benefits on the part of athletes, the 'greed' of trainers for medals and standing in the competition with other clubs for prestige and talent, and the state's overarching goal of demonstrating the superiority of socialism over capitalism (and also its desire to shine within its own bloc rivalry) that allowed the inhuman doping system to flourish. It is therefore convincing yet striking to read that the state-controlled doping system was implemented to control 'wild' or uncontrolled doping. As much as everyone would agree that the doping of unknowing children and young adults as practised in the GDR is a crime, we must also acknowledge that many athletes worldwide use performance enhancing drugs knowingly and willingly. The authors therefore discuss the development of the GDR's doping system in an international and comparative perspective. Ultimately, however, they reach the conclusion that the large degree of state control over the GDR's doping system sets it clearly apart from Western doping practices.

Taking football and the relationship between mass and elite sports as examples, the authors explore the most contested fields in the GDR's sports system. With the highly unpopular decision to relocate many traditional teams, GDR sports officials cut local roots and traditions as early as the 1950s, offending many fans. After that, football developed as a minefield created by various strong political, economic, and regional actors who, for many different, sometimes personal, reasons fought for control over the game. The state never achieved full control over football, which was also significantly harder to medicalize and manipulate than more mechanical sports such as track and field. This explains the GDR's strikingly unsuccessful presence on the international football scene. It also explains how football could remain the sport with the most space for individual aims and goals.

The individual aims, goals, and demands of GDR citizens are articulated even more strongly in the chapter on the tensions caused by declining investment in mass sports and the growing financial and structural gap between mass and high-performance sports.

Making use of *Eingaben*, petitions from citizens to state and party officials, the chapter shows the increasing disharmony within the GDR's sports system and a growing impatience on the part of citizens with the pressures and shortages caused by the rapid economic decline of the 1980s. This chapter reveals one of the significant shortcomings of Dennis's and Grix's work: their inability to embed their findings in current debates not just about GDR sport, but also about the country's culture and society. The stories they tell are signifiers of conflicts, but the causes and circumstances of these conflicts remain largely in the dark.

The final part of the study looks at the legacy of the GDR's sports system, its talent-scouting and fostering mechanisms, in the context of a process which the authors call the 'convergence of elite sport development' (p. 172) on a global scale. Here they compare the elite sports systems of East Germany, the UK, Australia, and China, arguing that a convergent high-performance system, differing only in the degree of state control, developed, although given the scope of the chapter they cannot go into the subject in any great depth. The chapter itself and, in particular, its focus on the period after the 1970s, is highly problematic. Globalization and cultural exchange processes, and sport as an actor, commodity, and product in and of global exchange processes since the nineteenth century, date back to earlier times and must be taken into consideration.

From the start, athletic ideals, training methods, and scientific knowledge travelled the globe alongside athletes and their trainers and coaches participating in international competitions such as the Olympic Games. A global history of sport with a focus on sports science, training mechanisms, and ideologies attached to specific attitudes towards athletic performance is an open and promising field of research, but does not fit well into this narrow study of GDR sport. The book finishes with the authors summarizing their arguments, highlighting again the contestations and conflicts in the high-performance sports system with competing individuals fighting for resources and personal and international prestige. They also point out the importance of existing regional and traditional understandings of the meaning of sport among fans, athletes, and trainers in producing ever new conflicts.

Dennis and Grix have produced a first concise and compelling English-language summary of the vast research done on GDR sport.

The book will surely prove valuable for teaching the subject and, it is to be hoped, will encourage further research in the field now that the basic facts are easily accessible. Even though the authors highlight important possible fields for future research, such as the tensions and conflicts within the sports system, they tend to follow the dominant approach in German sport history too closely, with its focus on structures, elite actors, state resolutions, and a controlled sport and science sector.

This perspective fails to shed light on the functioning of sport between different societal actors, an approach whose value has been demonstrated, for instance, by Molly Wilkinson Johnson (with her focus on leading sports figures, events, and fans), and German historian Klaus Latzel, who has written an outstanding study of the power relationships within sport and pharmaceutical industries (in this case Jenapharm).[2] Indeed, future research on sport in the GDR will only thrive if scholars either contribute to more recent approaches developed in GDR historiography, or if they use sport as a prism through which we can better understand the nature of the GDR dictatorship more generally.

Two leading historians of the GDR, Paul Betts and Jan Palmowski, have defined two fields that should be taken seriously when writing the history of GDR sport. Betts has traced the creation and production of a unique socialist version of modernity in the context of East German everyday life. Even though Betts formulates his ideas in the context of how individuals (and the state) contested the private sphere, his notion that there was a particular socialist idea of the 'modern' could be extremely valuable in conceptualizing the ideals of a socialist athlete. Through training and medicalization, the socialist athlete embodied the values of modernity and placed these on the international stage.

Palmowski, in his work, highlights the importance of regional celebrations and spectacles as contested fields in which regional identity was preserved and state control challenged, up to the point when the state lost its citizens in 1989. A future study of GDR sport events should go beyond Spartakiades and Deutsche Turn- und Sportfeste, analyse the cultural performances taking place during regional sports competitions, and explore, in particular, the tensions between

[2] Klaus Latzel, *Staatsdoping: Der VEB Jenapharm im Sportsystem der DDR* (Cologne, 2009).

regional collective identities and the artificial vision of a socialist nation fostered by the East German regime.

In short, the gap of a cultural history of GDR sport has yet to be filled. Sport provides a unique prism through which the relationship between science, the body, and the public in the GDR can be analysed. It is to be hoped that the fact that a key text on GDR sport is finally available in English will inspire future work on the history of sport science in the GDR, the cultural ramifications of the ideology of scientific–technological progress, the everyday life of those doing school sport in the GDR , and the role of regional sport spectacles.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Cooperation and Empire. Conference organized jointly by the University of Berne, Oxford Centre for Global History, German Historical Institute London, and Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung and held in Berne, 27–29 June 2013. Conveners: Tanja Bührer (University of Berne/Oxford Centre for Global History/GHIL), Flavio Eichmann (University of Berne), Stig Förster (University of Berne), Benedikt Stuchtey (GHIL), and Dierk Walter (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung).

The study of imperialism has, in many respects, become somewhat discredited and highly contested. However, few historians today would dispute that indigenous cooperation was a formative and continuous factor of empire. This was first expressed by Ronald Robinson in the 1970s. Imperial history then became increasingly outdated and by the 1990s seemed to have lost its relevance. This was also due to the rise of new theories and approaches, such as postcolonial studies. Nevertheless, many studies conducted today focus on interactions between 'colonizer' and 'colonized'. These studies often display many of the factors which Robinson had outlined in his theory of imperialism and collaboration. Robinson's ideas are therefore anything but irrelevant for the study of empires. The aim of the conference, however, was not to dig out Robinson's concept of collaboration and adapt it to the twenty-first century, but to complement his ideas with approaches and aspects from global, transnational and postcolonial history. It will be of particular interest to consider postcolonial concepts such as 'otherness', 'mimicry', and 'hybridity'. These consider that lines between 'colonizers', 'colonized', and 'collaborators' were often blurred and that there were various degrees of cooperation, which were often not as obvious and easily recognized as earlier approaches and theories implied.

The first panel of the conference explored issues of imperial politics and cultural adaption. Wolfgang Gabbert (Hanover) and Ute Schüren (Berne) both looked at cooperation in the Latin American

The full conference programme can be found under Events and Conferences on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

context. They came to the conclusion that many of the indigenous elites cooperated with colonial powers, often to protect their privileges and status and to pursue their own interests. In Tanja Bührer's presentation, it was the Westerners who found themselves in a weak position vis-à-vis the local ruler. At the time of the early British Residents at the Court of the Nizam of Hyderabad, common ground for cooperation first had to be established. The Nizam, however, did not consider the British East India Company a partner worth cooperating with. As the British Residents at the time were only functioning on the margins of imperial bureaucratic structures and often had no real power, they were the ones who had to adapt to local culture. Next, Myriam Yakoubi (Paris) also presented an example in which things did not go according to British plans: the development of the relationship between the British and Faisal I of Iraq. Even though Faisal had never set foot in Iraq, he was made king of the country as, from the British viewpoint, he seemed the best candidate who would promote their interests. But the relationship between Faisal and the British Colonial Office soon turned sour. Faisal turned out not to be the puppet the British thought they had installed on the Iraqi throne. Instead, he pursued his own interests and demanded independence for 'his' country. In the discussion following the first panel, many questions referring to individual presentations were addressed. Self-interest, networks of cooperation, and reducing costs were highlighted as some of the most important factors playing on the minds of 'colonizers' and 'colonized' when they considered cooperation.

The second panel explored the economics and social foundations of cooperation. Amélia Polónia (Porto) argued that in the case of early modern Portugal, the European expansion was not so much directed from the centre of Portuguese politics or by the Crown, but often began on the initiative of individual agents and maritime communities. Cooperation between these individuals and the state was crucial for the process of empire-building. Todd Cleveland (Minnesota) also presented a case in which the influence of a colonial state was largely missing. He looked at the Diamond Company of Angola (Diamang) and its relationship with its workers. Cleveland called Diamang 'a state within a state', which was therefore often untouched by colonial legislation. He argued that for a variety of reasons, Diamang looked after its workers comparatively well. In Jonathan E. Robins's (Michigan) study, it was initially not a colonial

power or Western company that dictated local industry, but Alake Gbadebo I of Abekouta, a local ruler. The Alake cooperated with the British Cotton Growing Association in order to modernize his country's cotton industry. Robins then contrasted this with the example of Buganda, where the same company coerced local farmers into growing cotton. Nevertheless, the British company required the cooperation of local elites in both of the studied cases. Haydon L. Cherry (North Carolina), looking at the social foundations of empire, then argued that social relationships played a crucial role in Vietnamese society during French colonial rule. They were critical for the maintenance of social order in Vietnam. Contrary to the idea of many scholars that French colonialism broke up Vietnamese society and freed individuals from social bonds and other ties, Cherry argued that this was not the case. These various bonds persisted, although they were often adapted and altered. Cherry argued that it was the gradual change in existing relationships that produced notions of a Vietnamese nation. In the subsequent discussion, Todd Cleveland's presentation in particular led to some controversy. Many participants doubted whether the treatment of local people at Diamang was in fact as positive as suggested by Cleveland. It can be difficult to understand why there was no resistance by the workers, which does not quite correspond to many of the notions of colonialism we have today. It also shows, as Jan Georg Deutsch (Oxford) pointed out, that there is a large scale of different types of cooperation, ranging from enforced to voluntary.

The third panel of the conference looked at science, intellectuals, and cultural translation. Deepak Kumar (New Delhi) considered the role of cooperation in science in early colonial India. Most colonial scientists were dismissive of local knowledge and believed their own epistemology to be superior. Nevertheless, there was some knowledge transfer between colonial scientists and locals. Early colonial medical men, for example, collected medicinal plants and discussed their use with locals, and local artists painted plants for colonial botanists. In publications, however, these locals remained unnamed. In the Filipino case looked at by Frauke Scheffler (Cologne), it was the 'colonized' who initiated research on infant health and programmes for improving it. The Filipinos claimed to have superior knowledge of infant health. These local efforts, however, were increasingly centralized and integrated into the medical system

which had been established under US rule. Scheffler showed how Filipinos cooperated and negotiated with US colonial administrators during this process. Charles V. Reed (Elizabeth City) also analysed a process of negotiation between 'colonizers' and 'colonized'. He looked at how British imperial subjects in the South African context articulated their political grievances against the rule of white settlers. Reed argued that the ideas of imperial citizenship and Britishness informed the political and intellectual origins of African nationalism in South Africa. Many coloured participants in colonial politics expressed these ideas rather than ideas of anti-colonialism or pan-Africanism. In the following discussion, the interesting observation was made that in the examples presented by Scheffler and Reed, the 'colonized' instructed 'their Empire' on its policies and what it should be about.

The fourth panel took a closer look at the role of agents of colonial governance. Ralph Austen (Chicago) compared the tax collection systems of colonial India and Africa. He came to the conclusion that in the case of India, the British had inherited an effective tax system which they could build on from the Mughal Empire and its successor states, whereas there were no such structures in Africa. This was one reason why tax collection in India, with the help of local administrators, was more efficient than it was in Africa. The French colonial administration of New Caledonia in Adrian Muckle's (Wellington) example also relied on locals to run their colony. Similarly, locals played an important part in the examples presented by Alexander Keese (Berlin). Many military operations on the African continent would not have been possible if the Europeans had not been helped by African allies. These often remained in the area after they had been 'conquered', and many tensions and difficulties were encountered when integrating them into the colonial administration as 'native guards'. In the discussion following this panel, it became clear how difficult it can be to find out more about local cooperators and what motivated them, as in many cases there is not enough information about them. This is a crucial issue which needs to be considered further in order to achieve a more complete understanding of cooperation and empire.

The fifth panel of the conference looked at settlers, alliances, and imperial wars. Dierk Walter (Hamburg/Berne) challenged many widely accepted notions of imperial conquest and control. He argued

that colonial empires could only be established with local military cooperation. Indigenous allies, however, have largely disappeared from historical records. After a colonial power had established itself, these allies were often downgraded to mere auxiliaries, and later integrated and regulated, also in order to control them, into colonial troops. Vincent O'Malley (Wellington, New Zealand) looked at some of the consequences which cooperation in colonial wars could entail for 'indigenous allies' by looking at the term 'Kupapa', which in New Zealand is a negative term used to describe Maoris who are considered collaborators. Originally, this term had had positive connotations. Today, all those who did not fight against the Crown are regarded as traitors. O'Malley contested this use of the term, arguing that it is ahistorical. There was no united Maori nation at the time. Maoris who collaborated with the Crown did not do so because they identified with its cause, but because it enabled them to pursue their own strategic objectives. The perseverance of one's own goals also played a crucial role in Flavio Eichmann's (Berne) presentation, which focused on local cooperation in Martinique from 1802 to 1809. He showed that the French colonial administrators often had no choice but to frame their policies according to the demands of rich local planters, who would then support their colonial careers in return. There was, therefore, a network of cooperation between colonial and army officials and rich white settlers in Martinique that undermined metropolitan policies. In the following discussion, the issue of agency was raised. While finally giving local cooperators some recognition is seen as positive, it is important that in doing so we do not create a new myth about local allies. It is always important to consider that those cooperating had agency.

The final panel looked at chiefs, kings, and rulers. Daniel Olisa Iweze (Nsukka) looked at the British colonial conquest of Western Igboland and the role of indigenous collaborators. He argued that locals cooperating with the imperial power, and not British superior arms, made the difference in this conflict and allowed a British victory. In the German colony of Cameroon, Ulrike Schaper (Berlin) argued, cooperation with local chiefs also contributed decisively to the establishment of a German colonial administration. Initially, this was less a political strategy than a necessity as there was a general lack of resources and knowledge about the prevalent political conditions. It was not just the case, however, that the 'colonizers' exploit-

ed the 'colonized'; rather, they were mutually dependent on each other. Éric Allina (Ottawa), also looking at chiefs in the African context, examined how, in the case of Mozambique, they exercised authority over their people as indigenous rulers while also operating in the system of colonial governance. Instead of examining whether they collaborated or resisted, Allina demonstrated that by pursuing their own agenda, chiefs had to operate in both of these overlapping spheres. Finally, Timothy Burke (Philadelphia) presented his analysis of imperial administration in Southern Rhodesia. Burke argued that the establishment of colonial Africa was not just the result of a number of random events, but was driven by prior social and economic structures, and the contingent agency of individuals and groups. An important topic of discussion following the last panel was whether the cases presented were individual and random, or part of a bigger issue which could be explained with the help of models and theories. While it was agreed that using theories can be helpful, some also warned of their dangers, as things which do not fit are often left out. While it is certainly important to differentiate as a historian, if there is no common ground and theory, comparison and analysis are difficult if not impossible, and the history of cooperation and empire becomes no more than individual stories.

The conference concluded with a round table discussion, during which it became clear that there was still an issue with the terminology of cooperation and empire. James Belich (Oxford) argued that in the colonial context, the term 'collaboration' had negative connotations. He asked whether using the term 'cooperation' laundered imperialism into something benign. To avoid this, he suggested that the term and concept of 'collaboration' needed to be refined so that historians all have the same understanding of it. Belich argued that applying subcategories could be a possible solution to this problem. Stig Förster (Berne) also referred to historiographical issues with the description of cooperation. Despite historians' best efforts to differentiate between various factors in their analysis, this is often complicated by political correctness. The wider public still thinks of imperialism in terms of black and white with clear perpetrators and victims. Förster argued that this notion needs to be overcome and suggested using the idea of 'people who somehow have a stake in imperial expansion' as an explanation for cooperation. Jan Georg Deutsch pointed out that Ronald Robinson's ideas were situated in the context

of the 1950s and 1960s. At this time, historiography was dominated by nationalist history. While Robinson was modern in his time, he is less so today. Like the organizers of the conference, Deutsch believed that it is important to use Robinson's ideas along with newer theories and ideas.

The conference considered a wide spectrum and various notions of cooperation. Unfortunately, during the conference discussions often referred only to specific issues and cases and, apart from the round table discussion, the bigger issues were somewhat neglected. It did, however, become clear that existing theories are not sufficient to explain the politically sensitive issue of imperial cooperation. The lines between colonizers and colonized were often indistinct and despite efforts to include postcolonial aspects, the voices of the 'co-operators' often remained unheard, in many cases also because of the unavailability of relevant sources. Nonetheless, it would have been desirable for more recent theoretical approaches to have been considered in greater depth. In all, the conference illustrated the various forms and settings in which cooperation took place in empires, and showed how difficult it can be to gain an understanding of cooperation in an imperial context.

TAMARA BRAUN (University of Berne)

Magna Carta 1215: History and Myth. Eleventh Summer School in British History, held at the German Historical Institute London, 22–26 July 2013. Organizers: Cornelia Linde (GHIL), Michael Schaich (GHIL), and Jörg Schwarz (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich).

There is a long tradition of summer schools at the GHIL, but this year's event, attended by twenty students from different German universities, was the first on a medieval topic. It focused on one of the most famous documents of the Middle Ages: Magna Carta. Experts Nicholas Vincent (University of East Anglia), Hugh Doherty (University of Oxford), and John Gillingham (LSE) were invited to lecture. The main four themes they discussed were: the reign of King John; the barons and their influence on Magna Carta; its intellectual background; and the document's reception from the Middle Ages to the present day.

In his introduction Nicolas Vincent presented the historical background of King John's reign and highlighted certain aspects which cast a slur on his kingship. Starting in 1200, a number of events destroyed John's authority within his kingdom. In order to secure and gain influence in Gascony, John had married the heiress of Angoulême, Isabella. But there were objections to their marriage. While John had still been married to Isabella of Gloucester, Isabella of Angoulême had been promised to Hugh de Lusignan. By divorcing his own wife and making Isabella of Angoulême his queen, John provoked a rebellion of the barons who were joined by his nephew, Arthur of Brittany. John ultimately proved victorious but the public implications of this rebellion were disastrous. As Arthur never returned from prison, there were rumours that John had had him killed.

Another aspect discussed was John's loss of Normandy. Summoned to the court of Phillip of France, John refused to attend and respond to the accusations of Arthur's murder. The French king therefore occupied vast tracts of Normandy, with the result that John could retain only small territories in the south. His military defeat and obscure incidents in his marriage with Isabella irreparably destroyed John's reputation. But as Vincent emphasized in his lec-

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ture, things got even worse for John when he dared to break with the Pope by refusing to accept Stephen Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury. Their dispute culminated in the imposition of a papal interdict on England and Wales in 1208. One year later Pope Innocent III excommunicated John. As an outcast from the church, John was totally isolated, which marked the nadir of his reputation within his kingdom.[1]

John Gillingham looked at the sources for John's reign: the Charter Rolls, which are preserved for the entire period of his reign; and the Patent Rolls, which begin in the third year of his reign. These allow us to take a deeper look at the everyday business of government and life at the king's court, as they list earnings and expenses. The image of a king of bad character who lacked the ability to rule put forward by earlier scholars can be balanced after examining these documents. The Charter Rolls show that John was actually a highly capable king when it came to household affairs. This statement was supported by documents from the Exchequer, the last type of source Gillingham presented to the students. They show that John was, in fact, extremely rich. Gillingham also looked more closely at John's itinerary, which made clear that he only went to certain areas. He did not, for example, visit the northern territories at all, preferring to stay close to the forests of southern England and France. Considering John's great wealth, Gillingham spelled out one of John's tactical moves: he kept people in debt instead of demanding payment immediately. Because of his long absences from certain areas of the kingdom, John tried to create relationships of dependency, which he could use to his own advantage in order to secure the territories he rarely visited.[2] Nevertheless, Gillingham's final statement emphasized that John was 'incompetent where it really mattered, in the management of his more powerful subjects',[3] as he could not keep his magnates content.

Finally, Hugh Doherty presented a new line of research which has not been published so far. He argued that the year 1212 marked the most important turning point on the way to Magna Carta. In finan-

[1] See Nicolas Vincent, *Magna Carta: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2012), 36–54.

[2] See John Gillingham, *The Angevin Empire* (London, 1984), 51–61.

[3] John Gillingham and Ralph A. Griffiths, *Medieval Britain: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2000), 36–7.

cial terms, John was not a bad king at all. In fact, by ruling strictly in order to consolidate his reign, he accumulated an abundance of power. According to Doherty, even the papal interdict did not damage John's reputation. But, Doherty argued, John's crucial mistake was to implement certain reforms in 1212, leading him to reduce the pressure he had exercised on society for years. As his new behaviour was interpreted as weakness, opposition to the king increased and paved the way for the remission of Magna Carta.

The barons provided another thematic focus. As research has generally concentrated on King John, they have long been neglected. Doherty asked about the composition of this social group and discussed its spheres of influence. In general, the group could be divided into greater and lesser barons by specific criteria such as the size of their landholdings and the venerability of their families. Their spheres of influence depended on family identity, which therefore took first priority in their thinking. In second place, localities were also decisive. Their estates and castles demonstrated honour as another fundamental category of their thinking. The final factor on which baronial influence depended was their relationship to the sovereign. As they swore an oath of allegiance to the king, their sphere of influence to a large extent depended on this relationship.

As the barons obviously controlled huge resources, such as castles, they could afford to resist the monarch. While addressing the intellectual background of Magna Carta, Doherty and Vincent asked what share the barons had in the conception of Magna Carta. Vincent concentrated on Stephen Langton's character. The Archbishop of Canterbury, who returned from exile in 1213 after the disagreement between Innocent III and King John, became one of the most important thinkers of his time. His likely influence on Magna Carta is visible in multiple aspects. In 1214 Langton issued statutes on the behaviour of clerics in his diocese, which were echoed one year later in Magna Carta. Langton's understanding of rule also became clear in the debates in which he participated. In his view, kings had to commit themselves to maintaining law and justice, which is perfectly reflected in Magna Carta. But apart from substantive reasons, there are also formal ones that reflect his influence. Langton is named second after the king in the opening formulae. Furthermore, the first clause of Magna Carta granted freedom of church and ecclesiastical elections.

Doherty stressed that the barons' share in Magna Carta should not be underestimated. As their influence on the document has often been neglected in research, he pointed out that Magna Carta was a highly sophisticated document initiated by an elite. Because literacy was one of the typical attributes of the eleventh and twelfth-century elite, the literate barons very likely had great influence on the composition of Magna Carta.

The last topic discussed was the reception of Magna Carta. Vincent made clear that it has inspired people's imagination for centuries. In the seventeenth century, during the struggle between the Stuart kings and Parliament, Magna Carta was identified as an 'Ancient Constitution', as the lawyer Edward Coke put it. It was considered a document which represented law as something old and immutable that defined individuals' rights against the sovereign. In America, in particular, Magna Carta was rapidly adopted and 'cited as the inheritance of a legal system itself'.[4]

In their final statements on the reception of Magna Carta, all the experts agreed that the current opinion that Magna Carta marked the beginnings of democracy must be firmly rejected. Although the king's actions were defined by law and further restrictions were put on him, the traditional and conservative character of Magna Carta dominated. This is clearest in its visual form, as it was a royal charter granted by the king and sealed with his royal seal. Moreover, it has to be asked who benefited from its articles? On this point in particular it should be stressed that the document addressed only a small audience—not a modern understanding of democracy at all.

The participants in this year's summer school enjoyed a highly informative time at the GHIL. Work in the seminars was complemented by several excursions, for example, to the British Library and Temple Church. The friendly atmosphere during discussions was enhanced by the willingness of the experts to speak individually to students during the breaks.

[4] Vincent, *Magna Carta*, 98.

CHRISTOPHER KAST (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich)

Medieval History Seminar. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German Historical Institute Washington and held at the GHIL, 10–12 October 2013. Conveners: Stuart Airlie (University of Glasgow), Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University Berlin), Patrick Geary (Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton), Stefan Hördler (GHIW), Ruth Mazo Karras (University of Minnesota), Cornelia Linde (GHIL), Frank Rexroth (University of Göttingen), and Miri Rubin (Queen Mary, University of London).

At the eighth biennial Medieval History Seminar, jointly organized by the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington, twenty participants from UK, US, and German universities presented and discussed their current research. These research projects represented a wide range of methodological approaches, reflecting the participants' different backgrounds, which ranged from political, social, and religious history to literary studies, communication studies, and art history. Each paper was briefly introduced by its author and was the subject of two commentaries by fellow participants. The papers were then discussed in plenum, allowing for rich and fruitful engagement with each paper, within the context of wider reflections on relationships between projects and the broader interests of the seminar's participants. Although the papers employed and combined a number of methodological approaches and utilized an array of source material, particular areas of shared interest emerged. A comparatively large group of the projects was concerned with cultural history and the history of religious cultures, while studies of social and economic history were less represented. A stress on modes of communication and reception, combined with the interpretation of political, visual, and theological languages, showed that recent theoretical emphases on questions of mediation and representation remain central to this group of early career medieval historians.

Several contributions were concerned with a broadly defined intellectual and cultural history of the high and late Middle Ages. Milan Žonca explored the beginnings of the study of Maimonidean philosophy in late medieval Jewish communities in Central Europe, especially in Prague. In his contribution to understandings of intel-

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lectual authority within Jewish communities, Žonca argued that the turn to philosophical texts in the late fourteenth century was stimulated by internal Jewish developments as well as external influences from contemporary Christian intellectual culture. Continuing this focus on communities and authority, Nicholas Youmans discussed the definition of early Minorite obedience and its development, arguing that increasing institutionalization of the order during the thirteenth century gradually changed the meanings of obedience. Charismatic understandings of the early Franciscans were gradually overshadowed by hegemonic strategies. Like Youmans, Torsten Edstam devoted his paper to changes in meaning over time, particularly changes in the reception of the writings of the twelfth-century theologian Hugh of St Victor within reforming monastic communities in the fifteenth century. Focusing on Hugh's texts at the Benedictine Abbey of Melk, Austria, Edstam argued that the interests of this particular community in linking discipline to love of God shaped the transmission of Hugh's work.

Reform and reform texts were likewise the focus of contributions by Matthew Champion and Sebastian Dümling. Champion's paper used the writings of the Louvain theologian Peter de Rivo to explore the ways in which the concept of time was created and experienced within reformed monastic communities of fifteenth-century Brabant. Arguing for a history of time which considers explicit reflections on time alongside the rhythms of human action, his contribution described the production and maintenance of a liturgical self in late medieval reform. Dümling's paper turned from the liturgical implications of reform to the construction of expertise and experts within a complicated body of texts devoted to political and ecclesiastical reform in the fifteenth century. In these texts, university-educated experts are presented as a means of reform, and failures of expertise are castigated; knowledge and experts emerge as a social good which offers a pathway to managing change and contingency. The role of experts and the reception of the past was also central to the paper by Joseph Lemberg. Addressing debates over the interpretation of Charlemagne in 1935, Lemberg's paper focused on the successful career of the German medievalist Friedrich Baethgen. Negotiating the poles of race and Reich ideology, Baethgen rehabilitated the idea of Charlemagne as a founder of the German Empire against the attacks of Alfred Rosenberg. Lemberg's paper accorded with the ple-

nary address by Stuart Airlie, who discussed the complex and mediated reception and projection of medieval power and rulership in the twentieth century, through reflections on Percy Ernst Schramm and Aby Warburg.

Questions of authority, knowledge, and the production of value mentioned in the preceding papers were pursued more closely in a trio of papers dealing with church structures, politics, and canon law. Étienne Doublier examined the use of indulgences by Pope Gregory IX, arguing that indulgences served as an efficient political instrument which supported and shaped the newly founded mendicant orders, particularly through crusade sermons, the inquisition, and the cult of the saints. Jeffrey Wayno analysed the communication practices and strategies of Pope Alexander III during the schism of 1159 and the role of Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg, in that conflict. Wayno's particular emphasis lay in the importance of the Archbishop's information networks for the Pope. Strategies of communication, this time in legal settings, were a theme for Emily Corran, who examined the function and the development of oaths of calumny in thirteenth-century canon law. She argued that the oath had a limited practical impact on court decisions. Instead it functioned as a statement of the ethical values of the ecclesiastical courts in the face both of increasing professionalization of the law and the concomitant danger of morally questionable legal practice.

Legally and ethically questionable inquisitorial practice emerged in Eugene Smelyansky's investigation of itinerant inquisitors in the fourteenth century. Smelyansky's paper focused on the means by which one such inquisitor, Heinrich Angermeier, negotiated and constructed his inquisitorial power and practice in the persecution of Waldensians in late fourteenth-century Augsburg. Smelyansky's largely cultural-historical analysis of late medieval urban persecution of heresy was balanced by investigations of urban and communal social structures in the papers by Dana Durkee and Lilach Assaf. Taking fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Norwich as an example, Durkee examined questions of social mobility in the late medieval English town. Revising theories of mercantile domination of guilds in Norwich, Durkee argued for the importance of weavers' guilds in Norwich's civic elite and traced examples of social mobility within these groups. Assaf's examination of Jewish memorial books explored social structures and gender relations in German Jewish

communities from the thirteenth century onwards by means of naming practices, leading her to suggestive conclusions concerning changes in women's positions within families and Ashkenazi communities.

In contrast to the lives of these Jewish women, Linda Dohmen's paper examined the women of the Carolingian court. Using Richardis, wife of Emperor Charles III, as a case study, Dohmen examined accusations of sexual impropriety against the wives of Carolingian rulers. She focused on the political implications of those accusations and emphasized the explanatory value of their political discourse for relations between Emperors and Carolingian elites. This emphasis on rule, as practised and performed, continued in three papers examining the complexities of hegemony in fifteenth-century Europe. Duncan Hardy explored lateral interactions between political actors, such as regional leagues and alliances, in the south-western Holy Roman Empire. Arguing against exclusively vertical analyses of imperial action, Hardy used the example of Emperor Sigismund to show how rulers could instrumentalize horizontal structures for political ends. Hardy's emphasis on the mechanics of horizontal relations was complemented by Daniela Kah's examination of self-representation and strategic communication in the imperial cities of Augsburg, Lübeck, and Nuremberg. Combining communication studies and art history, Kah interpreted the ways in which imperial presence was constructed and negotiated in civic architecture and town planning in the second half of the fifteenth century. Like Kah's paper, Julia Crispin's paper straddled the disciplines of political history and art history. Through a close examination of the manuscripts illuminated in Paris for John of Bedford, regent of France from 1422 to 1435, Crispin interpreted their function and use as devotional aids and pedagogical tools, showing their representations of politically central ideals of lineage and Lancastrian rule in fifteenth-century France.

Such questions of cultural interchange, transfer, and interaction were the subject of a final group of papers spanning an array of settings from early medieval Rome to early sixteenth-century Ethiopia. Maya Maskarinec's examination of the introduction of the cults of Eastern soldier–saints to early medieval Rome showed how these militant saints were shaped by, and responded to, the needs and ideals of changing communities, particularly the Byzantine presence

in Rome. In turn, these soldier–saints aided the development of Rome's new Christian topography. Moving northwards, Jan Clauß's paper examined the texts of Theodulf, Bishop of Orléans and scholar at the court of Charlemagne. Theodulf introduced specific Visigothic traditions and modes of communication, shaping Frankish court and scholarly culture. Christopher Braun was the sole historian of the medieval Arab world. His paper examined the enigmatic genre of handbooks for treasure-hunting in Egypt. These guides, which provide instruction for finding buried treasure and for the occult rituals associated with extracting it, present a window into the widespread phenomenon of treasure-hunting in the medieval world. Finally, in a paper based on the material culture of late medieval Ethiopia, Verena Krebs showed how European visual culture was received at the Christian court of the Emperor of Ethiopia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Through textual traces of European artists at the Ethiopian court, as well as surviving visual materials, Krebs shone a light on this complex and as yet under-researched world of cultural exchange and contact.

The seminar concluded with a wide-ranging discussion, led by Patrick Geary, on the purposes and methods of historical research. Debate about the purposes of history, and its social and cultural roles, led to reflections on the importance of public history from a variety of participants. This emphasis on the participation of historians in public life was mirrored by a strong emphasis on the important role of teaching in academic life. The role of teaching in maintaining a vibrant public discourse of history in turn generated reflections on the ways in which research can be tied to both dissemination and teaching. Yet, as several participants insisted, research also exists as a contribution to the longer history of academic discourse, emerging in unexpected ways at unexpected times to challenge and supplement later historical practice.

The 2013 seminar saw the retirement of Patrick Geary and Michael Borgolte from their leading roles in the Medieval History Seminar. It was fitting, then, that the final discussions closed with warm thanks for their rigorous dedication in mentoring early career medieval historians, and for their extraordinarily distinguished service to fostering international dialogue in the study of the medieval world.

MATTHEW CHAMPION (Queen Mary, University of London)
JULIA CRISPIN (University of Münster)

Swan Songs? Reconsidering the Death of Industrial Britain (ca. 1970–90). Workshop organized by Jörg Arnold (Nottingham) and held at the German Historical Institute London, 17–18 October 2013.

In March 2014 it will be thirty years since the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) embarked on a national strike against a programme of accelerated closures in the coal industry, pitting the NUM against the National Coal Board (NCB) and the Conservative government of the day, but also against its own members who refused to heed the traditional obligation not to cross a picket line. The strike was the most visceral industrial dispute in post-war British history. It dragged on for twelve months and ended in the total (although unacknowledged) defeat of the NUM. In retrospect, the Great Miners' Strike of 1984–5 is often seen as a turning point. In Avner Offer's memorable phrase, 'the miners' strike of 1984 was the proletarians' last stand',[1] marking the symbolic end of a socio-economic and socio-cultural model that had conceived of British society in terms of manual labour, industrial production, and collective responsibilities. As two journalists put it in a recent popular history of the strike: 'Before 1984, Britain was an industrial nation, reborn from the ashes of the Second World War by Clement Atlee's vision of a welfare state. After the miners' strike, which ended with humiliating defeat in March 1985, Thatcher's Britain was born.'[2]

The workshop had two goals: on an empirical level, it aimed to place the miners' strike of 1984–5 into the context of broader changes in the economy, society, and culture of late twentieth-century Britain. Indeed, ever since the mid 1960s, seismic shifts had been observable, from manufacturing to services; from full employment to ever larger residues of structural unemployment; from collective identities to the rise of individualism; from consensual models of conflict resolution to antagonistic models; and from confident visions of the future to a dystopian contraction of horizons.

The full conference programme can be found under Events and Conferences on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

[1] Avner Offer, 'British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers, c. 1950–2000', *Contemporary British History*, 22/4 (2008), 537–71.

[2] Francis Beckett and David Hencke, *Marching to the Fault Line: The Miners' Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain* (London, 2009), dust jacket.

On a conceptual level, the workshop aimed to bring into dialogue two historiographical traditions—and communities of scholars!—that, first appearances notwithstanding, all too often take too little notice of each other. For example, many comparative studies by German scholars on aspects of the social and cultural challenges facing European societies after the end of the post-war boom find little resonance in the mainstream historiography of contemporary Britain. Yet not only this specialist work, but also the broader theoretical underpinnings, such as the plea to reconfigure contemporary history in the light of the problems facing our present, are rarely taken note of by historians working in the UK.[3] Likewise, a persistent belief lingers among scholars working in the German context that there is no such thing as British contemporary history, all the pioneering empirical work and methodological innovations of the last twenty-five years notwithstanding.

The workshop was organized in four sections, broadly corresponding to economic, political, social, and cultural developments in late twentieth-century Britain. The panels placed particular emphasis on Scottish, regional, and 'marginal' developments in order to balance what often seems like a woefully London and elite-centred perspective.

Section one, 'After the Boom: Economic Developments', looked at Scotland as a case study in order to assess the extent and limits of deindustrialization in the second half of the twentieth century, the political ramifications of socio-economic change, and the impact on individual localities. In his introductory paper George Peden (Stirling) provided an overview of developments in the Scottish economy from the mid 1960s to the early twenty-first century. As he made clear, the Scottish economy underwent dramatic changes in the period under discussion. The industrial sector, in particular, became much leaner, especially as far as employment was concerned, contracting drastically from 39 per cent of total employment to a mere 11 per cent by 2007. While the 'Victorian' staples of coal, shipbuilding, steel, and textiles became virtually extinct (with the exception of steel), and car manufacturing shared their fate, there were, however, also success stories, notably in the food and drinks sector and in electronics. In the light of this contradictory evidence, Peden cautioned,

[3] See Lutz Raphael and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (3rd edn. Göttingen, 2012).

talk of the 'death' of industrial Britain might well be misplaced. In the second paper, Jim Phillips (Glasgow) examined the political management of structural economic change in Scotland, with particular emphasis on the coal industry. Taking as a point of departure the observation that 'deindustrialization does not just happen',[4] Phillips employed E. P. Thompson's concept of the 'moral economy' in order to explain the relative absence of industrial conflict over the rundown of the coal industry in the 1950s and 1960s as compared to the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas the social and economic fallout of change was corporately managed in the former period, by the 1970s key players in the industry started to abandon consensual approaches and thereby subverted the 'moral economy' of deindustrialization. The first panel concluded with a paper by Jim Tomlinson (Glasgow) on the town of Dundee, where deindustrialization took the form of 'dejutefication', making the town on the Firth of Tay a much less globalized place by the end of the twentieth century than it had been a hundred years earlier.

Section two, 'Divided We Fall?', shifted the focus from the economic sphere to politics and, in particular, industrial conflict. Chris Wrigley (Nottingham) examined the trajectory of the coal industry in the years following the 1984–5 strike. As he made clear, the denationalization of the industry, pursued since 1988 and hailed by one contemporary as 'the ultimate privatization', hastened the way to the virtual extinction of coalmining in the UK. In the process, the 'working miners' of the break-away Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM), who in 1984–5 had proved crucial to the defeat of the NUM, were unceremoniously cast aside. However, as Kim Christian Priemel (Berlin) showed in his paper on the printing trade unions in the period from the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s, unity proved no safeguard against what often appeared to be inexorable forces of modernizing change. In the conflict with management, the alleged industrial muscle of the trade unions, much debated in the 1970s, was soon exposed as the myth that it had always been. In the final paper of the section, David Stewart (University of Central Lancashire) drew attention to the link between deindustrialization and electoral politics. The huge Ravenscraig steelworks located near the town of Motherwell

[4] Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* (New York, 1982), 15.

came to symbolize, in the eyes of many Scots, the status of Scotland as an industrial power. When the mill finally closed in 1992, after a long and protracted struggle, the Scottish Conservative Party was widely held responsible and, Stewart argued, never recovered electorally from the blow to its reputation.

Section three took its subtitle, 'From Producers to Consumers', from the influential essay by Avner Offer, but added a question mark in order to leave room for doubt about the heuristic value of a (wistfully nostalgic?) teleology. In her introductory paper, Selina Todd (Oxford) cautioned that to focus on (male) industrial labour is to neglect large sections of 'the people' throughout much of the twentieth century. Servants, for example, made up the largest group of the working class well into the 1950s. Todd also stressed that in order to understand the changes in working-class life, 'all the groups who shape class relations' need to be examined, and not just working people's own perceptions of themselves and others. Sina Fabian (Potsdam) looked at patterns of holidaymaking among manual workers in the 1970s and 1980s, charting the decline of the traditional British seaside resort and the concomitant rise of package holidays abroad. In so doing, she called into question broad generalizations about the 1970s and 1980s as 'crisis decades'. In the final paper of this section, Arne Hordt (Tübingen) conceptualized the miners' strike of 1984–5 as an example of a 'threatened order of workplace conflict', paying particular attention to the way in which the strike was played out at local level in the north-east of England.

Section four, 'To Think This is England', was concerned with the impact of economic change on the social fabric of urban communities and the cultural expressions of these developments. Klaus Weinhauer (Bielefeld) argued for a cultural history approach that interprets urban violence as a 'pattern of communication' and puts instances such as the English inner-city riots of the early 1980s into a broader European context. By comparison, Peter Itzen (Freiburg) focused on attempts by the Church of England to speak out in defence of societal groups and regions that were increasingly being pushed to the margins during the 1980s, such as 'the poor' and places like Merseyside and the north-east of England. In the final paper, Harry Cocks (Nottingham) looked at the work of radical filmmaker Derek Jarman as an example of cultural disenchantment with the present and a wistful romanticizing of a better past that never was.

In a stimulating concluding discussion, the value of 'de-industrialization' as an analytical concept was debated and comparisons were drawn between the British and German experiences. Most but not all discussants agreed that E. P. Thompson's notion of the 'moral economy' might serve as a useful tool for explaining why often quite similar socio-economic challenges could elicit radically different political and cultural responses. While the workshop opened up vistas of future research on the history of de-industrialization in late twentieth-century Britain rather than providing definitive answers, there was universal agreement that it had succeeded in bringing into dialogue two historiographical traditions and, more importantly, communities of scholars.

JÖRG ARNOLD (Nottingham)

The World During the First World War: Perceptions, Experiences, and Consequences. Herrenhausen Symposium organized by the German Historical Institute London, Leibniz University Hanover, Volkswagen Foundation, and Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO), and held at the Herrenhausen Palace, 28–30 October 2013.

The centenary of the First World War has triggered a whole series of academic events in 2014, remembering it in various different ways around the globe. We do not yet know whether official commemorations will be limited to narrow national interpretations, or include reflections on the global dimensions of the war. Whose remembrance are we talking about when we discuss the memory of the First World War on a global scale? This was an underlying thread in the many questions posed at the international symposium 'The World During the First World War: Perceptions, Experiences, and Consequences', which discussed the causes, the course, and the consequences of the First World War, paying special attention to its global dimension. Analysing local, social, and political movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, its aim was to remove 'research patterns from the constraints of a narrow European approach'.

The rich programme both reflected the shift from a predominantly military history to a broader focus on social and cultural history in First World War studies, and made space for new interdisciplinary and comparative approaches. The evening lecture, 'The World, the War and the "Sepoy": Words, Images, and Songs. A Literary and Cultural Excavation', delivered by Santanu Das (King's College London), in particular, reflected a new interest in the history of senses and soundscapes of the First World War. Analysing photographs, poems, audio recordings, memoirs, and material objects of Indian colonial soldiers, Das showed how 'subaltern' voices of the First World War can be heard.

In order to include all participants in developing broader lines of thought, general questions on the conceptualization and the historiography of the First World War, the regional effects of the war, its impact on political movements, and new methodological approaches in studying the First World War were debated in plenary sessions.

The full conference programme can be found under Events and Conferences on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

The following panel sessions provided ample opportunity to present new empirical data and gave a chance for further conceptual debate. More than twenty speakers presented their current research with regard to the circulation of people and ideas, the human consequences of war in non-European societies, and new social and political movements. The highly stimulating conference debates can be summarized under the following headings.

Studying the First World War on a Global Scale: Challenges and Conceptual Constraints

Participants in the conference uncompromisingly acknowledged the Great War as a global phenomenon. At the same time, the meaning of Europe in the war and the continuous 'discursive hegemony of Europe' in First World War historiography were critically remarked upon and even challenged in various discussions. In his keynote lecture, Stig Förster (University of Berne) took the audience on a global journey from the European metropolises to battlefields on the rims of empire, and in four steps outlined what constituted a world war, how it came about, how it was fought out, and what its consequences were. He concluded that the war turned out to be more catastrophic than predicted, and argued that it changed the economies, societies, and politics of Europe as much as of the world. In the discussion Förster was confronted with the critique that he was displaying a 'Eurocentric view' of the First World War. He stressed that it was a 'European war' despite its global dimensions because it had started and ended in Europe, was centralized in Europe in 1914, was fought over European affairs, and its main battles took place in Europe, in sharp contrast to the Second World War. Others challenged this interpretation by alluding to the participation of 4 million non-Europeans from colonial or dependent territories, whose experiences of the war were equally relevant.

This argument linked up to the opening remarks by Ulrike Freitag (ZMO), who suggested taking the global dimension seriously and identifying the ways in which the Great War was a world war by adjusting instruments of research and looking at the theatre of war through 'the eyes of a region', rather than merely enlarging the focus of research geographically. She pointed out that a period of wars,

from the Balkan Wars (1912) to the Turkish War of Independence (1923), caused severe ruptures in the Ottoman Empire. Thus the expulsion of Armenians during the war, or the indirect effects of the war, such as the Great Arab Rebellion of 1916, were interventions in the history of the region that were as severe as the First World War. Her implicit plea to revise the 'European periodization' of the war was another constant topic at the conference. This was emphasized by Helmut Bley (University of Hanover), who remarked that the organizers had initially thought of expanding the timeframe of 1914–18 because this 'European periodization' is less relevant once the First World War is perceived from a global perspective. The discussion highlighted that extending the periodization of the First World War changes viewpoints and research questions. For instance, in his paper 'Oil and Beyond: Shifting British Imperial Aspirations and Emerging Oil Capitalism in the First World War', Touraj Atabaki (University of Leiden) put more emphasis on long-term developments and placed the experience of the First World War into the context of the history of capitalism. Dirk Hoerder's (University of Bremen) paper took a similar direction. In it, he convincingly argued that the 'production' of mass labourers and of mass soldiers was intertwined. A large-scale Japanese interdisciplinary project, presented by Shin'ichi Yamamuro and Akeo Okada (University of Kyoto), similarly challenged the periodization and the notion of the First World War as the first 'total' war.

A further point of discussion with regard to re-thinking periodization was brought up by Jennifer Jenkins (University of Toronto), delivering the keynote lecture '1918 and Germany's Eurasian Moment'. She analysed imperial visions and the economic and political aspirations developed by the German foreign office in 'Eurasia' (today Iran, Georgia, and Ukraine) during the war. Jenkins put Germany's war aims in global perspective (vision of economic expansion, mobilization of dissident groups) and demonstrated the relevance of studying the end of the war, a subject that German historiography has long neglected because of the dominant research focus on the beginning of the war.

Regional Perspectives: Comparison and Connections

In the panel discussion 'The World Dimension of the First World War Rediscovered: The Regional Perspective', Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and Chinese experiences of the First World War were centre stage. Stefan Rinke (Free University of Berlin) briefly sketched the political situation of Latin American countries, many of them neutral, on the eve of war. Analysing media representations of Europe, once the civilizatory role model, he showed how Europe came to be represented as a place of barbarism during the course of the war. Further, he elaborated on how this experience inspired a new national self-understanding and fostered the Argentinian student movement. Stefan Reichmuth (University of Bochum) stressed a similar changing perception of Europe in the representation of the war. He explained how new models of political institutions (monarchies, presidential states, mandate systems, and so on) were created during and after the war in the Middle East. He argued that the war represented a watershed for Muslim politics because of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which led to the rise of socialist ideas and nationalist movements, and disillusionment for Islamist ideas as a result of the end of the Khilafat movement in India. Toyin Falola (University of Austin) presented the 'African perspective' on the First World War and the transformative results of the war in general terms for the continent. He concluded that the loss of German colonies led, firstly, to a rethinking of colonialism in Europe and Africa by making it possible to talk openly about (mis)management of colonies. It also created the notion of material well-being and the progress of colonies as a new international aspiration. Secondly, the war created a shift in international relations and gave rise to anti-colonial agitation as evoked by Woodrow Wilson's policies and the Russian Revolution. Further, the creation of an African elite by Western education and, finally, the development of nationalist movements in Africa were significant for the continent and the long-term outcomes of the war. Guoqi Xu (University of Hong Kong) argued that China was important for the war through its participation in key war events, its political involvement, its military and personnel contributions, and its participation in the Paris Peace conference of 1919. The war was pivotal to China because its involvement in the war allowed the country to redefine its role in the emerging world system of nation-states. It

therefore marked a watershed in the formation of national identity, for example, with regard to the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

Other regional case studies, as presented by Radikha Singha (Jawaharlal Nehru University) on the experience and representation of the Indian Labour Corps in France, and by Babacar Fall (University Cheikh Anta Diop) speaking on 'Forced Labour in French West Africa 1900–9', showed how poor people from British India and French West Africa were sent to the European battlefields, demonstrating that 'class' was a relevant category across regions. The discussion stressed that such systematic comparative investigations of the war experience of social actors (soldiers, workers) across regions could allow for a 'common plebeian perspective' and provide a means of overcoming 'containers' or 'black boxes' of national or regional interpretations. With regard to comparison, it was stressed that comparative neutrality offers a promising new research topic considering, for example, Scandinavia, the Iberian peninsula, Ethiopia, or the role of the USA before 1917.

Another major issue of debate was whether the war was a catalyst for political movements across regions. Helmut Bley stressed that the First World War did not trigger political mobilization, but had radicalizing effects. In her paper Katja Füllberg-Stolberg (University of Hanover) discussed the development of the Pan-African movement during and after the war, while Patricio Geli (Universidad Tres de Febrero) showed the impact of war on the socialist party of Argentina. Ali Raza (ZMO) explored the transnational links of the Indian national movement in the interwar period, and analysed the impact of the Russian Revolution in shaping the Indian revolutionary movement. The role of the Gallipoli catastrophe in creating Australian national consciousness was discussed by Joan Beaumont (Australian National University) and contrasted with Michael Göbel's (Free University Berlin) findings for France.

A Global Social History of the First World War?

The symposium showed how important it is to bring together social and global history by linking historical approaches with social science, not least in order to generate microstudies. Discussions centred on the question of how to merge global and social history in studies

of the First World War. The panel 'Pandemic and Healing', which discussed infectious diseases in a comparative and transnational perspective, was a good example of how to combine these approaches, as was the paper by Samiksha Sehrawat (Newcastle University), who discussed the networks and practices of humanitarian aid organizations with special reference to the Indian context. Another major topic of debate was the long-term effects for societies, as debated in the panel 'The Social Impacts of the War'. Sara Ellinor Morack (Free University Berlin) discussed how a focus on materiality, in her case, houses abandoned after the Greek–Turkish population exchange, can provide insights into the legal and social relationships between different ethnic communities, not only before and during, but also after the war. Others stressed that questions regarding the war as an accelerator of social mobilization, for example, in women's emancipation, had been asked in the 1970s in a national context. Discussing these questions on a global scale now seemed a promising but challenging endeavour with regard to its comparative regional dimension.

How to organize this in practical terms was debated in the session 'Open Research Questions and New Approaches to the First World War', in which Oliver Janz (Free University Berlin) introduced the international collaborative project '1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopaedia of the First World War', and Barbara Göbel (Ibero-American Institute Berlin) discussed structural obstacles in organizing international research projects with regard to Latin American studies. In the same panel Britta Lange (Humboldt University of Berlin), analysing examples of sound recordings from the Humboldt University's sound archive, addressed the issue of the authenticity of sources, power structures behind archives, and the challenges historians face in using these sources in research.

The conference showed that thinking about the First World War on a global scale does not mean just looking at different regions, but thinking of them together and fostering comparative, translocal, and interdisciplinary approaches. At the same time, it was obvious that many discussions at the conference were dominated by the paradigms of social history, such as 'class', 'capitalism', or 'gender', and were perceived by some discussants as neglecting research achievements that tried to break with such metanarratives. Some argued that interdisciplinary approaches should be strengthened by systematically including literary studies, medical history, or archaeology in the

study of the First World War. The implied tension in studying the 'World during the First World War' (as the conference title suggested) was critically remarked upon because it makes the war the central historical event for global societies and, as such, reproduces a European paradigm. Seeing the war as the background to historical events (such as the Massacre of Amritsar in 1919 or the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin) would produce a more nuanced picture of what had happened in different parts of the world.

The conference gave space to a large variety of presentations on non-European war experiences, and also critically remarked upon the challenges of studying the First World War on a global scale. For a wider public, the upcoming national commemorations will show what significance is accorded to non-European war experiences and perceptions.

LARISSA SCHMID (Zentrum Moderner Orient)

Eleventh Workshop on Early Modern Central European History, co-organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German History Society, and held at the GHIL on 15 November 2013. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), and Angela Schattner (GHIL).

The German Historical Institute London once again hosted the annual workshop on early modern central European history, which brought together a total of thirty-four scholars working on aspects of early modern German history. Eleven papers, presented by participants from Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the USA, ranged widely thematically and chronologically, covering topics as diverse as micro-republics in Germany and Switzerland, notions of trust and mistrust in the Holy Roman Empire, and the transfer of saints' relics from Rome to Bavaria. Methodologically, approaches were equally broad, ranging from socio-political assessments of mining cities to global aspects of early modern writing, from anthropological analyses of blood and kinship to studies of early modern childhood through children's histories, and from musicology to literary analyses.

The first panel, on Trust, Political Culture, and Spatiality, opened with a paper by Hannes Ziegler (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich) which drew attention to notions of trust and mistrust in the Holy Roman Empire between the Augsburg Peace of 1555 and the beginning of the Thirty Years War in 1618. Trust played an important part in shaping and appropriating religious and political differences in an age of confessional co-existence. As a concept it not only impacted on the perception of others and political discourses, but was utilized to influence politics. Franziska Neumann (University of Dresden) employed tools of the 'new cultural history' and 'cultural history of politics' to analyse mining cities in the East German *Erzgebirge*. Neumann stressed the importance of complicating our understanding of cities and argued that mining cities offered a particularly telling example of the interaction of different power stakeholders whose varied interests and politics influenced the urban fabric. By looking for common 'mining values' and triangulating the

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political culture of these cities through inclusion of territorial lords, urban authorities, and miners, Neumann argued that we could gain an accurate picture of the complexity of these cities in the early modern period. Beat Kümin (University of Warwick) provided a fascinating account of early modern micro-republics. Drawing attention to their unusual degree of autonomy in places such as Dithmarschen, Gersau as well as imperial free villages in central Germany and shedding light on the foundation, appropriation, and repercussions of this urban independence, Kümin pointed out that these particular examples call into question notions of state-building and confessionalization and concluded by asking whether an alternative 'early modernity' existed within the Empire. Susanne Rau (University of Erfurt) delivered the final paper in the session with an analysis of urban spaces and how spatial relations were perceived by travellers and walkers. Presenting a part of her research project on early modern urbanization as a spatio-temporal process, Rau found that notions of time moving forward in a linear fashion cannot be applied satisfactorily to space and spatiality. Focusing on Barcelona as a case study, Rau argued that notions of space in an urban context, which can be reconstructed through travelogues, can only be studied successfully if attention is paid to narrative constructions and an individual's subjective agenda and background.

The second session focused on religious culture. Noria Litaker (University of Pennsylvania) presented findings of her dissertation project on the practice of moving martyrs' relics from Roman catacombs discovered in the late sixteenth century to Bavaria and other regions of the Empire. She struck a fine balance between the presentation of relics on a local level and the use of catacomb saints in a broader national and international Counter-Reformation. Although requested and bought by local rulers and clerical elites, the saints, frequently presented in splendid manner and adorned with gold, jewels, and silver, were included in local and regional traditions and could form an important part of local identity. In the second part of her paper Litaker also shed light on the visual representation of the saints as Roman soldiers in pamphlets and broadsheets. The evidence presented suggests there was a conscious Catholic attempt to reinforce clerical doctrine by sending catacomb saints in a number of different appropriations and variations to the whole of Europe. Matthew Laube (Royal Holloway, University of London) continued

the session with a paper entitled 'Minding the Gap: Music, Authority, and Confession in Heidelberg, 1556–1618'. He investigated the construction of Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic confessional identities through the use of music in a city which experienced a particularly turbulent era between 1556 and 1618. Through the oscillation between Lutheran and Calvinist rulers, Heidelberg was particularly prone to confessional change. Laube argued that the confessionalization thesis has to be refined in the case of Heidelberg as Lutherans, Catholics, and Calvinists borrowed heavily from each other in their hymn books, and religious music was not imposed in order to form a coherent and self-contained confessional society. Linnéa Rowlatt (University of Kent/Free University of Berlin) gave an account of Johann Geiler von Keysersberg's perception of the weather and environment in Strasburg during the Little Ice Age. By analysing the last recorded sermons of the Catholic preacher von Keysersberg, Rowlatt traced the preacher's wish to inform and educate his listeners about extreme weather conditions and provide them with remedies for it. In an age of extreme weather (1473–1550), such advice was highly welcome. Strikingly, however, Geiler did not illustrate his sermons with metaphors about weather or point to bad weather conditions as divine punishment.

Allyson Creasman (Carnegie Mellon University) opened the final session of the workshop on Society and Language with an account of insult and slander in early modern Germany. Creasman analysed cases of slander and insult in the criminal and civil courts of early modern Germany, focusing especially on notions of gender, honour, and civic identity. Creasman argued that accusations of insult and slander were normally tried in secular courts of mixed jurisdiction and not clerical ones. Rather than the assumed centrality of women's sexuality for an individual's honour, Creasman found in a representative analysis of civic court records that the reputation of both men and women rested on economic, social, and cultural factors, as well as their sexual reputation. Abaigéal Warfield (University of St Andrews) shared her research on witchcraft, infanticide, and the midwife–witch in the early modern German *Hexenzeitungen*, which formed part of her doctoral studies. Warfield investigated the rumours that witches killed infants for their rituals and used them for spells and magic potions. While recently historians have found that not many midwives were actually tried for witchcraft, Warfield

argued that the stereotype was nonetheless heavily publicized and communicated, especially in news reports (*Neue Zeitungen*). Even if not many midwives were therefore persecuted, the myth of the midwife–witch was a powerful and ever-present stereotype. Discourses of incest were the topic of David Sabean's (University of California) paper. By applying the concept of 'kinship', pioneered by Sabean in a historical context, he traced broader societal and cultural changes including sibling relations, families, and ideas about blood. These concepts of familial relations and blood were then traced to legal texts and biblical hermeneutics. Taking the long seventeenth century, Sabean illuminated how newly constructed notions of kinship revolved around lineages, vertical relationships, and rules of exogamy. Claudia Jarzebowski (Free University of Berlin) concluded the workshop with a paper on 'World Hi/stories for Children in the Eighteenth Century'. World histories for children—the intended audience was both adults and infants—have to be seen in connection with broader Enlightenment education and new perceptions of the world at large. Jarzebowski identified two types of world histories for children: one which depicted European superiority, and one more conciliatory and inclusive kind. Authors of the latter type tended to have travelled extensively and possessed connections around the world, through communication networks, trade, and personal ties; while authors of the former kind usually gained their knowledge from books and second-hand accounts.

A final discussion amongst all participants concluded that the workshop had brought to the fore many important current issues in early modern German and central European research and had been intellectually highly stimulating for all involved. Amongst others, these issues included the continuing popularity of the history of emotions, the return to a focus on individuals' perceptions of religious and political change, and the negotiation involved in many early modern processes. Participants felt that the great variety and diversity of presentations, many of which examined entirely different topics, led to fruitful discussions and the opportunity to approach their own research in novel and innovative ways. It remains to be hoped that the extremely informative and productive workshop will continue for many years to come.

MARTIN CHRIST (Oxford)

The Consumer on the Home Front: Second World War Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective. Conference organized jointly by the German Historical Institutes London, Moscow, and Washington and held at the GHIL, 5–7 December 2013. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHIW), Andreas Gestrich (GHIL), Nikolaus Katzer (GHIM), Jan Logemann (GHIW), Felix Römer (GHIL), Sergey Kudryashov (GHIM).

The home front of the Second World War is increasingly being recognized by historians not only as a vital part of military strategies during a war with an unparalleled degree of civilian mobilization, but also as a catalyst for broader social developments, for example, in gender and race relations. Collaboratively organized by three German Historical Institutes, this conference looked at the relationship of war and mass consumption and the role of the consumer in the war efforts of Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. While mass consumption has long been associated primarily with liberal democracies, research on Nazi Germany as well as Communist countries has demonstrated the degree to which these regimes also engaged the growing importance of mass consumption, even if in the Soviet case the structures of a mass consumer society did not fully develop until after the war. In the context of the war, however, the state rather than the market often played a central role in organizing consumption across all regimes. Next to comparative questions of how wartime consumption was organized and experienced, many papers also highlighted transnational exchanges and learning processes.

Hartmut Berghoff introduced the conference topic by highlighting the significance that all major powers attributed to civilian consumption during the Second World War, building on the lessons from the preceding war. The 'modern' home front under conditions of total war was seen as paramount for maintaining civilian morale, which meant that a shift to military consumption was inherently limited. Minimum standards of provisioning and a sense of distributional justice had to be ensured, and consumers were mobilized to participate in production, conservation, and distribution efforts. Consumption in fashion and entertainment also served as a form of

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distraction, while planners and marketing professionals in many countries fostered forms of 'virtual consumption', the promise of a consumerist post-war future which created a lasting legacy. Sheldon Garon, in the first keynote address, emphasized the global and transnational nature of home front planning, which runs counter to prevailing myths and narratives of national distinctiveness in collective memories of wartime experience. Taking Japan as his vantage point, Garon highlighted shared challenges in maintaining production and morale, in food security, and rationing. Far from unique, the Japanese, like other powers, paid close attention to the lessons of the First World War with its blockades, shortages, and ultimate home front collapses. They drew on a growing international body of knowledge in nutritional science to prepare for the coming war and mounted an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to maintain food self-sufficiency during the war. As clothing became increasingly uniform and much of the nascent consumer goods industry was converted to wartime production, food consumption became ever more central to the Japanese war experience by the end of the conflict.

Securing civilian nutrition was generally a central element in wartime efforts to maintain the home front, as explored in the first two panels of the conference. Rationing and price controls were part of the war experience in all societies under consideration here, albeit to significantly different degrees. Food provisioning was the central challenge in the Soviet Union, as Wendy Goldman showed, and deprivation was the predominant experience of most Russian civilians. Rationing was almost entirely handled through institutional canteens, while the retail sector was virtually non-existent. Still, the intricate rationing system was riddled with inequalities and corruption, often failing to provide factory workers with the bare minimum needed for survival. The consumer as an individual receded into the background in the Japanese case as well. Erich Pauer discussed the role of neighbourhood organizations in organizing rice rationing and the increasingly centralized distribution system that had supplanted private retailers and markets by the end of the war. In Germany, by contrast, consumer choice remained more viable and certain indulgences were seen as essential to morale. Nicole Petrick-Felber showed that while coffee consumption shifted entirely to surrogate products because of a collapse in imports, tobacco remained 'vital' to the war effort. Cigarette production continued, but after 1944 the

state increasingly lost control over the rationing process as black markets emerged. For the Western Allies, the situation was entirely different, as Ines Prodöhl's paper demonstrated. She analysed the Combined Food Board, an international body set up in 1942 to organize the distribution of US agricultural surpluses to allied nations. While shortages in areas such as fats and oils riddled Western Allies as well, American abundance and global access to goods ensured that starvation was of little concern in the West.

Differences in available supply and the distribution of foodstuffs made for very different experiences in home front consumption by civilian consumers. In the United Kingdom, as Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska explained, scarcity, not starvation, was the primary experience. While a 'flat rate' rationing system promised a sense of equitable sacrifice, black markets, self-supplied consumers in the countryside, and the possibility of circumventing rationing in restaurants posed challenges to the 'fair share' principle and its promise to mitigate class distinctions. Still, many post-war Britons would go on to memorialize a mythical 'wartime community'. Many Germans, too, Felix Römer argued, viewed the home front situation in a relatively positive light. Based on US surveys among German POWs, his paper analysed the views of *Wehrmacht* soldiers regarding the food situation on the home front and cross-referenced them with research about the German rationing system. In the soldiers' perception, he concluded, maintaining sufficient caloric intake outweighed the negative experience of deteriorating food quality, which was due not least to the vivid memory of conditions during the First World War. Donald Filtzer analysed Soviet home front experiences by looking at infant mortality rates. Poor hygiene and pervasive illness as well as shortages of milk and fuel presented conditions rife for mass mortality, which indeed spiked early in the war. Yet overall, the war saw an eventual decline in mortality which could, in part, be attributed to state programmes but also speaks for the already high levels of mortality before the war and the continuity in experiences of deprivation and scarcity that, for many Russian consumers, spanned the interwar and the post-war period.

The subsequent panel on wartime advertising provided a stark contrast to the realities of malnutrition in some countries, and furthermore provided surprising parallels between liberal democracies such as the UK and the USA and the organized economy of Nazi

Germany. David Clampin presented the British case, where advertisers were keen to contribute to the war effort, but also careful to maintain brand-awareness and encourage future consumption. Post-war visions of consumerism took the form either of forward-looking visions of modernity or a nostalgic promise of return to the 'good old days'. The anticipation they stoked, however, proved to be a political liability as rationing continued after the war. Many American advertisers, Cynthia Lee Henthorn argued, also blurred the line between government propaganda and commercial advertising. The overriding concern of US industry, however, was to ensure a return to an unfettered market economy in the post-war years. The consumerist world of tomorrow was to be a world of free enterprise. German advertisers, as Pamela Swett showed, also pursued their own commercial interests. While advertisements for consumer goods linked consumption and national expansionism, industry struggled to retain a degree of distance from the regime, especially towards the end of the war. Maintaining brand awareness during rationing was central for German advertising men, too, and Swett's examples suggested a surprising degree of continuity from the pre- to the post-war period.

Wartime nations thus frequently relied on 'virtual consumption', the deferral of immediate consumer satisfaction in anticipation of later rewards. In addition to advertising, the commercial entertainment industry was utilized to boost morale and influence consumer desires. Mila Ganeva discussed the prominence of fashion in wartime German media, from magazines to movies. While managing scarcity was an acknowledged reality, the imaginary consumption of luxury high fashion retained a prominent place in the media landscape. Even in the Soviet Union, as Sergei Zhuravlev showed, new fashion magazines appeared during the war. While textiles were extremely difficult to obtain, wartime photographs attest to a continuing concern with appearing fashionable among many Russian civilians. Despite a widespread struggle for survival, Russian workers in provincial factories also often had their first encounters with theatre and ballet, as cultural institutions were displaced from the major population centres. Erina Megowan argued that the Soviet policy of bringing 'high culture' and brigades of performers to the hinterland during the war was well received and had a lasting impact on cultural consumption across the country. In Germany, by contrast, as

Neil Gregor suggested, the continued practice of regularly attending symphony concerts attested to a continuation of 'banal social habits' and a sense of everyday normalcy amidst total war. At least in certain areas, 'normal life' persisted and a shortage of material goods meant that surplus income during the war could be spent on entertainment. This panel certainly raised questions about the paradoxes of wartime consumption and the at times jarring juxtaposition of cultural consumption and entertainment with pervasive mass death.

The final part of the conference focused on the legacies of wartime consumption. Frank Trentmann opened this section with the second keynote address. He challenged the audience to consider the implications of the war for the long-term development of mass consumption, especially in the Western world. On the one hand, 1945 was not the dramatic break that is often assumed and consumer desires were deeply rooted and well developed prior to a war which did not fundamentally challenge them. On the other hand, the war left its mark on post-war mass consumption. It widened the transatlantic gap in consumption levels; it shifted tastes through wartime migration and exchanges; and it impacted on generational patterns of consumption. Finally, the war heightened belief in the possibility of statecraft and planning for consumption, leading to a secular rise in taxation and public forms of consumption across Western nations.

The papers in the final panel then looked at various legacies of the war, primarily through its impact on expert communities. Jan Lambertz discussed wartime and post-war studies by US and British nutrition experts which yielded new analytical techniques for measuring human 'need' and 'deficiencies', and which would find later application in defining civilian health standards. Looking at Canada, Bettina Liverant showed the impact of the war on economists and policy experts. Canada's experiences with strategic austerity, rationing, price freezes, and consumer surveys, which pre-dated those of its US neighbour, informed post-war efforts to control consumer spending and inflation within the framework of a Keynesian economic policy. Jan Logemann similarly argued that the wartime expansion of state-sponsored market research in the United States acted as a catalyst for post-war transformations in marketing research. Focusing on three prominent émigré consumer researchers, the paper traced both transnational transfers in consumer psychology and the entanglement of commercial, academic, and government

research that connected the warfare state to the post-war consumer's republic. In the Soviet Union, Oleg Khlevnyuk showed, basic structures of provision remained in place from the 1930s to the 1950s, but victory in the war promoted a growing gap between consumer expectations and the continued reality of shortages. Especially as Russian soldiers came into contact with consumption levels in other parts of Europe, pressures for reform mounted, leading to a 'new course' after Stalin's death. The impact of war preparations on innovations in the food industry, finally, was at the centre of Uwe Spiekermann's paper, which traced the effects of efforts by German nutrition experts to improve military food. Iconic consumer goods of the post-war economic miracle, such as instant potato dumplings, he showed, were literally field tested during the war. His paper also provided an important reminder of how closely consumption on the military front and on the civilian home front were intertwined.

The concluding discussion, led by Hartmut Berghoff and Andreas Gestrich, emphasized the surprising degree to which continuities could be traced in various areas of consumption from the pre-war to the post-war eras. Especially for the more developed consumer economies, the Second World War was not as decisive a break in the long-term development of mass consumption. It did, however, provide a point for broader implicit and explicit societal debates about the role of consumption between market and state, individual and community. Despite structural similarities in the challenges posed by wartime consumption and parallel developments across regimes, the comparative look made clear that the experience for consumers varied tremendously among the countries surveyed, with the United States and the Soviet Union representing opposite ends of a spectrum between curtailed affluence and mass deprivation. Everyday wartime experience, for example, in the various constellations of black or grey market activity, was finally noted as an important field for future research, especially as the memories of wartime sacrifices helped to shape cultures of mass consumption in subsequent decades.

JAN LOGEMANN (German Historical Institute Washington)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year's postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to the Administrative Director, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the first allocation for 2014 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, or Anglo-German relations.

Natascha Bohnert (Berlin) Nation und Geschlecht in der britischen Malerei des 18. Jahrhunderts
Isabelle Chwalka (Mainz) Fremd- und Selbstwahrnehmung im 12. Jahrhundert: Deutschland und England im Vergleich
Susanne Friedrich (Munich) Ökonomien des Wissens in der Niederländischen Ostindien-Kompanie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts
Max Gawlich (Heidelberg) Die Elektrokrampftherapie und ihr Apparat zwischen 1938 und 1950
Solveig Grebe (Göttingen) Die Personalunion zwischen Großbritannien und Hannover 1714–1837: Ein internationaler Kommunikations- und Handlungsraum

Lydia Jacobs (Trier) Intermediale (Re-)Präsentationsstrategien von Armut: Das literarische Werk von George R. Sims und seine Adaptionen
Ulrike Kern (Frankfurt am Main) Kontinentale Einflüsse auf die britische Kunstwelt im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert
Alina Khatib (London) Das Kaiserpanorama im Deutschen Kaiserreich und der Weimarer Republik
Silke Körber (Mainz) Deutschsprachige Verleger im Exil in Großbritannien/USA und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des populären illustrierten Sachbuchs im 20. Jahrhundert
Anna Kranzdorf (Mainz) Das humanistische Bildungsideal im öffentlichen Diskurs: Die Entwicklungen des altsprachlichen Unterrichts im deutsch-englischen Vergleich 1920–80
Julia Maxelon (Cologne) Paradigmen der Moderne im europäischen Moscheebau
Birte Meinschien (Frankfurt am Main) A Tale of Two Cultures: Deutschsprachige Historiker in der britischen Emigration nach 1933
Désirée Schauz (Munich) Nützlich oder wahr? Die Entwicklung des modernen Wissenschaftsverständnisses im deutsch-englischen Vergleich (18. und 19. Jahrhundert)
Sascha Schießl (Göttingen) Das Tor zur Freiheit: Die Bewältigung der Kriegsfolgen, Erinnerungspolitik und humanitärer Anspruch im Lager Friedland (1945–80)

Postgraduate Students Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its eighteenth postgraduate students conference on 9–10 January 2014. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same or a similar field. The conference opened with words of welcome from the Deputy Director of the GHIL, Michael Schaich. Over the next one and a half days, thirteen speakers introduced their projects to an interested and engaged audience. The sessions were mostly devoted to the nineteenth century, the First World War, the Third Reich, and the post-1945 period. Participants gave a short summary

of their work containing general ideas, leading questions, sources, and initial findings, followed by discussion. The palaeography course tutored by Dorothea McEwan, which preceded the conference, was well received. Information about institutions that give grants for research in Germany was also exchanged. The GHIL can offer support here by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases it may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students conference early in 2015. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ.

Martin Christ (Oxford) Periculum inter fratres senatus: Urban Identity, the Six Towns League and the Reformation in Upper Lusatia
Tim Corbett (Lancaster) The Place of my Fathers' Sepulchres: The Jewish Cemeteries in Vienna
Eddie Flood (University of Central Lancashire) The German Railway Organization, 1835–1914: A Determination of the Causes for its Rapid Establishment and Effectiveness
John Goddard (UCL) Sozialdemokraten and Lokalisten: Building Worker Trade Unionism under the German Laws of Association, 1868–99
Christiane Grieb (UCL) US War Crimes Policies and Cold War Politics at Dachau, 1945–48
Andrew Kloes (Edinburgh) Protestant Women, Religious Revival, and Social Reform in Nineteenth-Century Hamburg: Amalie Sieveking and 'Der weibliche Verein für Armen- und Krankenpflege', 1832–59
Matt Lawson (Edge Hill) Holocaust Film Music in Germany: Issues and Approaches
Daniel Long (Nottingham Trent) A Disaster in Lübeck Bay: The Cap Arcona, Concentration Camp Inmates, and the RAF, 1944–6
Anna-Katharina Luepke (Bangor) Western European Responses to the Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath
Darren O'Byrne (Cambridge) The New Generation of Nazi Bureaucrats and the Coordination of the German Civil Service

Lisa Renken (Queen Mary) The Merits of Meritocracy: Defining and Evaluating 'Leistung' in the Third Reich and the Federal Republic 1933–75
Jacques Schuhmacher (Oxford) Hitler's War Crimes Investigators: Wehrmacht and SS Investigators of Allied War Crimes and Atrocities 1939–45
Elizabeth Ward (Leeds) The Depiction of Jewish Persecution during the Third Reich in East German Cinema

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British or Irish university), British history (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 Euros. Former Prize winners include Helen Whatmore, David Motadel, Britta Schilling, and Jana Tschurenev. To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British, Irish, or German university after 30 June 2013. To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract
- examiners' reports on the thesis
- a brief CV
- a declaration that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in the Institute's German-language series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision, and
- a supervisor's reference

to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by 31 July 2014. The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute's Annual Lecture on 7 November 2014. For further information visit: <www.ghil.ac.uk>
Email: ghil@ghil.ac.uk Tel: 020 7309 2050

Forthcoming Lecture Series and Conferences

First World War Noises: Listening to the Great War. Lecture Series to be held at the German Historical Institute London, May–July 2014. Speakers: 27 May 2014 Mark Connelly (Canterbury); 10 June 2014 Julia Encke (Berlin); 24 June 2014 Stefan Hanheide (Osnabrück); 15 July 2014 Jeremy Dibble (Durham).

In Monty Python's famous record shop, 'First World War Noises' was not among the 'terrifically popular' items. While other records were selling fast, the soundtrack of the Great War wound up stuck. In modern historiography, too, the acoustics of history have long been left on the shelf, as historians have only just begun to discover the significance of sound as a field of research. Inspired by this new strand of scholarship, the GHIL will mark this year's centenary with a series of lectures that revolve around the auditory dimensions of the First World War. In order to highlight the experience and the impact of sound in history from various angles, the lecture series will take a broad approach, including perspectives from military history, media history, the history of music, and the history of collective memory. The lectures will explore what the acoustics of the Great War meant for the soldiers on the battlefield and how they influenced public remembrance, popular media, and the arts. The lecture series will probe the place of sound in the contemporary experience and the aftermath of the war.

War and Childhood in the Age of the World Wars: Local and Global Perspectives. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute Washington, 5–7 June 2014. Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI Washington), James Marten (Marquette University), Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Arndt Weinrich (GHI Paris).

The goal of the conference is to come to grips with a fundamental paradox: how was it possible for modern societies to re-imagine childhood as a space of sheltered existence and to mobilize children for war at the same time? And how did modern warfare disrupt or accelerate rites of passage in the realms of gender, sexuality, national loyalty, ethnic and racial identity, and military involvement? These questions

assume that young people experienced war in ways that were age-specific and different from how adults endured it. Usually, these differences found some means of expressing themselves, and despite the devastation suffered by real children in wars, the power of youth as a symbol of renewal outlived them. Rather than merely investigate adult representations of youth and childhood in war, the conference aims to uncover the historical processes by which young people acquired agency as historical subjects. This means paying attention to the voices and actions of children in the different locales of modern war—from the home to the homefront; the bomb shelter to the battlefield; the press to the pulpit; the school to the street. At the level of representations, we want to examine how adult institutions (governments, civic organizations, social movements) utilized images of children for wartime propaganda. These images could be deployed for various purposes: to mobilize patriotism and popular support for the war effort; to discredit and dehumanize the enemy; but also to subvert the logic of escalating military and political violence. Contributions cover the nexus of childhood, youth, and war across political and geographical boundaries, and research revolving around a group of people, a region, a nation, or a paricular cultural space. The conference addresses historians specializing in various fields (military, political, social, economic, and cultural history) and aims to create a synthesis of the historiographies on war, youth, and childhood from roughly 1910 to 1950.

Remembering (Post)Colonial Violence: Silence, Suffering and Reconciliation. Workshop to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 19–20 June 2014. Conveners: Eva Bischoff (University of Trier/Martin Buber Society of Friends, Hebrew University), and Elizabeth Buettner (Universiteit van Amsterdam).

'We exist in a violent and violated world, a world characterized by . . . the peaceful violence of historical dispossession, of racial, cultural, and economic subjugation and stigmatization.' In these words, the Hawaiian writer and intellectual Haunani-Kay Trask summarizes the legacy of colonial conquest and imperial rule. Her conclusion is shared by the majority of scholars analysing the history of European colonial expansion. Yet the use of violence often did not end with the

achievement of political independence. Many societies of the Global South inherited a legacy of colonial and anti-colonial violence, which turned into postcolonial violence after the formation of independent nation-states. How are we to deal with loss and displacement, the experiences of physical and sexualized violence by victims and perpetrators alike, at the individual and the collective level? This is an urgent question in many societies of the Global South. Remembering colonial violence is also a crucial aspect of many political debates in European countries today. Here, the question of what constitutes the nation's colonial legacy and how to commemorate it is closely intertwined with debates on immigration and national identities. As Paul Ricoeur has demonstrated, collective memory is constituted of both remembering and forgetting. Often, an 'excess of memory' goes hand in hand with an 'excess of forgetting'. Taking up Ricoeur's insights, this workshop will examine the relationship between silence and enunciation in constituting the collective memories of (post)colonial violence. It will explore questions such as: how do postcolonial societies cope with the experience of colonial and postcolonial violence? What role do collective silences play in the processes of remembrance and reconciliation? What are the relationships of power involved? What are the similarities and differences between European societies and the societies of the Global South?

Dynamics of Social Change and Perceptions of Threat. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 29 September–1 October 2014. Conveners: Ewald Frie (University of Tübingen) and Andreas Gestrich (GHIL).

The conference will inquire into the possibilities and processes of political and social change in situations in which societies, or parts of society, perceive substantial threats, such as uprisings and revolts, disasters, phases of acceleration in otherwise lengthy transformation processes, or violent encounters between rival models of order, each claiming validity for society as a whole. Drawing on examples from Antiquity to the present, from several parts of the world, and different fields of research (history, philology, political science, anthropology), the conference asks how, and under what conditions, threats may lead to a reconfiguration of values, structures of authority,

responsibilities, and resources. Under what circumstances will an initially short-term reconfiguration of values, competencies, and resources accelerate social change in the wake of a perceived threat? Or how, and under what conditions, will the old order be re-affirmed and restored, assuming that this is possible? We are referring to change in a broad sense, for instance, to changes in basic social orders as well as to sub-orders. This will open up the possibility of correlating reciprocities between changes or continuities of order on a multiplicity of levels which will, in turn, afford a differentiated insight into the processes at work.

Inside World War One? Ego Documents and the Experience of War. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 23–25 October 2014. Conveners: Richard Bessel (University of York), Heather Jones (LSE), Sönke Neitzel (LSE), and Dorothee Wierling (GHIL).

As the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War approaches, interest in the war has predictably increased and research about the war has developed in new directions. This workshop aims to combine two of these directions: the increased interest in ego-documents from the Great War, and increased interest in the First World War beyond the western front. While British and French perceptions of the First World War understandably focus largely on the western front, and German perceptions too draw largely on the war in the west, increasing attention is now being paid to the fact that the eastern front involved as many soldiers, left behind as many dead, and had consequences at least as significant as what occurred in the west; and the First World War was also a global conflict, with consequences far beyond the European continent. The workshop will aim to discuss the value of ego-documents connected to the First World War, both as part of a broader belief in the 'authentic' access to historical events that they may bring and their use to professional historians, and to extend our understanding of the war geographically and culturally. The opportunity will be used to bring the east as well as the west into the frame, and to compare the nature of ego-documents coming from different cultures. Participants will discuss a broad variety of empirical studies extending over various geograph-

ical locations, the social origins of those who produced the ego-documents, and the themes highlighted in the sources (such as the experience of the battlefield as well as of occupation and homecoming, of the regular soldier as well as of the nurse and the painter). In a concluding panel, the value and uses of ego documents for our understanding of the First World War will be considered.

Society, Rule and its Representation in Medieval Britain. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 13–14 November 2014. Conveners: Julia Crispin (University of Münster) and Cornelia Linde (GHIL).

This conference will present and put up for discussion the work of German early career scholars of medieval Britain. The interdisciplinary event with a strong historical focus is divided into four themed panels consisting of three or four papers each. The focus lies on aspects of social history as well as on concepts and representation of rule and rulers, often with a comparative approach. All speakers are doctoral students or postdocs working on England, Scotland, or Ireland in the Middle Ages. Panel 1: 'Society' looks at various aspects of social history, ranging from fosterage in Ireland to the impact of natural disasters on fourteenth-century society. Panel 2: 'Rule and Kingship' examines, among other questions, perceptions of rulers, both in English and Scottish chronicles. Panel 3: 'Visual Representation' combines four papers with an art history slant, covering topics from artistic exchange between England and Germany in a courtly setting to the first depiction of the English parliament. Panel 4: 'Identity', finally, focuses on the construction of identity in Anglo-Norman and Plantagenet England. The event is intended to encourage young German scholars to pursue work on medieval Britain, and to create a network between them and their British peers. To achieve this, the conference's four panels will be chaired by academics from British universities working on related questions. For further information, please contact Cornelia Linde (linde@ghil.ac.uk).

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

Adam, Christian, *Lesen unter Hitler: Autoren, Bestseller, Leser im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2013)

Afflerbach, Holger, *Die Kunst der Niederlage: Eine Geschichte der Kapitulation* (Munich: Beck, 2013)

Ahrens, Ralf and Johannes Bähr, *Jürgen Ponto. Bankier und Bürger: Eine Biographie* (Munich: Beck, 2013)

Althoff, Gerd, *'Selig sind, die Verfolgung ausüben': Päpste und Gewalt im Hochmittelalter* (Stuttgart: Theiss, 2013)

Aly, Götz, *Die Belasteten. 'Euthanasie' 1939–1945: Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2013)

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Bobsin, Katrin, *Das Presseamt der DDR: Staatliche Öffentlichkeitsarbeit für die SED*, Medien in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 29 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013)

Böhm, Enrico, *Die Sicherheit des Westens: Entstehung und Funktion der G7-Gipfel (1975–1981)*, Studien zur internationalen Geschichte, 34 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014)

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