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

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TOWARDS THE LIMITS TO GROWTH*?* *THE BOOK AND ITS RECEPTION IN WEST GERMANY AND BRITAIN 1972–73*

Elke Seefried

In March 1972 a book was published in the United States and Europe. Its title became a key concept for the perception of crisis in the 1970s: *The Limits to Growth* (in German: *Die Grenzen des Wachstums*). The world model created by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for the Club of Rome suggested the following scenario: 'If the present growth in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.'[1] Only a controlled end to the growth of both economy and population could prevent that catastrophe.

The international response was immense. *The Limits to Growth*, which belonged to the heterogeneous field of 'futures studies' (or futures research/futurology), became a bestseller and received significant attention. Writers on futures studies, scientists, and intellectuals commented on its arguments, which also entered the political arena. In the Western industrialized countries, 'The Limits to Growth' became a topos for the perception of crisis in the 1970s, linked with an anticipation of crisis. This was expressed in concern about environmental deterioration, depletion of resources, overpopulation, and in a critique of growth, especially when the oil price crisis of 1973 seemed to demonstrate the fragility of the foundations of affluence and the limits of resources. Currently, the 1970s is one of the main

[1] Donella H. Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York, 1972), 23; published in German as Dennis Meadows, Donella H. Meadows, Erich Zahn, and Peter Milling, *Die Grenzen des Wachstums: Bericht des Club of Rome zur Lage der Menschheit* (Stuttgart, 1972).

areas of research in contemporary history. A dynamic research landscape has developed in this field, focusing on a number of questions. How far was the decade a watershed in the post-war history of Western industrialized countries, comprising economic crises, structural transformations in the wake of the decline of Fordism, and profound social, political, and cultural changes? And how far were the 1970s tied up with a crisis of the ideas of 'modernization' and 'progress'?[2]

Against the background of the latter aspect in particular, this article will examine the history of *The Limits to Growth*.[3] This article is not

[2] See Summer Conference of the Centre for Contemporary British History at the Institute for Historical Research, University of London, 'Reassessing the Seventies', 2010 <http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=173296>, accessed 16 Feb. 2010; Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (2nd edn. Göttingen, 2010); Andy Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies* (London, 2009); Thomas Raithel, Andreas Rödder, and Andreas Wirsching (eds.), *Auf dem Weg in eine neue Moderne? Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren* (Munich, 2009); Konrad Jarausch (ed.), *Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2008); Hans Maier, 'Fortschrittsoptimismus oder Kulturpessimismus? Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den 70er und 80er Jahren', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 56 (2008), 1–17; Martin Geyer, 'Rahmenbedingungen: Unsicherheit als Normalität', in id. (ed.), *1974–1982 Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Neue Herausforderungen, wachsende Unsicherheiten: Geschichte der Sozialpolitik* (Baden-Baden, 2008), 1–109; and now Niall Ferguson et al. (eds.), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), and the excellent study by Silke Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn': Eine Geschichte der Gründungsgrünen* (Munich, 2011).

[3] See Patrick Kupper, ' "Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer": Zur Geschichte der Studie "Die Grenzen des Wachstums" von 1972', in Frank Uekötter and Jens Hohensee (eds.), *Wird Kassandra heiser? Die Geschichte falscher Ökoalarme* (Stuttgart, 2004), 98–111, who focuses on the reception of *The Limits to Growth* in Switzerland. For accounts of the Club of Rome and the book's reception in West German trade unions and the Protestant church see Friedemann Hahn, *Von Unsinn bis Untergang: Rezeption des Club of Rome und der Grenzen des Wachstums in der Bundesrepublik der frühen 1970er Jahre* (Freiburg, 2006) <http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/2722/pdf/hahn_friedemann_2006_von_unsinn_bis_untergang.pdf>, accessed 12 Dec. 2010; further Nils Freytag, '"Eine Bombe im Taschenbuchformat"? Die Grenzen des Wachstums und die öffentliche Resonanz', *Zeithistorische For-*

interested in asking how accurate the study's forecasts have turned out to be. This would be of limited epistemological value for two reasons. First, in all cases forecasts and projected scenarios also had a social and political impact, prompting individual, social, and political action and thus operating within a specific context.[4] After all, the authors' aim in writing their apocalyptic scenario was to stir up public opinion in order to prevent the disaster they were forecasting. Secondly, the dynamic development and expansion of scientific and technical knowledge meant that the future became less and less predictable. As productive forces, science and scientific expertise changed 'the future more quickly and comprehensively than science, as knowledge of the future, can itself grasp'.[5] Instead, discussion of the study will be historicized. This article reflects new approaches to the history of science, linking this discipline with the discourse of general history by arguing that the production and distribution of scientific knowledge are based on their contexts.[6] Thus the contextualizations of *The Limits to Growth* will be examined in what follows.

schungen/Studies in Contemporary History Online, 3 (2006), 3 <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Freytag-3-2006>, accessed 12 Dec. 2010; Mauricio Schoijet, 'Limits to Growth and the Rise of Catastrophism', *Environmental History,* 4 (1999), 515–30.

[4] See also Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer'.

[5] Helmut Schelsky, *Die Arbeit tun die anderen: Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen* (Opladen, 1975), 373; Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, 'Das Jahrzehnt der Zukunft: Leitbilder und Visionen der Zukunftsforschung in den 60er Jahren in Westeuropa und den USA', in Uta Gerhardt (ed.), *Zeitperspektiven: Studien zu Kultur und Gesellschaft* (Wiesbaden, 2003), 305–45, at 306; Hermann Lübbe, *Zeit-Erfahrungen: Sieben Begriffe zur Beschreibung moderner Zivilisationsdynamik (*Stuttgart, 1996), 15–16; Niklas Luhmann, *Beobachtungen der Moderne* (Wiesbaden, 1992), 129–47; for economic forecasting see Tim Schanetzky*, Die große Ernüchterung: Wirtschaftspolitik, Expertise und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik 1966 bis 1982* (Berlin, 2007), esp. 270.

[6] See Helmut Trischler, 'Geschichtswissenschaft—Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Koexistenz oder Konvergenz?', *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte,* 22 (1999), 239–56; Lorraine Daston, 'Die Kultur der wissenschaftlichen Objektivität', in Otto Gerhard Oexle (ed.), *Naturwissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, Kulturwissenschaft: Einheit – Gegensatz – Komplementarität?* (Göttingen, 1998), 9–39; Jan Golinski, *Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science* (Cambridge, 1998).

Agreement and criticism will be discussed as well as, briefly within the framework of this article, the study's political impact.[7]

This article begins by analysing how futures studies changed around 1970 against the background of increasing criticism of growth (Part I). Part II outlines the scientific, cultural, and ideological context, and the main arguments of *The Limits to Growth*. Part III looks at scientific, intellectual, and political concurrence, and the reception of the book, while Part IV presents criticism of it. The final, concluding, section (Part V) examines to what extent this study strengthened the questioning of a linear paradigm of modernization and progress, and drew new attention to ecological and global categories. This article focuses on the debates in West Germany and Britain in the period 1972–3. Discussion of *The Limits to Growth* was particularly intense in these two countries, not least because some members of the Club of Rome (such as Alexander King and Eduard Pestel) were of British or German origin. A comparison highlights similarities in patterns of discussion as well as differences in the arguments used, reflected mainly in the intensity of reception and criticism of growth.

I

In the summer of 1972, the German weekly *Die Zeit* commented as follows on *The Limits to Growth*: 'In the past, futures researchers mainly occupied themselves by issuing optimistic forecasts about unimaginable prosperity, an excess of leisure, and victory over old age and

[7] Interactions between 'futures studies' and politics are the subject of a broader research project being conducted at the moment. The effects are, of course, difficult to measure, as scientific knowledge does not enter other contexts on a simple one to one basis; cf. Carol Weiss, 'The Many Meanings of Research Utilization', in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Social Science and Social Policy* (London, 1986), 31–40; Ulrich Beck and Wolfgang Bonß (eds.), *Weder Sozialtechnologie noch Aufklärung? Analysen zur Verwendung sozialwissenschaftlichen Wissens* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989); Peter Weingart, *Die Stunde der Wahrheit? Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Medien in der Wissensgesellschaft* (Weilerswist, 2001); Wilfried Rudloff, 'Einleitung', in Stefan Fisch and Wilfried Rudloff (eds.), *Experten und Politik: Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung in geschichtlicher Perspektive* (Berlin, 2004), 13–57.

disease. Today, their prognoses are mainly gloomy.'[8] It is true that around 1970 futures research in Western industrialized societies was combined with an ambivalent criticism of growth and progress, which also fed into *The Limits to Growth*.

Futures studies dates from the late 1950s, when it built on dynamic changes in science and technology and the increasing orientation of the Western industrialized states towards political planning.[9] It drew its arsenal of new methods largely from US think tanks such as the RAND Corporation and MIT, which had provided the science for the strategic planning of US Administrations in the emergent Cold War. In a process of transnational circulation of knowledge, futures studies institutions were set up in the 1960s. The field of futures research was fluid, but its practitioners shared a holistic view that looked at the future as a whole, a medium to long-term perspective, and an affinity with cybernetics, that is, the science concerned with control and communication processes in systems.[10] These three aspects were rooted in an acknowledgement that the pace of technological, scientific, and social change was accelerating, and that as a result, knowledge from different areas was now more strongly inter-

[8] Michael Jungblut, 'Zukunftsforschung: Ist Wachstum des Teufels?', *Die Zeit*, 18 Aug. 1972; similarly 'Was den Menschen vom Schwein unterscheidet', *Der Spiegel,* 8 Jan. 1973, 30–44.

[9] See Glen O'Hara, *From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and Social Planning in 1960s Britain* (Basingstoke, 2007); Gabriele Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns von Adenauer bis Brandt: Politische Planung in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft* (Paderborn, 2005).

[10] The plural term 'futures studies' is commonly used to highlight the notion that there are many possible futures. See Schmidt-Gernig, 'Das Jahrzehnt der Zukunft'; id., 'Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Zukunft: Westeuropäische Zukunftsforschung und Gesellschaftsplanung zwischen 1950 und 1980', *WeltTrends*, 18 (1998), 63–84; Karlheinz Steinmüller, 'Zukunftsforschung in Europa: Ein Abriß', in id., Rolf Kreibich, and Christoph Zöpel (eds.), *Zukunftsforschung in Europa: Ergebnisse und Perspektiven* (Baden-Baden, 2000), 37–54; Rolf Kreibich, Weert Canzler, and Klaus Burmeister (eds.), *Zukunftsforschung und Politik in Deutschland, Frankreich, Schweden und der Schweiz* (Weinheim, 1991); Wendell Bell, *Foundations of Futures Studies: History, Purposes, and Knowledge* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2003), 1–58; Alex Abella, *Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire* (Orlando, Fla., 2008).

connected.[11] Given the perception of acceleration, the knowledge of the past seemed to offer less and less that was useful for solving future problems. Thus the future was separated from any relation to the past; the horizon of expectation (*Erwartungshorizont*) was separated from the space of experience (*Erfahrungsraum*).[12] Here cybernetics offered new methodological approaches. This science held out the promise of unifying knowledge across the boundaries separating the natural sciences from the humanities, thus offering a way of researching the future in its entirety and controlling rapid change in the medium to long term.[13] On the basis of aspirations to exercise control, the majority of futures studies in the 1960s was shaped by a belief in feasibility and drew upon empirical approaches using trend extrapolations, systematic polls of experts, and computer simulations to forecast the consequences of technological and scientific innovations. In contrast, a smaller normative approach thought about how to secure peace and global food supply.

At the end of the 1960s, a polyvalent and ecologically tinged criticism of the growth and progress paradigm of Western industrialized societies crept into futures studies. During the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth had become the main criterion of

[11] See e.g. Robert Jungk, 'Vorwort: Damit die Zukunft nicht aufhört', in id. (ed.), *Menschen im Jahr 2000: Eine Übersicht über mögliche Zukünfte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), 9–11; Institut für Zeitgeschichte Archives, ED 701/7, Grundsatzerklärung der Gesellschaft für Zukunftsfragen; Karl Steinbuch, *Falsch programmiert: Über das Versagen unserer Gesellschaft in der Gegenwart und vor der Zukunft und was eigentlich geschehen müsste* (Munich, 1968); 'Futures', *Futures,* 1/1 (1968), 2–3.

[12] See Schmidt-Gernig, 'Jahrzehnt der Zukunft', 306–7; Reinhart Koselleck, '"Erfahrungsraum" und "Erwartungshorizont": Zwei historische Kategorien' (1976), in id., *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), 349–75.

[13] See Michael Hagner, 'Vom Aufstieg und Fall der Kybernetik als Universalwissenschaft', in id. and Erich Hörl (eds.), *Transformation des Humanen: Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte der Kybernetik* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), 38–72; Philipp Aumann, *Mode und Methode: Die Kybernetik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2009); Claus Pias (ed.), *Cybernetics: Die Macy-Konferenzen 1946–1953* (Zurich, 2004); Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, 'Das "kybernetische Zeitalter": Zur Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Leitbilder für die Politikberatung am Beispiel der Zukunftsforschung der 60er und 70er Jahre', in Fisch and Rudloff (eds.), *Experten und Politik*, 349–68.

national economic success and prosperity in these states. This attitude began to crumble in the second half of the 1960s.[14] Criticism of progress was nothing new. Conservative criticism of culture and consumption which drew on older intellectual patterns of the first half of the century can be seen in the 1950s and early 1960s, as can fear of an apocalyptic nuclear war or anxiety about a population explosion.[15] Now, however, a criticism of the paradigm of economic growth emerged with social and, especially, ecological motives. The new interest in ecology, whose criticism of growth was to become important, began in the 1960s and combined with the politicization of conservation. Since the mid nineteenth century, traditional nature conservation organizations had tackled the issue of protecting nature, animals, and landscapes. They were mostly 'located in the conservative milieu of the educated middle classes' and, especially in Britain, administratively interconnected.[16] At the end of the 1960s, however, a complex modern environmentalism emerged, initially in the USA. It grew out of the perception of growing pollution and the threats posed by new technologies and, unlike the traditional movement, was shaped by counter-culturalism and the self-perceptions and

[14] See Reinhard Steurer, *Der Wachstumsdiskurs in Wissenschaft und Politik: Von der Wachstumseuphorie über 'Grenzen des Wachstums' zur Nachhaltigkeit* (Berlin, 2002).

[15] See Jens Ivo Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung 1950–1980* (Paderborn, 2006), 281–2; Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und 'Zeitgeist' in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), 352–63; Holger Nehring, 'Cold War, Apocalypse and Peaceful Atoms: Interpretations of Nuclear Energy in the British and West German Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements, 1955–1964', *Historical Social Research*, 29 (2004), 150–70; Björn-Ola Linnér, *The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and Post-War Population Resource Crises* (Isle of Harris, 2003).

[16] Jens Ivo Engels, 'Umweltschutz in der Bundesrepublik: Von der Unwahrscheinlichkeit einer Alternativbewegung', in Sven Reichardt and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Das Alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil und linke Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968–1983* (Göttingen, 2010), 405–22, at 409; cf. Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik*; John McCormick, *Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement* (Bloomington, Ind., 1989), 1–17; James Sheail, *An Environmental History of Twentieth-Century Britain* (Basingstoke, 2002); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Tschernobyl, 26. April 1986: Die ökologische Herausforderung* (Munich, 1998), 49–128.

practices of civil society.[17] Ecology, the science of the relationship between living organisms and their environment, provided a link with traditional conservation. By thinking in terms of the circulation of materials and energy (rather than linear processes), this approach located the strain which humans put on the basis of life within the framework of the global ecosystem. Ecology became the 'master discipline for the description of environmental problems worldwide'.[18]

The left liberal US economist John Kenneth Galbraith provided a first reference point for the criticism of growth in the 1960s.[19] In *The Affluent Society* (1958), he had already deplored the growth of private wealth in the face of public poverty,[20] and in the mid 1960s called for lower economic growth rates to be accepted instead of economic growth involving social inequality and environmental damage. Galbraith conceived Lyndon B. Johnson's 'Great Society' speech and shaped the concept of 'quality of life', which embraced not only the quantity of goods, but also social and environmental aspects in the pursuit of individual happiness. This term played a central part in the debate on *The Limits to Growth*,[21] and thus criticism of growth was

[17] See Patrick Kupper, 'Die "1970er Diagnose": Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu einem Wendepunkt der Umweltgeschichte', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte,* 43 (2003), 325–48; John R. McNeill, 'The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s', in Ferguson et al. (eds.), *The Shock of the Global,* 262–78; John R. McNeill, *Blue Planet: Die Geschichte der Umwelt im 20. Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 2005), 356–60, first published as *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the World in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2000); Brian Doherty, *Ideas and Actions in the Green Movement* (London, 2002), 7–66; Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik,* 322–99; Kai F. Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise und die Formierung der deutschen Umweltpolitik (1950–1973)* (Stuttgart, 2004), 114–26; for Britain see Stephen Cotgrove, *Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment, Politics and the Future* (Chichester, 1982).

[18] Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik*, at 296; cf. ibid. 294–9; *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 389–97.

[19] Galbraith saw himself as a radical liberal who, in Europe, would possibly be a socialist: 'Glauben Sie mehr an Galbraith als an Marx: US-Ökonom John Kenneth Galbraith über die Gefahren wirtschaftlichen Wachstums', *Der Spiegel*, 10 Jan. 1972, 84–9, at 88.

[20] John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), published in German as *Gesellschaft im Überfluß* (Munich, 1958).

[21] The term 'quality of life' was used by Arthur Pigou in the 1920s and then

also combined with the 'post-materialist' aspects of the political.[22] Herbert Marcuse picked up this topic from the context of neo-Marxism and Critical Theory, and suggested that organized capitalism creates controlled needs in an affluent society. A peaceful, humane society, in his view, would reject unrestrained growth.[23] The link between criticism of growth and ecological thinking was essentially forged by the left liberal economist Kenneth Boulding, who coined the richly symbolic metaphor of 'spaceship earth', encapsulating the earth's fragility, its systemic nature dictated by the constant reproduction of resources, and its capacity to be steered. According to Boulding, the economic system of the future spaceship earth should be oriented not towards production and therefore growth, but towards quality.[24] This was picked up by the US eco-socialist

by Lyndon B. Johnson in his 'Great Society' speech of 1964 which was conceived by Galbraith; see Heinz-Herbert Noll, *Konzepte der Wohlfahrtsentwicklung: Lebensqualität und 'neue' Wohlfahrtskonzepte* (Berlin, 2000), 3–4; John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston, 1967), 408; 'Glauben Sie mehr an Galbraith als an Marx'; Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise*, 228–32; Dieter Masberg, 'Zur Entwicklung der Diskussion um "Lebensqualität" und "qualitatives Wachstum" in der Bundesrepublik', in Helge Majer (ed.), *Qualitatives Wachstum: Einführung in Konzeptionen der Lebensqualität* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), 11–31.

[22] For the 'post-materialist' redefinition of politics see now Lawrence Black, *Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954–70* (Basingstoke, 2010); see also Samuel P. Hays, 'The Limits to Growth Issue', in id., *Explorations in Environmental History: Essays* (Pittsburgh, 1998), 3–23, at 9; for the theory of 'post-materialist' value change, which is doubtful because materialistic differences between haves and have-nots persisted, see Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, 1977); for a critique see also Holger Nehring, 'The Growth of Social Movements', in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939–2000* (Malden, 2007), 389–406.

[23] Herbert Marcuse, 'Das Individuum in der "Great Society" '(1966), in id., *Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft* (3rd edn. Frankfurt, 1969), 157–190; 'Was den Menschen vom Schwein unterscheidet'.

[24] Kenneth Boulding, 'The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth' (1966), in Herman Daly and Kenneth Townsend (eds.), *Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 297–310, at 304; see Sabine Höhler, ' "Spaceship Earth": Envisioning Human Habitats in the Environmental Age', *GHI Washington Bulletin*, 42 (Spring 2008), 65–85. For British economist

Barry Commoner, who saw the environmental crisis as an outcome of capitalist economic growth structures.[25] At the other end of the political spectrum, a conservative cultural criticism of growth took shape in the late 1960s. By analogy with older trends in the conservative criticism of civilization (*Kulturkritik*), it stigmatized what it saw as dangerous tendencies towards a loss of individuality (*Vermassung*) and the devaluation of traditional values in modern industrial society, now linking them with the theme of environmentalism.[26] Thus the British economist Edward J. Mishan argued that the modern fixation on economic progress and growth had triggered a decline in values, the destruction of organic social ties, and environmental pollution, a line also taken by the conservative journal *Scheidewege* in the Federal Republic of Germany.[27]

The polyvalent, ecologically fed criticism of the paradigm of growth and progress in Western industrialized societies permeated futures studies and its public face around 1970. The image of spaceship earth, which was turned into the 'mythical figure of the environmental age' by the moon landing of 1969, whose pictures of the Blue Planet were transmitted around the world, facilitated the ecologization of futures research.[28] This discipline had a special affinity

Barbara Ward, who possibly coined the phase 'spaceship earth', see McCormick, *Reclaiming Paradise*, 67; Barbara Ward, *Spaceship Earth* (New York, 1966).

[25] Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology* (New York, 1971), published in German as *Wachstumswahn und Umweltkrise* (Munich, 1973).

[26] See Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 310–15.

[27] See E. J. Mishan, *The Costs of Economic Growth* (London, 1967); id. 'Growth and Antigrowth: What are the Issues', in Andrew Weintraub, Eli Schwartz, and J. Richard Aronson (eds.), *The Economic Growth Controversy* (New York, 1973), 3–38; Gerhard Helmut Schwabe , 'Naturschutz', *Scheidewege: Jahresschrift für skeptisches Denken*, 1 (1971), 78–96; for *Scheidewege* see Rüdiger Graf, 'Die Grenzen des Wachstums und die Grenzen des Staates: Konservative und die ökologischen Bedrohungsszenarien der frühen 1970er Jahre', in Dominik Geppert and Jens Hacke (eds.), *Streit um den Staat: Intellektuelle Debatten in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1980* (Göttingen, 2008), 207–28, at 215–17.

[28] Sabine Höhler, '"Raumschiff Erde", eine mythische Figur des Umweltzeitalters', in ead. and Fred Luks (eds.), *Beam us up, Boulding! 40 Jahre 'Raumschiff Erde'* (Hamburg, 2006), 43–52.

with the futuristic topic of space travel.[29] Moreover, the image of the spaceship as a system was highly susceptible of cybernetic interpretation, and could thus be linked with many areas of futures research.[30] The fact that around 1970 scenarios and prognoses often acquired such a pessimistic, even apocalyptic tone and that so-called 'prophecies of doom' proliferated was the result of a particular conjunction, namely, of a lasting belief in cybernetic and predictive models with (ecologically inspired) criticism of growth.[31] Alvin Toffler described the coming 'future shock' as a result of technological and social innovations that were too dynamic,[32] while the biologist Paul Ehrlich, who saw population development as part of the global ecological system, forecast a 'population bomb'.[33] Jay Forrester writing in his *World Dynamics,*[34] and *The Limits to Growth* combined methods of systems analysis with a critique of growth. These books arose in the context of the Club of Rome.

[29] See e.g. Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York, 1968).

[30] See also Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik*, 281; for futures studies and cybernetics see also Schmidt-Gernig, 'Das "kybernetische Zeitalter" '.

[31] McCormick, *Reclaiming Paradise*, 69; cf. ibid. 69–87; Kai F. Hünemörder, 'Kassandra im modernen Gewand: Die umweltapokalyptischen Mahnrufe der frühen 1970er Jahre', in Frank Uekötter and Jens Hohensee (eds.), *Wird Kassandra heiser? Die Geschichte falscher Ökoalarme (*Stuttgart, 2004), 78–97; Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise*, 209–21; Matthew Connelly, 'Future Shock: The End of the World as they Knew it', in Ferguson et al. (eds.), *Shock of the Global*, 337–50.

[32] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York, 1970).

[33] Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York, 1968), published in German as *Die Bevölkerungsbombe* (Stuttgart, 1971); see Sabine Höhler, 'Die Wissenschaft von der "Überbevölkerung": Paul Ehrlichs "Bevölkerungsbombe" als Fanal für die 1970er-Jahre', *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History Online,* 3 (2006), 3 <http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-Hoehler-3-2006>, accessed 16 Feb. 2011.

[34] Jay W. Forrester, *World Dynamics* (Cambridge, 1971), published in German as *Der teuflische Regelkreis: Das Globalmodell der Menschheitskrise* (Stuttgart, 1971).

II

The Club of Rome, a transnational circle of scientists, intellectuals, and industrialists, was founded in 1968 during a conference held at the Accademia dei Lincei. Its founders were the Italian industrial manager Aurelio Peccei, who became interested in aspects of global development when heading Fiat's Latin American operations, and the Scot Alexander King, a chemist who was, at the time, head of the OECD's Scientific Affairs Directorate in Paris. Dennis Gabor, a British physicist, was another one of the main characters. The Club of Rome described itself as an 'informal, multinational, non-political group of scientists, economists, planners, educators, and business leaders'. In its elitist view of itself, membership was limited to 100 people who had to be co-opted by the Executive Committee. The group was united by its members' conviction that mankind was in a 'predicament', the 'World Problématique'. Technical and economic progress had increased prosperity, the Club argued, but had also confronted 'mankind' with major problems which were 'of such complexity and are so interrelated that traditional institutions and policies are no longer able to cope with them, nor even to come to grips with their full account'.[35] In 1968 Peccei identified as major global problems the 'technological gap' between Western Europe and the USA, global overpopulation, food supply difficulties, and 'the degradation of our ecosystem'.[36] The aim was to conduct studies 'on systematic, long-term planning of world scope', and to inform politics and the public on the creation of a 'humane world society'. But the precise meaning of 'humane' remained unclear, as Peccei also spoke in a utopian sense of the need to produce 'a new set of values'. He had a technocratic, Western-led, elite-centred, and perhaps authoritarian solution in

[35] 'Foreword', in Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*, 9–10; cf. Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer', 98–9; Peter Moll, *From Scarcity to Sustainability. Futures Studies and the Environment: The Role of the Club of Rome* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), 49–70; Hahn, *Von Unsinn bis Untergang*, 23–45; Fernando Elichirigoity, *Planet Management: Limits to Growth, Computer Simulation, and the Emergence of Global Spaces* (Evanston, Ill., 1999), 60–74.
[36] Aurelio Peccei, *The Chasm Ahead* (London, 1969), 242, 1, p. viii.

mind as he focused on 'world planning' conducted in the main by the USA, Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan.[37]

The Club of Rome's first project, 'The Predicament of Mankind', was to examine global problems and developments and how they were interrelated. Eduard Pestel, Professor of Mechanics at the Technical University of Hanover, a systems scientist and member of the Club of Rome, organized funding by the Volkswagen Foundation. A first concept written by the systems scientist Hasan Ozbekhan did not persuade the Club's Executive Committee, who found it too complex and time-consuming. The Club then commissioned the electronics engineer and systems scientist Jay Forrester of MIT to recast his cybernetically inspired model of Systems Dynamics, which had been designed for urban and industrial subjects. This was a far-reaching decision, as the project was more or less restricted to mathematical and quantitative modelling. Forrester constructed the background model and some reflections on it, published in 1971 as *World Dynamics*. This book first put forward the thesis of imminent 'limits to growth'. MIT's interdisciplinary, international research group working on the World Model was led by Forrester's student Dennis Meadows. After eighteen months the MIT team and the Club of Rome published *The Limits to Growth* as a Report for the Club of Rome in a generally comprehensible form made visually appealing by the inclusion of many figures.[38]

The World Model was based on Jay Forrester's reflections on Systems Dynamics, according to which 'the structure of any sys-

[37] Ibid. 219, 281, 243; see id. and Manfred Siebker, *'Die Grenzen des Wachstums': Fazit und Folgestudien* (Reinbek, 1974), 19–21.

[38] Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*; see Moll, *From Scarcity to Sustainability*, 70–81; Hahn, *Von Unsinn bis Untergang*, 44–9; Eduard Pestel, 'Einführung', in Forrester, *Der teuflische Regelkreis*, 9–13, at 12; Jay W. Forrester, *Industrial Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); id., *Urban Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); id., *World Dynamics*; on the Volkswagen Foundation see Helga Nowotny, 'Vergangene Zukunft: Ein Blick zurück auf die "Grenzen des Wachstums" ', in *Impulse geben – Wissen stiften: 40 Jahre Volkswagen-Stiftung* (Göttingen, 2002), 655–94. The compactness and visual aspects of the report are also noted by Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer'. The technical report was published in 1973: Dennis and Donella Meadows, *Toward Global Equilibrium: Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973); published in German as *Das globale Gleichgewicht* (Stuttgart, 1974).

tem—the many circular, interlocking, sometimes time-delayed relationships among its components—is often just as important in determining its behavior as the individual components themselves'.[39] The MIT team examined five basic, interrelated parameters: population, agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production, and pollution. The most important phase was to identify the interrelations between the factors in a feedback loop structure that represented the dynamic behaviour of the factors. The World Model drew on growth figures in the five parameters from 1900 to 1970, and the computerized model extrapolated data from the five sectors. The MIT team stated that the model's central elements were 'the scientific method, systems analysis, and the modern computer'.[40] The 'standard run', which was based on the assumption that nothing in social, political, technical, or economic development would change, stated that exponential population and economic growth would lead to a world collapse within the next 100 years. The most probable result would be a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity. 'The behavior mode of the system . . . is clearly that of overshoot and collapse.' And that also seemed true for alternative 'runs' which introduced technological progress by way of recycling, substitution of resources, and so on into the model.[41] The MIT team therefore called for a 'state of global equilibrium', a 'deliberate, controlled end to growth' of both population and capital. This equilibrium state 'would not be free of pressures', they suggested, as freedoms such as that of having unlimited numbers of children or consuming uncontrolled quantities of resources would be limited. They recommended that people should concentrate on activities that do not require a large flow of resources or produce environmental degradation, such as education, art, music, or social interaction. The book referred to John Stuart Mill in order to legitimize 'a stationary condition of capital and population', which does not imply a stationary state of human improvement. 'Without such a goal and a commitment to it, short-term concerns will generate the exponential growth that drives the world system toward the limits of the earth and ultimate collapse.'[42]

[39] Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*, 31.
[40] Ibid. 21.
[41] Ibid. 125.
[42] Ibid. 170, 179, 175, 184.

III

The arguments put forward in *The Limits to Growth* obviously hit a nerve. The book became an international bestseller. It sold around 12 million copies, was translated into more than thirty languages, and, by the autumn of 1973, that is, within eighteen months of publication, had provided the topic for at least twenty television programmes and fifty conferences.[43] Apart from the readable text and visual nature of the book, 'mass marketing'[44] and 'clever use of the media'[45] were sometimes cited as factors in its success. Media reinforcement undoubtedly played an important part in the resonance achieved by *The Limits to Growth*, which picked up on two concepts that were topical beyond the academic discourse, namely, planning and growth (criticism).

Agreement with *The Limits to Growth* was based on the same two factors. First, computer simulations conferred a quasi mathematical validity on the scenario posited, which met with agreement among enthusiasts for planning and control. While the MIT team pointed out that the 'graphs are not exact predictions', but 'indications of the system's behavioral tendencies only',[46] it was also stated that the implications of the assumptions 'for the future behavior of the world system can be traced without error by a computer'. Even in the absence of improved data, they suggested, the information 'is sufficient to generate valid basic behavior modes'.[47] The MIT team thus emphasized its belief in the study's validity.[48] Beyond this, the study recommended a global programme of control in order to create glob-

[43] See <http://www.clubofrome.org/eng/about/4/>, accessed 18 Dec. 2010; Brüggemeier, *Tschernobyl, 26. April 1986*, 271, mentions a figure of 10 million books sold. Dennis Meadows, 'Kurskorrektur oder bis zur Kollision', in Horst E. Richter (ed.), *Wachstum bis zur Katastrophe? Pro und Contra zum Weltmodell* (Stuttgart, 1974), 98–107, states on p. 98 that two and a half million copies had been sold by autumn 1973.

[44] Robert Gillette, 'The Limits to Growth: Hard Sell for a Computer View of Doomsday', *Science*, 10 Mar. 1972, 1088–92.

[45] Steurer, *Der Wachstumsdiskurs in Wissenschaft und Politik*, 430.

[46] Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*, 93.

[47] Ibid. 22, 121.

[48] See also Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer'.

al equilibrium. Although the interpretative pattern on which it was based contained no traces of an optimistic belief in technological progress, the book itself, paradoxically, conveyed a belief in control and a trust in computer simulations. These and the book's inherent faith in global planning did, in fact, evoke a response among those who continued to believe that the future could be calculated and changes implemented.[49] Initially this was the Club of Rome, which assessed the study as 'a reasoned and systematic explanation of trends [of] which people are but dimly aware'. The Executive Committee, along with Peccei and King, mentioned critically that models could accommodate only a limited number of variables. Further, they went on, the report gave insufficient weight to the possibilities of scientific and technological advances in solving problems, and it did not consider social factors and specific regions. But it did show that 'the need will quickly become evident for social innovation to match technical change, for radical reform of institutions and political processes at all levels, including the highest, that of world polity'. A first step, they suggested, would be 'the creation of a world forum where statesmen, policy-makers, and scientists can discuss the dangers and hopes for the future global system' and coordinate 'joint long-term planning'.[50] The persistence of a technocratic belief in a global planning strategy and its implementation is obvious. Other futures researchers were also impressed by the combination of global planning strategies and cybernetic computer modelling, as illustrated by Karl Steinbuch, Professor of Communications Technology and previously an exponent of an empirical and technologically optimistic line of futures research. In contrast to his earlier views, he concluded: 'Human nature is at a tipping point in its development. The growth that has so far been possible has hit an insuperable limit.'[51] But the cybernetic model was also positively received by a more strongly normative

[49] See Kai F. Hünemörder, '1972—Epochenschwelle der Umweltgeschichte?', in Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Jens Ivo Engels (eds.), *Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945* (Frankfurt, 2005), 124–44, at 133, 142; Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer'.

[50] Alexander King et al., 'Commentary by the Club of Rome Executive Committee', in Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*, 185–97, at 189, 193–4, 196–7; see also Peccei and Siebker, *'Die Grenzen des Wachstums'*, 29–37.

[51] 'Dem Konsum abschwören: Fragen an Karl Steinbuch zum wirtschaftlichen Wachstum', *Die Zeit*, 2 June 1972.

branch of futures research represented by the philosopher Robert Jungk. He regarded cybernetic simulations of various different 'futures' as a 'breakthrough' in the areas of forecasting and planning.[52] Finally, administrative planning elites appreciated the book. On publication of *World Dynamics*, Alan Cottrell, Chief Scientific Adviser to Edward Heath's government, said: 'I believe that the Forrester approach is the most important development of its kind since Keynes' General Theory.'[53] Cottrell invited Dennis Meadows to take part in a discussion in London.[54]

Steinbuch leads us to the second factor on which agreement with *The Limits to Growth* was based. The study encountered the beginnings of a criticism of growth which, as we have seen, emerged from various intellectual backgrounds in the 1960s, and now drew scientific legitimization and encouragement from the book. This trend accelerated during the oil crisis, which seemed to confirm that resources and economic growth were fast approaching their limits. This criticism asked not only whether (economic) growth was possible, but whether it was even desirable; that is, its value was questioned.

In this context, *The Limits to Growth* was first applauded by conservative cultural critics who rejected growth as such. By analogy with the conservative cultural criticism of the first half of the century, which had expanded into an ecological criticism of growth, political and social changes were demanded. In the Federal Republic of Germany the conservative journal *Scheidewege* mentioned above, which was edited by, among others, Friedrich Georg Jünger, published a number of articles agreeing with *The Limits to Growth*, culminating in the Bussauer Manifesto, published in 1975. Given the problems of modern mass, industrial society, this manifesto called for a return to nature and advocated living in small units in order to overcome the alienation between humans and nature. References to 'self-help workshops' showed that it was also drawing upon the vocabu-

[52] Robert Jungk, 'Zukunftsforschung. Dennis Meadows: Die Grenzen des Wachstums', *Universitas,* 27 (1972), 1113–14.
[53] The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), CAB 168/291, Alan Cottrell to Burke Trend and Lord Rothschild, 23 July 1971.
[54] TNA, CAB 164/1083, Alan Cottrell to Dennis Meadows, 23 Sept. 1971.

lary of the alternative milieu.[55] Herbert Gruhl, a parliamentary deputy from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) who had dealt with environmental topics and was deeply impressed with *The Limits to Growth*, aimed even more strongly for a conservative Protestant ethic of austerity.[56] Faced with exponential population growth and growing environmental pollution, he rejected modern industrial society which, he claimed, concentrated purely on materialism, consumption, and linear growth. A strong state, if necessary, a dictatorship, was to ensure survival by enforcing population controls and a restriction on consumption. Given his views of order, Gruhl left the CDU and became a leader of the conservative group which co-founded the new political party, Die Grünen (the Greens).[57]

A similarly conservative criticism of growth can be seen in the reception of the MIT proposals in Britain, voiced in particular in the journal *The Ecologist*. Founded in 1970 by the philosopher and economist Edward Goldsmith, *The Ecologist* addressed Forrester's arguments and those put in *The Limits to Growth*, of which, it seems, it had received advance copies, in its issue *Blueprint for Survival* of January 1972.[58] In doing so, the journal regarded itself as the 'national movement' of the Club of Rome, 'complementing the invaluable work being done by the Club of Rome'. It used the book's arguments to develop its own future scenario, but its conclusions went far beyond those of *The Limits to Growth*. The MIT team's computer simulations had shown that the ideology of growth and the consumer mentality

[55] 'Bussauer Manifest zur umweltpolitischen Situation', *Scheidewege*, 5 (1975), 469–86; Gerhard Helmut Schwabe, 'Menschheit am Wendepunkt', ibid. 61–92; see Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 298–304, 310–15; Graf, 'Die Grenzen des Wachstums'.

[56] See Hermann Schreiber, ' "Ja, die Welt ist eben komisch": Hermann Schreiber über den Parteigründer Herbert Gruhl', *Der Spiegel,* 24 July 1978, 29–30; Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 73–5.

[57] Herbert Gruhl, *Ein Planet wird geplündert: Die Schreckensbilanz unserer Politik* (Frankfurt, 1975). See also Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 76–7, 302.

[58] 'Blueprint for Survival', *The Ecologist,* 2/1 (1972), quotations at 1, 2, 8; published as a book by Edward Goldsmith at al., *Blueprint for Survival* (Harmondsworth, 1972); published in German as *Planspiel zum Überleben: Ein Aktionsprogramm* (Stuttgart, 1972); see Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out*, 235–44.

had led to environmental pollution and shortages of raw materials, with the result that the breakdown of society was inevitable. The only hope, it claimed, lay in a stable or sustainable society where people looked after themselves in small communes and recycled materials, with an authoritarian state imposing population controls.[59] The parallels with Gruhl are obvious. Distributed with the *Blueprint for Survival* was an appeal for a Movement for Survival signed by well-known British scientists and conservationists such as Julian Huxley. This was the starting point for the founding of the People Party, predecessor of the later Green Party.[60] Initially, the Movement for Survival was supported by the environmental groups Conservation Society and Friends of the Earth. Both had been created as part of the modern environmental movement in the late 1960s. Unlike the established nature conservation organizations (such as the Royal Society for Nature Conservation and others), they used direct action to pursue their interests and were inspired by the practices of civil society. But they also worked within the system.[61] To this extent, their aims did not go as far as those of *The Ecologist*. The Conservation Society referred to *The Limits to Growth* when proposing a limit on consumption. It voted in favour of a 'sharing and rationing of the scarcer non-renewable resources' and supported a governmental campaign to influence consumer appetites and a shift in the emphasis of employment from manufacturing to services.[62] Like the majority of British environmental organizations, which were pragmatic by comparison with their international counterparts, the Conservation Society did not advocate opting out of industrial society altogether. Thus it is

[59] See Edward Goldsmith, writing in Willem L. Oltmans, '*Die Grenzen des Wachstums': Pro und Contra* (Reinbek, 1974), 131–7.

[60] See Christopher Rootes, 'Britain: Greens in a Cold Climate', in Dick Richardson and Christopher Rootes (eds.), *The Green Challenge: The Development of Green Parties in Europe* (London, 1995), 66–90; Wolfgang Rüdig and Philip D. Lowe, 'The Withered "Greening" of British Politics: A Study of the Ecology Party', *Political Studies*, 34 (1986), 262–84.

[61] John Davoll, 'The Conservation Society', *The Ecologist,* 2/4 (1972), 28–9; 'Many show interest in Doomwatch', *The Guardian*, 15 Jan. 1972; for Friends of the Earth see Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder, *Environmental Groups in Politics* (London, 1983), 124–37.

[62] The Conservation Society, *The Economics of Conservation: An Outline Plan for the United Kingdom* (Walton-on-Thames, 1973), at 23.

hardly surprising that the People Party with its far-reaching aims inspired by the *Blueprint for Survival* could not marshal the support of the British environmental movement.[63]

Secondly, the arguments of *The Limits to Growth* were in essence supported by those who did not reject growth outright, but attempted to distinguish between quantitative growth with negative connotations, and qualitative or organic growth seen in a more positive light. The notion of qualitative growth can be seen as a post-materialist interpretation which took ecological problems and quality of life into account but did not vote for 'back to nature' or an ethic of austerity.[64] This was true of the German and British members of the Club of Rome who initially defended the basic argument of *The Limits to Growth* against criticism (to be outlined below) and regarded it as vindicated by the oil crisis, but then differentiated between various criticisms of growth.[65] Alexander King explained that a total renunciation of growth was not feasible because jobs depended on industrial activity. Thus 'the immediate problem is not to stop growth as such, but to change its nature . . . it is our present economy of waste and of artificially stimulated consumption which is on trial.' The aim was to improve the quality of growth in terms of anti-pollution technologies, for example, but also with respect to the quality of life.[66] A similar argument was put forward by Eduard Pestel, who was work-

[63] See Christopher A. Rootes, 'The New Politics and the New Social Movements: Accounting for British Exceptionalism', *European Journal of Political Research,* 22 (1992), 171–91; Brian Doherty and Peter Rawcliffe, 'British Exceptionalism? Comparing the Environmental Movement in Britain and Germany', in Ingolfur Blühdorn, Frank Krause, and Thomas Scharf (eds.), *The Green Agenda: Environmental Politics and Policy in Germany* (Keele, 1995), 235–50; Wolfgang Rüdig, 'Between Moderation and Marginalization: Environmental Radicalism in Britain', in Bron R. Taylor (ed.), *Ecological Resistance Movements* (New York, 1995), 219–40; Nehring, 'The Growth of Social Movements'.

[64] See also Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 447–52; Steurer, *Der Wachstumsdiskurs in Wissenschaft und Politik*, 332, 334.

[65] ' "Wir können nur froh sein, daß es jetzt passiert ist": Interview mit Eduard Pestel', *Bild der Wissenschaft,* 11 (1974), 73–4; see also Dennis Gabor, 'The New Responsibilities of Science', *Science Policy,* 1/2 (1972), 1–8.

[66] Alexander King, *Another Kind of Growth: Industrial Society and the Quality of Life* (London, 1972), 18–20.

ing on an improved World Model with the US economist Mihajlo Mesarovic. This recognized seven world regions and further structures and, to this extent, was methodologically more complex than Meadows's study. However, it arrived at the same apocalyptic conclusions. The aim was not to renounce growth, as Meadows had suggested, but to promote 'organic growth'. In contrast to exponential, undifferentiated growth, organic growth gradually flattens out and becomes more structured, they argued. According to Pestel, who continued to believe in global planning, this controlled growth had to be implemented via a master plan. But he argued, as did Dennis Gabor, that it was equally necessary to develop a 'new ethic in the use of material resources' which would accept the coming shortages and foreground harmony between humankind and nature.[67] In a further development of *The Limits to Growth*, qualitative criticism of growth was linked with a technocratic spirit of planning.

The CDU accepted, at least in part, the formula of qualitative growth and so it is not surprising that Pestel joined this party in the late 1970s. Like the Conservative Party in Britain, the CDU in West Germany had adopted the concepts of environmental protection and quality of life in 1970–1. The preservation of creation could be seen as a classic field of Christian and conservative policy in the guise of environmental protection.[68] Unlike the Conservative Party, the CDU questioned its view of growth. With reference to the current scientific controversies (and to *The Limits to Growth*), Richard von Weizsäcker of the *Grundsatzkommission* declared in 1972 that in a social

[67] Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, *Mankind at the Turning Point* (New York, 1974), at 1, 7, 9, 147, published in German as *Menschheit am Wendepunkt: 2. Bericht an den Club of Rome zur Weltlage* (Stuttgart, 1974); Imperial College Archives, Gabor Papers, MC/1/2,3: Dennis Gabor, Thoughts on the Future, 20 Oct. 1973.

[68] Minutes of the 1971 CDU party conference held in Düsseldorf, at 197 and 572 <http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Protokolle_Bundesparteitage/1971-01-25-27_Protokoll_18.Bundesparteitag_Duesseldorf. pdf>, accessed 18 Dec. 2010; see 'For a Better Tomorrow: Conservative Party Manifesto 1970', in Fred W. S. Craig (ed.), *British General Election Manifestos 1900–1974* (London, 1975), 341; Bodleian Library, Conservative Party Archives, ACP 2/3, Minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Policy on 17 July 1968; see also Martina Steber, 'Konservatismus—Conservatism', Paper presented at the German Historikertag, Berlin, 1 Oct. 2010; Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise*, 234–5.

market economy, economic growth was 'not an absolute value, but a dependent variable'. And, he went on, it had to consider the conservation of the natural conditions of life and how the social costs which were incurred thereby were to be distributed. The rather nebulous aim was to pursue the 'qualitative control of growth' with the assistance of science and technology. The formula of qualitative growth made it possible to absorb ecological and social criticism of growth without abandoning the social market economy and a positive attitude to technology or giving environmentalism more space. The model of the social market economy was highly important to the CDU, not least because it allowed the party to claim credit for the dynamic economic growth created by the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s and early 1960s.[69]

A further interpretation can be found among Christian intellectuals who came to *The Limits to Growth* via a qualitative criticism of growth which, in essence, they welcomed. Their views grew out of an ambivalent combination of reflection about the consequences of the increased thinking about rationality and planning of the 1960s, the will to preserve creation, and an affinity with the ethics of renunciation greater than that of the CDU. The philosopher and theologian Georg Picht, who in the 1960s had defended the idea of planning,[70] conceded that the MIT study was correct in that the 'one-sided promotion of industrial growth' and 'technical-industrial production' had created a profound crisis. This was expressed in the 'growth of congestion, traffic, and environmental pollution and contamination' and even in 'crises of youth'. It was not consumption that increased the quality of life, he argued, but a 'revaluation of values' in the direction of 'sublimating desires'. Only a 'transition from extensive to

[69] Minutes of the Christian Democratic Party Conference in Wiesbaden 1972, contribution by Richard von Weizsäcker, 66 <http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Protokolle_Bundesparteitage/1972-10-09-11_Protokoll_20.Bundesparteitag_Wiesbaden.pdf>, accessed 18 Dec. 2010; see Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 451–2; Frank Bösch, 'Die Krise als Chance: Die Neuformierung der Christdemokraten in den siebziger Jahren', in Jarausch (ed.), *Das Ende der Zuversicht?,* 296–309.

[70] See Wilfried Rudloff, 'Georg Picht: Die Verantwortung der Wissenschaften und die "aufgeklärte Utopie" ', in Theresia Bauer et al. (eds.), *Gesichter der Zeitgeschichte* (Munich, 2009), 279–96; Georg Picht, *Prognose. Utopie. Planung: Die Situation des Menschen in der Zukunft der technischen Welt* (Stuttgart, 1967).

intensive growth', he went on, could avert the crisis.[71] The British economist and Christian social reformer Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, who had German roots, took a similar line in his bestseller *Small is Beautiful*. In it, he drew on Catholic social doctrine, Buddhist economics, Galbraith's socially and ecologically inspired criticism of growth, and *The Limits to Growth* to argue that a materialistic mentality of ever more growth now had to be replaced by qualitatively ordered growth orientated by the quality of life and decentralized and ecologically aware intermediate technology. *The Limits to Growth* helped to prop up his argument but, given his call for intermediate technology, Schumacher was highly critical of its fixation on computers.[72]

This qualitative understanding of growth linked these views with support for the MIT study from the left. It is of central importance that this opened the debate on environmentalism to sections of the left,[73] including representatives of normative left-wing futures research around Robert Jungk, to sections of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the British left. As mentioned above, Jungk praised *The Limits to Growth* because of its approach to cybernetics, but also because of its ecological criticism of growth. Like Picht and Schumacher, he called for a different, qualitative growth oriented by ecology, quality rather than quantity, and small units (such as village structures). And, like Schumacher, Jungk expressed doubts about the fact that *The Limits to Growth* depended entirely on the computer as 'a well-nigh infallible oracle' while neglecting the imagination as a factor.[74] Ossip Flechtheim, connected with Jungk by

[71] Georg Picht, 'Wir brauchen neue Überzeugungen: Von der Wechselwirkung zwischen Wachstum und Werten', *Evangelische Kommentare,* 6 (1973), 329–33; similarly Friedhelm Solms, 'Die bedrohte Menschheit: Streit um die Unheilsprognosen der Meadows-Studie', *Lutherische Monatshefte,* 13 (1974), 506–8.

[72] E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered* (London, 1973); see Barbara Wood, *Alias Papa: A Life of Fritz Schumacher* (London, 1984); Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 268.

[73] See ibid. 304–10, 396–7, emphasizing that many left-wing protagonists of what was to become the Grünen took some time to come to terms with the environment, ecology, and *The Limits to Growth*.

[74] Robert Jungk, 'Zukunftsforschung. Dennis Meadows: Die Grenzen des Wachstums', *Universitas,* 27/10 (1972), 1113–14; id., 'Anfänge eines anderen Wachstums', in Christopher Horn (ed.), *Umweltpolitik in Europa* (Frauenfeld, 1973), 34–44.

normative futures research, read *The Limits to Growth* more in terms of a neo-Marxist interpretation, which picked up on Marcuse's criticism of growth. Flechtheim criticized the book for neglecting social and political factors,[75] but, he argued, it made uncomfortably clear that, given the limits to growth (war, starvation in the Third World, overpopulation, exploitation of nature), human needs now had to be given greater consideration. These had been 'manipulated' in East and West, he claimed. For him, the utopian goal was a 'liberal socialist world democracy'.[76] As Flechtheim had close contacts with the alternative milieu in Berlin and Jungk was to play a central part in the anti-nuclear and peace movement, their views fed into the New Social Movements.[77]

Within the SPD *The Limits to Growth* evoked a fruitful response in the work of Erhard Eppler in particular and, again, a qualitative understanding of growth was the point of contact. Eppler, who was also a leading exponent of intellectual Protestantism, enthusiastically absorbed *The Limits to Growth*. The 'historical turning point' of the early 1970s, he argued, brought 'the insights of modern science within the boundaries of economic and demographic growth'.[78] Eppler focused on the global perspective: an 'undirected market mechanism' and the preoccupation with economic growth in the industrialized nations, he suggested, would have devastating consequences for the developing countries.[79] 'Quality of life' was of central significance for

[75] Ossip K. Flechtheim, 'Beunruhigend und unbequem', *Umwelt,* 4 (1972), 34–6.

[76] Id., 'Futurologie in der zweiten Phase?', in Dietger Pforte and Olaf Schwencke (eds.), *Ansichten einer künftigen Futurologie: Zukunftsforschung in der zweiten Phase* (Munich, 1973), 17–25.

[77] For Flechtheim see Mario Keßler, *Ossip K. Flechtheim: Politischer Wissenschaftler und Zukunftsdenker (1909–1998)* (Cologne, 2007), 199–200.

[78] Erhard Eppler, 'Die Qualität des Lebens', in Günter Friedrichs (ed.), *Aufgabe Zukunft: Qualität des Lebens. Beiträge zur vierten internationalen Arbeitstagung der Industriegewerkschaft Metall für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 11. bis 14. April 1972 in Oberhausen,* 10 vols. (Frankfurt, 1973), i. 86–101, at 87.

[79] Erhard Eppler, 'Alternative für eine humane Gesellschaft', in Heinrich von Nußbaum (ed.), *Die Zukunft des Wachstums: Kritische Antworten zum 'Bericht des Club of Rome'* (Düsseldorf, 1973), 231–46, at 244; see also Erhard Eppler, 'Lebensqualität als politisches Programm: Alternativen für eine humane Gesellschaft', *Evangelische Kommentare,* 6 (1973), 457–61, at 457.

Eppler. Although he refused to define it, he spoke of freedom, solidarity, self-determination, participation in nature and culture, and a notion of general welfare that built on Galbraith's demand for publicly owned property to be given priority. As an amalgam of social and ecological categories, 'quality of life' was, in his view, intended to point the way towards qualitative growth and 'free democratic socialism'.[80] This meant that Eppler played an important part in the formation of the emergent left-leaning ecological wing of the SPD. *The Limits to Growth* also influenced Willy Brandt, Chancellor and SPD party chairman. Although he saw the slogan of zero growth as mocking all those who lived in poverty, 'insight into the damaging impact of growth oriented by quantitative factors alone . . . has spread rapidly beyond the circle of theoreticians'. It remained to be seen, he said, whether the social 'value system would prove equal to the demand for an adequate quality of life'.[81] And the phrase 'quality of life' formed part of the title of the SPD's election manifesto in 1972.[82] Against the background of a certain crisis in the euphoric ideas of planning which had circulated widely in the SPD,[83] 'quality of life' now offered Brandt and the SPD a new paradigm which, in relation to ecology and securing resources, incorporated planning, but freed it from its technocratic, 'cold' shell. At the same time, it revived and ecologized the model of participation.

[80] Eppler, 'Die Qualität des Lebens', 99. In the mid 1970s Eppler saw himself as a *Wertkonservativer*; id., *Ende oder Wende* (Stuttgart, 1975), 29.

[81] Willy Brandt, 'Umwelt als internationale Aufgabe', speech delivered to the conference of Nobel Laureates held in Lindau, 26 June 1972, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 28 June 1972, 1285–9; more doubtful about the Club of Rome, Minutes of the negotations of the SPD's Extraordinary Party Conference held in Dortmund, 12–13 Oct. 1972, p. 62.

[82] *Wahlprogramm der SPD 1972: Mit Willy Brandt für Frieden, Sicherheit und eine bessere Qualität des Lebens* (Bonn, 1972); Willy Brandt, 'Die Qualität des Lebens', *Die neue Gesellschaft,* 19 (1972), 739–42.

[83] For the crisis of euphoric planning ideas, not least as a result of financial problems, see Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns*, 404–18; Winfried Süß, ' "Wer aber denkt für das Ganze?" Aufstieg und Fall der ressortübergreifenden Planung im Bundeskanzleramt', in Matthias Frese, Julia Paulus, and Karl Teppe (eds.), *Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch: Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik* (Paderborn, 2003), 349–77; Elke Seefried, 'Experten für die Planung? "Zukunftsforscher" als Berater der Bundesregierung 1966–1972/73', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte,* 50 (2010), 109–52.

In Britain, it is less easy to demonstrate an acceptance of *The Limits to Growth* on the part of the left. The small Liberal Party was impressed by the arguments put by the MIT study. While it was not left wing, it clearly oriented itself by Galbraith's socially and ecologically inspired criticism of growth. Limited resources on this planet and increasing social disintegration seemed to demand 'a policy of controlled economic growth, by which we mean the careful husbandry of resources and the limitation of private consumption by the few in favour of better public services for the majority of our citizens'. The aim was an 'age of stability', in which 'quality of life' could achieve a new significance in place of the 'pursuit of unlimited growth'.[84] The British Labour Party had begun to address environmental issues by the end of the 1960s, not least because of the *Torrey Canyon* oil spill of 1967. But in the early 1970s, the Labour Party's policy, and that of the unions closely affiliated with it, was more dominated by traditional industrial conflicts. The debate on *The Limits to Growth* coincided with violent industrial disputes around the Industrial Relations Act and the National Union of Miners' strike, which focused attention on the material aspects of industrial modernity. Beyond this, avoiding unemployment had been the Labour Party's main concern since 1945.[85] Only a small section of the Labour movement therefore questioned the notion of growth on the basis of ecological concerns, namely, the Socialist Environment and Resources Association, whose membership partly overlapped with that of the Labour Party, and a group around the journal *The Spokesman*, published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Those on the left who criticized growth also criticized the exponential growth of consumption. Socialist alternatives to growth were to emerge from a combination of decentralization and allocation planning. Yet the Club of Rome was rejected as

[84] 'Liberal Party Manifesto February 1974', in Craig (ed.), *British General Election Manifestos*, 411.

[85] See *Report of the Seventy-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party 1973* (London, 1973), 314–21; Anthony Wedgewood Benn, 'Die Qualität des Lebens', in Friedrichs (ed.), *Aufgabe Zukunft*, i. 27–52; Jon Tinker, 'The Environment: No Parsnips from Labour', *New Scientist*, 20 Sept. 1973, 667; Hugh Stretton, *Capitalism, Socialism and the Environment* (Cambridge, 1976); Sheail, *An Environmental History*, 273; Rüdig, 'Between Moderation and Marginalization'; id. and Lowe, 'The Withered "Greening" of British Politics', 271–2.

a 'technocratic elite',[86] and this follows the patterns of left-wing criticism of *The Limits to Growth*, which are discussed in the following section.

IV

In Britain, criticism of *The Limits to Growth* was stronger than in the Federal Republic of Germany, and focused primarily on the study's view of growth. To start with, scientists of various disciplines found fault with its epistemological and methodological determinism. The technocratic computer model, it was argued, underestimated individuals, their human potential, and technical progress. Forecasting should pay more attention to people and their values and needs, argued the interdisciplinary research group on Social and Technological Forecasting for the Future in the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex.[87] The group put forward a sophisticated and widely acknowledged critique of *The Limits to Growth*. They criticized 'computer fetishism' which endowed 'the computer model with a validity and independent power which altogether transcends the mental models which are its essential basis'. Every model, they pointed out, depended on assumptions which had been fed into it.[88]

[86] Colin Stoneman, 'Growth in a Socialist Society', in Michael Barratt Brown, Tony Emerson, and Colin Stoneman (eds.), *Resources and the Environment: A Socialist Perspective* (Nottingham, 1976), 137–50, at 141; Dave Elliott and Tony Emerson, 'The Democratisation of Decision-Making', ibid. 113–29, at 117; see Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), *Socialism and the Environment: Essays* (Nottingham, 1972).

[87] TNA, EY 216: Science Policy Research Unit, Christopher Freeman, Application to SSRC for Support for a Programme of Forecasting Research. The Research Group for Social and Technological Forecasting was also named STAFF (Social and Technological Alternatives for the Future).

[88] Christopher Freeman, 'Malthus with a Computer', *Futures,* 6 (1973), 5–13. This article is also published in Hugh S. Cole, Christopher Freeman, Marie Jahoda, et al. (eds.), *Thinking About the Future: A Critique of the Limits to Growth* (London, 1973), 5–13, published in German as *Die Zukunft aus dem Computer? Eine Antwort auf die 'Grenzen des Wachstums'* (Neuwied, 1973); see Marie Jahoda, 'Postscript on Social Change', in Cole, Freeman, Jahoda, et al. (eds.), *Thinking About the Future*, 209–15.

For the Sussex group, the future was still open: 'Forecasting . . . cannot predict history to come, it is limited to the identification of possible futures and of problems that might have to be faced on the way to such futures.'[89] It is striking how strongly British scientists picked up on the accusation of technocratism. One reason for this was the spectacular failure of a British forecast, 'Essay on the Principle of Population', by Thomas Robert Malthus. He, too, had ignored the potential of technological progress and the human capacity for development.[90] *The Limits to Growth* was 'Malthus with a Computer',[91] argued Christopher Freeman of the Sussex group. Another reason was that British scientists and futures writers displayed a more pragmatic attitude towards method and content than either the MIT group or West German researchers, in respect of both cybernetic approaches and ecology. While systems analyses could be useful, Freeman said, *The Limits to Growth* documented 'a strong, almost Messianic faith in the more modern system dynamics', which overshadowed everything else and was as 'characteristic of contemporary American thought' as the overestimation of ecology as a factor.[92]

Beyond this, criticism came from two sources, both of which defended economic growth but for different reasons. First, economists in particular insisted that a renunciation of economic growth was neither sensible nor practical, and they defended a market economy. The British economist Wilfred Beckerman's assessment of *The Limits to Growth* was damning. He called it 'a brazen, impudent piece of nonsense' which displayed an ignorance of economics. It neglected the price mechanism, he said, which, in a market economy, came into play where there were bottlenecks and led to technological innovation.[93] The German protagonist of a post-Keynesian theory of

[89] Marie Jahoda, 'Introduction', in Christopher Freeman and Marie Jahoda (eds.), *World Futures: The Great Debate* (London, 1978), 1–6, at 2.

[90] See 'Another Whiff of Doomsday', *Nature*, 10 Mar. 1972, 47–9; the chief editor of *Nature*, John Maddox, published his critique in the same year. John Maddox, *The Doomsday Syndrome* (London, 1972); Gillette, 'The Limits to Growth'.

[91] Freeman, 'Malthus with a Computer'.

[92] Ibid. 9.

[93] Wilfred Beckerman, 'Economists, Scientists, and Environmental Catastrophe', *Oxford Economic Papers*, NS 24 (1972), 327–44, at 327; published in German as *Naturwissenschaftler, Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und Umweltkata-*

growth, Gottfried Bombach, too, saw no alternative to a market economy and promoting new technologies which could solve problems such as environmental pollution and scarcity of raw materials. Moreover, he pointed out, it was only the rapid growth of the market economy in the post-war years that had created the foundation for widespread prosperity, and thus political stability.[94]

Secondly, critics of the MIT study defended the principle of economic growth with reference to social redistributive justice. They criticized the study on the grounds that it had not considered social factors which, they claimed, were of central importance not only to the present situation, but also for the future of growth. Without growth, the Sussex group pointed out, redistributive justice would never be achieved.[95] The German left, including such figures as Hans Magnus Enzensberger, editor of *Kursbuch* and Gerhard Kade, a neo-Marxist economist, pointed out that the technocrats of the Club of Rome, a group of entrepreneurs, could afford to question the whole notion of growth.[96] According to Kade, this was in order to preserve the capital accumulation of the wealthier classes. Growth, he argued, should be distributed justly on an international basis.[97] Representatives of developing countries, in particular, called for global distributive justice worldwide. They demanded that a distinction be drawn between industrialized countries and developing ones, something that had been mentioned in *The Limits to Growth* but not integrated into the computer modelling. Argentinian scientists in the Bariloche Group, for example, argued that by calling for zero growth the MIT study wanted to secure long-term Western domination and

strophe (Tübingen, 1972); cf. id., *In Defence of Economic Growth* (London, 1974); Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer'.

[94] Gottfried Bombach, 'Planspiele zum Überleben: Prophezeiungen des Club of Rome', *Mitteilungen der List-Gesellschaft,* 8/1 (1973), 3–16; for Bombach's 'qualitative growth' approach see id., 'Konsum oder Investitionen in die Zukunft?', in Friedrichs (ed.), *Aufgabe Zukunft*, vii. *Qualitatives Wachstum*, 38–73.

[95] See Freeman, 'Malthus with a Computer', 10.

[96] Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Zur Kritik der politischen Ökologie', *Kursbuch*, 9/33 (1973), 1–52, at 6; see Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*, 306–7.

[97] Gerhard Kade, 'Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe', in Cole, Freeman, Jahoda, et al. (eds.), *Die Zukunft aus dem Computer*, pp. vii–xxvii.

deny the developing countries their chance. This group put up its own world model,[98] earning the approval of West German protagonists of futures research such as Peter Menke-Glückert, President of the West German Gesellschaft für Zukunftsfragen (Society for Questions of the Future),[99] and the Sussex group.[100] This discussion, especially in relation to the developing world, meant that futures research as well as politics and public opinion focused more on the global dimensions of growth and ecology. One outcome of this aspect of the discussion was undoubtedly a greater perception of the conflict between North and South.

V

During the 1960s, studies in the field of futures research had been permeated by a belief in feasibility. Most were empirical and optimistic about technology. Around 1970, however, the main parts of this field became ecologized and underwent a pessimistic, even dystopian, turn. *The Limits to Growth* was the best known of these studies, first because it was short, readable, visually attractive, and appealed to a wide public. Secondly, its computer-based simulations and far-reaching planning model were able to build on the intense planning debates of the 1960s. And finally, the argument of *The Limits to Growth* hit the nerve of rising criticism of the paradigm of economic growth, which was fed by a growing uneasiness about the linear view of progress and material growth common in Western industrialized societies. The study criticized the optimistic view of technology and progress that had provided the instruments of its own

[98] Amīlcar O. Herrera, Hugo D. Scolnik, et al., *Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model* (Ottawa, 1976); Moll, *From Scarcity to Sustainability*, 118.

[99] Peter Menke-Glückert, 'Vorwort. Das BARILOCHE-Modell: Eine Chance zum Überleben', in Amīlcar O. Herrera, Hugo D. Scolnik, et al., *Grenzen des Elends. Das BARILOCHE-Modell: So kann die Menschheit überleben* (Frankfurt, 1977), 9–14.

[100] See Freeman, 'Malthus with a Computer', 10; Jahoda, 'Postscript on Social Change'.

analysis. Thus *The Limits to Growth* was located at a 'historical juncture' between planning euphoria and criticism of growth.[101]

If we examine the reception and impact of *The Limits to Growth*, we can say that a questioning not only of the feasibility but also of the desirability or value of (economic) growth, a questioning which drew on many sources, gained momentum, scientific credibility, and popularity as a result of this book. In essence, this ecological criticism of growth, which coincided with the reception of *The Limits to Growth*, aimed to question the linear paradigm of progress and modernization. The notion of progress in history was partly reconceptualized and bound up with ecological and qualitative aspects. It was thus open to support by some Conservatives (via criticism of industrial modernity), Christian intellectuals (via criticism of excess, materialism, and the destruction of creation), and even parts of the left-wing spectrum (via criticism of capitalism). First, this debate gave rise to the idea of qualitative growth which, in contrast to quantitative growth, was ecologically and socially balanced. The discussion culminated in the notion of 'quality of life' which expanded the category of 'living standard' by post-materialist aspects and comprised ecological, social, individual, and participatory criteria in addition to material ones. Secondly, the environment as a topic was examined in a more global dimension, for example, in the UN environmental conference held in Stockholm in the summer of 1972.[102] Thirdly, *The Limits to Growth* cast light on aspects of securing global resources and economic relations between North and South. As Peccei saw it, *The Limits to Growth* arose out of a Western-based and Western-led perspective. Yet against the background of détente during the Cold War, the crisis of the monetary system at Bretton Woods, and the oil crisis, the issues of international economic relations between North and South, between industrialized, threshold, and developing nations, and calls for a new economic world order became more attractive and were discussed at the UN General Assembly of 1974.[103] The debate

[101] Kupper, 'Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer', 110.

[102] See Kai F. Hünemörder, 'Vom Expertennetzwerk zur Umweltpolitik: Frühe Umweltkonferenzen und die Ausweitung der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit für Umweltfragen in Europa (1959–1972)', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte,* 43 (2003), 275–96; McCormick, *Reclaiming Paradise,* 88–105.

[103] See Glenda Sluga, 'The Transformation of International Institutions:

around *The Limits to Growth* supported the change in perspective because it provided a platform for scientists from threshold and developing countries.

As we have seen, the reception of *The Limits to Growth* and the debate around growth were temporarily stimulated by the oil crisis, but this changed when the implications of the economic crisis became clear. Zero growth could mean rising unemployment. This was now evident in Western industrialized societies. But 'quality of life' became a polyvalent leading concept, while the notion of 'qualitative growth' entered the vocabulary of environmental and development policy, later to be replaced by the term 'sustainability', which had already been used in Britain during the debate on *The Limits to Growth*.[104]

In essence, this applied to both Britain and West Germany. If we are looking for differences, then, first, the scientific, intellectual, and political reception of *The Limits to Growth* was more excited, ideologized, and marked by fears about survival in the Federal Republic of Germany than in Britain. In Britain there was more pragmatic criticism of the epistemological and methodological determinism of *The Limits to Growth*, and of the value of cybernetic models. And in terms of social and political perceptions, the broad spectrum of interconnected environmental organizations prevented a more apocalyptic pigeon-holing of environmentalism. Secondly, in Britain the notions of qualitative growth and quality of life were less important than in West Germany. In the early 1970s British politics were dominated by industrial conflict, which was a formative experience for the left. Until the consensus dissolved in the late 1970s, to avoid unemployment was the major concern, which meant that criticism of growth was not as widespread as it was in West Germany. Instead, thirdly, in Britain the focus was more on global population developments

Global Shock as Cultural Shock', in Ferguson et al. (eds.), *The Shock of the Global*, 223–36.

[104] 'Sustainable development' was defined by the Brundtland Report in 1987 as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs; see World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford, 1987); Moll, *From Scarcity to Sustainability*; Steurer, *Der Wachstumsdiskurs in Wissenschaft und Politik*, esp. 382–400.

and securing resources. This was certainly true of Edward Heath's government, as I will show in greater detail elsewhere. In 1971–2 it established an interministerial Committee on World Future Trends in reaction to Forrester's *World Dynamics* and *Blueprint for Survival*. As future problems, the committee identified population growth in the developing countries and Britain's dependence on imported supplies of food and raw materials, while criticism of growth played no part at all.[105] Thus British attention was focused on securing its own resources,[106] in part dictated by its position as a global trading nation. In the West German discussion, by contrast, environmentalism and ecological criticism of growth, added to the residues of a euphoric notion of planning, played a much more important part. Criticism of growth—or criticism of quantitative growth—flowed into the discipline of futures studies and various intellectual contexts, breaking through the classical continuum of left and right. This was one of the factors leading to the foundation of the political party known as Die Grünen in the late 1970s.[107] The notion of qualitative growth also entered the vocabulary of parts of the SPD and the CDU and, as we will see, West Germany's federal government. In 1969–70 Willy Brandt's government had set up a department for environmental protection within the Interior Ministry. Initially, it understood its environmental brief as a technical problem in the context of planning. Yet in 1972, during the debate around *The Limits to Growth*, the West German government diagnosed a basic tension between environmental protection and economic growth.[108] Not least for this reason,

[105] See Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cabinet Office, *Future World Trends: A Discussion Paper on World Trends in Population, Resources, Pollution etc., and their Implications* (London, 1976).

[106] TNA, CAB 178/20, esp. Robert Press to John Hunt, 12 June 1975.

[107] See also Mende, *'Nicht rechts, nicht links, sondern vorn'*; Engels, 'Umweltschutz in der Bundesrepublik'.

[108] Hans Dietrich Genscher, 'Umweltschutz und Umweltpolitik als weltweite Aufgabe: Rede vor dem Plenum der UNO-Umweltschutzkonferenz', 9 June 1972, printed in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 13 June 1972, 1185–7, at 1186; for West German environmental policy see Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik*, 275–94; Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise*; id., '1972', 126–30; Holger Nehring, 'Genealogies of the Ecological Moment: Planning, Complexity and the Emergence of "the Environment" as Politics in West Germany, 1949–1982', in Sverker Sör-

when the economic crisis hit in 1974–5, environmental policy was sometimes seen as putting a brake on growth.[109]

In principle, the debate around *The Limits to Growth* showed how difficult it was to separate scientific knowledge from social and political knowledge. Produced by a think tank using scientific methods, *The Limits to Growth* was so widely read largely because it was seen as a scientific study. The history of its reception shows, however, that scientific knowledge provided topics of argument for the public and politicians, and that the boundaries between science, politics, and public were blurred. Ultimately, the debate around *The Limits to Growth* showed that scientific knowledge was based on individual interpretations of the world, on inherent norms and ideas of order.[110]

Everyone was talking about *The Limits to Growth*, and yet the debate hastened a questioning of futures studies. As we have seen, criticism of growth combined with criticism of linear thinking about progress. From the 1970s, more and more doubt was cast upon modernization theories, large-scale concepts of planning and control, and promises of rationalization, while increasing attention was paid to global structures and theories of entangled, post-colonial modernities. This process, which is also spoken of as the beginning of a 'second' modernity,[111] was visibly reinforced by the debate around *The Limits to Growth*. Yet futures research and world modelling had lived from the belief that society could be controlled. In the throes of a new uncertainty, futures research was itself plunged into crisis.

ling and Paul Warde (eds.), *Nature's End: History and the Environment* (Basingstoke, 2009), 115–38.

[109] See Edda Müller, *Innenwelt der Umweltpolitik. Sozial-liberale Umweltpolitik: (Ohn)macht durch Organisation* (Opladen, 1986).

[110] Sam Cole, 'The Global Futures Debate 1965–1976', in Freeman and Jahoda (eds.), *World Futures*, 9–49, at 49; Sam Cole and Ian Miles, 'Assumptions and Methods: Population, Economic Development, Modelling and Technical Change', ibid. 51–75; further Weingart, *Die Stunde der Wahrheit?*; Kupper, '1970er Diagnose', 339.

[111] See Ulrich Beck and Wolfgang Bonß (eds.), *Die Modernisierung der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001); Raithel, Rödder, and Wirsching (eds.), *Auf dem Weg in eine neue Moderne?*; Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, 72–6, 116–19; Martin H. Geyer, 'Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit: Die Sozialstaatsdebatten der 1970er Jahre und die umstrittenen Entwürfe der Moderne', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 47 (2007), 47–93; Schanetzky, *Die große Ernüchterung*.

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IN SUBSIDIUM: *THE DECLINING CONTRIBUTION OF GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE TO THE CRUSADES TO THE HOLY LAND, 1221–91*

Nicholas Morton

> Though for a short time the Lord had forsaken it [the Holy Land], with great mercy he gathered together his children and restored the whole land's people from men of different races and diverse languages and nations, so that therein the prophecy seemed to be fulfilled: 'Thy sons shall come from far, and thy daughters shall be nursed by thy side.' [As] he observed and drew [them] together, his heart wondered and he was glad when [many] had been directed to him across the great sea, especially those of Genoa, Venice and Pisa. The strength of the nations came to him, especially from France and Germany.[1]

Thus wrote James of Vitry (bishop of Acre 1216–28) in his *Historia Orientalis* shortly after the Fifth Crusade, whilst describing the recovery of the kingdom of Jerusalem after the defeats of 1187–8. He then reflected on the strengths of the peoples who had contributed to this process, describing the Germans simply as 'men of war'.[2] He had good reason to praise their martial prowess. In the decades following the defeat of the kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Hattin 1187 both Frederick I and Henry VI had launched major campaigns in support of the Latin East. German magnates also took part in the Fourth and Fifth Crusades.[3] In a later section James discussed the establishment of the Teutonic Order. This institution was founded in 1190 as a medical establishment during the Third Crusade, but as-

[1] James of Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, ed. J. Donnadieu (Turnhout, 2008), 272–4.
[2] Ibid. 274.
[3] James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade: 1213–1221* (Philadelphia, 1990); J. Longnon, *Les Compagnons de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade* (Geneva, 1978); C. Naumann, *Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Heinrichs VI.* (Frankfurt, 1988); Reinhold Röhricht, *Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande: 650–1291* (Innsbruck, 1894).

sumed a military role at the request of German crusaders in 1198.[4] The very existence of this Order was an affirmation of the German nobility's commitment to the Holy Land. According to James, the Teutonic Knights did not merely buttress the Latin East's defences. They also helped to integrate German immigrants and travellers into the cultural milieu of the Levant.[5]

Despite this, as the graph on p. 40 demonstrates, in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade the number of German nobles travelling to the Holy Land fell dramatically and did not recover. This was not the consequence of a lack of communication; contemporary German annals, chronicles, and poems contain many emotive accounts of the sufferings of the Holy Land. Nevertheless, even those families with long traditions of pilgrimage to Jerusalem ceased to take the road to the east during the mid to late thirteenth century. The purpose of this article is to provide the first detailed and quantitative investigation into this decline by looking at the changing fortunes of the Latin East, the development of the crusading movement, and the political situation in the Empire.[6]

1221–1230

By 1221 many German noblemen had returned home from Egypt, dispirited by the failure of the Fifth Crusade. Their sombre reports seem to have caused a short-term sense of apathy towards future crusading ventures, and in Frankfurt in 1224, when Hermann von Salza (master of the Teutonic Order, 1210–39) attempted to rally support

[4] 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', in Theodor Hirsch, Max Töppen, and Ernst Strehlke (eds.), *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der Preußischen Vorzeit bis zum Untergange der Ordensherrschaft*, 6 vols. (Leipzig, 1861–74), i. 220–5. For further discussion on the origins of the Teutonic Knights, see Nicholas Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land, 1190–1291* (Woodbridge, 2009), 9–30; Marie-Luise Favreau, *Studien zur Frühgeschichte des Deutschen Ordens* (Stuttgart, 1974), 64–94.

[5] James of Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, 268–72.

[6] I am not aware of any other detailed study on this subject although Ashcroft refers briefly to this trend. See J. Ashcroft, 'Germany', in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, 4 vols. (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2006), ii. 525.



Methodology: this graph charts the changing patterns in German noble pilgrimage to the Holy Land during the period 1187 to 1291. As the name suggests, it is confined exclusively to Germans of noble or royal rank (for secular nobles, the rank of lord or above; for clergy, the rank of bishop or above). The decision to confine the graph to the upper ranks of society was driven by the consideration that pilgrimages made by noblemen are generally well documented, particularly at the upper end of the social scale, and therefore the changing frequency of such expeditions can be charted with some accuracy. For lesser pilgrims the sources are far more sporadic with occasional charters supplying a large number of names. Were these scattered references to be included in the above diagram, they would distort the graph's ability to show general trends because a single humble pilgrim would be accorded the same weighting as a nobleman or lord. The disadvantage of this approach is that popular expeditions to the Latin East or those which had no known noble leader, such as those of the Frisians or the pilgrimage of 1267, are not represented. Despite this, this graph is an attempt to display succinctly a wide-ranging trend. Only noblemen for whom a reliable reference exists have been included. This chart has drawn upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources but the following have been of particular value: Naumann, *Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Heinrichs VI.*; Röhricht, *Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande*; Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*; Longnon, *Les Compagnons de Villehardouin.*

for a new undertaking led by Emperor Frederick II, he met with little enthusiasm.[7] The papal legate, Conrad of Porto, dispatched to Germany on the same errand, fared no better.[8] On the eve of Frederick's subsequent departure in December 1227, he claimed that his agents had initially been able to recruit only the *paucos vel infirmos*.[9] Indeed, the poet Freidank, who took part in the crusade, stated explicitly that Frederick departed for *Outremer* without the support of the German princes.[10] In the event, the only major secular German nobles to participate were Landgrave Ludwig of Thuringia and the count of Limburg.[11] Even so, the landgrave of Thuringia could not be persuaded to take the cross at Frankfurt and a second recruitment drive was necessary to secure his support; a scenario more indicative of persuasion than enthusiasm.[12] This lethargy has historical parallels and recalls the reaction of the French nobility in the wake of the Second Crusade to the prospect of a new campaign in 1149–50.

1230–1239

By the early 1230s, however, the German nobility had a number of strong reasons to wish to travel to the Latin East. Emperor Frederick II was the king of Jerusalem and he had restored the holy city to Christendom in 1229, re-opening the pilgrim roads to the Holy Sepulchre, which had been shut for forty years. The conflict between the pope and emperor, which began ostensibly because of Frederick's seeming reluctance to embark on crusade in 1227, had been concluded in the treaty of San Germano in 1230. As an additional incentive, Gregory IX launched a new crusade (commonly known as the Barons' Cru-

[7] *Chronica Regia Coloniensis, Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum* (hereafter *MGH SRG*), 18, ed. G. Waitz (Hanover, 1880), 253–4.
[8] Ibid.
[9] *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, ed. J. L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, 7 vols. (Paris, 1852–61), iii. 42.
[10] Ulrich Müller (ed.), *Kreuzzugsdichtung* (Tübingen, 1969), 102–9; Freidank, 'Bescheidenheit', trans. J. Ashcroft, in Murry (ed.), *The Crusades*, iv. 1310–11.
[11] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, ed. H. R. Luard, 7 vols. (RS, London, 1872–83), iii. 128, 148.
[12] *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, iii. 36–48.

sade) in 1234 with the bull *Rachel suum videns*.[13] One might imagine that in such favourable circumstances, the German nobility's interest might have revived.

These inducements, however, were counter-balanced by a number of factors which either inhibited potential participants or diverted them away from the Levant. Frederick may have been ruler of Jerusalem, but his authority was vigorously resisted by a group of barons led by the Ibelin family.[14] Potential German pilgrims may have feared that, if they made a pilgrimage to the east, they would become embroiled in a civil conflict. Attempts were made to end this dissent by both the emperor and the papacy but, despite a lengthy period of negotiations, they were ultimately unsuccessful.[15] Furthermore, returning crusaders from both the Fifth Crusade and Frederick's crusade carried back stories highlighting the dissolute state of Acre and indicating a wider local hostility towards German visitors. The above-mentioned Freidank, for example, wrote:

> I have heard many a man express the wish: 'If I might get to Acre, and just see the Holy Land, I would not care if I died there on the spot.' Now I see these folk glad to be alive and anxious to get back to their homeland. . . . Acre has gobbled up silver, gold, horses, and clothes, and whatever a man may possess, nothing eludes their clutches. Now they mock us and say, '*Allez* – off you go home across the sea.' And if thirty armies came to Acre, they would fare as we have fared.[16]

Although Freidank does not refer explicitly to Latin Eastern resistance to the Emperor's rule, he clearly believed that co-operative action in the east was futile and there is more than a hint of xeno-

[13] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, iii. 280–7. For letters authorizing preaching in Germany, see *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, ed. L. Auvray, 3 vols. (Paris, 1890–1918), ii. nos. 2586, 2786, 2790.

[14] Peter W. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997), 24–57.

[15] Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London, 1973), 198–207.

[16] Trans. taken from Freidank, 'Bescheidenheit', in Murry (ed.), *The Crusades*, iv. 1310–11; Müller (ed.), *Kreuzzugsdichtung*, 102–9.

phobia in his account of local attitudes.[17] In similar vein, James of Vitry in around 1217 described Acre as a monster with nine heads.[18] Oliver, head of the cathedral school in Cologne and later bishop of Paderborn, presented Acre as a sinful city.[19] The dissemination of such sentiments would have done little to encourage German nobles to take the cross.

By the mid 1230s relations between the papacy and Empire began to deteriorate, as did Frederick's fragile relations with the Lombard communes. Initially, Frederick's position as king of Jerusalem and Pope Gregory's interest in the defence of the Holy Land gave them a common goal, but this cooperation became increasingly strained when both parties were drawn into the struggle for northern Italy.[20] Frederick's son, King Henry of Germany, also challenged his authority and in this atmosphere of political tension many nobles may have deemed it prudent to remain in Germany to monitor developments. Historically, wars in Western Europe had often served as an obstacle for potential crusaders and during the Second, Third, and Fifth Crusades effective peace-making had been a vital requisite for many participants.[21] In the 1230s, however, despite the best efforts of Hermann von Salza and other papal representatives, this controversy

[17] Other authors similarly reflect the tension between German and French settlers and crusaders in the Holy Land. The pilgrim John of Würzburg commented bitterly that although Jerusalem had been captured by the imperial nobleman, Godfrey of Bouillon, the Franks had subsequently colonized the land and attempted to present the First Crusade as a Frankish venture. John of Würzburg, *Peregrinationes Tres*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Turnholt, 1994), 126. For discussion on attitudes towards German pilgrims see also Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine: German Pilgrimages to Jerusalem between the Twelfth and Sixteenth Century', *Journal of Medieval History*, 21 (1995), 335–7.

[18] *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960), 83.

[19] Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', in *Die Schriften des Kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina,* ed. H. Hoogeweg (Tübingen, 1894), 171.

[20] Björn Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land, 1230–1239', in R. N. Swanson (ed.), *The Holy Land, Holy Lands, and Christian History* (Woodbridge, 2000), 201–4.

[21] It should be noted that war in Western Christendom did not always prevent participation in expeditions to the Holy Land. Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie has shown that German law permitted warriors to evade military serv-

escalated; antagonisms ran too deep and diplomatic relations between Frederick, Gregory, and the Italian cities continued to decline.[22] In the ensuing wars, many nobles fought in Italy and even those who were willing to venture east may have feared that the roads to the Italian ports—the key transit points for the Holy Land—would be blocked.

Gregory also launched a series of further crusades in 1233–4 against political enemies, heretics, and pagans which, intentionally or not, seem to have deflected any potential crusaders away from the Latin East. In 1234, for example, the people of Rome forced Pope Gregory to flee the city, posing a threat to the very core of papal power. However much Gregory may have wished to support the Holy Land, this challenge to his personal authority clearly took precedence and, almost immediately after issuing *Rachel suum videns* (Sept. 1234), he dispatched a series of letters (Oct.–Nov. 1234) requesting aid from the German nobility.[23] As Lower has argued: 'These appeals for military assistance against the Romans may have drawn potential recruits away from the Holy Land crusade.'[24]

Another crusade was directed against the Stedinger peasants in northern Germany. In 1229 Gregory excommunicated the Stedingers for their continued resistance to secular and ecclesiastical authority.[25] By 1232 the threat they posed had become sufficiently acute for him to offer the local nobility a Jerusalem indulgence if they were prepared to take the field against them.[26] During the resulting expedition Count Burchard of Oldenburg-Wildeshausen, a regional land-

ice if they took part in a pilgrimage to the Holy Land instead. She has demonstrated that Welf VI, duke of Spoleto, utilized this clause during his expedition to Jerusalem in 1167. Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 331.

[22] Otto of Freising, 'Gesta Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG*, 46 (Hanover, 1912), 47; *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ed. G. H. Pertz et al., 3 vols. (Berlin, 1883–94), i. no. 657.

[23] Ibid. i. nos. 602, 607, 608.

[24] Michael Lower, *The Barons' Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (Philadelphia, 2005), 39.

[25] Christoph T. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1998), 53; Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land', 195–6.

[26] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. nos. 1209, 1387, 1391, 1392, 1581.

owner, was killed in battle. The following year his son and successor Henry suffered the same fate.[27] In February 1234 a further crusading army assembled, led by Landgrave Henry of Thuringia, Duke Otto of Brunswick and Margraves John and Otto of Brandenburg.[28] The participation of these noblemen is significant for two reasons. First, they all came from families that had fought previously in the Eastern Mediterranean. The counts of Oldenburg had participated in the crusades of Frederick I[29] and Henry VI;[30] the landgraves of Thuringia in those of Frederick I,[31] Henry VI,[32] and Frederick II;[33] the dukes of Brunswick and the margraves of Brandenburg in the crusade of Henry VI.[34] Second, the expeditions against the Stedingers marked, in most cases (the margraves of Brandenburg being the exception), the first occasion on which these dynasties had participated in a crusade to any area other than the Holy Land. None of these dynasties ever returned to the Latin East. Although in hindsight this event marks a watershed in their crusading activity, it is unlikely that any long-term decision was taken at this time concerning their future crusading intentions. Gregory may even have hoped that with the suppression of such heresies, it would be easier to attract crusaders from these regions.[35] Nevertheless, whatever these noblemen's short-term motives, this event broke a chain of tradition and this alone may be significant.

[27] Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 53.

[28] Ibid. 57. For the participation of Henry of Thuringia see *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. no. 1785; 'Ex Godefrido Coloniensi', in *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum*, ed. J. Boehmer and A. Huber, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1843–68), ii. 364–6.

[29] 'Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG, Nova Series*, 5, ed. A. Chroust (Berlin, 1928), 20.

[30] Naumann, *Der Kreuzzung Kaiser Heinrichs VI.*, 238.

[31] 'Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi', in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (London, 1864–5), i. 68.

[32] This source is a list of the nobles who attended the militarization of the Teutonic Order in Acre in 1198. This meeting took place during the crusade of Henry VI and is therefore a good indicator of those who took part. 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

[33] See Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land,* 43–84.

[34] 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

[35] Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land', 196.

In addition to the campaigns against the Romans and the Stedingers, the mid-1230s also saw the beginning of a further offensive in the Baltic. In November 1230 Gregory gave his approval for the conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic Knights. Within months, under the leadership of Herman Balk, a small contingent began to develop the Order's position in this region at the expense of the native Prussians.[36] As the Knights pushed deeper into pagan territory, the papacy came under pressure to increase the level of assistance it rendered this frontier.[37]

Previously, when pontiffs had permitted the recruitment of crusaders for this region, they had been careful to ensure that these undertakings did not detract from campaigns to the Holy Land. In 1204, Innocent III had allowed the archbishop of Bremen to gather troops for an expedition to Livonia, provided that they could not travel to the Latin East.[38] In 1217, Pope Honorius III allowed the bishop of Prussia to recruit crusaders for the struggle with paganism on condition that they had not already taken a vow to travel to the Holy Land.[39] Nevertheless, the perceived significance of this frontier grew and Fonnesberg-Schmidt has shown that as Pope Honorius's pontificate progressed, 'the Baltic campaigns were recognized as being on a par with the crusades undertaken in the East'.[40] Potential crusaders would have been aware of the advantages of Baltic crusading. Indulgences on this front could be won at a lower cost and in a fraction of the time necessary to complete a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. During the Second Crusade, Duke Conrad of Zähringen is thought to have chosen the Baltic campaign over Conrad's expedition to the

[36] Peter von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', in Hirsch, Töppen, and Strehlke (eds.), *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, i. 49.

[37] Hermann von Salza is even reported to have asked that certain regions be set aside for the preaching of the cross for Prussia and Livonia. See *The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin: A History of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia, 1190–1331*, trans. M. Fischer (Aldershot, 2010), 65.

[38] *Liv., Est- und Kurländisches Urkundenbuch (Abt. 1)*, 17 vols. (Aalen, 1967–81), i. no. 14.

[39] *Regesta Honorii Papae III*, ed. P. Pressutti, 2 vols. (Hildesheim, 1888–95), i. no. 389.

[40] Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades: 1147–1254* (Leiden, 2007), 138–144, 249.

Levant because he was reluctant to make the longer journey to the Holy Land.[41]

It comes as no surprise that when Gregory IX repeatedly instructed the friars to preach the crusade for this region during the 1230s, several established crusading dynasties turned their attention to this new theatre of war.[42] The margraves of Meissen provide an instructive example of this transition. In 1197 Margrave Dietrich took part in Henry VI's crusade to the Holy Land and he was among those who advocated the militarization of the Teutonic Order. In 1219 he made a gift to the Order, citing his wish to support their work in the Holy Land. In 1234, however, when the Knights' primary need was for help against the pagans in the Baltic, Dietrich's son Henry (margrave of Meissen 1221–88, landgrave of Thuringia, 1247–88) travelled to support them in Prussia with a force of forty noblemen.[43] Subsequently, in 1272, Henry's son Dietrich went on crusade to Prussia, even though Gregory X was actively seeking recruits for the Holy Land.[44] This pattern is highly suggestive because it raises the possibility that the margraves were prepared to link their crusading aspirations to the Teutonic Knights' immediate needs; thus, when the Order began to expand in the Baltic, they redirected their energies accordingly. It is well known that individual families became attached to particular military orders and it is possible that, as an order's strategic priorities changed, its supporters were also prepared to divert their energies.

A further instance of this trend can be seen with the Babenberg dukes of Austria. This dynasty had an incredibly strong crusading

[41] Jonathan P. Phillips, *The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (New Haven, 2007), 238; 'Casus monasterii Petrishusensis', *MGH Scriptores*, 20, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1868), 674. Incidentally, this pattern was only temporary and his successor Berthold participated in the Third Crusade. For a discussion of the difficulties facing German pilgrims in their journeys to the Holy Land, see Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 321–41.

[42] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. nos. 754, 2098. For a discussion of Gregory's preaching, see Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 196–200.

[43] von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 59.

[44] Ibid. 116.

pedigree. Margrave Henry II[45] participated in the Second Crusade and his sons, Leopold V[46] and Frederick I,[47] took part in the Third Crusade and Henry VI's crusade respectively. Leopold V's son, Leopold VI, then took part in the Fifth Crusade.[48] During this time, the Babenberg family acted as major patrons of the Teutonic Order and made concessions of property in Austria and Styria. Frederick I was also among those who had advocated the militarization of the Order in 1198 and, during the Fifth Crusade, Leopold VI made a substantial contribution towards the Order's purchase of its first estate in the Latin East.[49] Leopold remained closely connected to the Order's master, Hermann von Salza, and in 1230 the two men helped to settle the disputes between Frederick II and Gregory IX.[50]

It seems that, like the margraves of Meissen, the Babenberg family came to see crusading as an activity that was intrinsically linked to its support for the Teutonic Order. The next stage in this relationship occurred in 1234 when Pope Gregory IX asked Leopold's son, Frederick of Babenberg, to travel on crusade in support of the Order, but specified that he should render this aid in the Baltic rather than the Holy Land.[51] This decision may have been driven as much by Leopold VI's frustrated ambitions towards the Cypriot throne as his relationship with the Order.[52] Even so, Gregory was aware of the Babenberg family's close association with the Order and he referred to it explicitly in this letter. Admittedly, Frederick did not travel to Prussia immediately. His support for Henry, son of Emperor Frederick II, during the above-mentioned period of internecine strife,

[45] Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, 129.

[46] Nicholas Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria, and his Claim to the Cypriot Throne', *ΕΠΕΤΗΡΙΔΑ*, 34 (2008), 22.

[47] 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224.

[48] Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 233; Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', 163. For the involvement of the Babenberg dukes in crusading to the Holy Land, see Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria', 19–35; Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land*, 23–4.

[49] Oliveri Scholastici, 'Historia Damiatina', 207.

[50] Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', *MGH Scriptores*, 19, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1866), 359.

[51] *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, i. no. 596.

[52] Morton, 'Leopold VI, Duke of Austria', 19–35.

made his position precarious.[53] Nevertheless, when Duke Fredrick finally embarked on crusade in 1244, it was to Prussia, not the Holy Land.[54] Clearly another major crusading dynasty had turned away from the Holy Land and, yet again, time would prove this change to be permanent. In these ways the connection between the Teutonic Order and many noble families seems to have provided a stimulus which diverted their attention to the Baltic. Of course, the Teutonic Knights continued to play an active role in the Eastern Mediterranean but between 1229 and 1239 the Latin East was covered by a peace treaty with the Muslims established by Frederick II. The Order therefore had little cause to demand support in the Holy Land, but had every reason to request it in the Baltic.

It was not merely the major noble families who were encouraged to focus their attention on the Baltic. The papacy was aware that many lesser magnates and knights wished to travel on crusade to the Eastern Mediterranean, but could not afford to do so. Responding to this need, in 1232 Gregory IX permitted the Dominicans in Bohemia to allow less affluent crusaders to commute their vows to the Prussian wars rather than the Eastern Mediterranean.[55] This issue of funding was clearly an important problem because in 1233 the pope authorized the dioceses of Mainz, Worms, and Speyer to absolve such pilgrims from their vows in exchange for funds to assist in the building of a church.[56] Reviewing this trend, it could be argued that these commutations represent a sensible use of resources given that such crusaders could not have afforded to reach the kingdom of Jerusalem. Even so, this policy does seem to have been yet another way that the idea of Jerusalem as an aspirational goal was blunted and diverted to serve more local ends.

As crusading to Prussia and Livonia gathered momentum, the Teutonic Order endeavoured to increase the appeal of these regions by styling them 'a new Holy Land'. Shortly after the arrival of their

[53] Alfred Haverkamp, *Medieval Germany: 1056–1273*, trans. H. Braun and R. Mortimer (Oxford, 1988), 251.
[54] von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 76; *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, ed. É. Berger, 4 vols. (Paris, 1884), ii. no. 711.
[55] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. no. 754; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 195.
[56] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. no. 1209.

main colonizing force in 1230, the brethren established a settlement on the Vistula named 'Toron'. It is no coincidence that there was a castle called Toron in the Holy Land, which the Order had tried to acquire the year before.[57] There were also times when the local pagans were described as 'Saracens', providing an obvious parallel to the wars of the Levant.[58] In time, the Order's chroniclers began to present the battles fought against the pagans in the language of the crusade to the Latin East. Figuratively, the Teutonic Knights were described as new Maccabees defending a new Jerusalem.[59] Although the characterization of Prussia in this way would have served a number of purposes, it is likely that such comparisons were designed to reassure the German nobility that expeditions to this region were equally meritorious.

With the establishment of so many crusades during the 1230s, several major crusading families received calls for assistance from multiple frontiers almost simultaneously. At different points during the years 1233–4, for example, Gregory asked the landgrave of Thuringia to fight against the Romans, the Stedinger peasants, and the Muslims in the Holy Land.[60] Obviously, the landgraves could not satisfy all of these demands and it is likely that these mixed messages would only have created an unnecessary level of confusion about the papacy's real objectives. Furthermore, the German nobility could now choose from a range of crusading destinations and, whilst Jerusalem was incontestably the most spiritually significant, the journey this entailed was also more expensive and time consuming than the alternatives. In addition, with war in Italy blocking the roads to the Mediterranean, civil war in the Holy Land itself and, by contrast, an absence of such impediments to expeditions against the pagans or heretics, it is hardly surprising that no major German nobleman is

[57] John of Ibelin, *Le Livre des Assises*, ed. P. W. Edbury (Leiden, 2003), 453–4.

[58] August Seraphim, M. Hein, E. Maschke et al. (eds.), *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, 6 vols. (Aalen, 1961), i. pt. 1 no. 78.

[59] Mary Fischer, 'Biblical Heroes and the Uses of Literature: The Teutonic Order in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', in Alan V. Murray (ed.), *Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier: 1150–1500* (Aldershot, 2001), 261–75; Mary Fischer, 'The Books of the Maccabees and the Teutonic Order', *Crusades*, 4 (2005), 59–71.

[60] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. nos. 1556, 1785; Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, i. 280–7.

known to have participated in Gregory's crusade to the Holy Land (the Barons' Crusade).[61]

1240–1269

Should the short-term disincentives of the 1230s have ended it is perfectly possible that crusading to the Latin East would have resumed as normal. During the 1240s, however, Hohenstaufen policies continued to focus on the struggle with the papacy, while a new threat appeared on Christendom's eastern border. In 1240 the Mongols invaded Hungary and Poland, destroying every army sent against them.[62] Shortly afterwards, the Prussians rebelled against the Teutonic Knights. With Christendom's eastern defences in tatters, the papacy needed to respond swiftly to prevent any possible invasion into central Europe. These crises were counter-balanced by those of the Latin East in 1244. In this year, Jerusalem fell to the Khwarazmians, who subsequently allied with the Egyptians and defeated the kingdom of Jerusalem's field army in the battle of La Forbie. Support was needed on multiple fronts. This section will explore the implications of these events and demonstrate that whilst various crises required many noblemen to remain in Germany, others *were* willing to devote themselves to the Holy Land but were then deliberately deflected by the papacy to make war on its political opponents.

Before 1240, eastern Europe had known times of crisis and defeat, but in general terms the overall trend had been one of progressive eastwards colonization. When crusades were launched in these regions they often had more in common with wars of expansion than those of defence. Nevertheless, the sheer ease with which the Mongols decimated Hungary and Poland's defences demonstrated that the eastern 'back-door' to Christendom was still open. When in 1243 the Prussians rose in revolt it must have seemed that the whole frontier zone was in jeopardy.[63] Furthermore, the Prussians and Mongols were not always viewed as separate threats but were fre-

[61] Lower, *The Barons' Crusade*, 41.
[62] Peter Jackson, 'The Crusade against the Mongols (1241)', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 42 (1991), 1–18.
[63] von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 66.

quently perceived as synonymous. For example, a number of chroniclers portray the Teutonic Knights in Prussia fighting the 'Tartars' in this region, even though the Mongol forces never reached this far north.[64] Also, in 1254 and 1265, when crusades were preached against the Mongols, they were executed against the Prussians.[65]

Among the immediate consequences of these defeats was a rapid fall in the level of aid that could be rendered to the Levant, either by Poland or Hungary. Both regions had sent crusaders to the Holy Land in the past and King Andrew of Hungary led a large contingent on the Fifth Crusade.[66] When the Mongols invaded in 1241 they defeated King Bela IV, who had previously taken a vow to travel to Jerusalem (although this had been commuted to an expedition to the Latin Empire of Constantinople in 1235).[67] The kingdom of Poland had contributed troops to the Second Crusade, possibly under Władysław, prince of Silesia.[68] Prince Henry of Sandomierz then went on a pilgrimage to the Latin East from 1153 to 1154 and further knights joined subsequent expeditions, including the Third Crusade.[69] Nevertheless, after 1241, no major ventures were launched to the Latin East. Ironically, only one year previously, Gregory had ordered the provincial prior of the Dominicans to preach the cross in Hungary for the support of the Holy Land and Romania.[70]

The papacy responded to these threats with a series of crusades against the Mongols in 1241 and the Prussians in 1243.[71] In 1245, Pope Innocent IV declared that troops could be recruited for the

[64] For an example see 'Continuatio Sancrusensis Secunda', *MGH Scriptores*, 9, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1851), 644.

[65] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 289; *Les Registres de Clément IV*, ed. É. Jordan, 4 vols. (Paris, 1893–1904), i. no. 113.

[66] James R. Sweeney, 'Hungary and the Crusades, 1169–1218', *International History Review*, 3 (1981), 479–81.

[67] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, ii. no. 2872.

[68] John Kinnamos, *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus* (New York, 1976), 70.

[69] Rafal Witkowski, 'Poland', in Murray (ed.), *The Crusades*, iii. 968–9.

[70] *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, ii. no. 5123. Further preaching was authorized in 1243, *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. no. 30.

[71] *Bullarium Franciscanum*, ed. J. H. Sbaraleae (Rome, 1759), i. 296–7; *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 146. For further discussion see Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 225–7; Jackson, 'The Crusade against the Mongols (1241)', 1–18.

Prussian frontier without papal authorization.[72] This effectively created what Riley-Smith has described as a 'perpetual crusade' with a recruitment zone encompassing the whole of Germany.[73] Such measures made Prussia the permanent crusading target, although preaching continued to be authorized against Islam and heretics. In the same year, when Louis IX of France began to rally troops for a much needed campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean, Innocent ordered that recruitment drives conducted in Germany should not interfere with preaching for the Baltic crusade.[74] Clearly, in Germany at least, the papacy was not prepared to allow the Holy Land crusade to jeopardize campaigns in Prussia and Livonia.

In later years the papacy's fears of a second Mongol invasion, linked with the Teutonic Knights' ongoing struggle to maintain and extend their position in the north, drove pontiffs to support a series of further offensives. During the 1250s there was a very real prospect of a new Mongol offensive and grave reports carried by envoys and missionaries returning from the Mongol armies only heightened these concerns.[75] To combat this threat, the Church strove to form alliances between frontier rulers and in 1254 Pope Alexander IV preached the above-mentioned crusade against the Mongols.[76] In 1257 Alexander IV permitted the Teutonic Order to allow crusaders who had promised to travel to the defence of the Levant to redeem their vows in return for a cash payment of 500 marks (to be spent on the defence of Prussia).[77] Many nobles with traditions of crusading to the Levant and patronage for the Teutonic Order responded to these appeals and marched against the Mongols and pagans. Margrave Otto of Brandenburg set out for Prussia in 1251 and again in 1266.[78]

[72] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 168.

[73] Jonathan S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History* (2nd edn. London, 2005), 197.

[74] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 169; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 229–30.

[75] Salimbene de Adam, *Cronica*, ed. G. Scalia, 2 vols. (Bari, 1966), i. 298–9, 580–1; Johannes Giessauf, *Die Mongolengeschichte des Johannes von Piano Carpine: Einführung-Text-Übersetzung-Kommentar* (Graz, 1995).

[76] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 289.

[77] Ibid. i. pt. 2, no. 25.

[78] 'De Primordiis Ordinis Theutonici Narratio', 224; von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 88, 114.

In 1265 the landgrave of Thuringia set off for the Baltic. In 1254–5 and 1267–8 King Otto II of Bohemia assembled a large army to support the Teutonic Knights' wars against the pagans.[79] In general, therefore, it can be seen that further crusading dynasties began to turn away from the Mediterranean and towards the Baltic.

The crusade to the Holy Land continued to be preached in Germany throughout the thirteenth century with a persistence which suggests that it met with some response. In 1261, for example, when Urban IV, former patriarch of Jerusalem, became pope, crusading policy changed dramatically. He launched a new campaign to the Levant the following year, commissioning preaching across Germany.[80] Nevertheless, by the 1260s, the crusade to the Baltic seems to have become so entrenched that attempts to gather forces for the Latin East were actually resented by local recruiters. In 1263 and 1265 the papacy responded to complaints that preachers were attempting to persuade crusaders to commute their vows away from Prussia and towards the Holy Land.[81] This practice was repeatedly forbidden, providing an interesting benchmark for the relative importance attached by the papacy to these two frontiers.

While the papacy showed considerable support for Prussia and Livonia, those crusaders who still chose to serve in the Latin East were often re-directed to fight against Frederick II and his descendents. In 1245 the conflict between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen entered a new phase when Innocent IV excommunicated Frederick.[82] The following year Innocent IV launched a crusade against the emperor which he sustained until 1249 (precisely the period when Louis IX was trying to raise troops for a campaign against Egypt).[83] He coupled this with instructions that those German crusaders who were eager to go to the Holy Land should campaign instead against

[79] Ibid. 90, 113.

[80] Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 80.

[81] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 2, nos. 198, 214, 239.

[82] This section has drawn upon, *The Seventh Crusade, 1244–1254: Sources and Documents*, compiled and trans. Peter Jackson (Aldershot, 2007), 49–52.

[83] *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 1993, 3002, 4060, 4068; ii. nos. 4265, 4525, 4681; 'Menkonis Chronicon', *MGH Scriptores*, 23, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1874), 540.

the emperor.[84] Given that Innocent had already ordered that preaching for the Latin East should not interfere with expeditions to the Baltic, it is not surprising that Louis received very little support from Germany. Admittedly, this diversion of crusaders seems to have been confined to Germany because Innocent was generally careful to ensure that French nobles remained committed to the French crusade.[85]

An example of this policy in operation can be seen with the dukes of Brabant. In 1246 Duke Henry II announced his intention to join the Holy Land crusade.[86] Presumably he wished to follow the example of his father, Henry I, who had participated in the Third Crusade and had led Henry VI's campaign.[87] Even so, by 1247 and with Innocent's full support, he was serving in defence of the papacy against Frederick II.[88] This seems to have been a source of regret for Henry looking back years later, because on his deathbed he made a second crusading vow to travel to Jerusalem. This was intended to be redeemed with a cash payment.[89] Henry was not the only crusader to be guided in this way and the Frisians, who had been encouraged to embark for the Holy Land in 1246, were told to commute their vows in November 1247 and April 1248 to the service of the new anti-king, William of Holland.[90] Frisia was an area with a strong crusading pedigree and had contributed to both the Third and Fifth Crusades.[91] In June 1248 and again in November 1250 Innocent clearly changed

[84] It should be noted that these instructions were rescinded a few months later. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 229–30; Haverkamp, *Medieval Germany*, 257; *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 2935, 4269.

[85] Ibid. i. nos. 3054, 3384. There were some minor exceptions to this. See ibid. no. 4060.

[86] *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ii. no. 229; Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade,* 51.

[87] Preaching was authorized in Brabant in November 1246, *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. no. 2229.

[88] *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ii. nos. 425, 468. In 1241 he had been asked to go on crusade against the Mongols. Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, iv. 109.

[89] *MGH Epistolae Saeculi XIII*, ii. no. 523.

[90] Ibid. ii. no. 453; *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 2054, 3779. For the papal authorization to preach the cross in favour of William and against Conrad, son of Frederick, see *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, ii. nos. 6304–5; see also ibid. no. 5037.

[91] J. Mol, 'Frisian Fighters and the Crusade', *Crusades*, 1 (2002), 89–110.

his mind for a second time because he wrote to the Frisians encouraging them once again to travel to the Holy Land.[92] Jackson has shown that these changing demands seem to have been linked to the fluctuating fortunes of war both in the Egyptian campaign of Louis's crusade and the struggle against Frederick in Germany. But from the Frisian perspective these contradictory instructions would have been rather confusing and it must have been very difficult to know what the papacy actually wanted.[93] In the event, many served with William of Holland at the siege of Aachen in 1248, but they did not set out for the east.[94]

Other major families chose voluntarily to involve themselves closely in the struggle between papacy and Empire. Henry Raspe, landgrave of Thuringia, set himself up as an anti-king in 1246 and during his subsequent attempt to usurp Frederick's power he cut a swathe across Germany in a series of encounters with Hohenstaufen forces.[95] After Henry's death in 1247 the papacy found a new champion in the form of the above-mentioned William II, count of Holland (1234–56). Both of these men had a substantial crusading pedigree. As has been shown, the landgraves of Thuringia were devoted crusaders and Henry Raspe's brother, Conrad, had been the master of the Teutonic Order (1239–40).[96] William of Holland's great grandfather, Florent III (count of Holland, 1157–90), and grandfather, William (count of Holland, 1203–22), fought during the Third and Fifth Crusades respectively.[97] Naturally these magnates' determination to oppose the Hohenstaufen prevented them from travelling to the Eastern Mediterranean whilst drawing other families into the conflict. This process was encouraged by Innocent IV who, on 2 January and 11 May 1249, permitted German crusaders to commute their crusading vows if they were prepared to fight with William

[92] *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, ii. no. 4927.
[93] Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade*, 52.
[94] 'Menkonis Chronicon', 540.
[95] *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. nos. 1969, 1989.
[96] Hartmut Boockmann, 'Konrad von Thüringen', *Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1190–1994* (Marburg, 1998), 17–20.
[97] Ansbert, 'Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris', *MGH SRG,* NS 5 (Berlin, 1928), 19; 'Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum', in *Quinti Belli Sacri: Scriptores Minores,* ed. Reinhold Röhricht (Geneva, 1979), 29.

against Frederick.[98] As Maier has argued, at this time 'Germany was expected mainly to supply the crusades against the Hohenstaufen and in the Baltic'.[99] The consequences of these policies and re-directions were clearly felt in the Holy Land. In 1254 Peter of Koblenz, marshal of the Teutonic Order in Acre, wrote to King Alfonso X of Spain describing the Holy Land's perilous situation in the wake of Louis IX's defeat in Egypt. He complained that because of the war between the papacy and Empire, it had been years since his Order had last received any support from the German Empire.[100] Later commentators were also aware that these conflicts had diminished the assistance the Holy Land had received from Germany, and when Pierre Dubois in 1306 offered suggestions for the recovery of the Holy Land, he wrote: 'we have seen that the Germans and the Spaniards, although renowned as warriors, have on account of the incessant wars of their kings long ceased to come to the aid of the Holy Land.'[101]

The papacy's injunctions were, however, not altogether successful and some German pilgrims still set off to fulfil their pilgrim vows in the Levant. As Kedar has shown in his study of the list of passengers who embarked on the *St Victor* in 1250, many of the pilgrims' names contain German or eastern European toponyms or titles.[102] The largest party of thirty-six passengers was led by Lord Markwald of Bohemia. There was also *dominus* Ulandus Mane and *dominus* Theoderic of Windberg, who had a following of three *socii*.[103] None of these noblemen led contingents of much military importance, but their presence on this list demonstrates that some imperial subjects did manage to set off for the Holy Land. The survival of this docu-

[98] *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, ii. nos. 4269, 4525.

[99] Maier, *Preaching the Crusades*, 72.

[100] Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Salazar, 'Carta de la Orden Teutónica a Alfonso X' (G49, fo. 453, Sig. 9/946. Index Number 33005).

[101] Pierre Dubois, *The Recovery of the Holy Land*, trans. Walther I. Brandt (New York, 1956), 71.

[102] Benjamin Z. Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship, 1250: Towards the History of the Popular Element on the Seventh Crusade', *Studi Medievali*, 13 (1972), 267–79.

[103] *Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, vi. 785; Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship', 270.

ment also highlights an inherent limitation of the sources for this investigation. Whilst letters, references in chronicles, and witnessed documents permit a reconstruction of the movements and crusading activities of the more important imperial nobles, our knowledge concerning the expeditions of the lesser nobility and knightly classes is far more reliant on chance survivals.[104] Thus this passenger list produces valuable, if isolated, examples of crusaders/pilgrims from the lower levels of German noble society.

An interesting indication of the general feeling among German nobles towards crusading occurred in 1266. In this year, after heavy losses inflicted in the Holy Land by Sultan Baybars, Clement IV proclaimed a crusade to the Holy Land across Germany. He approached the king of Bohemia, the margrave of Brandenburg, the duke of Bavaria, the lord of Brunswick, and the margrave of Meissen individually to ask for support.[105] They had evidently already expressed some enthusiasm for such a project because in 1265 Clement IV responded to a letter from Otto of Brandenburg in which the margrave stated his intention of journeying to Jerusalem.[106] Clement also expressed a hope that his example would rally other great nobles to support the Latin East.[107] In the event, in 1266 the rulers of Bohemia, Meissen, Brunswick, and Brandenburg all went on crusade as Clement had requested, but they carried their swords to Prussia, not the Holy Land.[108] For Otto of Brandenburg at least, this chronology seems to suggest that he had considered and then deliberately rejected the idea of a crusade to the Holy Land before travelling to the Baltic.

There were others who still desired to go to the Eastern Mediterranean at this time and they marched south, presumably to take ship from the Italian ports. The *Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi* describes their fate:

[104] Kedar, 'The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship', 270; Favreau-Lilie, 'The German Empire and Palestine', 322–3.

[105] *Les Registres de Clément IV*, i. nos. 842, 845.

[106] Otto had been encouraged to go on crusade to the Baltic in 1260. See *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 1, no. 112.

[107] *Les Registres de Clément IV*, i. no. 828.

[108] von Dusburg, 'Cronica Terre Prussie', 113; 'Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi', *MGH Scriptores*, 24 (Hanover, 1879), 204.

> In the year of our Lord 1266, Pope Clement sent out letters throughout the kingdom of Germany commanding the Dominicans and Franciscans to preach the cross faithfully and urgently against the Sultan of Babylon, who is the Pharaoh of Egypt, and against the Saracens overseas, so that the suffering of the Christians [there] might be alleviated and for the support of the Holy Land. Pope Clement, having gathered a huge army, appointed for them a general of the army and captain namely Count Charles of Anjou, brother of King Louis of France, a worthy man. He proceeded to Tuscany and towards Apulia against Manfred, prince of Apulia, son of Frederick, former emperor, who he attacked and overcame with a glorious triumph.[109]

Once again, the continued struggle against the Hohenstaufen took precedence, even at a time of crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. Other sources similarly reflect the ongoing prioritization of the struggle against the Hohenstaufen over the Latin East and in 1265 a Templar knight, writing about the fall of Arsuf and Caesarea, accused the papacy of using crusading monies to support the wars of Charles of Anjou.[110] In the event, one group of about 500 pilgrims from the Rhineland, which set off in 1267, did reach Acre. Perhaps the death of Manfred in the previous year had persuaded Clement that he could afford to allow this small group at least to reach their intended destination.[111]

1270-1291

By 1270 it had been over forty years since a sizable expedition had left Germany for the Holy Land. For some families it seems that the tradition of the Jerusalem crusade had been broken and other committed crusading families had simply died out. The Babenberg dy-

[109] 'Chronica Minor Auctore Minorita Erphordiensi: Continuatio I', 204.

[110] V. De Bartholomaeis (ed.), *Poesie provenzali storiche relative all'Italia*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1931), ii. 222–5; P. A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam, 1940), 105–14.

[111] 'Annales Colmarienses', in J. Boehmer (ed.), *Fontes Rerum Germanicarum*, 4 vols. (Aalen, 1795–1863), ii. 4–5; R. Bleck, 'Ein oberrheinischer Palästina-

nasty, which had governed Austria for over a hundred years, ended when Duke Frederick II was killed in 1246.[112] The Ludowinger line of the landgraves of Thuringia failed with the death of the Thuringian anti-king, Henry Raspe in 1247.[113] The Hohenstaufen family had previously provided a rallying point for Germans wishing to take part in the Second Crusade, the Third Crusade, the Crusade of Henry VI, and, to a lesser extent, the Crusade of Frederick II. By 1268 this family had, of course, long been the target rather than the instigator of crusading; nevertheless in earlier years it had demonstrated how the presence of a reigning monarch could act as a magnet for recruitment. By 1269 such a figure had been conspicuously absent for many decades.

With the extinction of the Hohenstaufen line, rule in Germany increasingly passed into the hands of the leading princes. German opportunities to intervene in the Mediterranean also began to fade in the face of growing French and Angevin power in Italy. The mix of nationalities involved in the ongoing game for the Mediterranean had shifted to exclude the Empire. It seems likely that this new distribution of political power would have reduced both the willingness and ability of German nobles to travel to the Holy Land. Even so, after his election in 1271, Pope Gregory X was determined to win German recruits for the Latin East and to this end he wrote to Bishop Bruno of Olmütz, requesting advice about the crusade. The choice of corresponding with Bruno on this matter would not have been coincidental because his master, King Otto II of Bohemia, had considerably increased his territorial power in recent years and, although there had been several contenders for the imperial throne, many saw him as the power in Germany.[114] Accordingly, when Bruno replied to this request, it was seemingly to outline Otto's position. In two letters issued in 1273 Bruno described the condition of Bohemia and the surrounding territories.[115] He argued that no expedition to the Holy

Kreuzzug 1267', *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, 87 (1987), 5–27; 'Annales Basileenses', *MGH Scriptores*, 17, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861), 193.

[112] 'Annales Frisacenses', *MGH Scriptores*, 24 (Hanover, 1879), 66.

[113] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, iv. 611.

[114] Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade*, 105–14.

[115] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 2, no. 315; C. Höfler, 'Analecten zur Geschichte Deutschlands und Italiens: Bericht des Bishof Bruno von Olmütz an

Land could be attempted while the German nobility continued to fight amongst themselves and pagan peoples threatened Christendom's borders. Only with the eradication of these threats could the needs of the Latin East be considered. Schein has shown that Bruno's ideas were not isolated and that other contemporaries saw the need to wage the *crux cismarina* to establish the necessary conditions for the *crux transmarina*.[116] Bruno claimed that only the king of Bohemia could protect the region against such threats, a statement clearly designed to support Otto's candidature for the imperial throne.[117] He wrote:

> Behold the queen of Hungary is a Cuman, her nearest kin were and are gentiles. The two daughters of the king of Hungary are promised to the Russians, who are schismatics. . . . The Letts and Prussians like many gentiles have already utterly destroyed the bishoprics of Poland. . . . We do not intend to be silent about the princes of Germany, who to this point have been so divided among themselves, since they do not intend to have one ruling above the others, that one is seen to expect the desolation and destruction of his land by the others. Acordingly they are unfit to defend Christianity in our regions or to repulse the defeats in the lands overseas. Only the king of Bohemia is seen to aspire to the defence of the Christian faith in our parts. Certainly through his lands did the Tartars invade and they are expected a second time.[118]

Bruno (and by extension Otto) was well placed to comment on the defensive needs of this area. As shown above, Otto had twice travelled to Prussia to support the Teutonic Knights, who by 1270 were engaged in the suppression of a second major Prussian rebellion.

By 1275, however, Otto II was sufficiently interested in the crusade to the Holy Land to take a crusading vow. Whether he honestly intended to embark, or whether this was a piece of diplomacy linked

Papst Gregor X.', *Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1846), 1–28.

[116] Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274–1314* (Oxford, 1998), 64.

[117] Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade*, 1–25.

[118] *Preußisches Urkundenbuch*, i. pt. 2, no. 315.

to his bid for the German crown is unclear, but either way he never fulfilled his oath. In 1273 the German electors appointed Rudolph of Habsburg as king of Germany.[119] Rudolph, like Otto, took a crusading vow in 1275. Initially neither man could stage an expedition because between 1276 and 1278 they were at war with one another. In later years, although Rudolf managed to establish a degree of peace over the Empire, he did not set off for the Holy Land, despite receiving an appeal from Acre in 1285.[120] Perhaps by this stage, with the passing of so many years since the last major campaign, the general will for such a venture had simply evaporated. Housley has shown that 'enthusiasm for the crusade varied enormously from country to country, and . . . instead of forming a straightforward pattern of growth followed by decline, it waxed and waned over the generations'.[121] The only major German prince to visit the Levant during this period was Duke Henry of Mecklenburg. Henry departed in 1272 and was subsequently captured and imprisoned by Muslim forces.[122] Although his pilgrimage met with disaster, his crusading vow is remarkable because, as Bartlett notes, in the twelfth century his family had been the 'targets of crusades'.[123]

While the number of noblemen to travel to the Holy Land fell dramatically, crusading taxes were still exacted for its support.[124] In 1246, for example, Innocent IV levied the *vicesima* for three years in Lotharingia and Brabant for the support of Louis IX.[125] This followed the agreement at the Council of Lyons 1245 that the *vicesima* would

[119] 'Annales Colmarienses', 9. See also. J. Guiraud (ed.), *Registres Grégoire X* (Paris, 1892), no. 669.

[120] *Patrologiae Latina*, xcviii, cols. 820B-821B.

[121] Norman Housley, *The Later Crusades: From Lyons to Alcazar, 1274–1580* (Oxford, 1992), 376.

[122] William Urban, *The Baltic Crusade* (DeKalb, Ill., 1975), 224, 256; Röhricht, *Die Deutschen im Heiligen Lande*, 128–9; *Meklenburgisches Urkundenbuch*, 28 vols. (Schwerin, 1863-1977), iii. no. 1934.

[123] Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350* (London, 1993), 268.

[124] This paragraph has drawn upon Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254–1343* (Oxford, 1982).

[125] *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, i. no. 2048.

be levied across Christendom for three years.[126] In 1274, at the Second Council of Lyons, Pope Gregory X imposed an annual tax of one-tenth of ecclesiastical revenues upon the entire church for six years.[127] Like the crusaders themselves, however, these taxes were often diverted to support the needs of other frontiers. As early as 1213 the German poet Walter von der Vogelweide voiced concern that monies raised for the Holy Land would be wasted by the papacy without reaching the Levant.[128] In time, the diversion either of crusading taxation or funds raised through vow redemption became relatively common practice. As Housley has shown, Pope Nicholas III 'had to rebuke some of the German clergy in January 1278 for displaying reluctance to pay the Lyons tenth because of their suspicion that it had been and would be converted "into other uses"'.[129] Describing the collection of crusading taxation in 1274, the author of the *Annales Altahenses* did not claim that the papacy misused these funds, but stated that he was unsure what useful purpose these monies could serve in the Latin East.[130]

Other taxes were also introduced to fund the papacy's other crusading endeavours. Although this was not technically a crusade, in 1228 Gregory IX ordered new taxes to support his struggle with Frederick II.[131] In later years, further revenues were raised across Christendom for crusades against, among others, Frederick II, the Sicilians, and the Aragonese.[132] These seem to have been unpopular and in 1265 Clement IV complained that the German nobility tended to be disobedient in fulfilling its tax obligations.[133] Evidently, as the thirteenth century progressed, papal crusading taxation policy

[126] *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. Norman P. Tanner (ed.), 2 vols. (London, 1990), i. 298.
[127] Ibid. 310.
[128] *Walther von der Vogelweide: Leich, Lieder, Sangsprüche*, ed. C. Cormeau (Berlin, 1996), 64–5; Walter von der Vogelweide, 'Ahi wie kristenliche nu der babest lachet', trans. J. Ashcroft, in Murray (ed.) *The Crusades*, iv. 1309.
[129] Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, 107.
[130] 'Annales Altahenses', *MGH Scriptores*, 17, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861), 410.
[131] Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, 97–106, 184; *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, i. no. 251.
[132] Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, 174-6.
[133] Ibid. 205.

became increasingly opaque to contemporaries, provoking concerns about its true destination.

In addition to this hostility there was ongoing criticism of the Latin East itself. For many, the defeats of the Holy Land were God's judgement on the inability of the local magnates to work with one another. Menko, abbot of Werum in Frisia, also blamed the disputes of the military orders, as did the annalist of Regensburg.[134] In later years, Peter von Dusburg (a member of the Teutonic Order) blamed the internal squabbling of the barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem.[135] These complaints are reminiscent of the comments made by the German poet Freidank, mentioned earlier, and they would only have reinforced the conviction that sending aid to the Holy Land was futile.

Conclusion

In 1290 Burchard von Schwanden (master of the Teutonic Knights, 1283–90) led a contingent of troops and pilgrims to the Holy Land. Before his departure he visited King Rudolph, but gained little support, either from the king or from the German nobility.[136] It seems likely that, with the collapse of the imperial position in Italy, the Eastern Mediterranean had come to be viewed as a remote and chaotic place. Between the demands of the Baltic and the frequent wars of the past decades, the former dynastic links with the Latin East had been broken. Burchard's operation was a fiasco.[137] Soon after his arrival in Acre he quarrelled with the local nobility and then resigned his position as master.[138] Tales of this disaster would presumably have served only to confirm contemporaries in their opinion that political conditions in the kingdom of Jerusalem were too anarchic for anything of value to be attempted. This conviction seems to be confirmed in *Ottokars Österreichische Reimchronik*, a fictional recre-

[134] 'Eberhardi Archidiaconi Ratisponensis Annales', *MGH Scriptores*, 17, ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover, 1861), 594; 'Menkonis Chronicon', 555.

[135] von Dusburg, 'Chronicon Terrae Prussie', 208.

[136] K. Militzer, 'Burchard von Schwanden', in Udo Arnold (ed.), *Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1190–1994* (Marburg, 1998), 38–41.

[137] *The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin*, 207.

[138] *Cronaca del Templare di Tiro (1243–1314),* ed. L. Minervini (Naples, 2000), 204.

ation of the fall of Acre 1291. Here, the master of the Teutonic Knights states his wish to take his revenge for this disaster through campaigns in the Baltic, rather than expeditions to the east.[139] This episode marks the final conclusion of German crusading to the Holy Land before the fall of Acre.

In this article I have suggested why, in the wake of the Fifth Crusade, the number of German crusaders to the Holy Land fell and did not recover. Although initially this seems to have been the result of the disappointments and expenses of the Fifth Crusade, the consistently low level of crusading to the Eastern Mediterranean in subsequent decades was the result of a variety of issues which, when combined, formed an effective barrier even to those who were determined to visit the Holy Land. The growing importance attached to the crusade against Paganism, along with ongoing fears of a second Mongol offensive, ensured that Jerusalem indulgences were available for targets that could be reached in a far shorter time and at far less expense than by an expedition to the Levant. Meanwhile, the papacy's ongoing conflict with the Hohenstaufen drew other warriors into political crusades in Western Christendom, whilst simultaneously compelling many others to remain in Germany in order to guard their estates. Several pontiffs clearly gave the struggle against Frederick higher priority than the affairs of the east and were prepared to divert both crusaders and crusading taxation to this end. Presumably the argument would have been made that the suppression of the Hohenstaufen family was merely a prelude to a major campaign in the Levant. Even so, this conflict took a long time to conclude and no new German crusade to the Holy Land ever took place. Although this cannot be satisfactorily proved, it seems likely that, after decades of crusading in Western Christendom and the Baltic, the general will to intervene in the Holy Land had declined whilst the crusading traditions forged by major families in the twelfth century had largely evaporated. Certainly the decline of German interests in Italy would have served as a discouragement.

No single cause can account for the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291, but the decline in German pilgrimages to the Levant must be numbered among the contributory factors. German pilgrims had formerly played an important part in the building, rebuilding,

[139] 'Ottokars Österreichische Reimchronik', *MGH Deutsche Chroniken*, v. pt. 1 (Hanover, 1890), 689–90.

and ongoing defence of the Latin East, but during the mid to late thirteenth century, their contribution was negligible. The Teutonic Knights continued to serve there until the fall of Acre; indeed Favreau has shown that they even sought to increase their landholdings in Acre and the seigniory of Scandalion after the loss of their major fortress of Montfort.[140] Even so, whereas during the first quarter of the century they had acted primarily as a base for newly arrived German knights, in later years it appears that they were increasingly thrown back on their own resources. Furthermore, the Order itself was heavily committed in both Prussia and Livonia; a struggle which served only to draw more established crusading dynasties away from Jerusalem.

[140] Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, 'The Teutonic Knights in Acre after the Fall of Montfort (1271): Some Reflections', in Benjamin Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer, and R. C. Smail (eds.), *Outremer* (Jerusalem, 1982), 272–84; Marie-Luise Favreau, 'Die Kreuzfahrerherrschaft Scandalion (Iskanderūne)', *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*, 93 (1977), 12–29.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

NORMALITY, UTOPIA, MEMORY, AND BEYOND: REASSEMBLING EAST GERMAN SOCIETY

Thomas Lindenberger

MARY FULBROOK (ed.), *Power and Society in the GDR, 1961–1979: The 'Normalisation of Rule'?* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 344 pp. ISBN 978 1 84545 435 7. £58.00 $95.00
ELI RUBIN, *Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic* (Chapel Hill, NC.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), xviii + 286 pp. ISBN 978 0 8078 3238 7. $49.95
MARTIN SABROW (ed.), *Erinnerungsorte der DDR* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009), 619 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 59045 0. €29.90
JAN PALMOWSKI, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945–90*, New Studies in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 360 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 11177 5. £60.00

Historical studies on the GDR, mushrooming so suddenly because of the unexpected access to communist files in the 1990s, were long marked by a consistent duality. On the one hand, political history delivered abundant information about the party and the state, planned economy and omnipresent bureaucracy, physical terror and ideological indoctrination, and the resistance to all or parts of this by a small minority of intellectuals, artists, Christians, and other nonconformists. On the other, a vast range of social and cultural historiography tended to privilege groups and interactions more remote from official politics, focusing on everyday life under communist rule. This dichotomy was also mirrored in discourses and representations in the wider sphere of public memory culture. In consequence, elitist condemnatory narratives of the GDR as a dictatorship and popular, *ostalgic* imageries of the GDR as a lost living world still co-exist, side by side, often without much connection, but sometimes clashing as if they were irreconcilable. Only recently, deliberate

attempts have been made to overcome this image of a disjointed reality consisting of 'hard' political facts and 'soft' socio-cultural experience through empirical research and historical interpretation. What is at stake in such endeavours is nothing less than historiography's competence and capacity to 'reassemble the social' of a defunct polity in which, according to sociologist Sigrid Meuschel's famous dictum, society had ceased to exist at all.[1] Each of the works discussed in this Review Article confront this *problematique* in their own peculiar way.

'Normalisation of Rule': The 'Fulbrook School' of Understanding the GDR

There can be little doubt about the stabilizing purpose and impact of the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 for the East German communist dictatorship.[2] It is, however, difficult to determine the nature of the relative inner peacefulness marking the GDR from then to its sudden implosion in 1989. Was it the outcome of a regime of terror (including shooting at the border) and tight surveillance? Or of an effective regime performance in terms of providing modest material wealth and social security in exchange for political acquiescence? Or of a successful claim to legitimacy based on basic values such as anti-fascism, peace, egalitarianism, and decent work?

Let us suppose that each of these factors might have been relevant to some extent. Yet the challenge of understanding the intricate logic of their articulation remains. After all, we are dealing with a case of seemingly successful and lasting pacification of a society which, until 1961, had proved to be difficult to hold in check. For a number of years, Mary Fulbrook has been promoting the idea of conceiving of this change as a process of 'normalisation of rule' which took place in the middle period of the GDR's history, the 1960s and 1970s.[3] She has

[1] Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–1989* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

[2] See now Patrick Major, *Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power* (Oxford, 2010).

[3] Mary Fulbrook, 'Introduction: The People's Paradox', in ead., *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven, 2005); ead. 'Putting the People Back In: The Contentious State of GDR History' (Review Article), *German History*, 24/4 (2006), 608–20.

supervised a whole series of dissertation projects devoted to specific aspects of this process. Now an edited volume presents results from this endeavour along with contributions by a number of very distinguished scholars of the social and everyday life history of the GDR, which aptly show the merits, but also the limits, of this line of interpretation.

In her introductory chapter, Fulbrook places her concept of the 'normalisation' of East Germany after 1961 between two usages of the term already established in recent scholarship on European contemporary history and in memory and political discourses more generally. The first refers to a return to 'normality' as perceived and lived in Western societies, in particular, West Germany during the 1950s. Inner pacification and high growth rates ensured a general reorientation of large segments of the population towards the purportedly apolitical private sphere. This was complemented by an obstinate silencing of the disquieting aspects of the 'abnormal' war and the immediate post-war years. In the second usage, 'normalisation' was a recurrent term in some of the Eastern bloc countries, although it had very different implications. It was used both by power-holders and their dissident critics to characterize the years following the violent restoration of party rule, that is, after the thwarted uprising in Hungary 1956 and the Soviet invasion directed against the highly popular communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this context 'normalisation' stood for legitimizing intentions on behalf of the dictators, but was perceived as a cynical propaganda tool by the societies undergoing it, since it implied curtailed citizens' and human rights, severe repression of dissidence, and, in the long run, material and spiritual stagnation.

Fulbrook's concept of a 'normalisation of rule' in the GDR claims a place between these two paradigmatic cases as a unique third type. It proceeds from the observation that even under an imposed state ideology monopolizing the official meaning of 'normality' for the benefit of the party state's dictatorship, post-crisis expectations of an expected return to how things should and could actually be were widespread among the people. In the case of the post-1961 GDR, Fulbrook identifies the following components of 'normalisation': 'stabilisation', 'routinisation of institutional structures and regular patterns of behaviour', the increasing 'predictability' of individual lives, and, along with these, a growing awareness and taking into account

of the rules of the regime, which might eventually result in their complete internalization by the ruled (p. 15).

As Fulbrook puts it in her introduction, this proposition deserves critical consideration in several regards. She suggests that 'normalisation' is meant to serve as an 'ideal type' for comparisons with other cases. Yet, technically speaking, its components lack the definitions required for the application of an ideal type analysis. This consists in measuring the relative deviation of the empirical cases from the model expectation. If 'stabilisation', 'routinisation', 'predictability', and 'learning to play by the rules' are proposed as key components of an ideal type, their measurability must be established in advance. What concrete properties of which events and actors are to serve as indicators of 'stability' and 'routine'? Should we look out for certain statistical regularities and patterns? What concrete modes of behaviour have to be taken into account in order to make a statement about specific actors' notions of the 'predictability' of their life circumstances? Does it matter whether notions of the 'normal', 'normality', or 'normalisation' played any part in the thinking of the actors themselves, whether at the time (to be derived from archival sources) or today (as could be ascertained from interviews)? How can we determine whether citizens of a communist state have internalized the 'rules'? Does 'internalization' mean that they are not even aware that they are playing by these rules?

Fulbrook does not develop such concrete criteria for the pertinence of her 'ideal type'. One of the main arguments she uses to substantiate her model at a general level is the outstanding importance of the 'substantial minority' among the GDR population consisting of small functionaries who 'appeared . . . to have developed somewhat more leeway and room for a limited degree of partially autonomous action within the local sphere' (pp. 24–5) during the 1970s than their counterparts in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 'Appeared to have . . . somewhat more'—in view of the current state of research I consider this speculative pre-assumption. Our knowledge of these communist regimes has not yet reached the required density and coherence to allow us to come up with such conclusions, in particular in the case of Czechoslovakia, which intuitively lends itself best for a comparison. Therefore Fulbrook's claim that 'arguably normalisation in the GDR was rather more successful than in the neighbouring Eastern European states' (p. 26) is also by and large impressionistic. Even in

the application of her own criteria ('stabilisation', 'routinisation', and so on), it could be asked why, logically speaking, the 'somewhat more leeway' enjoyed by small functionaries rendered 'normalisation' per se 'rather successful'. And how did this relate to the majority of non-functionaries? Does the 'normality' experienced by the loyal service class stand for the whole of society?

On the other hand, Fulbrook concedes not only that a 'normalisation' on the West German model did *not* occur in the GDR, but that the mere fact of being the smaller state within a divided country undermined the belief of its own citizens in claims to such 'normality' (p. 26). 'Normalisation of rule' thus remains a fuzzy object of knowledge. It lacks the level of abstract model construction and the clear definitions of its individual components and their interdependency, including criteria for the explanatory power of differences between the model and empirical findings, which it requires if it is to serve as an ideal type *sensu stricto*. Since Fulbrook mobilizes social science approaches such as 'ideal type' and cross-national comparison it is all the more surprising that her discussion of 'normalisation' circumvents any of the standard sociological approaches to this topic. There is not a single mention of 'classical' approaches in the tradition, for instance, of Erving Goffman or Michel Foucault. Their pioneering analyses of the historical interdependency of behaviours, truth production, and practices of disciplination in a set of concrete institutions of normalization (the prison, the asylum, the hospital, and so on) have nowadays become standard fare in social and cultural theory.[4]

Fortunately, we are given the opportunity to follow Fulbook's concerns more closely by looking at the outcome of her own practical application of the concept in the book's concluding chapter, a research report entitled ' "Normalisation" in the GDR in Retrospect: East German Perspectives on their Own Lives' (*sic*). In 2005 Fulbook distributed some 350 questionnaires combining quantitative and qualitative items to East Germans in East Berlin and East Brandenburg in order to find out how they (and obviously not their 'perspectives') perceived their lives under state socialism. The reader is given

[4] See Erving Goffman, *Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order* (New York, 1971); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977); and, most recently, Jürgen Link, *Normalization* (Minneapolis, 2004).

no precise description of the questions submitted; nor is the regional bias of the survey discussed (under communist rule, Berlin and its vicinity were always better off in material terms and less hostile to the regime than the southern districts of the GDR). Fulbook also fails to provide any data about the class, educational, and occupational status of her respondents during socialism and thereafter. To make a long story short, I will pick out one item: 'The extent to which respondents agreed with the statement that it was possible to lead a "perfectly normal life in the GDR"', broken down into six age cohorts born between 1917 and 1979 (p. 298). My point is not that the result, namely, that older generations are a bit more polarized on the issue than the younger ones, while in both there is a safe absolute majority responding 'partly agree' and 'strongly agree', is not worth discussing. It is that the suggestive method by which the data was obtained, that is, by putting the term 'normal' into the informants' mouths, is highly questionable. During the first decade after unification, the claim to have led a 'ganz normales Leben' (I assume that this is what they were asked—unfortunately the German version is not given) became popular among East Germans as a defensive discourse when they had to face the public devaluation of their economic, social, and cultural capital. This also becomes clear in the way in which Fulbrook takes the responses to her questions about the impact of Stasi intrusion into the respondents' lives at face value. After fifteen years of demonization by the media of all East Germans as having been nothing but puppets of the secret service, it is almost a matter of simple self-esteem that nowadays they reject the notion that the Stasi had been omnipresent in their lives, and claim to have been something like normal people.

Fulbrook makes no systematic effort to deconstruct the textual material she has amassed. Thus its different discursive layers and their relation to different temporal frames of actually lived experience cannot become visible. Probably the narrations she collected in these interviews were not exhaustive enough for such a hermeneutic approach. This, of course, is one of the typical weaknesses of hybrid interview methods, which neither meet the requirements of strict quantitative methodology with the concomitant checks on reliability and validity of the collected data nor allow for the extensiveness of biographical–narrative interviews and their in-depth analysis as a historical source. After more than twenty years of highly sophisticat-

ed interview research in the field of GDR history (Wierling, Niethammer, von Plato, Alheit, to name only a few), glossing over basic standards of methodology is perplexing.

On the whole, the results of this survey are therefore not very surprising. East Germans are well-known for cherishing the greater security of life under socialism while acknowledging that a return to the GDR is not desirable. In her final discussion of this result, Fulbrook posits that the ' "people's own voices" perhaps [?] deserve more respect in a democracy than to deny their validity as essentially misguided misperceptions, or (ironically) the effect of suffering from a form of "false consciousness" '(p. 319). This is certainly an honourable motive when embarking on field research of this sort, but it cannot dispense historians from the task of treating the traces left behind by these voices in methodologically adequate ways. These 'people', Fulbrook continues, 'deserve, at least, to be given a hearing as an authentic expression of subjective experience, even if the sophisticated observer will pick up on certain patterns of discourse in a given historical context' (p. 319). Since no source ever speaks for and by itself, 'authenticity' in historiographical texts has to be constructed by careful individual and collective contextualization. 'Picking up on certain patterns' may, in the long run, be a more respectful and insightful way of dealing with the testimonies than sacrificing methodological rigour for the sake of a populist posture.

Yet this critique of Fulbrook's concept of normalization and her application of it should not be misunderstood as a rejection of the subject, or of the substantial empirical contribution that she and her students have made in recent years to a more nuanced understanding of GDR history. In particular, I do not share the recurring objection that to ascribe anything like 'normality' to the GDR per se contributes to belittling its dictatorial nature. On the contrary, I fully sympathize with the attempt to take at face value some obvious changes in the enclosed GDR, its growing tranquillity, its proverbial predictability which would later earn it the dubious honorary title of the 'most boring country in the world', its cradle-to-grave welfare security promises and their partial fulfilment.

Some of the eleven remaining chapters by other authors contribute valuable insights into this process. They are divided into two sections. The chapters in the first part, entitled 'Normalisation as Stabilisation and Routinisation? Systemic Parameters and the Role of

Functionaries', form a coherent though far from homogenous exploration of the basic assumption of the normalization-of-rule model. The second section, however, is more diffuse, offering very diverse reflections of principle rather than actually treating what is suggested by the title, namely 'Normalisation as Internalisation? Conformity, "Normality", and "Playing the Rules"'. For reasons of space, I will limit myself to discussing only a selection in order to exemplify some of their strengths and weaknesses.

Jeannette Madarász's essay, 'Economic Politics and Company Culture: The Problem of "Routinisation"' is among the smaller group of contributions which explicitly pick up the ideal type 'normalisation of rule' in order to demonstrate its fruitfulness. She discusses the paradox of stability and inner erosion at the core site of societal integration of the GDR, the workplace in large, state-owned enterprises. 'Normalisation' in this context refers to the development of patterns for negotiating interests between the workforce and the party state in a routinized, non-confrontational manner. She follows these changes through the period of reform attempts in the planned economy and their failure in the 1960s up to the advent of Erich Honecker's welfare state policy prioritizing the fulfilment of the consumer interests of workers. For anyone familiar with the GDR's economic and enterprise history most of this is not new, yet Madarász convincingly brings out one particular aspect, namely, the barely conceivable tension between increasingly routinized (and thereby also internalized) practices of compromise between upper and lower levels of the economic hierarchy and the concomitant experience of stagnation from the mid 1970s on, resulting in frustration, lethargy, resignation, and eventually widespread individualization. In her conclusion (p. 75) Madarász correctly points to the remarkable degree of enthusiasm for mobilizing policies such as the brigade movement during the 1960s, and the widespread optimism of the early 1970s as prompting this sense of resignation with its well-known long-term consequences. However, it remains unclear how precisely this finding relates to 'normalisation of rule'. Put to the test of reality it quickly dissolves into a seemingly constitutional contradiction between expectations and their ongoing frustrations, which we might call a 'normal' feature of life in general and of life under communist rule in particular. A discussion of whether this diachronic logic of routinization, rising expectations, and permanent frustration proves or dis-

proves the assumptions on which Fulbrook's model is based would perhaps have contributed to its better understanding.

Esther von Richthofen's chapter, 'Communication and Compromise: The Prerequisites for Cultural Participation', dealing with the activities of grass roots functionaries in cultural mass organizations also claims to put Fulbrook's ideal type into practice. In the end it suffers from a lack of specificity when it comes to showing how these actors negotiated cultural needs with party representatives (apart from a somewhat superficial recapitulation of some of the recent approaches in German historiography on social and everyday life in the GDR). By contrast, two other contributions in Part I, George Last's 'Rural Functionaries and the Transmission of Agricultural Policy: The Case of *Bezirk* Erfurt from the 1960s to the 1970s', and Dan Wilton's 'The "Societalisation" of the State: Sport for the Masses and Popular Music in the GDR', take a different approach to fulfilling the editor's commission. In these cases, 'normalisation' features only in the introductory or concluding remarks and in a number of subheadings and adds nothing decisive to otherwise informative treatments of their respective subjects.

Jan Palmowksi, by contrast, while dealing with a topic very similar to von Richthofen's, offers a third variant. He discusses 'normality' and 'normalisation', but based on detailed case studies of grass roots functionaries taken from the study discussed more extensively at the end of this Review Article. His essay, 'Learning the Rules: Local Activists and the Heimat', presents biographies of two *Heimat* activists, showing how they learned to use the programmatic and material constraints imposed by the party as a source of negotiating power when it came to giving their respective *Heimat* activism a specific local meaning. The first example describes a young *Neulehrer* of 1945, full of idealism and belief in creating a new 'socialist Heimat', who, however, was not accepted by the traditional *Heimat* activists in the Saxon town of Altenburg. As a convinced Marxist–Leninist, he remained a respected outsider. The contrasting case of a Cultural League functionary in Mühlhausen, who was twenty-five years younger, reveals a much more pragmatic handling of party expectations in order to serve his clientele's interests and needs. From interview passages Palmowski quotes the three golden rules of a successful *Heimat* culture functionary: (1) never criticize the party, 'not in the slightest' (2) no contacts between the Cultural League and foreign

countries, and (3) no contact with the churches. In this case the cultural functionary was transformed into a buffer between the party state and the people, instead of bringing the party state's utopia to the people. Although in both cases 'learning the rules' can be shown to be an essential feature in the *Heimat* functionary's practical work, Palmowski ends with a critical assessment of 'normalisation' as a concept. First, *Heimat* activism, though seemingly motivated by a set of innocuous and 'normal' dispositions and preferences (preserving nature, cultivating hobbies), also contained the potential of its grass roots activists to confront what had gone wrong as a result of the socialist state's regulations and failures—ornithologists observing birds in nature as part of 'their' normality could not gloss over 'abnormal' environmental pollution. Secondly, none of Palmowski's forty-five interviewees ever used the term 'normality' or any of its derivatives. Finally, he contends that the concept of 'normalisation' obscures more than it enlightens because it presupposes an ideal-type phase within the development of East German *Heimat* activities. This, however, cannot be identified, as more or less 'harmless' and quietist hobbies were always pursued at the same time and often by the same people as activities which had an 'abnormal' critical potential, such as ecological, nature preservation, or city conservation issues.

The second section of the book contains contributions commenting on or complementing Fulbrook's concept of 'normalisation' in more associative and sometimes also contradictory ways. Alf Lüdtke's essay engages with one of the basic implications of any notion of 'normality', namely, the assumption that specific individuals can be seen as examples of a 'normality' which might be expressed numerically, by graphs and tables, but also through certain pictorial conventions, constituting a 'diagonal' normativity informing a 'public transcript' of expected behaviours and characteristics of individuals. Against stereotypes such as that embodied by the public figure of the 'hero of work', Lüdtke posits findings about individual 'practices of work' which discarded such expectations: the stubborn sense of 'workers' honor'; the disjunction between utter conformity to political expectations and subjective indifference in the case of a former female textile worker; the professional attitudes of a career-minded engineer untouched by 'internalised' SED (Socialist Unity Party) values; or the case of the Stasi informer who went into the business of denunciation not for the sake of internalized values but in order to

find satisfaction in writing and being listened to. Lüdtke insists on the disparate phenomenology of these randomly chosen examples of 'normal' people, all acting within the same frame of time and space, and ends with the obvious question as to what 'normalisation' can actually reveal about historical actors if it is intended to cover such disparateness.

Ina Merkel's essay, 'The GDR—A Normal Country in the Centre of Europe', begins from Fulbrook's definition, but takes it to a higher level of transnational comparison. According to Merkel, the significance of 'normality' and 'normalisation' can be only assessed within the context of post-war European modernization compared across the East–West divide on the one hand, and set against the recent notion of a second, reflexive modernity, on the other. Merkel thus transposes 'normality' into the semantic field of the historical actors themselves, as their 'relational and evaluating concept' in their 'mentalities of everyday life' (p. 199) when they compare their own predicaments with those in other societies, and in the case of East Germany *the* other society. This approach highlights *aspirations* for normality while allowing for the actors' sense of the actual lack of normality, or as Merkel nicely puts it: 'The "normal condition" of the GDR was that its citizens did perceive themselves as a "not quite normal" society, but as one which did absolutely aspire to "normal" conditions in their near and the more distant future' (p. 202). By stressing the ambiguity of 'normalities as temporarily accepted and simultaneously questioned conditions of social stability, which, for a certain period of time, can give individuals a necessary security of action' (p. 203), Merkel renders Fulbrook's static conception more dynamic but also more precarious with regard to objective criteria of validation.

Dorothee Wierling's account of normalization takes quite a different angle. Based on her pioneering studies of generational experiences in GDR society she juxtaposes the lack of 'normal times' experienced by the cohort born around 1929, and growing up with the experience of increasing normality for those born twenty years later. Both processes converge in the perception of the 1950s as the decade during which regaining 'normality' was the main aim of society as a whole. But while this laid the ground for a sense of biographical fulfilment among the first generation from the 'normal' 1960s on, the very same state of security and predictability began to be felt, by

those born around 1949, as 'depressing boredom of stabilisation, and the emptiness of routinisation' (p. 218)—the flipside of normalization undermining any easy sense of normality. Wierling substantiates this observation by quoting psychoanalytical insights into the counter-productiveness of constant and external control for processes of internalization of normative sets, because they prevent personal beliefs and needs from becoming independent from authority (cf. p. 219). Marc Allinson's 'test' of the normalization thesis by exploring the 'normality' of the year 1977 also underlines the explanatory limits of this concept, since it was, at best, normality under conditions of permanent economic precariousness that the SED was able to provide.

Merrilyn Thomas's contribution on Britain's gradual recognition of the GDR during the 1960s and 1970s ('Aggression in Felt Slippers: Normalisation and the Ideological Struggle in the Context of Détente and *Ostpolitik*') in the first part of the book and Angela Brock's essay on the education policy of the SED state ('Producing the "Socialist Personality"? Socialisation, Education, and the Emergence of New Patterns of Behaviour') deserve a separate discussion. They share an astonishingly uncritical affirmation of some of the SED's fundamental self-representations, namely, the 'normality' of the GDR as a nation-state and the 'good core' of its educational ideology, a 'socialist personality' which was badly applied but not repressive in itself. The testimonials of former *Jugendwerkhof* inmates could have made rewarding reading in this case.

Read as potential 'proofs of the pudding' for the 'normalisation' concept, these essays have so far yielded contradictory results. Some describe the phenomena which the concept claims to explain without making much or any use of the term (Last, Wilton); some take it to another level of reflection (Lüdtke, Merkel); yet others reconstruct its phenomenology (routine, internalization, stabilization) while rejecting or relativizing the notion of 'normality' (Palmowski, Wierling, Allinson); while some affirm the SED leadership's claims to the historical legitimacy of its dictatorial rule on the grounds of the 'normality' of the GDR as such (Thomas, Brock). Only Madarász and Richthofen try to apply the concept as an 'analytical tool', but with mixed results. Put to the test of historical interpretation, 'normalisation of rule' remains a rather inconclusive concept. In particular, its epistemological status is difficult to assess. Is it an analytical term introduced *ex post* by the observer? Or an actor's term within a

grounded-theory approach? Or an overarching concept of societal development reflecting the normative concerns of the researcher? None of this and a bit of all of it, is the impression gained from reading those contributions which claim to adopt Fulbrook's programme, while some manage to go beyond the limits of this concept.

It has to be underlined to the credit of the editor that she has not attempted to streamline these obvious differences. While it is customary to complain that edited volumes lack thematic or conceptual focus, this is a rare case of a productive encounter between different positions all referring to one contested, precarious, and, in the best sense of the term, risky conceptual proposition. Read with a critical eye, this volume can be recommended as an introduction to some of the dilemmas and paradoxes of understanding the East German experience with communist rule.

Synthetic Socialism

Eli Rubin also focuses on the middle and late years of the GDR and on the way in which everyday life was impregnated and structured by the regime's policy of consumption. He follows the intentions and impact of integrating plastics into the overall fabric of economic activities and consumption, from the production sector to the everyday life of average citizens. Rubin's study thus provides a convincing example of how to combine the history of an industrial sector with the history of state socialist ideology and transformation of everyday life. It deserves praise as a practical demonstration of how to overcome the traditional divide between political/economic history and societal/cultural history very common also in GDR studies.

Before I examine this claim in detail, however, Rubin's introduction cannot go uncommented. Against the integrative grain of his own work, it is couched in a less than ecumenical spirit. In order to define his ambitions Rubin could not resist the temptation to divide up the research landscape in a rather partisan and out-dated way. From the viewpoint of the year 2009, we can look back on twenty years of steadily diversifying research on the GDR and unifying Germany, making these topics among the most pluralistic and innovative in contemporary history worldwide. Does one really have to rehash the old stories about 'bad' 'neo-conservative triumphalism'

(throwing Ernst Nolte, Dan Diner, and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk into one pot) and 'good' bottom-up historians, themselves compartmentalized into *Alltagshistoriker* (that is, Niethammer plus Lüdtke), the 'Potsdam group' (an unwieldy construct) and, of course, the 'Fulbrookians', in order to allow one's own (undeniable) originality to shine in the most favourable light? I think we should instead inform readers about how and why we relate to the—in our modest opinion—good works of colleagues, or choose to reject the less good ones regardless of ideological or other affiliations which we have become accustomed to associate them with.

Having said this, it may not come as a surprise that I share some of Rubin's criticism of Mary Fulbrook's concept of 'normalisation', and appreciate his study as a demonstration of how the internal stabilization of the GDR in the period under consideration can be explained by focusing on the entangled changes in economy, ideology, and material culture—a rather 'improbable' success story, or, at least, not a 'normal' one.

Rubin starts this story with the launch in 1958 of the Chemistry Programme (*Chemie-Programm*), which constituted one of the core agendas in the SED's promise to overtake West Germany in per capita consumption within the next seven years. Rubin rightly terms this shift in policy the 'consumer turn', whose staging was closely linked to the SED's fifth party congress in July 1958, and which was otherwise marked by a renewed spirit of highly ideological voluntarism, such as the encouragement of 'cultural revolution' complete with a new socialist Decalogue and a campaign against Christianity. Rubin stresses the internal, basically economic constraints as well as external and traditional factors in connecting utopian goals with the construction of a large-scale chemicals industry: the endemic shortage of raw materials within its own territory; the GDR's dependency on the Soviet Union; and a tradition of policies encouraging autarky stretching back to the Nazi period and late Imperial Germany. After laying the ground in this chapter Rubin treats the integration of plastics into GDR life in three areas: design; apartment construction; and everyday consumer goods. A fifth chapter connects these findings with the questions developed at the beginning. How did the creation of a consumer world based on plastics contribute to the dictatorship's legitimacy? Did it improve the party state's chances of finding greater acceptance for its communist utopia among the people?

Rubin's overall argument that plastics were congenial to constructing socialism is developed in a particularly convincing way with regard to the astonishing career of the small community of East German industrial designers firmly rooted in inter-war Bauhaus functionalism. Shunned by dogmatic ideologists for their modernist and 'anti-national' aesthetics during the early 1950s, they made a comeback by offering solutions to the many challenges posed by the transition to plastics: saving expensive material resources by economies of scale; functionality defined in terms of time-saving handling of appliances and furniture in private households; and an aesthetic of timeless durability immune to the dictates of fashion. This confirmed state socialist claims to rationality with regard to the new socialist man's way of life which saved time and resources, while distancing the GDR from the West's decadent culture of waste. The chapter on plastics in apartments expands this notion of imbuing a new lifestyle with the logic of materiality. Old furniture simply would not fit into the standardized apartment buildings made of prefabricated elements (*Plattenbau*). Advertising the new, plastic-covered and thus easy-to-clean kitchens and living rooms in popular magazines and newspapers offered a welcome opportunity to market not only the achievements of the socialist apartment construction programme and the new chemicals-based industries, but also a rational lifestyle permitting women to combine gainful employment with household duties. Rubin examines these strategies for charging the meaning of everyday life with utopian values when it comes to utilitarian items such as plastic tubs, children's toys, eating utensils, and so on. But while these campaigns established and reaffirmed the notion of an intimate, quasi-natural link between growing output in the chemicals industry and the improvement of individual living standards, the fifth chapter shows the obstacles to putting such ideas into practice. Here Rubin is able to re-connect his culturalist argument with the basics of economic history, delivering an innovative and nuanced reading of the failures of the SED's New Economic Policy (*Neue Ökonomische Politik*) during the 1960s. The processing of synthetics for myriads of household items (the proverbial '1000 little things') had to be achieved by hundreds of small, state-owned (*volkseigene*) enterprises. But increasing the autonomy of the state-owned enterprises without exposing them fully to the pressures of market forces resulted in waste and bad quality, prompting the recentraliza-

tion of planning in the hands of a separate central institution charged with standardization and quality management. 'In short, rather than mixing the best of both [that is, market and planning] systems, the reforms managed to mix the worst of systems' (p. 174). The subsequent increase in output of consumer products in the early 1970s and their successful distribution to GDR consumers confirms Rubin's astute characterization of the failing reform economics of the 1960s.

Some aspects of this fine study, however, invite further discussion. On the whole, it is more, though not exclusively, about projections and encouragement of the consumption of plastics than about the practice of consumption itself. Rubin introduces a handful of interviewees who represent different life experiences and attitudes as GDR consumers. Standing alone, some of these consumer biographies make interesting reading, but the analyses are superficial and rather serve the purpose of illustration. They do not render less plausible the overall argument that introducing plastics in East Germany was a matter of supreme politics entangling macro economics, regime legitimacy, and everyday life, giving it a peculiar 'made in the GDR' appeal—on the contrary. But a close-up, ethnographic inquiry into the usage of plastics would have to reconstruct consumer biographies in a much more systematic way, and this would probably have transcended the frame of Rubin's already highly complex and rich research agenda.[5]

Finally, there is one peculiarity in Rubin's style which I find somewhat perplexing. He prefers to use original German key terms where an appropriate and easily understandable or definable English version obviously exists. That we may come across several instances of *ersatz* in a book about plastics goes without saying. But why the constant talk of *Volkswirtschaft* and *Herrschaft*?[6] In the case of *Volkswirtschaft* Rubin justifies his practice by pointing to the difficulty of translating the term *Volk*, since it means more than the Western 'citizen-

[5] See, as an example, Margarete Meggle-Freund, 'Zwischen Altbau und Platte. Erfahrungsgeschichte(n) vom Wohnen: Alltagskonstruktionen in der Spätzeit der DDR' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Jena, 2004) <http://margarete.meggle-freund.de/content/view/15/53/>, accessed 23 Mar. 2011.

[6] That I, along with Alf Lüdtke, am credited with introducing the term *Herrschaft* into GDR research is very flattering, but off the mark. We merely picked up standard Weberian sociology, as other GDR researchers had already done one or two generations before.

ship' or 'place of residence', involving 'blood, tradition and nationalism', making it 'similar' to the National Socialist term *Volksgemeinschaft* (pp. 229–30 n. 28). Meanings of words may shift according to their connotations, specifically, their place in different fixed word combinations. For centuries now *Volkswirtschaft* has been and still is nothing but the standard German term for 'national economy' or, in the good old days of Karl Marx, 'political economy'. East German workers and party functionaries alike had the 'national' in the sense of 'state economy' in mind when they said *Volkswirtschaft*, in contrast to *Betriebswirtschaft*, the economy of the individual enterprises. The recurrent use of *Volkswirtschaft* and *Herrschaft* instead of 'the (national or macro) economy' on the one and 'rule', 'authority', or 'domination' on the other contributes to an exoticizing tone, as if only the untranslated jargon of local academia could adequately render the strange peculiarities of this perished living world in the heart of twentieth-century Europe.

Yet, setting aside style and superfluous exercises in claim-staking, to which one could add an astonishing number of spelling and grammatical mistakes in the rendering of German terms, Rubin's study stands out as a highly original and effective contribution to our understanding of the GDR in its middle period. This is a rare case of crossing conventional borders between different sub-fields of research, of combining the development of an industrial sector with aesthetics, consumer policy, and everyday life. Following the paths of one specific material, plastics, it admirably reconstructs how the private and the public were interwoven with each other—a model for future studies.

Memory Sites of the GDR

A different way to approach the legacy of the GDR is to assess its impact on memory culture in present-day Germany. The title of Martin Sabrow's edited volume *Erinnerungsorte der DDR* raises high expectations. After all, it was Pierre Nora's legendary *Lieux de mémoire* (of France) which essentially contributed to the breakthrough of the memory paradigm both in scholarly reflection about societies' relations to the past and in the rising value of remembering the past in culture, whether popular or elitist, in the last two decades. The orig-

inal idea proposed that memory sites work as focal points for references to the past which are shared by a given group of people and which, thanks to their relative durability, create and stabilize the sense of identity of such *collectivités*. The latter do not necessarily have to be whole nations; they can also be other groups such as generations, professions, movements, or local societies.

The tricky thing with regard to the GDR, however, is that the identities it inaugurated were quite fuzzy, unstable, and difficult to ascribe to an entity endowed with stability in time and space. Not everything which is nowadays regarded as typically 'GDR' by Western observers can serve as an example of such identity-creation, or, if it does, the historical relevance of such identity groups must be questioned. This is not at all problematic so long as we are dealing with units corresponding to 'la (Grande) nation', as in Nora's case. But in the case of practices of remembrances focused on the GDR, it quickly becomes clear that the lack of historical legitimacy and collective recognition which accompanied its existence to the end, and which enabled its swift dissolution into the FRG, makes it difficult to define *topoi* which share the longevity and self-evident existence of the century-old *héxagone*. It was not by chance that many East Germans discovered their 'East Germanness' only *after* the event, after unification, in confrontation with West Germany and in reaction to West German projections onto the East.

In a bold move, Martin Sabrow now proposes a set of items from the defunct GDR as candidates for the status of memory sites, although this may be at odds with the original concept's sociological claims to empirically based plausibility and sustainability over time. Strictly speaking, it would have been more accurate to put a question mark behind the title of the book, because what awaits the reader is a rich but uneven collection of forty-nine essays, ranging from eight to twelve pages in length. Most of them, in one way or another, address the issue of whether the particular item under consideration can and/or should qualify as a functioning 'memory site'—or not. In some cases, the essays leave the reader to ponder this question, and just tell the story of their item from beginning to end (for example, 'Alltag und Privatheit', 'Die Ständige Vertretung', 'Westberlin', 'Das Helsinki-Abkommen'). The majority of essays first describe the historical phenomenon as such, switching to a short discussion of its quality as a memory site only at the end. In several cases it is assert-

ed that, despite its recurrence in memory discourses, a specific piece of GDR history ('Einkaufsbeutel und Bückware', 'Palast der Republik', 'Die Mauer', 'Das Westpaket') does *not* qualify to be regarded as memory site, or at least only in a very limited sense. Sandrine Kott contributes one of the most original articles, coming up with a negative result of this sort. Her highly effective 'short story' on the East German *Kinderkrippe* offers a biting critique of the very idea of considering this a memory site for East Germans. She starts by citing evidence that the perception of collective education of toddlers as something typically 'totalitarian' and thus 'GDR' was, in the first instance, a projection of West German experts intent on defaming an institution which was otherwise widespread all over Europe, East *and* West. What follows is a highly informative, ten-page historical reconstruction of the social and cultural history of the crèche and the recurring disputes that have always surrounded it, from the nineteenth century to the present day.

Only a few of the articles stick consistently to the task of examining the quality of the memory site in question by narrating its career as an object of remembrance which eventually induces the stability of memory communities. This is true of both Jens Gieseke's article on the Stasi and Barbara Könczöl's comparison between the GDR's Mayday rituals (not a memory site) and the demonstrations held on 15 January (commemorating the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht) (a memory site), and of Marina Chauliac's excellent study of the *Jugendweihe* (youth consecration ceremony), whose astonishing career after 1989 undoubtedly makes it a marker of East German identity in unified Germany. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk's 'Puhdys', the GDR's most successful rock band, Christoph Classen's 'Sandmann' (a daily TV programme for pre-school children which, since 1989, has prevailed over its West German competitor) and Ina Merkel's 'Trabant' can also serve as excellent examples of combining sound historical knowledge with sensitive observation of more recent commercial and nostalgic practices. They aptly illustrate how popular culture and everyday life in the GDR, and their current remembrances, eventually crystallize into memory sites with some chance of becoming a lasting tradition for a large section of the population, and with potential to be handed down the generations. For the minority of political activists, Ralph Jessen can show how the *Montagsdemonstrationen* (Monday demonstrations) in Leipzig, which

precipitated the decisive breakthrough of the peaceful revolution in the autumn of 1989, later developed into a specific pattern of protest techniques in unified Germany, one which is also used to promote much more specific, single-issue agendas. In this case, the subject in question might serve as a memory site, but one which is marked by highly divergent associations and validations among those who invoke it, depending on the heterogeneity of East Germany's post-unification society.

On the whole, the reader of this volume is left with a mixed impression. Some of the articles make excellent reading; others are boring and show signs of less inspired routine or, in the case of a couple of *Zeitzeugen* 'expert' contributions, self-serving affirmation. Martin Sabrow provides a conceptual introduction to the volume, developing an analytical frame in which the public in present-day Germany is structured by a tripolarity of 'memory landscapes' which provide the basic construction principle for remembering the GDR: a 'dictatorship memory' focused on the perpetrator–victim dualism; an 'adaptation memory' connecting the sphere of power with the living world; and a 'progression memory' setting the original potential of the socialist project against its later degeneration. Written in the elegant and eloquent style which is Sabrow's brand, this introduction is worth reading as representing the advanced stage of debate on memory culture in the German public.

Ultimately, this volume serves several purposes. It certainly works as highly instructive reading for non-experts, including non-academics, who want to know more about the GDR without having to read forty-nine separate monographs. For GDR experts it provides a welcome opportunity to sharpen their sense of the applicability of Nora's venerable concept of *lieu de memoire* and of the 'collective memory' concept in the Halbwachsian tradition more generally. The recent popularity of such transfer experiments has triggered a virtual wave of similar edited volumes pertaining to the Balkans, East Central Europe, Europe as a whole, and further world regions. Sabrow's editorial achievement in this field lies in the experimental and, to this extent, also risk-taking approach which offers us a chance to cultivate our sensitivity for a subject that will occupy German *Befindlichkeiten* for quite a while.

Politics of Everyday Life

One of the outstanding achievements of the last book under review here is that it shows that, despite all the inherent risks of romanticist projection and simplification, 'people's history' can be dealt with in a sophisticated manner, balancing high methodological standards with empathy for actors 'on the ground'. Jan Palmowski's study of *Heimat* activism as a 'politics of everyday life' covers more than four decades of communist domination in all cultural matters. It looks at the ways in which local enthusiasts for such venerable hobbies as stamp collecting, ornithology, folklore, hiking, and so on, found ways of adapting to the constraints set by the party state. They did so partly by adopting the official ideology of a new socialist nation, and partly by infusing it with their own sense of localism, thereby gradually undermining its hyperbolic aspirations to create a new socialist culture. In a rare case of innovative methodological design, Palmowski combines three analytical approaches: an analysis of domination as a social practice entailing the actors' *Eigen-Sinn*, inspired by Alf Lüdtke; James W. Scott's notion of the interplay between 'public' and 'hidden transcripts', which he enlarges by introducing 'private transcripts' as a third, mediating category; and Victor Turner's theory of the 'social drama' as an approach to deconstructing the performative production of social meanings in conflicts about culture politics between the party and its insubordinate antagonists on the ground.

The first part of the book develops the basic ambivalence of communist culture politics with regard to traditions of *Heimat* activism. These traditions were instrumentalized for the implementation of the concept of anti-fascist ideology and 'socialist realism', while *Heimat* activists themselves preferred to focus on the local and regional meanings of their activities. It was only in the course of accelerated modernization after 1958 that a specifically 'socialist *Heimat*' culture was developed: festivals for workers and sports festivals (*Arbeiterfestspiele, Spartakiaden*); TV programmes featuring folk music; and the promotion of the GDR's own pop music (*Schlager*). All this was meant to testify to the GDR's new identity as a modern, future-minded society. The shortcoming of this cultural policy, however, was its lack of grass-roots mobilization. While the popularity of such manifestations helped to establish a sense of the GDR as a specific place to live in, its socialist and anti-fascist mission was largely lost on *Heimat*

activists. Thus there was a reversal of the relationship between *Heimat* and the socialist project: 'Whereas in the 1950s heimat had reinforced the themes of anti-fascism and socialism, now socialism and anti-fascism reinforced the essence of the socialist heimat, the GDR' (p. 107). This finding has far-reaching consequences, as it allows us to trace the emergence of the GDR as a lived collectivity, bound in space and time, and its dissociation from the claims of the socialist project back to the 1960s. This dissociation can be considered a prerequisite both for the revolutionary developments of the late 1980s and for present-day *Ostalgia*.

The main empirical part of Palmowski's study, however, is devoted to the Honecker years. Part II, entitled 'Public and Private Transcripts', shows how a much more pragmatic approach in cultural policies allowed for a broad popularization of *Heimat* activism within the limits set by the party, while at the same time the specifically socialist content of such activities was lost. Enjoying pride in local customs and participating in communal activities to improve the local infrastructure in the pervasive *Mach mit!* (Join in!) initiatives gave GDR citizens plenty of opportunity to indulge their understanding of local identity while remaining lukewarm with regard to the overarching socialist claims of such activism staged by the state: 'It was possible for individuals and communities to engage publicly in the socialist heimat without assuming the identity of GDR citizens' (p. 149). Extending the freedom to engage in local initiatives contributed to a 'euphemization of power', Palmowsky concludes, but not to a '"normalisation" of everyday life' since, from the party state's point of view, 'the citizens' acquiescence was bought at the cost of activists developing local meanings that were separate from, and even opposed to, those of state and party' (pp. 184–5). One realm in which the ensuing 'marked disrespect for authority' was played out most forcefully, as demonstrated convincingly in a separate chapter, was in conflicts about environmental destruction and the decay of old inner city quarters. Although the party successfully monopolized and contained environmentalist and preservationist activism within the boundaries of its own mass organizations, the seed of continuing frustration about the party's responsibility for the accelerating deterioration of the environment undermined the belief of even these loyalists in the system, and made the state of the environment one of the most sensitive issues for the party's credibility.

Part III, 'Power, Practices and Meaning', enriches these insights into the persistent precariousness of the SED's *Heimat* policy by presenting two local case studies. The chapter on Holungen in the Catholic diaspora of Eichsfeld carries on the motif of environmental damage mobilizing the social and cultural resources of a local milieu against the consequences of the expansion of the local potash mine. Far from turning to rebellion and defiance of state authority as such, local citizens stubbornly worked against the threatened destruction of the landscape by using the power of religious symbols and invoking *Heimat* on public occasions, thus reasserting their *Eigen-Sinn* vis-à-vis party rule while leaving power relations as such untouched. *Heimat* discourse and practice served to euphemize the reality of power relations while allowing for the staging of 'social dramas' within the limits set by party rule.

The second case study portrays a village which was a model of socialist *Heimat* work, Dabeln in the northern district of Schwerin. After the completion of enforced collectivization, a group of young, enthusiastic party members there had developed widely acclaimed *Heimat* activities, including their own folk music band, which was eventually featured on nationwide radio and TV programmes. This success story, however, also had a dark side. Combining oral history and Stasi sources, Palmowski reconstructs how, during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Stasi had used several dozens of informers, among them the chief activists of the local Kulturbund section, to repress oppositional attitudes and activities in the village community. This pervasive Stasi presence, however, could hardly be broached in the interviews. Silence about this breach of the community had been established and maintained throughout the decades and was also observed vis-à-vis the researcher. Thus the village community continued to exist in a deeply precarious state, which is why Palmowsky firmly rejects any notion of 'normalisation' of rule once the immediate confrontation between state repression and parts of the village had subsided (p. 293). In the concluding chapter Palmowski not only recapitulates the rich findings of his superb study, but also surveys the short careers of some of the *Heimat* activists as revolutionaries during the implosion of communist power in 1989–90.

Palmowski's study can undoubtedly be considered one of the most powerful and original contributions to a deeper understanding of the interaction between regime and society in recent years. It sets

methodological standards, in particular with regard to the combined use of archival sources (including Stasi files) and oral history in micro-historical settings. The fact that far from excluding each other, East German histories of political domination and everyday life can and should be integrated into a dense narrative texture of submissiveness and agency, of public and hidden transcripts, has rarely been demonstrated in such a convincing manner.

In the long run, such an approach will serve our understanding of the second German dictatorship much more than its retroactive 'normalisation' on behalf of 'the people'. Like Rubin's study of the 'plasticization' of the GDR, such bottom-up studies of the intricate ways in which East Germans created their own sense of belonging to a country in which the vast majority of them had never had the chance to govern themselves will be helpful also with regard to the understanding of present-day memory culture. They might serve as welcome antidotes to the search for merely assumed, if not erroneously presupposed, East German sites of memory, as has seemingly been the case in several of the miniatures commissioned for Sabrow's ambitious editorial project, *Erinnerungsorte der DDR*.

To understand East German memory culture and its functions in present-day Germany requires an exploration of the fabric of social practices, political interventions, and individual commitments which encouraged the millions of East Germans to consider their environment as something to which they belonged while rejecting the party state's offering of a socialist GDR identity. Such a sense of *Heimat* could (and still can) exist only in opposition to the overarching ideological propositions of the whole collective, in particular, when these are predicated on the identity constructions of a totalizing centralism. It may safely be assumed that cherishing their *Heimat* under the tutelage of the party's strategies of *divide et impera* boosted the ability of East Germans not only to integrate into a unified and necessarily federalist Germany, but also to establish themselves in it as a highly distinct and lasting feature of German and European diversity.

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RESPONSE TO THOMAS LINDENBERGER

Mary Fulbrook

What is 'normal'? Clearly there is no absolute standard of 'normality' in the social, cultural, and political world: any historian is interested precisely in variation and change.

So why does use of the term 'normalisation' as an analytic concept throw so many otherwise intelligent academics into such a state of confusion? Many simply think of the word 'normal', and apply this as though historians and those whom they study should understand the word in exactly the same way; they then start to protest that there is no way that life in the enclosed GDR, part of a divided nation, could conceivably be viewed as in any sense 'normal'. Of course this is not the way I intended use of the analytic concept of 'normalisation', as I thought I had repeatedly made clear. But now even Thomas Lindenberger, whose contributions I always value—perceptive, inquiring, stimulating—seems also to have at least partially misunderstood the way I propose using this term. Let me briefly recap.

Like so many other words that historians use in a specialist sense, the concept of 'normalisation' also has 'ordinary language' usages, varying in diverse settings. Thus for example many West Germans—'Aryans' who saw themselves as victims of air raids, as refugees and expellees, as former soldiers who had suffered in prisoner of war camps, as a community of the bereaved and the occupied—spoke of a 'return to normality' in the 1950s; a sense that could not be shared by traumatized survivors of Nazi persecution now scattered across the world. Soviet leaders also used the notion of 'normalisation', but from a very different social and political perspective: following periodic upheavals in eastern Europe in 1956 (Hungary, Poland), 1968 (Czechoslovakia), 1970 and 1980–1 (Poland), it related to the reimposition of Soviet control and the 'social pacification' of unruly populations through what widely became known as 'goulash communism'.

It has even been used in reference to far more short-lived and by any standards extreme circumstances: as, for example, the brief period of somewhat under two years, from the spring of 1940 to the win-

ter of 1941–2, when Jews under Nazi occupation in Eastern Upper Silesia had got through the first weeks of terror following the German invasion, and settled into new routines under civilian administration. Thinking that the new system of expropriation, exploitation, segregation, forced labour, and reduced rations was as bad as it would get, many sought to devise means of 'normalising' the situation and living through it—only to find that questions of survival were to mean something radically different once the 'final solution' displaced colonial racism in the Nazi hierarchy of ideologically driven priorities.[1] This is a brief and horrendous moment: but the point is the comparison with a 'before' and an 'after'.

I use these examples *not*, as Lindenberger has misunderstood it, to show that there was a 'third variant' in the GDR in the 1960s and 1970s, but rather precisely to highlight how these and many other cases could be viewed against a concept defined in more abstract terms at three levels: a stabilization of social and political conditions following a period of challenges, upheaval, and potentially radical change; a sense that routine was once again setting in, that the future was relatively predictable (whether or not mistakenly); and an imposition of a framework of dominant norms (to which one could conform or against which one could rebel, but with predictable sanctions and consequences in each case). Thus, I sought to devise a Weberian 'ideal type' that does not remain at the anthropological level of contemporary discourse, nor at the political science level of structures and institutions, but seeks to highlight the interconnectedness of structures and patterns of subjectivity.

In a general theoretical sense, 'normalisation' is no different in principle from concepts such as 'revolution', allowing us to select cases to compare and contrast—for example, 1789, 1917, 1989—without collapsing or equating these instances of radical challenges and rapid changes in the social and political order. I do not, incidentally, accept Lindenberger's rather reductive representation of Weber's notion of ideal types; nor do I entirely accept Weber's methodology in any event, though to head off down that particular theoretical avenue would not be in place here.

To repeat what I have written so many times: there is, in principle, no such thing as 'a normal state', or a 'perfectly normal life'; there

[1] Discussed further in my book, *Ordinary Nazis: Reflections on Memory, Terror and a Small Town in Poland* (Oxford, forthcoming 2012).

are, rather, constructions of these, by contemporaries in different positions both at the time and in retrospect. A significant task for historians is not (or not only) to redescribe the world in contemporaries' terms, but to understand how subjective perceptions and lived experiences were not only possible within certain historical circumstances, but indeed also variously sustained, reproduced, and challenged such circumstances and hence contributed to historical change.

So the ideal type is a template against which the history of any place, any period, can potentially be examined. In applying it to the GDR, it rapidly becomes evident that, compared with the 1950s or, indeed, any time since 1914, the two decades of the 1960s and 1970s were relatively stable: one needs only mention détente, *Ostpolitik* and international recognition, and a modest sense of the possibility of socio-economic improvements, to recognize the distinctiveness of this period in contrast to what had come before, and in contrast to the economic and environmental decline, the domestic political challenges, and the renewed Cold War tensions of the 1980s. Nor was there the rapid and unpredictable turnover of personnel, as far as both the economy and the functionary system of rule were concerned, so characteristic of the period before the construction of the Berlin Wall; or the rising sense of frustration with the Honecker gerontocracy and growing desire even among formerly committed SED members to explore change during the Gorbachev era. My characterization of relative stabilization and routinization in the middle decades of the GDR is thus not, as Lindenberger suggests, predicated on research on functionaries in other Eastern European states, interesting though such comparisons may prove to be; it is rooted in a view of twentieth-century Germany as a whole, in which people had lived through what Hobsbawm dubbed an 'age of extremes'; in this perspective, the 1960s and 1970s do indeed stand out as at least somewhat different. So far, so obvious (or at least so I had thought).

Through what other conceptual lenses could one view this period? There are many different ways, and different potential periodizations, depending on the focus of interest. But the abstract notion of 'normalisation'—which is, I repeat, not an empirical description but rather a theoretical construction—precisely asks us to explore the links, in different areas, between external parameters, domestic arrangements, and people's subjective views and assumptions, bear-

ing in mind the differences in experience and frameworks of perception of people from different backgrounds and generations. The significance of the Wall and the West, the introduction of conscription, or the increasing involvement of women in the workplace, for example, were not the same for people born in 1929 as for those born in 1949.

The real difficulties come with exploring different facets in detail. I am glad Lindenberger awards high marks to at least some of the contributors to my edited volume for wrestling explicitly with the questions suggested by this concept. And of course, as Lindenberger also points out, a *Sammelband* based on a conference is not necessarily the place to find contributions all running towards similar conclusions: indeed, this volume was precisely designed to stimulate debate and elicit a diversity of responses.

Given that Lindenberger devotes some time to it, I should perhaps add that I never intended my own modest substantive contribution to this volume, summarizing the results of a small survey, to displace the more comprehensive research that would be required for a fuller exploration.[2] I even explicitly highlighted the methodological limitations (pp. 284–5, n.12), although I do not agree that hybrid interview methods are intrinsically characterized by 'inherent weaknesses'; they do have their uses. The survey specifically phrased questions in terms of concepts emerging from a pilot study, including not only the claim to have lived 'a perfectly normal life' but also, for example, comments about 'warm interpersonal relationships', precisely to gain some sense of the relative prevalence and resonance of such catchphrases among people of different backgrounds (hardly a populist agenda; equally, I think it important to hear the self-representations not only of 'victims' but also of 'perpetrators', and all the ambiguous shades between, when exploring Nazi Germany). For all its limitations, I do think the patterns revealed by this survey are suggestive; certainly worthy of further exploration. Hence my decision to report on it—but I certainly never considered it a comprehensive 'practical application of the concept' of normalization, as Lindenberger suggests.

Lindenberger goes on to agree with Rubin's critique of what the latter dubs the 'Fulbrookians' (though not all those whom Rubin

[2] Although not centrally concerned with normalization, I touch further on these issues in my book, *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships* (Oxford, 2011).

includes are, in fact, former students of mine, and not all students of mine are listed, or, indeed, follow my own approach). Here again, I have to enter some reservations. Flattering though the general label is, Rubin will have to revise the details: I do not recognize my own approach in the 'Fulbrookian' straw man he constructs (*Synthetic Socialism,* 'Introduction'). Curiously, despite footnoting a couple of my books (*Anatomy of a Dictatorship* and *The People's State*), Rubin does not actually refer to my own work in his selective pastiche of 'Fulbrookians'. So in the interests of clarity, let me reiterate: contra Rubin's caricature, I do not posit some '"normal" society' (*SS*, p. 6, also p. 8); I do not restrict my research materials to 'internal party memos and other government sources' thus allegedly replicating 'the kind of top-down analyses' that I 'claim to reject' (*SS*, p. 6); there is absolutely no way that I 'would have us believe' that East German society was 'autonomous' (*SS*, p. 7, also p. 9); and, indeed, had Rubin actually engaged with my own books and articles, he would know that my notions of a 'participatory dictatorship' and a 'honeycomb state' were designed precisely to overcome this kind of dichotomous approach, which I have long critiqued; finally, I have never sought to argue that East German society was in some unexamined sense 'normal' (*SS*, p. 8). Rubin is thus simply wrong in his portrayal of my concept of normalization, my selection of sources, and my wider understanding of social and political processes in the GDR, where I explicitly argue against notions implying a strict separation of 'state and society'. So I am sorry that Lindenberger aligns himself with Rubin's critique, since the latter is so wide of the mark and so far below the intellectual standards of Lindenberger's own more perceptive comments. We have indeed travelled a long way beyond Rubin's simplistic representation of the theoretical landscape—although his own substantive interpretation of the significance of plastics, in fact, ironically builds on precisely the kinds of recent approach, including my own, that he decries, and uses similar materials (including *Eingaben*) that I have myself been using for many years.[3]

Like all ideal types, then, the notion of 'normalisation' is a concept designed for heuristic purposes. It is not intended to summarize the GDR in the 1960s and 1970s, let alone the whole of GDR history (as frequently misunderstood). 'Normalisation' is an inherently relative

[3] This is the more positive aspect of Rubin's work which I chose to highlight in my review in the *American Historical Review* (Dec. 2010), 1549–50.

concept embodying a sense of process and change. It compares in the light of a disruptive 'before', focusing on an always precarious and inherently transient attainment of relative stability. It directs attention to ways of 'coming to terms with the present', and to norms which may appear as 'second nature', or may be self-evidently new and imposed, but in terms of which people have to negotiate their conduct. These may be dominant 'on the ground' (hegemonic post-war West German discourses) or among ruling political elites (hegemonic post-upheaval Soviet discourses); they may be passing, tragically mistaken, among oppressed groups (Jews of Eastern Upper Silesia, 1940–1) or relatively long-lived and rooted in a sense of gradual and ordered change (Britain since the 1950s?). The concept also prompts queries as to how such norms may be internalized, such that, for some people most of the time, and for most people some of the time, the world thus ordered may begin to appear 'normal': think here, for example, of the radical changes in assumptions about gender roles over the period since the Second World War; or of whether it is a clear sign of 'abnormality' for a bourgeois German male to walk around Berlin without wearing a hat (the case before the First World War).[4]

All of this is not just a parochial spat: it is, indeed, only interesting in virtue of the wider issues it raises about the uses of abstract concepts, and its significance for interpretations of GDR history. We have (mostly) moved beyond the politically entrenched theoretical alternatives of the early 1990s towards widespread recognition of the complexity of people's simultaneous involvement in and self-distancing from the circumstances and structures which inevitably constrain and partially constitute their lives. I am no more committed to the ideal type of 'normalisation' than to any other historical concept; if based on plausible premises and highlighting significant issues, concepts are useful insofar as they suggest interesting questions, prompt us to look at things from different perspectives, and stimulate productive debate and fruitful research. In this, I believe the notion of 'normalisation'—for all the misunderstandings along the way—has succeeded. I am glad, then, that Lindenberger ultimately

[4] This is not far-fetched: I refer here to a 1917 court case against Hans Paasche, in which not wearing a hat provided useful evidence for his alleged 'insanity', as did wearing shorts and sandals, or turning up to a dinner party on a bicycle; discussed further in *Dissonant Lives*.

deems it a 'risky conceptual proposition', and this 'in the best sense of the term'. I do not myself think the substantive questions have as yet been satisfactorily resolved; nor have the last theoretical words yet been said. Whether Lindenberger's appeal to Goffman and Foucault—about both of whom I have reservations—could be any more helpful than pointing to Bourdieu, or, indeed, anyone else remains a moot point. But the current state of the GDR historiographical landscape is certainly a great deal more interesting and productive than it might have been had we stayed on the previously well-beaten tracks of totalitarianism and repression theories.

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BOOK REVIEWS

JENNIFER R. DAVIS and MICHAEL McCORMICK (eds.), *The Long Morning of Medieval Europe: New Directions in Early Medieval Studies* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), xx + 345 pp. ISBN 978 0 7546 6254 9. £65.00

The 'decline and fall of the Roman Empire' was not followed by the twilight of the Dark Ages, but rather by the 'long morning of medieval Europe'. This is not news to scholars of early medieval history, but some of the approaches taken to this period by the participants at the conference 'New Directions 2: The Early Middle Ages Today', which was held at Harvard University in October 2004, are decidedly new. The length of time it has taken to compile and publish the ensuing volume of essays might have been due to the enormous task of interlinking the texts with one another. This has been admirably fulfilled: the volume is in five parts, all featuring introductions by Michael McCormick and concluding articles by different scholars, reflecting on the contributions to the section in question—integrated reviews, so to speak.

Part I, 'Discovering the Early Medieval Economy', begins with Chris Wickham's 'Rethinking the Structure of the Early Medieval Economy'. He lucidly summarizes earlier research, contrasting a 'production model' with a 'distribution model', and argues that the connections between production and distribution have hitherto not been sufficiently emphasized. After demonstrating how the kind of research he calls for can be implemented, Wickham concludes that the manufacturing of 'artisanal products' depended equally on the wealth of a region's elite and on long-distance trade. Additionally, he perceives an 'economic simplification' occurring in several regions between 400 and 700, often corresponding to political crises, whereas the complexity of the economy increased again between the sixth and ninth centuries. Wickham, whose conclusions are based mostly on archaeological evidence, rightly warns against generalizations, 'for the wider one attempts it, the more exceptions there are'. Joachim Henning's 'Strong Rulers—Weak Economy? Rome, the Carolingians

and the Archaeology of Slavery in the First Millennium AD' continues the examination of productivity on an archaeological basis, comparing the late Roman and Carolingian countryside. His main conclusion differs from Wickham's: 'weak power structures were more innovative and efficient so long as they had access to the most advanced technical improvements of late antiquity.' The late Riccardo Francovich's 'The Beginnings of Hilltop Villages in Early Medieval Tuscany' argues against the view that there was no 'village organization' before the eleventh century. He also relies on archaeological evidence, and advocates reading the written sources against the background of models based on archaeological excavations. He then tries to match the archaeological evidence to the terminology for villages used in written sources, and draws the conclusion that nucleated settlements emerged much earlier than can be seen from the written evidence alone. In his 'Molecular Middle Ages: Early Medieval Economic History in the Twenty-First Century', Michael McCormick deals with historical biology and biomolecular archaeology, which can yield information about, for example, dietary habits. He focuses on DNA analyses conducted at Harvard University's laboratory of ancient DNA, and presents some possible outcomes for the interpretation of the two main pandemics of the Middle Ages, the Justinianic plague of the sixth to eighth centuries and the Black Death of the fourteenth century. McCormick readily acknowledges potential problems, but his enthusiasm arouses interest for these new directions of historical research. In her concluding article, 'The Early Medieval Economy: Data, Production, Exchange and Demand', the late Angeliki E. Laiou questions some of the premises behind Wickham's argument concerning the production of ceramics and warns against neglecting 'small-scale production/demand', although she supports Wickham's core thesis of 'elite demand'.

Part II, 'Sounding Early Medieval Holiness', is much shorter. Guy Philippart and Michel Trigalet present a part of their project HAGIOGRAPHIES,[1] a quantitative analysis of the entire hagiographical corpus of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, which aims to complement classical philological and historical approaches. After

[1] Information on the project 'HAGIOGRAPHIES. Sociologie et histoire de la littérature hagiographique en Occident des origines à 1550' can be found at <http://www.fundp.ac.be/philo_lettres/histoire/h221.htm>, accessed 30 Mar. 2011.

discussing some problems of the database structure, Philippart and Trigalet present several questions that derive from the collected data. They point out functional differences between texts in Gaul and Italy, trace the ecclesiastical attitude towards passions of the martyrs, observe peculiarities in Latin translations from Greek, and examine centres of *réécriture* before the ninth century. Arnold Angenendt, in his '*Donationes pro anima:* Gift and Countergift in the Early Medieval Liturgy', delineates the history of sacrifices and (mostly monastic) countergifts from the fifth to the twelfth century, thus extending the 'long morning' of Medieval Europe into 'midday'. Angenendt provides a fine overview of earlier research, including his own, but there are not many 'new directions' in his contribution, and consequently Thomas Head struggles to find some in his summary of this part, 'The Early Medieval Transformation of Piety'. Head also criticizes 'the relative lack of attention to Anglophone scholarship' in both contributions.

Part III is concerned with Latin literature, or rather 'Representation and Reality in the Artistry of Early Medieval Literature'. Paul Edward Dutton makes some 'Observations on Early Medieval Weather in General, Bloody Rain in Particular', the latter often interpreted as a manifestation of 'divine displeasure'. In the twelfth century, Dutton notices a clear shift towards a more observational attitude to nature and an effort to explain these phenomena in an elemental or physical way. Joaquín Martínez Pizarro, in 'The King Says No: On the Logic of Type-Scenes in Late Antique and Early Medieval Narrative', sees the stereotypical form of narrative literature in a more positive light than previous scholars did. He is especially interested in the modification of type-scenes and what this can tell us about the times in which a given work was written. Pizarro concludes that 'type-scenes and other narrative formulas constitute priceless documents of the political and historical imagination, and thus a crucial chapter in the history of mentalities'. Jan M. Ziolkowski, 'Of Arms and the (Ger)man: Literary and Material Culture in the *Waltharius*', focuses on descriptions of weaponry that depart from the literary sources of the *Waltharius*. Danuta Shanzer, 'Representations and Reality in Early Medieval Literature', presents some helpful reflections, complementing Dutton's contribution with a convenient formula: 'While climate is objective, "weather" is subjective.' She adds, for consideration, that there are more than twenty

words for 'red' in Latin, all of them with different meanings. Shanzer also expresses reservations about Pizarro's article because there is no established corpus of 'type-scenes', as there is one of 'topoi'.

Part IV considers 'Practices of Power in an Early Medieval Empire'. Janet L. Nelson, 'Charlemagne and Empire', asks how Charlemagne could assert his regime down to the lower ranks of society. She looks mainly at the 'Mainz hostage list' dating from *c.*805, which she also presents in English translation. Jennifer R. Davis, 'A Pattern for Power: Charlemagne's Delegation of Judicial Responsibilities', seeks to find 'recurrent patterns' that can expose the principles behind Charlemagne's rulership. She concludes that the functions of 'judicial officials' (counts, bishops, and *missi*) found in royal legislation overlapped. Davis considers this as neither accidental nor a manifestation of incompetence, but rather 'a clever way of delegating power while still maintaining overall royal control'. Matthew J. Innes, in 'Practices of Property in the Carolingian Empire', reminds us that 'absolute property' and 'exclusive ownership' are products of the nineteenth century and should not be seen as 'historical constants'. By examining four symptomatic cases ('postcards') from the ninth century, he defines 'Carolingian property law . . . as being a matter of loose, supposedly common-sensical, notions of ownership'. In his concluding article, 'The Cunning of Institutions', Stuart Airlie calls attention to the danger of understanding the term 'Carolingian' as too homogeneous or monolithic. This can be allayed by means of comparative studies, or by taking a longer chronological perspective, into the tenth and eleventh centuries, in order to define the characteristics of the Carolingian period more precisely.

The last part covers 'The Intellectuality of Early Medieval Art'. Beginning with Notker Balbulus' description of Charlemagne's palace at Aachen (which Notker had not seen), Mayke de Jong examines the term *solarium* and its meaning in texts of the ninth century. Her study, 'Charlemagne's Balcony: The *Solarium* in Ninth-Century Narratives', is architectural, linguistic, and literary history at the same time, and thus interdisciplinary in the true sense of the word. She concludes that *solarium* was not just a term denoting a piece of architecture, but was 'heavily invested with meaning': 'the essence of a *solarium* was its altitude, both physically and socially.' Herbert L. Kessler looks at 'Image and Object: Christ's Dual Nature and the Crisis of Early Medieval Art' and shows that artwork was meaning-

ful in terms not only of iconography, what we see, but also of the material used to make it. The iconography could, for example, represent the human Christ, the material (gold, for instance) his divinity. In his summary, Thomas F. X. Noble presents 'Matter and Meaning in the Carolingian World'. He adds a few examples to de Jong's definition of *solarium* and makes commonplace remarks such as: 'Buildings talk, and they speak known languages.' Finally, he doubts whether there was a crisis at the end of the eighth century, as Kessler argues.

All in all, this volume, with its intertwined presentation accompanied by Michael McCormick's introductions which provide additional cross-connections between the five parts of the volume, is an excellent example of fruitful discussion among scholars of different fields. The broad approach in topics and the long period covered are fascinating, but although not every aspect can be covered in one volume for obvious reasons, the geographical focus on central Europe, and especially on the Carolingian realm, impairs the overall impression. Some of the contributors—especially McCormick, Philippart and Trigalet, and Dutton—use new methodologies and thus open up the 'new directions' addressed by the editors in their introduction, where they state that '[n]ew tools and methods . . . open new possibilities for discovering the early medieval past'. Most of the authors, however, rely on 'old skills', primarily detailed textual analysis. Yet a recurring aspect throughout the book is that the authors reflect upon their methods and elaborate on the way of developing their results. By this means, even the more well-trodden paths of research on early medieval history presented in this volume often lead to exciting outcomes and inspiring impulses.

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Das Lehnswesen im Hochmittelalter: Forschungskonstrukte – Quellenbefunde – Deutungsrelevanz, ed. Jürgen Dendorfer and Roman Deutinger, Mittelalter-Forschungen, 34 (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2010), 488 pp. ISBN 978 3 7995 4286 9. €54.00

Feudalism, it seems fair to observe, lends itself better than most big historical subjects to associative study and reportage. The present volume is the latest in a series of published conferences—Toulouse 1968, Rome 1978, Girona 1985, Conques 1998, Spoleto 1999, Göttingen 2000, Balaguer and Estella 2001, Louvain 2005, Munich 2008—on this phenomenon.[1] Yet the very existence of 'feudalism' is deemed questionable in them all; or, to say it more exactly, is questioned ever more urgently by contributors, onlookers, and readers alike. For the writers of invited papers, while from the 1970s they were increasingly sensitive to the conceptual difficulty of using a modern coinage—*Lehnswesen*, or (in English and Romance languages) feudalism—for deeply past socio-cultural realities, were thrust into the scholarly constraint of reporting on precisely those medieval practices—lordship, vassalage, homage, fidelity, and the fief—that had long since been codified in learned usage as the very elements of 'feudalism'. Were these then proofs of a phantom? What justified the conferences was an astonishing wealth of written evidence, increasingly accessible in printed editions, that permitted regional experts in successive meetings to improve on positivist results for (say) fiefs in Old Catalonia, bishops' vassals in Italy, hom-

[1] *Les structures sociales de l'Aquitaine, du Languedoc et de l'Espagne au premier âge féodal* (Paris, 1969); *Structures féodales et féodalisme dans l'Occident méditerranéen (X^e–XIII^e siècles): Bilan et perspectives de recherches* (Rome, 1980); *La formació i expansió del feudalisme català*, ed. Jaume Portella i Comas (Girona, 1985–6); *Fiefs et féodalité dans l'Europe méridionale (Italie, France du Midi, péninsule ibérique) du X^e au XIII^e siècle*, ed. Pierre Bonnassie and Hélène Débax (Toulouse, 2002); *Il feudalesimo nell'alto medioevo*, 2 vols. (Spoleto, 2000); *Die Gegenwart des Feudalismus. Présence du féodalisme et présent de la féodalité. The Presence of Feudalism*, ed. Natalie Fryde, Pierre Monnet, and Otto Gerhard Oexle (Göttingen, 2002); *El temps i l'espai del feudalisme*, ed. Flocel Sabaté and Joan Farré (Lleida, 2004); *Señores, siervos, vasallos en la Alta Edad Media* (Pamplona, 2002); *Le vassal, le fief et l'écrit: Pratiques d'écriture et enjeux documentaires dans le champ de la féodalité* (Louvain-la Neuve, 2007); and the volume here in review.

age and fief in north-east Germany, and non-feudal homage in England and France.

What became clear from about 1950, and was no small impetus to collective scholarly concern, was that venerated books by masters in the field—Heinrich Mitteis, Marc Bloch, and François-Louis Ganshof—had failed to resolve a disconnect between the concrete and its meanings.[2] And this scene was complicated by an intellectual inheritance from Marxist historiography that offered (often presumed) to define 'feudalism' in terms of the socio-economic realities of medieval lordship. Yet even as it peaked in works by excellent historians,[3] the Marxist approach lost its appeal to scholars close to the sources. What rankled were two circumstances that mattered more to historical truth than to modern politics. Amongst English-language readers feudalism figured in elementary teaching and textbooks as if it were a salient medieval institution.[4] In Germany the failing of such misplaced concreteness was compounded by a disposition to think of *Lehnswesen* as normal in medieval *Staatswesen*, or even in *Verfassungsgeschichte*. And this second circumstance may help to explain why, among recent collections on feudalism, only the one concerned exclusively with Germany and three near neighbours (Flanders, Verona, Provence)—it is the book here in review—has seen fit to define its purpose in relation to the problem whether feudalism is a fit subject for objective inquiry.

In so doing, the present writers commendably respond to the most challenging critique of their subject to appear in our time. In her book *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford,

[2] Heinrich Mitteis, *Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt: Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Weimar, 1933); Marc Bloch, *La société féodale*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939–40); François-Louis Ganshof, *Qu'est-ce que la féodalité* (Brussels, 1944). All three books were often reprinted after the Second World War; those by Ganshof and Bloch were published in English translation in (respectively) 1952 and 1961.

[3] e.g. R. H. Hilton, *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism: Essays in Medieval Social History* (London, 1985); Guy Bois, *Crise du féodalisme: Economie rurale et démographie en Normandie orientale du début du 14e siècle au milieu du 16e siècle* (Paris, 1976).

[4] This was a guiding concern of Elizabeth A. R. Brown, 'The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe', *American Historical Review*, 79 (1974), 1063–88.

1994) Susan Reynolds not only dismissed the concept of feudalism prior to 1200 in much of Europe, but did so for Germany with searching erudition. Moreover, quite beyond her contention that feudalism was the belated concoction of Italian jurists and post-medieval theorists, Reynolds argued that the elements of 'feudalism' attested in medieval sources fail to withstand critical reading. These arguments have been widely questioned, not least by German scholars. Johannes Fried easily exposed unwary presumptions about government and property which undermine Reynolds's own preconception of a feudalism in need of intellectual discovery. And he cast serious doubt on her readings of early medieval allusions—less easily, for they remain few and problematic—to personal submission and conditional tenure.[5]

It was no aim of the present book to prolong this debate. Its contributors, like other critics of Reynolds, were content to recognize her challenge, while mostly ignoring its radical implications. In a comprehensive introduction Jürgen Dendorfer places the collective enterprise in its setting of recent German research and the 'debate' provoked by Reynolds, and explains how the chapters carry forward an argument about *Lehnswesen* (not *Feudalismus*) from case-studies in the sources leading to the resonance and meaning of findings and events. The coherence of a long book is well served by a questionnaire (p. 26) that effectually preserves the deep consensus of past research that *Lehnswesen* (or feudalism), whatever it was not, had assuredly to do with concretely attested realities: (1) vassals or dependents; (2) vassalic services; (3) the fief (*Lehnsobjekte*) and conditions binding parties to its grant; (4) the connexion between vassalage and the grant of fiefs; (5) changes with respect to these points discernible in the twelfth century. *Lehnswesen* exists, for these writers, in these particulars, open to discovery in variable regional circumstances and perspectives; a historical phenomenon open to improved measurement and dating.

What follows is an attempt to identify the contents of this book with respect to topics and findings, leaving some selective commen-

[5] Johannes Fried, review of Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, in *German Historical Institute London Bulletin,* 19/1 (1997), 28–41. Reynolds responded, ibid. 19/2 (1997), 30–40. See also Otto Gerhard Oexle, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 May 1995.

tary on the problems they raise to the end. Werner Hechberger and Hans-Henning Kortüm show how *Lehnswesen*, having first been appropriated by constitutional history, was reconceived as legal and societal history by (respectively) Mitteis and Otto Brunner.[6] Rudolf Schieffer, exploiting some 1,400 royal records (from Lothar III to Frederick I, 1125–90), finds that *feudum* overtakes *beneficium* in these sources only after 1150. In records of fiefs after 1166, according to Karl-Heinz Spiess, benefice and fief are vassalic, tied normally to homage. Steffen Patzold, working from monastic narratives of Lotharingia and Swabia, concludes that conditional tenures were common, although not all such rendered their holders vassals. Jan-Dirk Müller finds that allusions to *Lehnswesen* in concrete detail are hard to find in epic literature. With respect to *Privaturkunden*, Hubertus Seibert has a trove to work with in Bavaria, finding abundant and diverse evidence for conditional tenures, even for norms thereof, especially after 1150. For Thomas Zotz the duchy of Swabia illustrates the elements of *Lehnswesen* without clearly revealing how fiefs entailed vassalic obligations. Here, too, *feudum* displaces *beneficium* in the twelfth century. Stefan Burkhardt explores the archiepiscopal records of Mainz and Köln for the whole prescribed range of elements of *Lehnswesen*, on which something more is said below. In north-eastern German lands Oliver Auge reports that, with some delay, *feudum* and *ius feudale* appear, but not customary *Lehnswesen*, towards 1250.

The peripheral lands of Flanders, Provence, and the March of Verona offer comparable results. Dirk Heirbaut shows, from thorough research, that fiefs and vassalage figure abundantly in Flemish sources in the twelfth century. He refers repeatedly to a 'breakthrough' of feudalism as early as *c*.1000; yet he emphatically rejects my own conclusion that Flanders became a 'feudal society' in the twelfth century.[7] In southern lands the writtenness of obligations is evident from around 1100, creating massive evidence in Provence for tenures and submission. Florian Mazel argues that this written *Lehns-*

[6] Otto Brunner belongs in the little galaxy cited in n. 2. His *Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter* (6th edn.; Darmstadt, 1970) was first published, with politicized title, at Baden-bei-Wien in 1939.

[7] pp. 201, 227; cf. T. Bisson, 'Lordship and Tenurial Dependence in Flanders, Provence, and Occitania (1050–1200)', in *Il feudalesimo nell'alto medioevo* (Spoleto, 2000), i. 389–439, at 401. This article is not cited.

wesen is a largely elite phenomenon, and suggests that *amicitia* may be of greater importance than we see. Daniela Rando finds diversity and peculiarity in the assimilation of public charges to fiefs around Verona, where fidelities cease to be exclusively personal, and *feuda sine fidelitate* are found.

Coming lastly to the significance of problematic events and contexts, Dendorfer and Roman Deutinger are less inclined than past historians to interpret the Concordat of 1122 and the imperial-papal confrontation of 1157 as symptomatic. Fully exposed at Besançon, feudal-vassalic forms occupied the foreground of the older dispute over ultimate precedence. Jan Keupp and (the late) Gertrud Thoma pursue the conceptual divergence of legal historical research from the sources. So the 'service-fief' (*Dienstlehen*) is said to have no recognition prior to the systematizing *Sachsenspiegel*. For Thoma the *beneficia* recorded in surveys (*Urbaren*) from about 1100 point to a diversity of conditional tenures in *Grundherrschaften*. Philippe Depreux wishes to distinguish the homage of recognition from that of vassalage, with reference to Galbert of Bruges on the acceptance of Count William Clito; yet the rites other than investiture cannot alone prove vassalic status.

Klaus van Eickels questions the relation of vassalage to family and friendship, a highly pertinent new concern perhaps too little explored in this volume. His suggestion that homage served to sharpen focus on ranks in society would help to explain one long-recognized tendency in the twelfth century. Gerhard Lubich retrieves a traditional frame of debate by questioning how elite lordship and dependence worked in post-Carolingian Germany. Stefan Weinfurter concludes this part with an illuminating exploration of oaths in relation to conditional tenures and trust. Fidelity was politicized for a time in the later eleventh century, only to be 'relativized' as homage and investiture intruded on relations of trust.

Most of these chapters raise questions in need of further comment or study. Can we speak of a *Lehnswesen* of knights as distinct from that of royal or ducal vassals? What relation to the abbot of St Maximin had the holders of enfeoffed manses in his domains towards 1175?[8] Similar questions arise for 'feudal' scenes in other

[8] *Das Urbar der Abtei St. Maximin vor Trier*, ed. Reiner Nolden (Düsseldorf, 1999), 41–51.

lands. Comparatively, the present results are unsurprising. German sources, even in their diversity, confirm an understanding far from new, yet repeatedly improved since the Second World War, that in much of Europe the resort to conditional tenures that were associated (more or less) with vassalic commitments, attained customary status in the twelfth century.

What remain far from clear—and not only for Germany—are the answers to two larger questions: (1) the differential importance (or amounts) of *Lehnswesen* (or, less concretely, feudalism) in medieval societies. And (2) whether, for the *medieval* understanding of the questions addressed in this book, our covering terms *Lehnswesen* and feudalism are problematic.

While perhaps without interest for Susan Reynolds, these questions cry out from the sources. The first of them may seem simpleminded, but it has been much treated, and remains fundamental. Implicit in several of these chapters (those by Seibert, Burkhardt, Auge, Mazel), it is explicit in Heirbaut's treatment of Flanders. If our answers can only be impressionistic, it is because in most places we lack the evidence to show how contemporaries viewed the realities of conditional tenures. What is needed may be suggested in two ways. If we could suppose that the *Lehnrecht* invoked at the trial of Henry the Lion, or the custom of fiefs in that of Duke-King John, were real pointers to the widespread recognition of tenurial obligation towards 1180–1204,[9] then the traditional arguments for feudalism as national (and notional) reality would be justified. But it is the suspicion of such evidence that has galvanized the reluctance of historians working today. In Normandy, where, by the questionnaire of this book, *Lehnswesen* was thoroughly elaborated in the twelfth century, the normative recognition of this reality was long delayed.[10]

On the other hand, a much better test of contemporary awareness may be found wherever the entities and values in *Lehnswesen* become the very form and content of records themselves. And whereas German lands are far from unyielding in such inquiry, the best

[9] See generally Joachim Ehlers, *Heinrich der Löwe: Eine Biographie* (Munich, 2008), 317–45; and John W. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1986), 265–6.

[10] To see this one need only compare the *Très ancien coutumier* (*c.*1200) with the *Summa de legibus Normannie* (*c.*1245), ed. Ernest-Joseph Tardif, *Coutumiers de Normandie: Textes critiques*, 2 vols. (Rouen-Paris, 1881–1903).

instances may be found in France. In Champagne, as Theodore Evergates has shown, not only were the count's fief-holders surveyed, castellany by castellany, from 1178 to 1275, but in 1230 the 'chancery recopied its entire collection of records dealing with fiefs and homages'.[11] In Occitania and Catalonia, the scene sketched (for Provence) by Florian Mazel is perhaps even more insistently 'feudal', because the oaths and conventions that are so overwhelmingly records of castles and fiefs (or both at once) were preserved in archives (and cartularies) that were themselves 'feudal'.[12] In these regions something like 'fiefism' was a contemporary (not *ex post facto*) reality, a regime of fiefs for which a good translation might be—'feudalism'. Especially in such regimes the roles of non-'feudal' property and relationships are in need of historical inquiry. But the concepts of societies *lehnrechtlich* or 'feudal' are not only justified. They are capable of descriptions both quantitative and qualitative.

Coming to my second question, let me observe that the authors of *Das Lehnswesen* have worked with a template that says nothing about lordship. So have most historians since 1950, including Susan Reynolds. This seems to me a startling fact.[13] Granted that fiefs without lords are attested, typically as if they were properties; normally conditional tenures of whatever description were held by dependents owing homage and/or fidelity to lords. Vassalage entailed obligations and services to lords. Equally normal was the distinction *and convergence* between lordships over vassals and those over peasants, an engaging complication of medieval history, touched on here and

[11] Theodore Evergates, *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne, 1100–1300* (Philadelphia, 2007), 63 (and ch. 3).

[12] Hélène Débax, *La féodalité languedocienne XIe–XIIe siècles: Serments, hommages et fiefs dans le Languedoc des Trencavel* (Toulouse, 2003), together with her article ' "Une féodalité qui sent l'encre": typologie des actes féodaux dans le Languedoc des XIe–XIIe siècles', in *Le vassal, le fief et l'écrit*, 35–70; Pierre Bonnassie, *La Catalogne du milieu du Xe à la fin du XIe siècle: croissance et mutations d'une société*, 2 vols. (Toulouse, 1975–6), ii. chs. 13, 14.

[13] I have repeatedly drawn attention to this point since 1994. Not lordships, on which modern studies abound, but lordship is the missing subject. My view was shared by Patrick Wormald, review of Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, in *Times Literary Supplement*, 10 Mar. 1996, 12. The problem is illustrated, in effect, by the useful collection *Herrschaft als soziale Praxis: Historische und sozial-anthropologische Studien*, ed. Alf Lüdtke (Göttingen, 1991).

there in *Das Lehnswesen*,[14] that has seldom caused historians much trouble. Every element mentioned in the preceding sentences is examined in this volume—except lordship. Lordship figures here, as of course it must, but seldom other than incidentally.

Why should this matter? It matters for two quite different reasons. First, because the cultures of *Lehnswesen* cannot be read alone in rites of deference; or to say it otherwise, fidelity was experienced as lordly responsibility as well as vassalic. A massive failure of archiepiscopal lordship at Mainz after 1165 is well cited by Stefan Burkhardt for its illustration of the 'classical elements of *Lehnswesen*, homage and fief-taking'. What it also displays, I would add, is the coercive genesis of new lordships, and Archbishop Konrad's determination to restore his disrupted ecclesiastical *familia*.[15] On sociabilities in seigneurial courts, much harder to pluck from charters than from literature, more work is needed.

My second reason follows from the first. If 'lordship' had been the generalization of choice, and not 'feudalism', there could have been no such dissatisfaction as Susan Reynolds exploited. For lordship in all its written forms (*dominatio*, *dominus-a*, *senior*, *praeesse*, etc.) is quite as hugely attested in medieval sources as 'feudalism' is lacking. What worked against this concept was its irreducibility to an easy nominative in English, together with its cooptation in German and Romance languages to designate dominations over peasants.

Das Lehnswesen is not gravely deficient in its failure to place fiefs and vassalage more fully in their medieval settings. The collaborators have splendidly updated the paradigm bequeathed by historians, here deemed classical, who first demonstrated the institutional maturity of the twelfth century. Yet there was bias in that paradigm, which held more to the 'elements' than to the whole of an original human contrivance. What Klaus van Eickels chose to compare with family and friendship in his valuable chapter is vassalage, not lordship. The heritage of Bloch and Brunner is perceptible here and there. Yet the multiplication of lay lordships and castles in post-Carolingian times, one of the important findings of post-*annaliste* historiography, finds little echo here.

[14] Notably (but not only) by Jan Keupp and Gertrud Thoma.

[15] p. 177. His remarkable source may be found in *Mainzer Urkundenbuch*, ed. Manfred Stimming and Peter Acht, 2 vols. (Darmstadt, 1932–71), ii:2. no. 531. See also (here) K.-H. Spiess, 93–4.

Das Lehnswesen invites the surpassing perspectives I have mentioned. More than most conference volumes, it seeks to keep its German-imperial focus (not mentioned on its title-page) oriented to the conceptual and methodological problems of the wider European scene. In a fine closing reflection, Roman Deutinger observes that, by holding to a time-tested (and -tainted) model of feudal-vassalic reality, his colleagues have not only sharpened their chronology, but have also invited recognition that, even in Germany, *Lehnswesen* may now be too exclusive a term to comprehend the diversities of conditional dependence and tenures before 1150. 'Feudalism', after all, proves difficult to put down.

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JOCHEN BURGTORF, *The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars: History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120–1310)*, History of Warfare, 50 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), xxviii + 761 pp. with 3 maps and 73 tables. ISBN 978 90 04 16660 8. €179.00. US $286.00

The Hospitallers and the Templars were certainly the most important and prominent military–religious orders during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They were founded in Jerusalem, the Templars from a band of knights for the sole purpose of fighting the infidel and the Hospitallers from *conversi* running a hospital next to the Holy Sepulchre. Both orders soon became famous for the protection they offered Christian pilgrims, for their victories against the Muslims, and the Hospitallers also for their care of the poor and the sick. The headquarters of both orders remained in the Latin East after the loss of Jerusalem in 1187. Both orders developed strategies to recruit fighters, raise alms, and exploit estates in the west to support the Christian East. Yet they were unable to continue this support after the middle of the thirteenth century when enthusiasm for the crusades dwindled and communal, princely, and monarchical control increased. Even before the Mamluks conquered Acre in 1291, both orders began to be blamed for Christian failures in the Levant. Such criticism led to various proposals for reform. Finally, the Hospitallers moved their headquarters from Cyprus to Rhodes in 1309 where they formed a more or less independent *Ordensstaat* for the next two centuries, similar to the Teutonic Order which, also in 1309, moved its headquarters to Prussia. The Templars were arrested by King Philip the Fair of France in 1307, and after criminal proceedings Pope Clement V suppressed the order in 1312; in 1314 the last Templar master and some senior officers were burnt at the stake in Paris on charges of misdemeanour, offence, and heresy. There is a vast and rapidly growing amount of modern research on the military–religious orders during the crusader period.[1] But a proper understanding of what really happened is impossible without comprehensive prosopographical studies. This large gap is filled by Jochen Burgtorf's *opus magnum*, the published version of his Ph.D. thesis that was

[1] An excellent survey including a critical discussion of the sources and an up-to-date bibliography is Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Templars and Hospitallers as Professed Religious in the Holy Land* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2010).

supervised by Rudolf Hiestand (Düsseldorf) in 2001 and has been available so far only on microfiche.

The first part of the book is a historical outline, divided into three chronological chapters for the periods when the headquarters were in Jerusalem 1099/1120–1187/91, in Acre 1191–1291, and on Cyprus 1291–1310. Each chapter starts with a discussion of the written descriptions and the extant physical remains of the headquarters and continues with two surveys, one for the people living and serving in the headquarters, not only knights, sergeants-at-arms, other sergeants, and turcopoles but also male and female servants, priests, sisters (only for the Hospitallers), and the second for the officers adopted probably in imitation of princely courts. The role of the orders during the several crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Levant is duly considered. Special crises are discussed: the resignation of the Hospitaller Master Gilbert of Assailly in 1170, the Hospitaller chapter general of 1204/06, and the resignation of the Master Alphonso of Portugal; the opposition to the Hospitaller masters Odo of Pins in 1295 and William of Villaret in 1299; the quarrel on Cyprus between King Henry II and his brother Amaury of Lusignan in 1306–10; and the Templar trial of 1307–14, which ended on Cyprus in 1311 when the Order's Marshal Aimo of Oiselay was incarcerated for life at Kyrenia, not because of the Templars' crimes but because he had been involved in a conspiracy against King Henry II. Earlier theories that the Hospitallers had their headquarters at Margat in Syria for a while after 1187 and that after 1218 the Templars had their headquarters at Pilgrims' Castle, Château Pèlerin, At(h)lit are convincingly rejected; see pp. 80–1 and 93–4, with asides that between 1187 and 1191 both orders most likely had their headquarters at Tyre and that in the thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights probably never moved their headquarters to Montfort, Starkenberg, outside Acre.

The second part of the book concerns the Templar and Hospitaller officers in the central convent, their hierarchies, titles (such as *bailli*, *preceptor*), seals, and other insignia, tenure and accountability, entourage and equipment. These officers came to represent the central convent as opposed to the master, who was frequently absent (about 20 per cent of the time) and often needed a lieutenant. The officers included (1) the seneschal, who is attested only for the Templars from 1129/30 to 1191, (2) the (grand) preceptor, who oversaw provisions

and acted as the master's lieutenant in geographically or legally defined areas, (3) the treasurer, (4) the marshal, (5) the turcopolier, who is attested in both orders only from the thirteenth century onwards, originally subordinate to the marshal and in charge of non-knightly fighters and auxiliary troops, (6) the admiral, only for the Hospitallers from 1299 onwards, (7) the draper for the tailoring department and clothing store, (8) the hospitaller, again only for the Hospitallers, in charge of their conventual hospital, and, finally, (9) the prior, who was in charge of the conventual church, who is well known for the Hospitallers but attested for the Templars only on rare and controversial occasions in the thirteenth century. Lists of the officers are printed. The respective ranks in comparison with other eastern and western officials are ascertained by the number of companions and horses the officers were allowed to have, by their place in lists of witnesses, and so on. A final paragraph is devoted to collective action by the officers, the convent or parts of it, especially the *prudhommes* mentioned in many charters as giving counsel and approving decisions.

The third part of the book gives the prosopographical catalogue of the conventual officers in alphabetical order, sorted according to their first or Christian names (pp. 462–695). The more than two hundred entries are not numbered, perhaps because it is sometimes difficult to decide whether names mentioned in sources refer to one and the same person. As a rule, all entries try to establish the origin of the person, usually by proposing geographical identifications for the family name, then discuss problems of attributing equivocal sources, mention the literature, and, finally, list the charters, letters, chronicles, statutes, and other sources in a sometimes provisional chronological order. The vast amount of information inevitably includes a few mistakes and lacunae.[2] Yet the published sources up to 1310 have been used more or less exhaustively. In some cases Burgtorf even corrects previous editions, for example, the funeral inscription of Peter of Vieillebride (†1242) extant in Acre (p. 620).[3] It would be a surprise

[2] See Hans Eberhard Mayer in a review published in *Deutsches Archiv*, 66 (2010), 315–17, with reference to the Hospitaller Aimo Burgunhun mentioned in 1194 who cannot be identical with the Templar Amio of Ays (p. 480), and to Peter of Beaune, 1249 Hospitaller preceptor of Acre (p. 609).

[3] Correcting Sabino de Sandoli (ed.), *Corpus inscriptionum crucesignatorum Terrae Sanctae, 1099–1291* (Jerusalem, 1974), 303–5 n. 406.

if important sources had been overlooked, although there may be hitherto unpublished references in papal or other western archives such as Venice, Barcelona, or Paris. For the Hospitaller Grand Preceptor Boniface of Calamandrana (†1298) Burgtorf himself has since published a more comprehensive article.[4] It should be noted, however, that he has used the invaluable Collection d'Albon, Paris, Bibliothéque Nationale, nouv. acq. lat. 1–71, the still unpublished material for the continuation of the Templars' *Cartulaire général* that has been published only up to 1150.[5] Extant data for conventual brethren who never became officers is not included, for example, for the Templar *capellanus* Peter who in 1148 wrote a charter (p. 336 n. 770).

Prosopographical data can, of course, be tricky and misleading, especially as gaps in the historical record may give wrong impressions. But Burgtorf is very prudent in drawing conclusions. He rightly informs his readers that ordinary members of the orders tended not to be mentioned by name in the written sources, and that most Hospitallers and Templars probably never set foot in the central convent. The numerical strength of the central convent is not easy to assess, perhaps 400 to 500 people for the Hospitallers in the early fourteenth century, and the 76 Templars interrogated during the Cypriot trial in 1310 probably represent only those who were unable or unwilling to escape. Information about the social and regional background of most brothers is sparse. However, in the early fourteenth century the ratio of knights to sergeants was supposed to be 7 to 1 for the Hospitallers, 2 to 1 for the Templars. There is ample evidence that officers returned to offices they had held before, and often deciding whether an officer was continuously in office or whether he had been replaced by another person is pure guesswork. Lack of reliable information means that career patterns remain unclear; there are, however, examples to demonstrate that the fruitful administration of offices furthered advancement as well as nepotism or inter-

[4] Jochen Burgtorf, 'A Mediterranean Career in the Late Thirteenth Century: The Hospitaller Grand Commander Boniface of Calamandrana', in Karl Borchardt, Nikolas Jaspert, and Helen J. Nicholson (eds.), *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell* (Aldershot, 2007), 73–85.

[5] André Marquis d'Albon (ed.), *Cartulaire général de l'ordre du Temple, 1119?–50* (Paris, 1913); *Fascicule complémentaire*, ed. Paul Fournier (Paris, 1922).

vention by the pope or the kings of France, England, or Aragon. Some Hospitallers and Templars were entrusted by popes and kings with sensitive missions and played important parts in the international relations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Boniface of Calamandrana has already been mentioned. Other examples include Robert Anglicus, sent by King John to Emperor Otto IV in 1209; William Cadel, who negotiated King John's truce with France after the battle of Bouvines in 1214; and Stephen of Cissey, who was commissioned to bring Thedald Visconti, the newly elected Pope Gregory X, back from Acre to the west in 1271.

Some historians may consider prosopographical data dull and boring. Those who read Burgtorf's book will soon discover that the contrary is true. It may be a pity that the publication has been included in a series on warfare, as the central convent was certainly more than just a military headquarters, and its officials were more than military officers. It is true that Burgtorf does not try to depict religious routine, the prayers and the liturgies of the Hospitallers and the Templars. But it is unfair to criticize him for totally neglecting the religious or spiritual side of the two orders.[6] The conventual church and the priests living in the convent receive due attention, as do the regulations concerning the care of sick or dying brothers. The sources do not permit us to draw comprehensive character portraits or to describe the brethren's spirituality. However, both standard epitheta and special cases offer glimpses into some facets of their personalities. Contemporaries usually hailed their braveness and honesty, but there were also brethren such as Amblard of Vienne, Guy of Foresta, Raymond of Ribells, and William of Villaret who were willing to take a calculated risk, transgress the rules, and get caught.

In sum, the book is truly an *opus magnum* which everyone studying the military–religious orders and the crusades will have to consult constantly. The prosopographies of the officers in the central convent could perhaps be complemented by data concerning other Hospitallers and Templars in both east and west. Of course, this would mean collecting scattered evidence from many different archives and libraries. And as many sources are unpublished, or have not been edited properly so far, the continuation of d'Albon's Templar cartulary and perhaps an up-dating of Delaville's Hospi-

[6] Jonathan Riley-Smith in a review published in *Crusades*, 8 (2009), 216–17.

taller cartulary[7] would be the logical next step and a *magnum desideratum*. At present, the impending 700th anniversaries of the events from 1307 to 1314 concerning the suppression of the Templars are producing a plethora of publications, including some valuable new studies on the Templar rule[8] and the Templar trial records,[9] but so far no one has launched an initiative to continue and complete the Templar cartulary. Jochen Burgtorf would certainly be an ideal candidate to coordinate such a project.

[7] Joseph Delaville Le Roulx (ed.), *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem,* 4 vols. (Paris, 1894–1905).

[8] Simonetta Cerrini is preparing a new edition; see so far ead., *La révolution des Templiers: une histoire perdue du XIIe siècle* (Paris, 2007), and Judith M. Upton-Ward (ed.), *The Catalan Rule of the Templars: A Critical Edition and English Translation from Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Cartes reales, MS 3344* (Woodbridge, 2003). See also Christian Vogel, *Das Recht der Templer: Ausgewählte Aspekte des Templerrechts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Statutenhandschriften aus Paris, Rom, Baltimore und Barcelona* (Berlin, 2007).

[9] Helen Nicholson is preparing an edition of the trial records of the British Isles. See so far Anne Gilmour-Bryson (ed.), *The Trial of the Templars in the Papal State and the Abruzzi* (Vatican City, 1982); ead. (ed.), *The Trial of the Templars in Cyprus: A Complete English Edition* (London, 1998); Barbara Frale (ed.), *Il papato e il processo ai templari: l'inedita assoluzione di Chinon alla luce della diplomatica pontificia* (Rome, 2003).

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OLIVER AUGE, *Handlungsspielräume fürstlicher Politik im Mittelalter: Der südliche Ostseeraum von der Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts bis in die frühe Reformationszeit*, Mittelalter-Forschungen, 28 (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2009), xiv + 543 pp. ISBN 978 3 7995 4279 1. €79.00

In recent years, the nobility of the Later Middle Ages has become a popular subject for innovative research projects by German medieval historians. The source base, especially for the princely families of this period, is remarkably rich and varied, enabling scholars to explore a broad range of topics that are difficult, if not impossible, to examine for the nobility of the preceding centuries. Dynastic structures, noble court culture, and the development of territorial lordship are only a few of the themes that have been studied intensively and creatively in new work. Some of the best of this current research has been published in the series Mittelalter-Forschungen, and Oliver Auge's book is another welcome addition to this list. Auge completed this *Habilitation* at Greifswald under the guidance of Karl-Heinz Spieß, whose own published *Habilitation – Familie und Verwandtschaft im deutschen Hochadel des Spätmittelalters* (1993)—remains one of the most important and influential works in the field. Auge, in this book, has provided historians with one of the most ambitious studies to date of the late medieval nobility.

The focus of Auge's work is the southern Baltic region, specifically the area that today comprises north-eastern Germany and north-western Poland, in the period from the late twelfth to the early sixteenth centuries. The medieval polities that form the foundation for his study are the princely lordships of Mecklenburg, Werle, Pomerania, and Rügen. As Auge explains, the history of these polities during the Later Middle Ages is unusually complex because of their geographical location. The Holy Roman Empire, Poland, Denmark, the Teutonic Order, and the Hanseatic League all had overlapping claims and interests that significantly impacted the political strategies of individual lords in these territories. Moreover, these were lordships that lay along the frontier between German-speaking, Scandinavian-speaking, and Slavic-speaking peoples, making the region a nexus point for cross-cultural interactions. By exploring more than three hundred years of this region's complicated history, Auge has chosen an immensely challenging topic that has rarely been examined critically in the past.

What makes Auge's accomplishment in this book even more impressive is the fact that he addresses a wide range of themes concerning noble lordship. For him, *die Handlungsspielräume fürstlicher Politik* (the spheres of action of princely politics) are best analysed through the lens of five main categories or coordinates: (1) the prince's interactions with other powers both inside and outside of his territories; (2) the prince's financial interests; (3) the prince's dynastic and familial relationships; (4) the prince's place in the constitutional framework of lord–vassal relations; and (5) the prince's cultivation of his princely identity and status. Each of these categories has been the basis for book-length studies of individual noble families or lordships in the past, yet Auge analyses all of them in detail in this work. As he explains, these five components of noble lordship must be viewed together. They all provided princes with a variety of opportunities for consolidating and expanding their authority—while simultaneously placing certain limits on the political strategies that princes were able to pursue. In trying to examine so many different pieces of the puzzle of medieval lordship across multiple centuries and several different princely territories in a complex corner of Europe, Auge has given himself an extraordinarily difficult task. That he is largely successful is a testament to his skills as a historian.

Auge's argument unfolds across a brief introduction, five chapters of widely varying lengths, and a short conclusion. As he rightly notes in his excellent introduction, scholars have analysed noble lordship effectively as a cultural phenomenon in recent years, but the political dimensions of lordship have rarely received close scrutiny. His goal of adding a 'political return' to the 'cultural turn' (p. 6) in the study of noble lordship thus provides him with the opportunity to explore a broad range of issues that have been overlooked in most current scholarship. Auge's approach to the political aspects of princely power and authority is a cautious one, however. According to him, each generation of each noble family had to devise its own strategies for successfully maintaining its position and influence. As a result, very little of princely political action involved grand plans based on long-term goals. Instead, princes tended to react to events and circumstances as they arose, and their ability to act in particular situations was impacted—both positively and negatively—by the five components that defined an individual lord's sphere of political action.

Over the course of the five main chapters of the book, Auge investigates each of the different factors that he sees as central to princely politics. In chapter 1, which is more than 150 pages in length, he examines the interactions that the princes of the southern Baltic had with other regional powers both inside and outside of their territories. Beginning with Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony and with the increased interest that both Saxon lords and Danish kings took in this region during the later twelfth century, he explores the changing dynamics of diplomatic interactions in the southern Baltic until the early sixteenth century. A principal component of his methodology in this chapter is the analysis of the abundant source material that details the creation of coalitions and bonds of friendship (*amicitia*) amongst the princes of the region. Within this context, Auge is especially interested in moments when the fluid nature of diplomatic relationships becomes evident—for example, the period following the extinction of a princely dynasty. This first chapter also examines the relationships between princes and the other lords in their territories, especially local nobilities, church institutions, and towns. In its scope, this is therefore a sweeping chapter that offers an extraordinarily rich glimpse into the political landscape of the southern Baltic during the Later Middle Ages.

Each of the subsequent four chapters is significantly shorter than the first. Chapter 2, which is only 30 pages long, focuses on princely finances. The vast majority of the evidence for this chapter is drawn from the years after 1300 because the surviving source material for the money economy of this region is scant for the preceding period. Here, Auge again emphasizes the opportunities and limitations that defined princes' spheres of action. Lords were routinely devising new strategies for consolidating their control over fiscal resources within their lands, yet they were simultaneously facing increased financial pressures that forced many of them to mortgage ever more rights and properties. In chapter 3, family and dynasty move to the forefront of the book's argument. In keeping with current trends within German academic circles, Auge stresses the ways in which bonds of kinship, friendship, and lordship all overlapped and worked together to shape political networks within medieval society. He then proceeds to examine the roles that kin played in the territorial strategies of individual lords, with an analysis of marriage patterns forming the centrepiece of the chapter.

The theme of chapter 4 is *Verfassungsgeschichte*, specifically, the nature and significance of lord–vassal relations in the southern Baltic. Auge is especially interested in exploring the ways in which the princes of this region became members of the Estate of Imperial Princes (*Reichsfürstenstand*) during the Later Middle Ages. After this, he considers how membership in this Estate both helped and hindered the ability of these lords to pursue their own political and territorial strategies. Finally, in chapter 5, Auge turns to the symbolic dimensions of princely lordship and considers the various strategies that princes employed to protect and enhance their status within the noble hierarchy. The argument of this chapter includes many aspects that are typical of late medieval noble culture more generally, such as princely generosity and Christian conceptions of knighthood, but Auge does suggest that there are some features unique to the princes of the southern Baltic region. The book closes with a brief conclusion, in which Auge summarizes the arguments of the individual chapters and then attempts a short synthesis.

Given the complexity and the comprehensive nature of the claims about princely lordship that Auge is trying to make here, it is only to be expected that the organization and structure of the book limit the effectiveness of his argument to a certain extent. Choosing to organize his book thematically around the five key factors shaping the spheres of action of southern Baltic princes was logical because this approach highlights the multiple facets of princely lordship. However, this approach also leads to a fragmented narrative. Reading this book from start to finish does not provide a straightforward story about princely politics in this region during the Later Middle Ages. The reader comes away with a sense of the complexity, but not with a clear narrative. Furthermore, because of the scope of this project, Auge cannot be systematic in his treatment of all five factors across all of the different princely lordships he is discussing. Instead, he makes general statements at the opening of each section of each chapter and then supports his claims with two or three brief case studies of individual princes. Frequently, these examples are drawn from different centuries and different territories, making it difficult for the reader to account for change over time or for variations across all four of the princely lordships he is considering. Some princes, such as Duke Albrecht II of Mecklenburg (d. 1379) and Duke Erich of Pomerania (d. 1459), receive significantly more

attention than other princes, making the book very uneven in its analysis.

The brief synthesis Auge gives his readers in the conclusion fills in a few of the gaps in his narrative, but his argument would have been more successful if he had lengthened this section. As it stands, the broad scope of the book is simultaneously its greatest weakness and its greatest strength. This is not an easy book to read, and given the complexity of his subject matter, Auge could have done more to convey his main points clearly and convincingly. Nevertheless, Auge's vision of politics and lordship here is an expansive one that brings us much closer than most books do to understanding the multiplicity of factors that influenced the ability of medieval princes to exercise their power and authority effectively.

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DOMINIK HAFFER, *Europa in den Augen Bismarcks: Bismarcks Vorstellungen von der Politik der europäischen Mächte und vom europäischen Staatensystem*, Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung. Wissenschaftliche Reihe, 16 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 723 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 76982 4. €68.00

When Gustav Stresemann's *Vermächtnis* was published shortly after the statesman's death, some of the revelations it contained triggered a furious debate amongst contemporaries and historians. Did the former chancellor and foreign minister really deserve his reputation as a great European? Or had he only ever been a cunning, dissimulating Machiavelli, who had pursued nothing but Germany's national interest? For Stresemann's great predecessor in the Wilhelmstrasse, however, this question has seemed less controversial. Notwithstanding the fulsome praise Bismarck's foreign policy attracted during his lifetime and beyond, few commentators have seen the grand master of *Realpolitik* as a champion of the concerns of a wider Europe. In addition to perusing Bismarck's *Kissinger Diktat* of 1877, where the chancellor sketched the 'ideal image' of a European constellation in which Germany would benefit from perpetuating a chronic hostility amongst the other powers, one could always turn to *Was sagt Bismarck dazu?* The well-known aperçus listed under 'Europe' in Max Klemm's inexhaustible two-volume compendium range from Bismarck's claim that he had only ever found the word in the mouths of those seeking to veil their own self-interest, to his lampooning a European congress as a 'convention of the superannuated', and the chancellor's admission that the topic left him as stumped as his wife's question what he might like for Christmas. The entries convey, at best, a fairly jaundiced view of the subject.

Undeterred by such bleak omens, Dominik Haffer has produced a hefty tome to throw light on Bismarck's perception of the European dimension of international politics, of its ethical, legal, procedural, and diplomatic aspects, and of the policies pursued and systems formed by the Great Powers. The author has done a stupendous amount of work. In addition to combing through a vast body of edited sources and literature, he has consulted an impressive selection of unpublished sources in half a dozen archives. While there is no doubting the solidity of its scholarship and the courage of entering a field as densely researched as Bismarck's foreign policy, *Europa in den*

Augen Bismarcks is, in many respects, a frustrating and disappointing book.

A key problem is the uneven fashion in which Haffer's study covers its topic. At more than 700 pages the book is certainly long enough to accommodate the full stretch of the Iron Chancellor's perception of and reactions to the European system within a truly Pan-European (or, at least, 'pan-Pentarchical') panorama. Sadly, however, the reader has to make do with only half the story. Two hundred and seventy-five pages are dedicated to the years before Bismarck's appointment as Prussian minister president. The following nine years up to the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War take up a further 313 pages, which leaves fewer than sixty pages for the nineteen years of Bismarck's foreign policy as *Reichskanzler*. A meagre four-page section on the Congress of Berlin and the silence on the years between 1887 and 1890 sit rather incongruously alongside lengthy passages dedicated to Danube navigation issues (pp. 242–53) or yet another detailed summary of the origins of the Franco-Prussian War (pp. 508–30).

Moreover, much of the study consists of a thorough narrative of known political events and developments. This provides the reader with an authoritative account of Bismarck's analyses of and reactions to numerous important questions that arose between 1848 and 1871. It would have been preferable, though, to concentrate on the strictly European and systemic issues at the heart of the question tackled by the book. Attempts to reform the German *Bund*, Austria's policy, the Prussian Constitutional Conflict, the Polish rising of 1863, the Zollverein and German liberalism: these and many other topics are knowledgeably and meticulously explored, but the fabric of Haffer's prose is only rarely shot through with the golden thread of a passage focused on his principal European concern. When this does happen, as on pp. 402–4, for example, where Bismarck's suggestion that Prussia's international security must be gained not by seeking a mightier patron but through independent power is discussed, the text quickly comes to life.

A third imbalance concerns the unstinting attention paid to German affairs in comparison to the relatively scant consideration afforded to the non-German powers. Even the 140-page chapter on 'Germany and Europe before and after the Crimean War' focuses overwhelmingly on Prussia, the German Confederation, and, above

all, Austria. With only three marginal references in this chapter, Lord Palmerston is barely visible. Nesselrode, Cavour, and Drouyn de Lhuys do not make it into the main text at all. Whether intended or not, the unequal treatment of the two halves of Bismarck's career before and after 1871 and the German preoccupation of the text make the statesman who emerges from this study seem a less European and more narrowly German actor, buried under a mountain of events and with little time and occasion for systemic musings.

Europa in den Augen Bismarck bears the hallmarks of a German doctoral thesis: the book does not wear its unquestionable erudition lightly. It confronts readers with more than 2,300 often very substantial footnotes. Frequently they take up more than half a page and offer further quotations and additional observations. The prose style, with its long sentences, cautious qualifications, and occasional glitches, is marked by a similar kind of gravitas. On page 20, for instance, a 115-word sentence takes up 14 lines to explain the book's central question: was Bismarck's foreign policy informed by European values and systems? The sentence ends, fittingly, with footnote 44: a veritable humdinger whose 28 lines end up spilling onto the bottom of the next page. Prose so involved and circumscribed is not only hard to digest; it also obscures the author's findings which are often presented in too insipid a fashion. Concluding observations need to be expressed with much more clarity of purpose than Haffer's claims that 'experience and trust' were part of Bismarck's political approach (p. 288), that a 'continuous awareness of current moods and attention to the flexibility of the interests (*Interessenflexibilität*) of all states remained decisive for his European policy' (p. 387), or that his actions were 'determined by Prussia's vital and justified interests' (p. 451).

This is not to say that the book lacks a thesis. The general thrust of the argument suggests that through his life experience, education, and political practice Bismarck had absorbed a European diplomatic mentality which influenced his *modus operandi*. This argument shines through most clearly where the author offers carefully nuanced reinterpretations of established views. These tend to qualify some of the sharper edges of Bismarck's foreign political beliefs. The interpretation Haffer provides of the Prussian minister president's view of the German Confederation in the 1850s and even during the run-up to the Danish War suggests a more subtle attitude than has often been assumed. The author also attests Bismarck a greater willingness

to pursue a course of peaceful co-existence with France after 1867 than many accounts would have us believe. Haffer's analysis of Bismarck's intentions ahead of the Austro-Prussian War (pp. 422–32) is similarly generous. In the light of Winfried Baumgart's recent work, however, it seems problematic to present the minister president as having pursued a policy of restraint that was not designed to bring about a conflict with the Habsburg Empire.

Haffer concludes by stating that Bismarck's determination to obtain for Prussia–Germany a position that was 'commensurate with its co-equal status alongside the other Great Powers' was not tantamount to being 'anti-European' and merely required an 'adaptation of the European states system' (p. 665). The author is certainly right in saying that this did not make Bismarck a power politician who knew no limits. It seems less clear, though, whether Bismarck would ever let his European mentality get in the way of defining these limits entirely by himself.

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JAMES RETALLACK (ed.), *Imperial Germany 1871–1918*, The Short Oxford History of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xv + 328 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 920488 5. £50.00

Does Imperial Germany resemble the *Titanic*? In some ways, according to James Retallack. Both were brought down by an event external to them, but which they could have prevented if they had really wanted to. That they did not avert the catastrophe was the result of dramatic miscalculations on the part of the actors involved. These, in turn, point back to specific conditions that were typical of both the *Titanic* and Imperial Germany: social structures, cultural tensions, and political hierarchies which meant that it was hardly possible to observe reality adequately.

Retallack uses the comparison with the *Titanic* to open the final essay in this edited volume, which is well worth reading. He thus adopts the same procedure as his eleven co-authors, each of whom develops their theme out of a vignette. Retallack expertly sums up each of the contributions in a sentence (pp. 268–9). The argument of the book is that the sharpening of internal conflicts which ended in dilemmas giving rise to unforeseeable paradoxes was specific to Imperial Germany. As visibility deteriorated on the bridge, discussion increased: about the course, who should take the helm, and the telescope. According to Retallack, the full scope of these discussions (actors, topics, structures, and the culture of discussion) must, of course, be taken seriously and they must be related to each other. In contrast to earlier publications in which Retallack encouraged individuals to undertake their own research with the aim of creating many Wilhelmine Germanys, he now concentrates on integration, but without reducing it to a simple concept. The last sentence of the book reads: 'A transitional epoch, when Germans were exploring how best to reconcile tradition and change . . . an era when tensions and conflict had many possible outcomes . . . an object worthy of study in its own right' (p. 274).

Retallack's co-authors do not make it easy for their editor. All established experts on Imperial Germany, most of them working at North American or British universities (Angelika Schaser is the only author represented in the volume who was educated in Germany, works in Germany, and has published predominantly in German), they draw on their own primary research and a close reading of the

German- and English-language research. While they observe the guidelines laid down in the introduction (introductory example, treatment of the themes of change, bourgeoisie and state, internal conflicts, and the modernity of Imperial Germany), the quality of most of the essays is so high that the editor has to work hard to sum up their findings in the conclusion.

Mark Hewitson contrasts Thomas Mann's *Königliche Hoheit* with Heinrich Mann's *Der Untertan* to introduce his survey of Wilhelmine Germany, discussing political structures and political decisions within the field of tension generated by these two images of society. Hewitson regards Imperial Germany's capacity for survival as very high. He sees the reforms introduced as late as October 1918 as evidence of its adaptability, and the shadow which Imperial Germany cast on the Weimar Republic points to the attractiveness of this model for the Germans. For Hewitson, the strength of Imperial Germany lies in the fact that the Germans could have both Mann brothers at the same time: a national *Machtstaat* and a village *Heimat*; bourgeois self-government and aristocratic, imperial splendour. 'Playing with scales' (p. 6), invoked by Retallack in the introduction, is both the research strategy of historians, and the identification strategy of contemporaries.

Thomas Kühne begins with the disagreements within the Catholic Centre Party before the Landtag elections of 1908 in the suburbs of Cologne on the right bank of the Rhine, and is more sceptical. He identifies three 'paths towards democracy' (p. 191) which the Germans trod after 1900: (1) 'the increasing trend to go to the polls and vote', (2) 'a grass-roots political movement, which increasingly demanded and favoured parliamentary candidates who shared the local ties or social background of their voters', and (3) 'the fascination with the politics of togetherness'. In Kühne's view, the first and second trends worked against each other. The rapid democratization of the franchise prevented the full professionalization of parliament. While the third trend could potentially bridge the tensions between the first two, Kühne doubts whether the images of an external enemy and harmonizing internal political models associated with 'togetherness' could have stabilized Imperial Germany and taken it down the path leading towards Western democracy.

Christopher Clark, who starts by cutting down a linden tree planted to commemorate Luther's birthday in Affaltrach in the state of

Württemberg (not in person, but Clark can create the impression that he was there while simultaneously providing a distanced analysis), does not want to link the religious conflicts too closely with the decline of Imperial Germany or the rise of National Socialism. The processes of conflict and integration between Protestants, Jews, and Catholics which, at local and regional level, were highly dynamic and interconnected with each other in different ways, he suggests, would have advanced rather than impeded political participation, the organization of civil society, the development of the welfare state, and women's emancipation. While the scars of the *Kulturkampf* were still visible in the 1930s, according to Clark they blocked the rise of the Nazi Party rather than promoted it. On the whole, he suggests in conclusion, 'playing with scales' in the area of religion will have to reach from Affaltrach to the European level before an adequate assessment can be made.

In this volume we can hurry through Bismarck's Germany with Katharine Anne Lerman; observe economic and especially social developments with Brett Fairbairn; have cultural institutions, works of art, art movements, and the cultural establishment presented by Celia Applegate; and allow Edward Ross Dickinson to cast new light on reform efforts. Angelika Schaser analyses 'gendered Germany' (p. 128), while Sebastian Conrad introduces the theme of 'Transnational Germany' (p. 219). Roger Chickering's presentation of militarism and radical nationalism is as polished as Jeffrey Verhey's discussion of the First World War and the 1918 revolution. At the end of the volume we find an extensive and useful annotated bibliography, a chronological overview, an index, and three maps, which, apart from confirming Thomas Nipperday's thesis that the basic colour of history is grey, are not especially helpful.

All in all, this book is useful, informative, and entertaining in equal measure. It provides an introduction to the history of Imperial Germany and presents it in all its complexity without trying to sum it up conclusively. In his concluding essay, Retallack refers hopefully to the internet, which, he suggests, is opening up completely new perspectives for researching pictorial sources in particular. He describes future fields of work derived from the logic of research, sources which have not yet been fully utilized, and the need for international comparison. 'Looking Forward' is an appropriate title for this final chapter. The *Titanic* surprisingly sank on its maiden voyage.

Imperial Germany, too, had only one chance, and it ended violently in world war and revolution. The historiography of Imperial Germany manages without any violent deaths. And it can start again at any time. As a national history it came to an end in the 1990s. To write it anew from a non-national perspective, in terms of both subject and authors, is the challenge.

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DIERK HOFFMANN, *Otto Grotewohl (1894–1964): Eine politische Biographie*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 74 (R. Oldenbourg Verlag: Munich, 2009), viii + 721 pp. ISBN 978 3 486 59032 6. €69.80

On a fact-finding tour of the Eastern Bloc in 1954, the British Labour MP Desmond Donnelly had a two-hour long meeting with Otto Grotewohl in his capacity as head of the GDR government. The East German Minister President made a broadly positive impression on Donnelly, who noted: 'In manner he [Grotewohl] was a mild person. His immaculate dove-grey suit, dove-grey shoes and rimless spectacles made him look like a prosperous American.' The substance of the discussion, in Donnelly's view, was also punctuated by some encouraging aspects, in particular, Grotewohl's readiness to express 'outright a sense of remorse' for the war—a sentiment conspicuous by its absence during the MP's recent visit to Bonn.[1]

In his articles for the British press and the books he subsequently published, Donnelly appeared unaware of Grotewohl's political past as a Social Democrat; he was merely described as the 'communist head of state'. The leitmotiv of Dierk Hoffmann's long and learned biography is precisely this—how a Social Democrat could so completely shed his past political skin, adopting the *Habitus* of a leading German communist. Perhaps the most convincing answer, more implicit than explicit in much of this mighty tome, is symbolized by the 'dove-grey suit': the trappings of prestige and privilege exercised an irresistible attraction on Grotewohl, even when they came without actual power.

The Rise and Rise of a Professional Politician

Otto Grotewohl was born in Brunswick on 11 March 1894, where he grew up during the later stages of the Kaiserreich. His father was an unskilled worker and a trader (of some unspecified sort), his mother a dressmaker. Professionally, he trained as a book printer, but almost immediately changed his career path to work as a clerk in the insurance business. It was here that Grotewohl first honed his talent as an

[1] Desmond Donnelly, *The March Wind: Explorations Behind the Iron Curtain* (London, 1959), 67.

administrator that served him well as an SPD functionary and a politician. On the outbreak of war Grotewohl was called up, serving on the Eastern Front from May 1915 until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed him to be redeployed to the Western Front in March 1918. He was injured twice and his personal accounts of military service were without bravado, noting his unsuitability as a conscript.

When the SPD split over participation in the war in early 1917, Brunswick was one of only six party districts to go over in their majority to the newly founded Independents (USPD) in what was a highly acrimonious rupture at local level. Grotewohl joined the locally dominant wing of the now divided workers' movement, but not until his return home at Christmas 1918. He was too late to have played a part in the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils and their radicalism. Although the moderate (Sepp) Oerter wing of the USPD and its support for parliamentary democracy over a Soviet-inspired council system asserted itself in regional elections at the end 1918, Brunswick during the November Revolution had been a Spartacist stronghold and the Left USPD remained influential until the party split over the question of joining the Communist International.

As we will see below, Grotewohl's refusal to accept Moscow's domination of German communism in 1920 receives only a few pages in a book marked by its readiness to deviate far from the immediate role of its biographical subject. Careerism is implicit in his reasons for remaining in the Rump USPD, which subsequently returned to the reunited SPD in October 1922, following the reign of right-wing terror against those accepting the Versailles Treaty in the evaporating centre ground and on the communist left. This decision was broadly typical of more senior party officials, and the ambitious Grotewohl was certainly no exception. He entered the Brunswick Diet (*Landtag*) in 1920, where he specialized in finance and social insurance policy. The following year, aged only 27, he took up his first ministerial portfolio as Minister for Education. Grotewohl had been talent-spotted by Sepp Oerter, the then USPD Minister President and later Nazi Party member, on account of his abilities as an *apparatchik* and a public speaker. In 1923 he replaced Ewald Vogtherr, the SPD Minister of the Interior who had died in office. Although remaining primarily a regional political player (despite Hoffmann's attempts to inflate his subject's importance), Grotewohl was elected to the Reichstag in 1925 and might well, had it not been for the Nazi 'seizure of power' in

1933, have continued his political ascent and made a mark at national level.

During the Third Reich Grotewohl was little involved in politics let alone resistance. Yet he was purged from a civil service position in insurance which had previously supplemented his income. In connection with what were presumably trumped up accusations of corruption, he was harassed and arrested on a number of occasions. Grotewohl owed his ability to provide for his family to the solidarity of party colleagues and friends who found work for him, including selling kitchen appliances.

After moving to Berlin during the war, Grotewohl emerged in the summer of 1945 as one of three leading figures in the SPD's central committee (*Zentralausschuß*) in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ). Initially, he won public acclaim for his criticisms of Stalinist policy in Germany. But by the end of 1945 at the latest he had abandoned all of his previous reservations in a departure drawing the wrath of Büro Schumacher in the West and the SPD leadership in exile. Most famously, Grotewohl helped give a veneer of consent to the forced merger (*Zwangsvereinigung*) between the SPD in the Soviet Zone and the KPD, becoming the co-chairman, with Wilhelm Pieck, of the so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED) at the 'unification' congress on 21 April 1946.

The promised parity in the new party's leadership was soon abandoned and, in the campaign against *Sozialdemokratismus*, which reached its high point in 1948, Grotewohl not only failed to defend his former party comrades but put himself at the head of the movement. By 1953, only Grotewohl and Friedrich Ebert (son of the first Social Democratic President of the Weimar Republic) were left in the upper echelons of the SED leadership. Even the persecution of personal friends—most notably Erich Gniffke who had done so much to help Grotewohl survive the Third Reich—inspired no loyalty.

At a meeting of regional party officials in 1948, Grotewohl conceded communism's refusal to permit principled opposition by stating: 'We are all sitting on a train and must drive it together; otherwise we will be thrown off' (p. 658). Clearly the former Social Democrat had no intention of getting off the train to 'socialism', even if this meant a scorched-earth policy of burning down its democratic content. During the power struggles in the SED, most notably following the anti-communist rising of June 1953 and again in 1958, Grotewohl

kept his head down, conforming to the policies of the dominant leadership group under Walter Ulbricht. Hoffmann concludes that Grotewohl opposed even limited de-Stalinization because he had become an 'ardent admirer' of Stalin and the Soviet system (p. 661).

In domestic politics, Grotewohl played a part in 'constructing socialism' by introducing the Five Year Plan and the drive for heavy industry, which ultimately required Soviet financial support as well as imported coal to turn the wheels of the East German economy. In foreign affairs, he was willingly used as a vehicle with which to project Moscow's German policy on to West German politicians and the public—notably opposition to Adenauer's (and Schumacher's) integration with the West and rearmament within NATO—and to head East German delegations to the 'non-socialist abroad', including a series of state visits to the Middle and Near East in 1959. Here, too, Grotewohl had no role in formulating policy, as Ulbricht's authorship of the so-called 'Grotewohl Brief' (1950) symbolized so poignantly.

But Who Was Otto Grotewohl?

Hoffmann's mammoth monograph undoubtedly makes a welcome and weighty contribution to our knowledge about a significant figure in twentieth-century German politics, even if Grotewohl's significance is largely based on his role in the *Zwangsvereinigung* between SPD and KPD in 1946 and its consequences. The collection and collation of myriad documents from more than a dozen archives could only have been a Herculean feat of research. It is on these solid foundations that the author reconstructs the political life of his biographical subject in painstaking detail and, integrating a wealth of historiography, contextualizes Grotewohl within his various roles, not only in GDR history but in the wider history of twentieth-century Germany.

A traditional conceptual framework—not the various nods in the direction of cultural history methodologies (pp. 12–13)—informs a robust political biography. Yet some of the insights of more recent cultural history methodologies could have informed the reader much more explicitly about how Grotewohl made sense of his own life. Hoffmann is reluctant to leave the concrete, documented past chart-

ing Grotewohl's 'political function' in any foray into the more tentative realm of reading between the lines in order to discuss motivation. At various points we are informed that there is not a sufficient corpus of surviving materials from which to reconstruct this inner world. But the author's choice to abstain from more than the most limited 'speculation' leaves readers charting this psychological territory for themselves. This reviewer was left with a mental image of Grotewohl as a talented politician who had administrative and oratorical abilities and an affable manner with which to deliver his message; yet, in stark juxtaposition to his agreeable public face, there was a craven individual who could not resist the frills and status of high office, even when this was devoid of political substance. But how could a Social Democrat abandon his past so thoroughly, becoming a Stalinist who not only admired the eponymous dictator and the Soviet system, but made every effort to internalize the *Habitus* of the SED elite?

I found no answer to this. The author devotes only six full pages to explaining why Grotewohl decided to remain a Social Democrat in 1920 when the USPD Left opted to merge with the KPD and join the Third International on the Bolsheviks' terms. Unlike the party districts neighbouring Brunswick, the grass-roots membership as well as USPD politicians (20 out of 23 deputies in the regional Diet) and other functionaries voted against Moscow—and Grotewohl spoke out against 'foreign steering'. Yet Hoffmann's main explanation is political pragmatism (p. 73). It certainly served Grotewohl's career well. From the reunification of the Rump USPD and SPD in 1922 at the very latest, he was firmly integrated into the local party's parliamentary leadership and was soon to enter the Reichstag. I would not like to take as critical a stance as Gareth Prichard, who stated that Hoffmann had nothing new to say on Grotewohl on the crucial issue of his support for *Zwangsvereinigung* in 1946.[2] But to omit deeper reflection on what explains Grotewohl's rejection of communism in 1920 and Social Democracy in 1946 is a jarring silence.

If we are to see Grotewohl as more than an isolated exception to the Social Democratic rule of enmity towards communism and its spurious claim to represent a 'higher form of democracy', Hoffmann has missed another opportunity. In the opening pages of the volume,

[2] See his review in *German History*, 4 (2010), 392–3.

we discover that in 1930 Felix Riemkasten wrote a novel entitled *Der Bonze,* whose protagonist was based on Grotewohl.[3] This angle of interpretation could have been developed into a thematic reflection on the role of careerists in modern German politics in a strand of continuity running parallel to all the ruptures in modern German history. Unfortunately, we hear no more about Riemkasten's *Bonze*, yet this could have been a fascinating typology spanning the period and offering comparisons reflecting on the role of professional party officials across the party spectrum from Weimar through the Third Reich and into the GDR. In another enticing but undeveloped reference, we read of Grotewohl's retreat into 'private life' and the pursuit of high culture (classical music, German literature, and architecture) in the GDR and how this was similar to his response to the Third Reich. Yet this, too, could have been fertile ground for a cultural–historical comparison of the 'niche societies' in the 'two German dictatorships'.

Hoffmann's *Otto Grotewohl* is a commendable exercise in painstaking historical reconstruction and will serve specialist readers well. Yet I am left feeling that I still do not know Grotewohl, and cannot see beyond the image of a man who looked like 'a prosperous American', yet strangely sided with Stalin.

[3] The term is pejorative in German. It is often translated as a (political) 'bigwig', but also implies a careerist who has lost touch with his constituency.

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JANE CAPLAN and NIKOLAUS WACHSMANN (eds.), *Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories* (London: Routledge, 2010), xii + 243 pp. ISBN 978 0 415 42651 0 (paperback) £19.99

Concentration camps were a constant feature of the National Socialist dictatorship and, in the form of hundreds of satellite camps, were virtually everywhere in the Reich by the end of the war. In the immediate post-war period there was no lack of sources, yet the historical profession in Germany has long been reluctant to include them in their research on the Third Reich. Too sinister a topic, too little narrative to cover in the style of a great epic? Whatever the reasons, until the 1980s scholarly works on the Nazi camps were far and few between. The topic has only recently become popular and has, in fact, experienced something of a boom. In the first two decades after 1945 there seemed to be a dearth of solid information, but now the abundance of literature is bound to make orientation difficult. This book offers a way out of the dilemma by presenting concise surveys of a range of topics associated with the Nazi concentration camps by internationally renowned scholars from Britain, Germany, Israel, and the USA. Nikolaus Wachsmann provides a survey of the concentration camp system, Karin Orth describes the concentration camp personnel, Falk Pingel tackles the victims' perspective, and Karola Fings looks at the views of bystanders by examining opinions voiced by the general public and journalists in the Third Reich. Jane Caplan explores the aspect of gender and Jens-Christian Wagner focuses on the relationship between work and extermination in the camps. Dieter Pohl's article is concerned with the relationship between the genocide of the Jews and the camp system. Finally, Daniel Blatman covers the death marches, while Harold Marcuse writes about the multitude of uses to which concentration camp sites have been put since 1945, and the protracted processes by which memorials were created in East and West Germany, Austria, and Poland.

Collections of essays are often of variable quality, making life difficult for the reviewer. Should one emphasize the outstanding pieces while neglecting the lesser contributions, or criticize the negative examples without referring to the more appealing essays? In the case of this volume, the reviewer is happy to say that all the essays are of such outstanding quality that the only problem is to praise them all adequately.

Nikolaus Wachsmann provides a brief tour through twelve years of Nazi camps, covering the complicated developments in the world of the camps, and distinguishing them from other all too frequent forms of detention in the Third Reich. As he rightly notes, the concentration camp system underwent considerable changes throughout the twelve years of the Nazi dictatorship. The early makeshift sites of incarceration, mainly for political opponents, gradually became a huge network of main and satellite camps which, by the end of the war, held almost three-quarters of a million inmates from the whole of Europe, who were persecuted for political and social, religious and racial reasons. At the beginning hardly any women were imprisoned, but by 1945 about one-third of all inmates were women. Work was initially just a means of harassing the prisoners, while during the war the manpower available in the concentration camps became a factor in the SS's bid to become a major player in the economy of the Third Reich. From 1941 on, Jews were singled out for extermination and deported to camps outside the Reich for killing, but at the end of the war, huge numbers of Jewish concentration camp prisoners were taken back to camps in the Reich. How did perpetrators, victims, and bystanders adapt to these varying and contradictory circumstances? And how do historians explain these conflicting developments in the camp system?

Karin Orth's essay shows how SS guard personnel were recruited and describes the social strata from which the small group of commandants—SS officers heading the camps—were drawn. They often came from impoverished, middle-class families, had been unemployed during the early 1930s, and had been in contact with *völkisch* circles since the Weimar Republic. While a closer examination of the SS guards' social networks might be worthwhile, lack of sources will probably preclude further socio-statistical analysis.

Falk Pingel points to the limits of the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky's static model regarding concentration camps and undermines given 'truths' about the victims. It is generally assumed that prisoners' functionaries who were given privileges by the SS had a certain status in the unofficial inmates' hierarchy. However, this status was extremely fragile, as they might be stripped of their power when transferred to another camp. While survival was largely determined by nationality and allocation to a particular category (defined by Nazi criteria), the status of a camp inmate could change. For exam-

ple, compared to political prisoners, homosexual inmates had a high mortality rate in the 1930s. If, however, they survived long enough, they became streetwise 'veterans' who had a better chance of survival than the new political prisoners who entered the camps in the war years. Pingel also shows that more research needs to be done on the fate of children in the camps, and on evaluating the oral history sources of survivors' interviews.

The starting point of Jane Caplan's work is the fact that concentration camps are still associated with both male perpetrators and male victims. She questions her own approach by asking how important gender is when the camps were so obviously dominated by primarily racial aspects. And yet, when dealing with women's experience of the camps, new perspectives shed new light: women were often incarcerated for different reasons from men (such as 'illegal' sexual relations with Polish foreign workers); they struggled with similar, but also distinctly different problems from men. In the concentration camps (excluding extermination camps) women usually had a lower mortality rate than men, but it is still a matter of debate whether this was because of better work conditions (women were often given lighter assignments even if they also had to do back-breaking manual work), better living conditions in the camps (as women were reported to place more emphasis on cleanliness in billeting), or better social networks of women who relied on the help and solidarity of family and friends alike. Caplan also stresses the influence of gendered stereotypes in contemporary judgements about female guards. Often they were characterized much more harshly than men as their behaviour did not conform to the prevalent female stereotype.

The awareness of Germans concerning the atrocities is a contentious topic, as Karola Fings shows. No systematic analysis of contemporary press accounts is yet available, although several newspapers ran articles on the new camps in 1933, which gave them a certain amount of publicity. In the second half of the war, concentration camp inmates once again became visible because of their presence in industrial plants and the ubiquity of satellite camps. However, most Germans reacted with indifference. The longer the war lasted, the more the Germans became habituated to the plight of the prisoners, who were perceived as dehumanized. Municipal councils were much more concerned with the camps than previously known: they offered

help to the SS in the choice of location, supported construction, and provided services for the operation of the camps as they considered the SS an economic factor in the often remote communities with a flagging economic life.

The relationship between work and extermination is discussed by Jens-Christian Wagner. By 1942, the camps had become sites of both forced labour and genocide. The role of labour in the camps shifted from punishment to exploitation, from unproductive humiliation to a quest for economic profitability. Yet even while the demand for labour grew, genocide continued. All Jewish concentration camp prisoners in the Reich were transferred to extermination camps, while hundreds of thousands of European Jews were simply deported to these camps to be killed without ever becoming prisoners and entering the camp proper. The SS combined labour and extermination (in the programme 'annihilation through work') and categorized prisoners according to racial criteria. It is puzzling to note that prisoners from Western Europe often had higher mortality rates than Sinti and Roma, who were at the very bottom of the Nazi hierarchy.

The fate of the European Jews is often associated with the brutality of the camps. However, the majority of Jews were not murdered there, but fell victim to mass executions by the SS task forces. Those who did lose their lives in camps had often not been admitted as prisoners in the camp proper (for example, deported Jews in Auschwitz-Birkenau selected for death were not even registered at the camp). As Dieter Pohl rightly points out, before 1942 Jews formed a minority in the concentration camps (with the notable exception of the brief incarceration of almost 30,000 people arrested during the pogrom of 1938) as they were interned either in ghettos or improvised work camps outside the Reich. Only from 1943, when the majority of European Jewish victims had already been murdered, did Jews form a substantial group in the camps. Auschwitz then became the major extermination camp, but new—exclusively Jewish—camps also sprang up. By late 1944, one-third of the inmates in all concentration camps were Jewish.

Daniel Blatman covers the final phase of the camp system, characterized by the usually chaotic evacuation of prisoners by train or on foot. Little comprehensive research has been done on the death marches (which did not happen in all camps). While Daniel Goldhagen has argued that they were the final element in Nazi anti-

Semitism, Blatman points out that they affected Jews and non-Jews alike. Indeed, he suggests, during this terminal phase a sort of nihilistic 'twilight of the gods' atmosphere prevailed, encompassing the murder of all prisoners. Harold Marcuse identifies different uses and abuses of the sites of former camps in East and West Germany, Austria, and Poland in the aftermath of the Third Reich. First, in the immediate post-war era, they served a purpose in punitive pedagogy as the Allies forced the local people to march through the sites and look at the heaps of corpses and crematoria. Second, they housed survivors who were nursed at the site of their sufferings. Third, some were turned into internment camps and improvised courts where perpetrators were tried in judicial proceedings. Fourth, some sites were finally preserved and turned into memorials, while in other cases ignorance and neglect still reigns. Camps which were at the centre of media interest (such as Dachau, which had a proverbial notoriety even during the Third Reich and Buchenwald, which was the centre of an American media campaign after liberation) and thus had an established place in public awareness had a much better chance of becoming memorials than other former *Lager*. Memorialization also depended on survivors, which meant that those with *Lagergemeinschaften* of German political prisoners were in a better position than those which had held largely foreign inmates or racial persecutees (who, if they survived, were repatriated and could not fight on the spot for a memorial, or lobby and put pressure on local politicians and others to support commemoration). Curiously, what Volkhard Knigge once termed the simultaneous process of minimizing the historical remnants while maximizing the creation of meaning ('Minimierung der historischen Überreste und Maximierung der Sinnstiftung') applied to concentration camp sites in East and West Germany alike. In Flossenbürg, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald physical remnants (such as crematoria, barracks and huts, and prisons cells) were deliberately razed in the early post-war years, against the explicit wishes of survivors, in order to create 'aesthetic' places and monuments. Marcuse also comments on the difficulties of memorials recognizing and commemorating the suffering of certain groups of victims, such as homosexuals, Roma and Sinti, and Jehovah's Witnesses, who were also discriminated against in post-war Germany.

We have sixty-five years of published memoirs of survivors, Allied and German trials and investigations, numerous documen-

taries, and hundreds of monographs by historians—and yet the book also makes clear where further research is needed. It is not known, for example, why certain main camps commanded a whole network of outer camps, often numbering more than 100, while others, such as Bergen-Belsen, had only a handful of satellites. We still know very little about the admittedly short-lived and exclusively Jewish concentration camps of Riga-Kaiserwald (Latvia), Kauen/Kaunas (Lithuania), Vaivara (Estonia), and Warsaw, which evolved from ghettos or replaced them. We do not fully understand the transfer in the last months of the war of Jewish inmates who were deported from ghettos such as Lodz or from camps such as Vaivara to the sub-camps of Natzweiler in the south-west of Germany, or from Kaunas to the sub-camps of Dachau. We do not know why, at the approach of Allied troops in 1944, some camps were evacuated and their existence thus terminated, while Natzweiler and to some extent also Groß-Rosen developed mobile headquarters in 1945 (the commandant of Natzweiler briefly operated out of Dachau until he moved his headquarters to an inn; the commandant of Groß-Rosen moved into a satellite camp) and continued their existence via their sub-camps. Despite the Holocaust, Jews formed the largest group of inmates in some camps towards the end of the war. In Bavaria the number of Jews in Displaced Persons camps after the war exceeded by far the pre-war Bavarian-Jewish population.

In short, this book is an outstanding piece of work which is recommended to both newcomers in the field and scholars who have extensively researched the Nazi camps. It is general enough to make the subject accessible to a wide readership, yet detailed enough to attract the interest of specialists by covering a plethora of recent research literature. If the topic were not so grim, I would add that it is a sheer joy to read such concise, clear, and lucid articles by historians at the cutting edge of their profession.

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durch die deutsche Justiz in den westlichen Besatzungszonen 1945–1949 for publication. Her other publications include *Die Dachauer KZ-Außenkommandos Kaufering und Mühldorf* (1992); *Überlebende von Kaufering* (2008); and *Zwischen Krieg und Liebe: Der Dichter Jehuda Amichai* (2010).

ANTHONY GRENVILLE, *Jewish Refugees from Germany and Austria in Britain 1933–1970: Their Image in AJR Information* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2010), xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978 0 85303 842 9 £45.00 (hardback) ISBN 978 0 85303 852 8 £19.95 (paperback)

The prosaic numbers are known rather well. By the outbreak of the European war in September 1939, more than 74,000 Germans, Austrians, and German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia had fled their respective countries since Hitler's 'seizure of power' in 1933 and found shelter in Britain. Bewildered, stateless, and uprooted from the world of stable security, they were often barely able to communicate in the language of their host nation, and in many cases were without any means or support from relatives and friends. The refugees, like so many others who had fled to the United States, South America, Turkey, and elsewhere, had lost almost everything they cherished. However, they were united in their opposition to, and hatred of, the ruthless Nazi dictatorship and grateful to a society whose generosity had literally saved their lives. People from other European countries, mainly Jews, were soon to follow. Apart from the United States, Britain gave refuge to more of the oppressed and persecuted from Central Europe than any other single country in the world. Eventually, about 50,000 of them decided to stay on and settle in Britain permanently.

Modern scholarship, to all intents and purposes, discovered this extraordinary exodus of German-speaking refugees to Britain in 1988 after the publication of Marion Berghahn's pioneering study *Continental Britons*.[1] Thereafter, historians and social scientists in Britain, Germany, Austria, and the United States analysed and described practically every aspect of that emigration, more forced than not, whose revolting underlying causes had failed to stir and unite world opinion in protest. So, today, we have at our disposal a glittering array of studies that depict extensively not only one of the great human tragedies of the twentieth century, but also the hardships and deprivations countless individuals had to suffer. In their entirety, the published works make up an impressive memorial for posterity to celebrate the lives and achievements of a distinctive group of people who were among the earliest victims of totalitarian despotism.

[1] Marion Berghahn, *Continental Britons: German-Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany* (Oxford, 1988).

More than twenty years after Marion Berghahn's path-breaking survey, the Germanist Anthony Grenville, son of Jewish refugees from Vienna and former lecturer at various English universities, thought it was time to take stock in the light of recent research by recounting the life stories of his parents and their fellow-refugees. However, he ingeniously shifts the focus of his narrative away from the often-told story of the exodus, with all its dramatic particulars, to the long and, in many cases, rather arduous process of the refugees' assimilation and integration into their host society after arrival in Britain. Consequently, the emphasis of Grenville's book lies clearly on the years after 1939 and then, in particular, on the austere two decades after the end of hostilities in Europe. In the vast majority of cases, this process with its many facets was a success story. But Grenville does not deny the fact that there was also a tiny minority among the refugees who nurtured a resentment that Britain had admitted them grudgingly and that British society had hardly gone out of its way to make them feel welcome, and who therefore preserved a sense of alienation and marginality. Grenville concludes his intriguing account, somewhat arbitrarily, with a chapter on the former refugees' lives in Britain in the more affluent 1960s.

The welcome result of Grenville's endeavours is a comprehensive social history of the thousands of German-speaking Jews from Central Europe in Britain, spanning nearly four decades, lucidly structured, and written with both empathy and scholarly objectivity. As an introduction to this remarkable story, Grenville gives an outline of the Jewish exodus from Germany and Austria between 1933 and 1939, followed by chapters on the refugees' fate during the war, their situation as British citizens after 1945, and the relationship between the 'Continentals', established Anglo-Jewry, and their British neighbours. After that, and this is actually the book's core, there is a long chapter on the refugees' successful efforts to integrate into British society up to the mid 1950s. This is supplemented by the author's observations on the peculiar refugees' culture and pattern of settlement up to about 1970. In this context Grenville does not let slip the opportunity to discuss the fascinating issue of the refugees' sense of identity. While there was not the slightest doubt whatsoever that their loyalty belonged to King and host country, their answer to the tormenting as well as persistent question: who are we, the new arrivals in a foreign country? was, to say the least, ambivalent. Of

course, the overwhelming majority of refugees were eager to integrate socially and professionally by learning the language of their host country, by Anglicizing their names and celebrating afternoon tea. Nevertheless, they adamantly retained some of the familiar customs of their former lives—and, indeed, never got rid of them completely. Most refugees, moreover, re-established contacts and personal links with their countries of origin shortly after the end of the war, and even went there for holidays. However, only a handful decided to return permanently. With their sons and daughters, writes Grenville, that peculiar Central European social culture of their parents 'in subsequent decades was gradually but inevitably to dwindle and disappear from the areas of British life that the refugees had inhabited and enriched' (pp. 263–4).

Before this generational change, the former refugees had launched an unprecedented initiative. Fittingly, Grenville concludes his account by referring to the establishment of the 'Thank-You Britain' Fund in 1963, administered by the British Academy to the present day. Among the patrons of the Fund, designed to promote learning, were luminaries such as Lord Lionel Robbins, Sir Isaiah Berlin, and Professor Sir Ernest B. Chain and Professor Sir Hans Krebs, the two refugees from Nazism who had won Nobel Prizes by 1964. The original target of the Fund's organizing committee was to raise between £40,000 and £60,000. In the end, the contributions amounted to more than £96,000, or nearly one million pounds in today's money. It should be noted that some of the former refugees donated the 'restitution payments' which they had received from the West German and, rather belatedly, Austrian governments since the 1950s.

Grenville's main source for his appraisal of a crucial chapter in Anglo-German history in the twentieth century is the monthly journal *AJR Information*, founded in January 1946 by the Association of Jewish Refugees. Its articles, obituaries, letters to the editor, and personal and commercial advertisements offer a unique wealth of material, hitherto untapped, on issues that had concerned the refugees individually and collectively since their arrival in Britain. This unrivalled source on the refugees' lives is supplemented by autobiographies, memoirs, and interviews, thus creating a lively picture of a culturally and intellectually vibrant community which has now almost completely vanished as a distinctive group in British society.

Almost—because the London-based Association of Jewish Refugees, founded as early as 1941 to represent the interests of Jews from the German-speaking lands in Britain, is still a vigorous organization, an outstanding remnant of dark times. Several attempts over past years to drop the term 'Refugees' from its designation were stubbornly rejected. And when a witty correspondent of the *AJR Information* suggested adding at least *a.D.* (*außer Dienst* = retired) to 'Refugees', he could be sure of a laugh but not of much approval.

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PATRICK MAJOR, *Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), xiv + 321 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 924328 0. £60.00

The title and the cover of this book suggest to the casual observer that it is about the Berlin Wall. But if we open it and examine the Contents page, we find, somewhat to our surprise, that it devotes roughly equal space to the periods from 1945 to 1961 (Part I), and from the building of the Berlin Wall to its fall in 1989 (Part II). This is followed by a slightly shorter section on the time after the Wall (Part III). On reading the book, it quickly becomes clear that it is not a history of the Berlin Wall alone; the main subject is the German Democratic Republic's western border as a whole. The author wants to take a completely new look at this border. In his view, most of the existing literature, not least that written in German, runs the risk of no longer seeing the 'Wall for the bricks' (p. 7). He therefore rejects the 'top-down Cold War histories' (p. 11), offering instead 'an interlocking political, social and cultural history of the impact of the open frontier, followed by border closure, on the East German population at large—an everyday history of high politics, if that is not a contradiction in terms' (p. 10).

Patrick Major's approach is based on the work of the economist Albert O. Hirsch, who suggests that in an unsatisfactory situation, every member of an economic, political, or social entity has two basic options, namely, to leave the entity (exit), or to address the problem and complain (voice). The 'exit' strategy, he goes on, tends to result in the atrophying of 'voice', that is, a decline in the ability to address problems. If both options are suppressed, he claims, a collapse of the the entity is inevitable in the long term. Major undertakes no less than an investigation of the interdependent development of 'exit' and 'voice', and of how they limited the power of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) over the whole period of its rule.

How is it possible to reconstruct, in retrospect, the form and content of 'voice' for a dictatorship which had a monopoly of power and opinion? Major attempts this mainly by evaluating internal information about mood and opinions among the people generated by the apparatus, such as information put out by the Party, the Volkspolizei, and the Stasi as well as petitions submitted to the state or the SED and similar sources. Although he is not the first to do this, Major's is

the first systematic attempt to do this for the whole period and to concentrate on the border. Throughout his account, he always draws on the opinion of the *Volk* as it presents itself in the sources.

In a brief introductory chapter Major looks at the part played by walls in history, explains his methodology, and discusses the problems posed by the sources. This is followed by three chapters examining aspects of the time 'before the wall': the impact of the political and economic crisis; the different motives for leaving the country (*Republikflucht*); and the way in which the SED leadership dealt with the still open border, vacillating between repression and liberalization. According to the author, the East German people certainly found ways and means to make their voices heard, but suffered a largely ignorant leadership. Yet the people were in a position to blackmail the SED, as behind every complaint lay the implicit and often explicit threat of leaving for the West. The diplomatic and economic crises, he suggests, were only a symptom of a much deeper 'people's crisis'.

In the second part of the book, again in three chapters, the author analyses the people's immediate reactions to the building of the Berlin Wall and the state's initially strong repression of all protest before going on to describe how a new modus vivendi was sought between the party and the people. After abandoning its phase of economic reforms, the party had to pursue a strategy of social pacification ('Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik'), while the people again presented public agreement against the concession of private refuges. The difference between this and the modus that held until 13 August 1961, Major suggests, was that the promises of utopia to come were having less and less effect, while for the time being the people lacked the means of blackmail ('exit'). Instead, a dissident culture developed in parallel at all levels. In the next chapter, entitled 'Wanderlust', the author shows how the means for blackmail which had been lost were restored as a result of détente (better opportunities for travel and escape, applications to leave), and increasing use was made of them, especially in the last ten years of SED rule. Instead of the classless society which the SED had promised, the people noticed a new division in society, one between those who had increasing access to the West (relatives in the West, Western money, travel) and those without such 'privileges', who often turned out to be the people loyal to the party.

In Part III the reader first discovers how the interplay between 'exit' and 'voice', favoured by external factors, finally caused the system to collapse in 1989. In the last chapter, the author criticizes the way in which the Berlin Wall has been treated over the last twenty years, suggesting that it has been seen mainly from the point of view of the West, with the 'winners' in the West, largely misunderstood, face the 'losers' in the East. In the legal sphere, for example, he contends that 'many East Germans felt that they were being subjected to an arbitrary interpretation of West German law' (p. 265). It may be that 'many' of the 2 million former SED members saw it this way, but there is little evidence that this statement applies to all East Germans. Although the successor party to the SED is relatively strong in East Germany, three-quarters of the East German people have not voted for it in any of the elections held so far in unified Germany.

One of the merits of this book is that on the basis of many new sources, it systematically works out the significance of the border and travel issues for the mood of the German people and, ultimately, for the decline of SED rule. Earlier research largely concentrates on debating the relative significance of external (the end of the Brezhnev doctrine) and internal (the opposition and citizens' movement) factors in precipitating the collapse of SED rule. To these, Major claims to add a third, crucial factor. In his view, it would be wrong 'to see ordinary East Germans as all "free riders" on the coat-tails of the risk-takers', and to overlook their capacity for 'waging guerrilla campaigns which absorbed a great deal of state resources' (p. 293). Major certainly offers many arguments in support of his view. But must we really see the ordinary East Germans' notorious culture of moaning (*Meckerkultur*) as a serious attempt to defend 'their political and human rights' (p. 293)?

This study offers such a wealth of data, information, insights, and judgements that justice cannot adequately be done to them all here. The book will in any case stimulate the research discussion. Its arguments will probably also provoke dissent, for example, concerning the statistical relevance of the sources used. In addition, many of its insights are not as new—with reference to both the English- and German-language scholarly literature—as the impression created here may suggest. The expert reader is quickly fatigued by the illustrative listing which sometimes replaces an analytical assessment of popular opinion. And the recounting of historical events, such as the

second Berlin crisis and the process of building the Berlin Wall, is at times too detailed for an expert readership. In this context, it would have been interesting to ask to what extent popular opinion in the GDR merely reflected the speculation about possible future developments that was a daily feature of the offerings of Western print and broadcast media. After all, as the author acknowledges, almost 90 per cent of GDR citizens watched West German TV and listened to Western radio, not least to the BBC's German Service that broadcast out of West Berlin.

For the general reader, or someone who has limited knowledge of GDR history, however, the question addressed by this volume is too specialized. Moreover, important aspects of developments in East Germany, and the way in which the relationship between the people and the SED leadership evolved, are hardly mentioned, if at all. Examples are the forced merger of the German Communist Party (KPD) and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) to form the SED; the alignment (*Gleichschaltung*) of the Block Parties; the dirty tricks played against the Church and Christians; opposition and resistance in the 1950s, and so on. For some aspects, such as the role of strikes in the GDR, relevant studies already exist, but they are not mentioned. The reader could gain the impression that issues to do with travel, emigration, and escape were right at the top of the Communist leadership's agenda for forty years because of the permanent pressure emanating from the people. But, with the exception of the time immediately before the erection of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the wall, this is not how it was. The Berlin Wall was rarely the subject of consultations in the SED Politbüro. For the SED leadership the Berlin Wall was not a political, but a technical and military problem whose solution was left to the generals and the secret police. Until the collapse, the Politbüro had been 'building up socialism', and had hardly thought about the people's desire to travel. What there was in the way of 'menschliche Erleichterungen' was there because West Germany had paid for it.

In such a comprehensive account, errors are almost inevitable. I shall merely mention a few here as examples, making no claim to completeness: in the 1950s the Berlin underground (U-Bahn) was no longer run by BVG, which was based in the western part of the city but, like the whole city, was already split (p. 28); Ingrid Stoph (married name: Berger), who went to the West in 1984, was not the daugh-

ter but a niece of the GDR Minister President (p. 204); in 1983, when he arranged a billion deutschmark loan to the GDR, Franz Josef Strauss was not Federal Finance Minister, but the Minister President of Bavaria (p. 228). And it is at best misleading when Major writes: 'as part of the FRG's diplomatic Cold War, all East Germans were entitled to Federal citizenship' (p. 57). A Federal or West German citizenship never existed. There was only German citizenship, and every German could, of course, claim it, for in the legal understanding of the Federal Republic and the three Western powers, the German state had not been dissolved in 1945; the four powers had only temporarily taken over the reins of government in Germany. The German constitutive people (*Staatsvolk*) and German citizenship also continued to exist. German citizenship, even in the GDR, was defined by the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* of 1913. The GDR constitution of 1949, which remained in force until 1968 also, like the West German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), referred to 'unitary German citizenship' ('einheitliche deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit'). The GDR did not create its own citizenship until 1967, when it passed the *Gesetz über die Staatsbürgerschaft der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. But it spoke of citizenship, and not membership of a state. Thus the fact that every East German could readily get a West German passport had less to do with the Federal Republic's 'diplomatic Cold War' than with the legal situation, like so much else in the history of Germany's division. Therefore it is less surprising than it might seem when reading this book that for a long time, and for some people until the end of the GDR, the inhabitants of the SED state quite simply saw themselves as what they were: Germans.

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CONFERENCE REPORT

The Influence of Personal Relationships between Statesmen on the History of Politics (1815–1914), workshop held at the German Historical Institute London, 11–12 Oct. 2010.

Why the great interest in the history of emotions these days? And what place, to take up a crucial question of Ute Frevert's, do emotions have in history? The workshop 'Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Staatsmännern als Kategorie der Geschichte des Politischen (1815–1914)' discussed the usefulness and challenges of the history of emotions for accessing international relations between Britain and the Continent in the nineteenth century.

Within its Post-Doc programme focussing on 'History of the Political' the GHIL gives a scholarship-holder the opportunity to invite international scholars to a workshop. Andreas Gestrich (Director), Benedikt Stuchtey (Deputy Director), and the organizer, Heidi Mehrkens (Brunswick) welcomed both younger and more established scholars from Germany, Russia, Italy, Britain, and France to Bloomsbury Square.

The aim of the workshop was to concretize, by using specific examples, thoughts on how to deal methodologically with personal relationships as a category in writing the history of the political. In two sections the participants discussed papers on 'Personal Relations' und 'Political Networks', in each case from the perspective of the actors. Personal relations between statesmen were of a private nature. However, long-standing friendships, personal dislikes, and mentor or patronage relations also had the potential to affect political relations. Feelings thus became the motive or catalyst for specific decision-making. All the participants asked about the place of social interaction in the specific political setting of the nineteenth century, that is, how the 'private' became intertwined with the 'public'.

Birgit Aschmann (Kiel) introduced the first section with a paper on emotions as hidden factors in political history and presented the inclusion of emotions as a suitable means of analysing, amongst other things, power relations in history. She said that looking at the

relationship between emotions and politics was a trend in historical science, and was currently being applied on a large scale to the twentieth century. What is more, Aschmann said, cultural history offered a new perspective on the nineteenth century. Seen through the glasses of emotional history, the room for manoeuvre in the relationships between monarchs could be analysed and the social acceptability of demonstrated emotions and emotional political styles discerned. In any case, a careful contextualization of the political events, the people involved, and the social norms was needed in order to determine how important emotion was in relation to the political event.

Andrea Stahl (Wolfenbüttel) looked at the significance of common political values, experiences, and objectives in the 'Metternich generation'. Using the negotiations about Austria joining the Quadruple Alliance against Napoleon Bonaparte as an example, Stahl could show how sympathy and personal impressions in a face-to-face encounter between Metternich and Castlereagh influenced the political constellation at the Congress of Vienna. Mistrust and prejudice, previously dominant on both sides, gave way to growing trust. This initiated co-operation that was crucial for European politics and was based on common values, even though the two men had different political aims.

Volker Barth (Cologne) presented rulers and statesmen travelling incognito as something that peaked in the nineteenth century. This carefully worked out ceremonial, which was supposed to reduce the burden of state visits, clearly had a political function. According to Barth, the 'private' journey was staged for the public and opened up new opportunities for political action. The journey of the French Empress Eugénie to Queen Victoria in 1867 was an example of how the personal relationship between the dignitaries based on grief and empathy after Emperor Maximilian was hanged in Mexico became the object of public demonstration.

In the context of the Balkan Crisis, Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl Derby, had to resign as Disraeli's Foreign Secretary in spring 1878. Jennifer Helen Davey (Norwich) explained the background to the crisis, which was linked to Lady Derby's relationship with the Russian Ambassador Shuvalov. The accusation that in the course of an affair Lady Derby had divulged cabinet secrets to the Russian served as an instrument for Derby's political exclusion. In a broader sense, according to Davey, the incident demonstrated the unchal-

lenged male dominance of international High Politics and the strong position of the press as an instrument for politicizing supposedly 'private' matters.

A triumvirate from the field of the social sciences and international law was the focus of Christian Müller's (Münster) paper. Using the long friendship of the 'fathers' of the Institut de Droit International, John Westlake, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, and Tobias Michael Asser, as an example, Müller showed how the business of international congresses became more professional. Personal networks accompanied the establishment of these and other leading academics as political experts, but the objectives changed over time. According to Müller, the avant-garde with the oppositional agenda and international perspective had transformed, around 1900, into government experts, whose main interest was in the well-being of their own nation.

As moderator of the first section, Hans Henning Hahn (Oldenburg) drew some of the threads together. His commentary took up the gender aspect, often mentioned in the papers, since depending on the actors' gender contemporaries clearly attributed different functions to personal relationships. So the great challenge to historians, he said, was how to deal with constructions from the private and public spheres that had the potential to scandalize or instrumentalize emotionality.

The second section was introduced by Constance Bantman (Guildford, Surrey) with a keynote lecture that provided a new look at the elites dealt with so far. A specialist in the history of nineteenth-century international anarchist networks, she used the 'class change' to open the discussion on the politically organized Left. The concepts of political friendship dealt with so far were not, she said, confined to the Conservative side. She posed the question to what extent in the late nineteenth century modes of behaviour and interpretations of personal relations 'seeped through' to the politically organized Left from the elites.

Federigo Niglia (Rome) gave an example of the ability of political relations to adapt and change in a paper on the Italian diplomatic elite between 1870 and the First World War. Rooted in the political milieu of the *Risorgimento*, Niglia demonstrated the development of various alliances of the young national state with Austria, France, the German Reich, and Britain based on the personal connections of lead-

ing diplomats. He was able to show the enduring influence of German and French diplomatic models on Italian foreign policy after 1870 and, in addition, how the traditions of an originally Neapolitan or Piedmontese social milieu marked Italian diplomacy up to the First World War.

Vera Dubina (Moscow) talked about comradeship and the reorganization of patronage relationships amongst the Russian bureaucratic elite of the nineteenth century. She explained the great significance of patronage networks by the fact that they represented protection for personal status, value system, and, not least, career. Using the Imperial School of Justice in St Petersburg, one of the most renowned aristocratic boarding schools, as an example, Dubina demonstrated the self-perception of an elite bureaucratic society bound together by comradeship and patronage. After completing their studies, the students were assured of taking up important positions. Increasing professionalization of education thus did not, as Dubina stressed, lead to greater distancing from the infamous 'old system' of corruption.

Heidi Mehrkens (Brunswick) looked at the relevance of relations between politicians in unequal power relationships. During the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1870–1 the disempowered French Minister François Guizot had activated an old network of friendly politicians, amongst them British Prime Minister Gladstone. Ultimately, the attempt to persuade the island nation to intervene in the conflict failed. However, Guizot's activities in the wider space of what could be said, in which the politician out of office could still make his opinions known abroad, were actively used by Gladstone to direct British foreign policy away from the principle of non-intervention in Europe.

Moderator Sabine Freitag (Frankfurt) summed up the main points of the second section. In her commentary she stressed the motives of the historian who decides to look at events from the perspective of the history of emotions and asked, as did Birgit Aschmann in her introductory remarks, what the reasons were for the current peak in research on the history of emotions. She also pointed out the rediscovery of emotions by academics in the second half of the nineteenth century, which led to a similar boom.

The concluding discussion was moderated by Heidi Mehrkens. Various points had been raised regarding personal relations as a cat-

egory for writing the history of the political: the request was discussed that (self)statements about the perception of emotions should be more precisely located in their historical contexts and that spheres of study such as the public sphere and diplomacy should be separated. The meaning of the expressions used also needed to be precisely defined in the historical context. What did trust mean to an early nineteenth-century person in the context of treaty negotiations? On the conceptual level differentiation was suggested of terms such as comradeship, friendship, network, and beyond that a historical analysis of 'emotional' concepts in the diplomatic context (*friendship of nations, entente cordiale*).

One key feature of the papers and discussions was the question as to how the change in political style in the nineteenth century may have influenced personal relations between politicians. It is possible that the expansion of the political space to include new actors also presented new opportunities for forging personal relations and making use of them. It would be interesting for further research to take account in particular of the function of the Courts and Court societies. The speakers and experts attached great importance to common social values and codes of conduct, membership of a class or social stratum, and common religious affiliation in forging relationships within a changing political constellation which, despite all national perspectives, on the level of relations remained a genuinely European one.

HEIDI MEHRKENS (University of Brunswick)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year's postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised each year in September on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications may be sent in at any time, but allocations are made in April (deadline for applications 15 Mar.) for the current year and October (deadline 30 Sept.) for the following calendar year. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, together with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to the Director, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ.

During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the Institute's Research Seminar, and British scholars do the same on their return from Germany. In the second allocation for 2010 and first allocation for 2011 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Beate Althammer (Trier): Schwerpunktbereich 'Fürsorge und Solidarität'
Charlotte Backerra (Mainz): Beziehungen zwischen Großbritannien-Hannover und Österreich-Habsburg im frühen 18. Jahrhundert: Der Zweite Wiener Vertrag von 1731
Rachel Century (London): German Women Working for the Third Reich in Administrative Roles

Julia Crispin (Münster): Repräsentanten der englischen Krone als Förderer von Buchmalerei und Tafelwerken auf dem Kontinent (1399–1485)
Sarah Ehlers (Berlin): Europäisierung aus der Peripherie? Zur Kategorie des Europäers in den internationalen Schlafkrankheitskampagnen (1900–1945)
Ellinor Fried-Brosz (Giessen): Auf der Suche nach der 'Wiege der Menschheit': Die Diskussion des menschlichen Ursprungsortes in Wissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit seit dem 19. Jahrhundert
Stefanie Hakelberg (Jena): Die Transformation der britischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren
Matthias Oppermann (Potsdam): Die Kultur der Mäßigung: Der politische Mittelweg der englischen Liberal Tories und der französischen Doktrinäre (1789–1850)
Sarah Panter (Freiburg): Jüdische Solidarität oder nationale Loyalität? Die 'Ostjudenfrage' während des Ersten Weltkriegs im internationalen Vergleich (Deutschland, Österreich, Großbritannien, USA)
Benjamin Pohl (Bamberg): Anglo-Norman Self-Fashioning: The Writing of History and Cultural Memory in the Early Twelfth Century
Benjamin Schröder (Berlin): Kulturen des Wahlkampfs in Großbritannien und Deutschland (1918/19–1933/35)
Verena Steller (Frankfurt): *Imperial Justice*? Freihandel vor Gericht: Rechtfertigungsnarrative, Ordnungsbehauptungen und Gerechtigkeitserfahrungen in den britischen Kolonien des 19. Jahrhunderts
Phillip Wagner (Berlin): Die Internationale der Stadtplaner (1910– 1950)

Postgraduate Students' Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its fifteenth postgraduate students' conference on 13–14 Jan. 2011. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same or a similar field. The conference opened with warm words of welcome by the Deputy Director of the GHIL, Benedikt Stuchtey. Over the next one

and a half days, sixteen speakers from Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom introduced their projects to an interested and engaged audience. The first session, consisting of three papers, covered the early modern period. The remaining five sessions were mostly devoted to the nineteenth century, the First World War, the inter-war period, the Third Reich, and the post-1945 period. No paper was given on the Middle Ages. Participants gave a short summary of their work containing general ideas, leading questions, sources, and initial findings, and this was followed by discussion. A general discussion concluded the conference. Again it became clear that the palaeography course at the Warburg Institute, tutored by Dorothea McEwan, which had preceded the conference, was particularly well received. As Benedikt Stuchtey did not fail to point out, the German Historical Institute can offer students from the UK and Ireland support by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction which may be necessary for them to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases the German Historical Institute may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The German Historical Institute also provides scholarships for research in Germany (see above).

The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students' conference early in 2012. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, German Historical Institute, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, or by email: abellamy@ghil.ac.uk

Speakers at the 2011 Postgraduate Students' Conference

Tony Cowan (Liverpool): The German Army in the Battle of Arras and the Nivelle Offensive, April–June 1917: A Study in Command and Control
Sheona Davies (Manchester): Using Medieval History: The Teutonic Knights in the Weimar Republic and the 'Third Reich'
Andrea Fröhlich (Cambridge): Students from Upper Hungary at Universities in the Holy Roman Empire, 1520–1620: A Case Study of Schemnitz, Kremnitz and Neusohl
Max Haberich (Cambridge): Arthur Schnitzler and Jakob Wassermann: A Struggle of German-Jewish Identities

Rachel Hoffman (Cambridge): Political Murder Plots and the Making of Modern Germany
Jochen Hung (SAS, London): The Spirit of Kochstraße: The Role of Ullstein and Springer in the Reception of the Weimar Republic
Laura Kounine (Cambridge): The Gendering of Witchcraft in Early Modern Germany
Jamie Melrose (Bristol): How Did the *Revisionismusstreit* Form a Discursive Regime?
Mark Miller (Cambridge): Initial Reactions in the GDR to the 1969 Election of Willy Brandt
Patrick Milton (Cambridge): Intervention in Early Eighteenth-Century Central Europe
Jeff Porter (Birkbeck): 1945: British Plans and German Realities
Bernd Raeke (Plymouth): German-German Relations in the Fields of Sport and the Olympic Games 1952–1972
Anne Rosenbusch (NUI Maynooth): Neutrality in the Balance: Spanish-German Relations During the First World War, 1914–1918
Anna Ross (Cambridge): At the Revolution's End: Prussia and the European Transformation of Politics, 1848–1858
Andrew Tompkins (Oxford): After '68: Transnational Activism in France and West Germany, 1968–1981
Margit Wunsch (LSE, London): German Media Coverage in the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars of the 1990s

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British or Irish university), British history (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 euros. In 2010 the prize was awarded to Britta Schilling for 'Memory, Myth and Material Culture: Visions of Empire in Postcolonial Germany' submitted to the University of Oxford.

To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British, Irish or German university after 31 August 2010. To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract
- examiners' reports on the thesis
- a brief CV
- a declaration that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in the Institute's German-language series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision
- a supervisor's reference

to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by 30 June 2011. The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute's Annual Lecture (date to be confirmed).

For further information visit: www.ghil.ac.uk
Email: ghil@ghil.ac.uk Tel: 020 7309 2050

Forthcoming Conferences

The Dilemmas of International Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute and the Department of International History at the London School of Economics, to be held at the GHIL, 12–14 May 2011. Convener: Johannes Paulmann (Mannheim).

The conference investigates cross-border aid in a European and global frame from the end of the nineteenth century to our times. It focuses on the dilemmas, contradictions, and ambiguities of humanitarian commitment. In a historical perspective, humanitarian assistance covered a broad range of measures: emergency relief delivered to people struck by natural or man-made disasters; longer term efforts

to prevent suffering from famine, ill health or poverty; or schemes such as international adoption, specific campaigns against human rights abuses, and humanitarian intervention by armed forces. The respective role of donors and recipients will be assessed in the context of colonial rule, decolonization, economic dependency, international politics, and global governance. Non-governmental, governmental, religious, and secular organizations and individuals were active in the field. Efforts and agency were determined, to various degrees, by needs as well as by politics, organizational or personal interests, and moral issues.

The Crusades, Islam and Byzantium. Interdisciplinary workshop organized by the German Historical Institute, the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, the History Department of Royal Holloway, University of London, and the Institute of Historical Research, London, to be held at the GHIL and IHR, 8–9 July 2011. Conveners: Jochen Schenk (GHIL), Jonathan Phillips (RHUL), Jonathan Harris (RHUL), William Purkis (Birmingham).

This is a workshop aimed at those in the latter stages of their Ph.D., those engaged in post-doctoral research, or early career academics. It is intended to bring together people from across these three subject areas to generate scholarly contacts and to give an insight into the workings and approaches of scholars from different methodological and thematic fields; it will also provide participants with an opportunity to have their work analysed by contemporaries and a panel of distinguished commentators.

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the GHIL library in the past year.

Ahonen, Pertti, *Death at the Berlin Wall* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

Albert, Gert and Steffen Sigmund (eds.), *Soziologische Theorie kontrovers*, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 50 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2011)

Aly, Götz (ed.), *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945*, iv. *September 1939–Juli 1941*, ed. Klaus-Peter Friedrich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011)

Ammerer, Gerhard, Elke Schlenkrich, et al. (eds.), *Armut auf dem Lande: Mitteleuropa vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010)

Anders, Freia, Katrin Stoll, and Karsten Wilke (eds.), *Der Judenrat von Bialystok: Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Bialystoker Ghettos 1941–1943* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

Angelow, Jürgen, *Der Weg in die Urkatastrophe: Der Zerfall des alten Europa 1900–1914*, Deutsche Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, 2 (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2010)

Anton, Christine and Frank Pilipp (eds.), *Beyond Political Correctness: Remapping German Sensibilities in the Twenty-First Century*, German Monitor, 72 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010)

Arendt, Hannah, *Der Briefwechsel, Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem*, ed. Marie Luise Knott (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 2010)

Arndt, Johannes and Esther-Beate Körber (eds.), *Das Mediensystem im Alten Reich der Frühen Neuzeit (1600–1750)*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft 75: Abteilung für Universalgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010)

Asbach, Olaf and Peter Schröder (eds.), *War, the State, and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2010)

Bachmann, Ingeborg, *Kriegstagebuch: Mit Briefen von Jack Hamesh an Ingeborg Bachmann*, ed. Hans Höller (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010)

Bald, Detlef and Wolfram Wette (eds.), *Friedensinitiativen in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges 1945–1955*, Frieden und Krieg, 17 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2010)

Bannock, Graham and R. E. Baxter, *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of World Economic History Since 1750* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010)

Baranowski, Shelley, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

Barbian, Jan-Pieter, *Literaturpolitik im NS-Staat: Von der 'Gleichschaltung' bis zum Ruin* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2010)

Bauer, Joachim, Olaf Breidbach, and Hans-Werner Hahn (eds.), *Universität im Umbruch: Universität und Wissenschaft im Spannungsfeld der Gesellschaft um 1800*, Pallas Athene, 35 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010)

Becker, Jean-Jaques and Gerd Krumeich, *Der Große Krieg: Deutschland und Frankreich 1914–1918* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2010)

Becker, Ulrich, Hans Günter Hockerts, and Klaus Tenfelde (eds.), *Sozialstaat Deutschland: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 87 (Bonn: Dietz, 2010)

Bell, Peter, Dirk Suckow, and Gerhard Wolf (eds.), *Fremde in der Stadt. Ordnungen, Repräsentationen und soziale Praktiken: 13.–15. Jahrhundert*, Inklusion, Exklusion, 16 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2010)

Bennett, G. (ed.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Ser. 3 (1960–), vi. *Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990*, ed. Keith A. Hamilton, Patrick Salmon, and Stephen Twigge (London: Routledge, 2009)

Berghahn, Volker, *Industriegesellschaft und Kulturtransfer: Die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 182 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010)

Bergien, Rüdiger and Ralf Pröve (eds.), *Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre: Militärische Mobilisierung und gesellschaftliche Ordnung in der Neuzeit* (Göttingen: V & R unipress, 2010)

Bering, Dietz, *Die Epoche der Intellektuellen 1898–2001. Geburt, Begriff, Grabmal: Zur Erinnerung an Reinhart Koselleck* (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2010)

Bernecker, Walther L., *Geschichte Spaniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Beck, 2010)

Betts, Paul, *Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Beuys, Barbara, *Sophie Scholl: Biografie* (Munich: Hanser, 2010)

Biess, Frank and Robert G. Moeller (eds.), *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010)

Bispinck, Henrik, *Bildungsbürger in Demokratie und Diktatur: Lehrer an höheren Schulen in Mecklenburg 1918 bis 1961*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 79; Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011)

Bjork, Robert E. (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Black, Monica, *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany*, Publications of the German Historical Institute Washington, DC (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Blanning, Timothy C. W., *The Romantic Revolution* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010)

Blasius, Dirk, *Carl Schmitt und der 30. Januar 1933: Studien zu Carl Schmitt* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009)

Blickle, Peter, *Unruhen in der ständischen Gesellschaft 1300–1800*, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 1 (2nd expanded edn. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010)

Bliemeister, Andreas (ed.), *20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit: Wunsch oder Wirklichkeit* (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010)

Bloxham, Donald and A. Dirk Moses (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Bonney, Richard (ed.), *Confronting the Nazi War on Christianity: The Kulturkampf Newsletters, 1936–1939*, Studies in the History of Religious and Political Pluralism, 4 (Oxford: Lang, 2009)

Bosworth, Richard J. B. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Bothmer, Karl Freiherr von, *Moskauer Tagebuch 1918*, ed. Gernot Böhme and Winfried Baumgart (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

Brandes, Detlef, Holm Sundhaussen, and Stefan Troebst (eds.), *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010)

Brandt, Bettina, *Germania und ihre Söhne: Repräsentationen von Nation, Geschlecht und Politik in der Moderne*, Historische Semantik, 10 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010)

Bräuer, Helmut, *Kinderbettel und Bettelkinder Mitteleuropas zwischen 1500 und 1800: Beobachtungen, Thesen, Anregungen* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitäts-Verlag, 2010)

Brechenmacher, Thomas, *Die Bonner Republik: Politisches System und innere Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik*, Deutsche Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, 13 (Berlin: be.bra Verlag, 2010)

Brendle, Franz, *Das konfessionelle Zeitalter* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010)

Broadbent, Philip and Sabine Hake (eds.), *Berlin Divided City, 1945–1989*, Culture and Society in Germany, 6 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010)

Brockmann, Thomas, *Dynastie, Kaiseramt und Konfession: Politik und Ordnungsvorstellungen Ferdinands II. im Dreißigjährigen Krieg*, Quellen und Forschungen aus dem Gebiet der Geschichte, NS 25 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011)

Browning, Christopher R., *Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave-Labor Camp* (New York: Norton, 2010)

Bruce, Gary, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi*, The Oxford Oral History Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert*, Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Beck, 2010)

Brumlik, Micha and Karol Sauerland (eds.), *Umdeuten, verschweigen, erinnern: Die späte Aufarbeitung des Holocaust in Osteuropa*, Wissenschaftliche Reihe des Fritz-Bauer-Instituts, 18 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010)

Brunner, Detlev, *Stralsund: Eine Stadt im Systemwandel vom Ende des Kaiserreichs bis in die 1960er Jahre*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 80; Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010)

Buchstab, Günter, Hans-Otto Kleinmann, and Hanns Jürgen Küsters (eds.), *Die Ära Kohl im Gespräch: Eine Zwischenbilanz* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010)

Budde, Gunilla, Eckart Conze, and Cornelia Rauh (eds.), *Bürgertum nach dem bürgerlichen Zeitalter: Leitbilder und Praxis seit 1945*, Bürgertum, NS 10 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010)

Burleigh, Michael C. B., *Moral Combat: A History of World War II* (London: HarperPress, 2010)

Calic, Marie-Janine, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 2010)

Cameron, Euan, *Enchanted Europe: Superstition, Reason, and Religion 1250–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Caplan, Jane and Nikolaus Wachsmann (eds.), *Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories* (London: Routledge, 2010)

Carson, Cathryn, *Heisenberg in the Atomic Age: Science and the Public Sphere*, Publications of the German Historical Institute Washington, DC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Cesarani, David, Suzanne Bardgett, et al. (eds.), *Survivors of Nazi Persecution in Europe after the Second World War*, Landscapes After Battle, 1 (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010)

Chickering, Roger and Stig Förster (eds.), *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815*, Publications of the German Historical Institute Washington, DC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Clauss, Martin, *Kriegsniederlagen im Mittellalter: Darstellung, Deutung, Bewältigung*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 54 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

Cole, Laurence (ed.), *Glanz, Gewalt, Gehorsam: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie, 1800 bis 1918*, Frieden und Krieg, 18 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2011)

Conrad, Sebastian, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Conway, Martin and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

Conze, Eckart (ed.), *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (3rd edn. Munich: Blessing, 2010)

Conze, Eckart (ed.), *Die Herausforderung des Globalen in der Ära Adenauer*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 24 (Bonn: Bouvier, 2010)

Cook, Michael (ed.), *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, i. *The Formation of the Islamic World: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries*, ed. Chase F. Robinson; ii. *The Western Islamic World: Eleventh to Eighteenth Cen-*

turies, ed. Maribel Fierro; iii. *The Eastern Islamic World: Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid; iv. *Islamic Cultures and Societies to the End of the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Robert Irwin; v. *The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance*, ed. Francis Robinson; vi. *Muslims and Modernity: Culture and Society since 1800*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Cornelißen, Christoph (ed.), *Geschichtswissenschaft im Geist der Demokratie: Wolfgang J. Mommsen und seine Generation* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010)

Coy, Jason Philip, Benjamin Marschke, and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire Reconsidered*, Spektrum, 1 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010)

Davidson, Martin, *The Perfect Nazi: Uncovering my Grandfather's Secret Past and How Hitler Seduced a Generation* (London: Viking, 2010)

Demel, Walter (ed.), *WBG Weltgeschichte*, vols. 5 and 6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010)

Denzel, Markus A., Jan de Vries, and Philipp Robinson Rössner (eds.), *Small is Beautiful? Interlopers and Smaller Trading Nations in the Pre-Industrial Period: Proceedings of the XVth World Economic History Congress in Utrecht 2009*, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 213 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2011)

Dinzelbacher, Peter (ed.), *Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte im deutschsprachigen Raum*, i. *Altertum und Frühmittelalter* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011)

Donson, Andrew, *Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914–1918*, Harvard Historical Studies, 169 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010)

Drews, Arne G. (ed.), *Der lange Abschied: Das Ende des Königreichs Hannover 1866 und die Folgen*, exhibition catalogue (Göttingen: MatrixMedia Verlag, 2009)

Dülffer, Jost and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), *Frieden durch Demokratie? Genese, Wirkung und Kritik eines Deutungsmusters*, Frieden und Krieg, 15 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2011)

Echternkamp, Jörg (ed.), *Perspektiven der Militärgeschichte: Raum, Gewalt und Repräsentation in historischer Forschung und Bildung*, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 67 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010)

Ehrmann-Herfort, Sabine and Michael Matheus (eds.), *Von der Geheimhaltung zur internationalen und interdisziplinären Forschung: Die*

Musikgeschichtliche Abteilung des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom 1960–2010, Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 123 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010)

Externbrink, Sven (ed.), *Der Siebenjährige Krieg (1756-1763): Ein europäischer Weltkrieg im Zeitalter der Aufklärung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011)

Fahlbusch, Michael and Ingo Haar (eds.), *Völkische Wissenschaften und Politikberatung im 20. Jahrhundert: Expertise und 'Neuordnung' Europas* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

Feiner, Shmuel, *Moses Mendelssohn: Sage of Modernity*, trans. Anthony Berris (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)

Feinstein, Margarete Myers, *Holocaust Survivors in Postwar Germany, 1945–1957* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

Ferguson, Niall, *High Financier: The Lives and Time of Siegmund Warburg* (London: Allen Lane, 2010)

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

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

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