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ARTICLES

THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF LEHNSWESEN

SUSAN REYNOLDS

In 2010 Jürgen Dendorfer and Roman Deutinger edited a collection of essays in response to an attack on the concept of feudalism that I had published sixteen years before.[1] I was much encouraged by their interest and learned a lot from their book about the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, specially but not only in Germany, even if it did not quite address my problem about the content and coherence of the actual concept of *Lehnswesen,* either to reject or support my argument. What I had argued was that the words *Lehnswesen, féodalité, feudalità*, or 'feudalism' do not represent a coherent category of phenomena in medieval law, politics, and society. Most non-Marxist historians of medieval Germany, like those of the rest of medieval Europe use these words as if their meaning is too obvious to need justification or definition. This may not be surprising since, leaving aside F. L. Ganshof's deliberately narrow, technical, and legal treatment of the subject in *Qu'est-ce que la féodalité?,* Max Weber and Marc Bloch, both undeniable masters, gave very similar lists of the characteristics of what they respectively called *Lehnswesen* and *féodalité.* Both mentioned what Weber called the contractual nature of fiefs as the characteristic form of feudal property and also the purely interpersonal character of vassalage as the main social bond of society. The six components of both lists, however, occur in different sources from different dates and areas, too variously distributed to form a single pack-

This article is adapted from a lecture delivered at the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung at the University of Vienna in April 2017. I am very grateful to the Institut for having me and to Professor Dr Brigitte Kasten for all her help and encouragement with the subject since 1994.

[1] Jürgen Dendorfer and Roman Deutinger (eds.), *Das Lehnswesen im Hochmittelalter* (Ostfildern, 2010); Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1994).

age, let alone anything like Weber's own idea of an Ideal Type.[2] This objection does not apply to Marxist feudalism, which is relatively simple and well attested: there was surely an inherent conflict between the interests of landlords and peasants, which was exacerbated by the landlords' superior position in government.

The incoherence of non-Marxist *Lehnswesen*, on the other hand, raises serious problems. They may not seem so obvious if one concentrates, as most European medievalists do, on the history of the modern state one belongs to and on just one part of the thousand years of medieval history, but they make it hard to fit together the different aspects of the single phenomenon they assume. Two items in both lists raise questions which explain the title of my book and my concentration on what medieval historians call vassalage and fiefs/*Lehen*. The first is the supposedly close interpersonal relationship between lords and those whom historians call their vassals. This seems to be attested chiefly in reports of rituals which may not have always taken place or have represented very real interpersonal emotions and commitments, specially when a king or other lord had many vassals whom he seldom, if ever, saw. The second item, fiefs, are seen as the standard form of property of nobles and free men, which were 'conditional property', with less complete rights and more obligations than are normally attached to property in capitalist societies today. This comparison, however, seems to be based on very little analysis of property rights and obligations in real practice either in the middle ages or now. All property in any society is conditional in so far as its rights and obligations are subject to judgement: claims can only become rights in any society, whether in land or anything else, if they are acknowledged by some sort of authoritative judgement.

There are also serious problems about words. We must each use our own, in our own various languages, but we need to think whether either similar or different words that we find in our sources were always understood in the same way by different people, or

[2] Ganshof's definition and the two lists are set out in Susan Reynolds, 'The Use of Feudalism in Comparative History', in Benjamin Z. Kedar (ed.), *Explorations in Comparative History* (Jerusalem, 2009), 191–217, repr. in Susan Reynolds, *The Middle Ages without Feudalism: Essays in Criticism and Comparison on the Medieval West* (Farnham, 2012).

referred to the same phenomena, in different contexts and times. The relationship between words, concepts, or notions, and the actual phenomena to which they seem to refer is vital to my argument, and I shall return to it later.

The Origin and Development of the Idea of Lehnswesen

In order to make sense of the concept of feudalism or *Lehnswesen* and its meaning in the social and political history of the European middle ages, we need to start by thinking about the way that it first appeared and developed its vocabulary. It seems to have started from discussions among academic lawyers in sixteenth-century France about the authority of Roman law in France and whether the noble properties that they called fiefs had derived from Frankish or Roman law. The arguments were not based on the records of French law as it had been practised in early medieval France, but from the academic law in which the more ambitious lawyers of the later middle ages had been trained. This derived from a twelfth-century legal compilation now known as the *Consuetudines Feudorum* or *Libri Feudorum*.[3] The second title seems preferable since the work is clearly not a statement of custom. It looks more like the product of discussions among the new kind of academic and professional lawyers who had appeared in north Italy by 1100. It starts, after listing those who can give a *feudum*, with a short passage of conjectural history—that is, history invented to make sense of the present and explain it—about the origin of *feuda*. However slight and unsupported by evidence, this must rank as the first, as well as most influential, item in the historiography of feudalism, *féodalité, Lehnrecht, Lehnswesen*—and Marxist *Feudalismus* too. According to the author of this part of the *Libri, feuda* were first granted to be held at the lord's will, then for life, and only later became hereditary.

To make sense of the *Libri Feudorum*, however, we need to go even further back: to a diploma about the holding by laymen of ecclesiastical and royal property that the emperor Conrad II issued in 1037

[3] Karl Lehmann (ed.), *Consuetudines Feudorum, Compilatio Antiqua* (Göttingen, 1892), 8, repr. with *Das Langobardische Lehnrecht* (Göttingen, 1896) as Karl August Eckhardt (ed.), *Consuetudines Feudorum* (Aalen, 1971).

while he was besieging Milan.[4] Conrad cannot have known that he was creating a new sort of law that would come to be called feudal law/*Lehnrecht.* He simply intended to deal with trouble that had broken out between the archbishop of Milan and the laymen who held lands belonging to his church. Common as were disputes like this between great churches and those to whom they granted land in return for the protection and service that armed laymen could provide, Conrad's diploma started something new because he made his judgement in Lombardy, where it was formally recorded just at the time when the new kind of academic and professional law was emerging there. It gave the new kind of academic lawyers a basis for argument about the disputes that continued to arise between churches and their lay tenants.

Historians often call Conrad's diploma his *Lehngesetz,* but the word *feudum* is not used in it, though *beneficium* is—probably in the sense of favour rather than as the synonym for *feudum* that would be used later by German lawyers. Nor is the word vassal used. The diploma refers to those whose rights it was defending against their lords as *milites* and *maiores vasvassores.* This last word does not seem as yet to have had the sense of 'vassal of a vassal' that was later attributed to it. When *vavassores* were referred to elsewhere at about this time they seem to have been people of moderate status, above the ordinary *milites*, and that may be what Conrad or his advisers intended.[5] The diploma protected the archbishop's tenants against arbitrary confiscation by subjecting it to the judgement of their equals (*pares*) and added that this should also apply to the tenants of all royal or church land under Conrad's authority. That merely gave them a right that belonged by custom to freemen in general:[6] Conrad seems therefore to have meant his judgement to confirm to tenants of royal and

[4] H. Bresslau (ed.), *Die Urkunden Konrads* (Mon. Ger. Hist., 1909), no. 244; on which see Hagen Keller, 'Das Edictum de Beneficiis Konrads II und die Entwicklung des Lehnswesen in der ersten Hälfte des 11. Jahrhunderts', *Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto Medioevo*, 47/1 (2000), 227–57.

[5] Timothy Reuter, 'Valvassor', in Adalbert Erler and Ekkehard Kaufmann (eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1984–90), v. 643.

[6] E.g. Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300* (2nd edn. Oxford, 1997), 23–38.

church land the same security as freemen had in their own land. His diploma did not introduce any new principle or 'feudal privilege'. How far the diploma was known in the kingdom of Germany before the mid twelfth century seems uncertain.

During the twelfth century more texts became attached to the original compilation of the *Libri Feudorum* and the whole compilation then became attached to the texts of Roman law studied in universities in Italy and southern France that ambitious young lawyers, including Germans, might attend.[7] Some students may have done no more than attend one or two lectures on it, if that, but using its vocabulary suggested the sort of expertise that might impress a court of law. Along with the words *feudum*, which was in Conrad's diploma, and *vassallus*, which was not but crept into later versions, lawyers started to use other bits of technical legal vocabulary like *dominium directum* and *dominium utile*. They could show it off in any secular court since, I suggest, separate systems of law with separate courts did not as yet exist except for canon law. There were no regular and separate 'feudal courts' in France any more than there were, I suspect, in the kingdom of Germany.[8] Disputes about fiefs came to the court of whatever person or community had some level of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the area in which the land lay. The law applied differed, I suggest, because higher courts with more professional lawyers adopted the vocabulary and rules of Roman law and the *Lehnrecht* attached to it, not because lords' courts were 'feudal' courts which therefore used 'feudal' law.

When the French academic lawyers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who started the historical study of *Lehnrecht* were concerned about the authority of Roman law in France, the origin of fiefs in Roman or Frankish law, and the rights of nobles in their fiefs, they picked up those few sentences of conjectural history from the opening of the *Libri Feudorum* and accepted them as authoritative. Then from the seventeenth century French historians integrated what came to be

[7] Helmut Coing, *Römisches Recht in Deutschland* (*Ius Romanum Medii Aevi,* 5/6) (Milan, 1964), and 'L'Application des "Libri Feudorum"', in *Diritto Commune e Diritto Locali della Storia dell'Europa* (Milan, 1980), 15–23; Gerhard Dilcher, 'Das lombardische Lehnrecht der Libri Feudorum im Europäischen Kontext', in Karl-Heinz Spieß (ed.), *Ausbildung und Verbreitung des Lehnswesens im Reich und in Italien im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2013), 41–91.

[8] Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 454.

called *féodalité* into the history of France itself, to show how the rise of their monarchy ended 'feudal anarchy.' In France ever since then the stages by which fiefs became hereditary have continued to figure in discussions of the earlier middle ages, while the whole subject of feudal history has generally continued to be focused on the nobility. In the late eighteenth century the story was enriched—or confused—by the study of the medieval *chansons de geste*. There the vernacular word *vassal* had been used to mean a warrior or valiant man, with no implications of landholding or relationship to a particular lord.[9] Assimilating the landowners whom lawyers had since the later middle ages been calling *vassalli* to the knights of chivalric literature gave vassalage a new aura of romance. Paradoxically, *les droits féodaux* that were abolished in the Revolution just at this time were not about relationships between lords and their noble vassals at all, but about the rights of landowners over their peasant tenants.[10]

Scholars in seventeenth-century England took up the subject from the French and tried to apply the laws and words of French feudal law to medieval England, with its entirely different legal system and vocabulary. They focused on the difference between what one of them called the right of property, which they thought 'inherent in every Englishman' in their own day, and what they called the mere 'tenure' of medieval 'fees', which they thought dated from 1066.[11] From the twelfth century virtually all jurisdiction in England both over free land and over serious crimes was reserved to the king. The lord of what historians call a vassal thus became merely the person from whom he or she acquired land and the English 'feudal hierarchy' became a hierarchy of property rights, or what English histori-

[9] T. Venckeleer, 'Faut-il traduire vassal par vassal?', in *Mélanges de linguistique, de offerts à J. R. Smeets* (photog. typescript, Leiden, 1982), 303–16; Lionel Gossman, *Medievalism and the Ideologies of the Enlightenment* (Baltimore, 1968), 273–84.

[10] On the need to distinguish these see Dominique Barthélemy, *L'Ordre seigneuriale: XIe–XIIe Siècle* (Paris, 1990), 1–12, and 'Seigneurie', in *Dictionnaire Raisonné de l'Occident médiéval* (Paris, 1999); Susan Reynolds, 'The Historiography of Feudalism in France', in Osamu Kano and Jean-Loup Lemaitre (eds.), *Entre Texte et Histoire: Études d'Histoire médievale offertes au Professeur Shoichi Sato* (Paris, 2015), 293–308.

[11] Susan Reynolds, 'Tenure and Property in Medieval England', *Historical Research,* 88 (2015), 563–76.

ans call 'tenure', rather than the hierarchy of jurisdiction that it was in France and Germany. As for vassalage, historians of England are as sure of its importance as are historians in France, even though the word is almost never in their sources. Bloch in France and Maitland in England defined a feudal society as one in which the characteristic or main bond was the relation between a man and his immediate lord (*un chef tout proche*).[12] Great historians though they both were, any suggestion that medieval society could be considered feudal in this sense ignores the vast evidence of the collective element in medieval society and government.[13]

The difference between the historiographies of feudalism in France and England may help to explain how the story of what is supposed to have been a Europe-wide phenomenon seems to be different again in the kingdom of Germany. Lawyers and historians in each country who took up the idea of feudal law and then broadened it to feudal government and society seem to have adapted it to suit both their evidence and the preoccupations of the law and politics of their own time. That applies to the kingdom of Germany as much as to France and England, though I must point out that I know even less about Germany after the middle ages, when the texts that I have read were written, than I know about medieval Germany. My suggestions may nevertheless spur someone on to correct them, which would advance at least my knowledge.

Lehnswesen *before the Nineteenth Century*

The first German writing about the history of feudal law/*Lehnrecht* that I have read comes, like the first French, from the sixteenth century. Ulrich Zäsy (Zasius), who died in 1535, explained how the *Usus Feudorum* set out in the *Libri Feudorum*, though unknown to civil law and separate from it, had come to Gaul and Germania from the Romans. It was, he said, useful and necessary even though it had become complicated by *doctores feudistae*, and though Germans had

[12] Marc Bloch, *La Société Féodale*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939–40), ii. 247; Frederick William Maitland, *Constitutional History of England* (Cambridge, 1946), 141, though cf. Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland, *History of English Law*, 2 vols. (2nd edn. Cambridge, 1911), ii. 234.

[13] Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities.*

always been too naturally free to have had true *servi*.[14] According to Johannes Schneidewein, writing a little later, the *Libri Feudorum* was originally a private work, but had secured public authority not only by imperial decisions, but by having been edited by doctors of Bologna on the order of the emperor, Frederick the Younger (*Friderici Iunioris*).[15] Having 'public' authority did not, of course, mean being what is now called 'public law'. Legal historians have sometimes read the distinction between public and private law back into the middle ages, but it apparently only began to be made in German law from the end of the fifteenth century and did not become reasonably clear until the early nineteenth.[16]

In the seventeenth century, German scholars, including lawyers, like those of France and England, became increasingly interested in wider constitutional and social history. Nearly all, like European historians ever since, were primarily interested in the history of their own 'peoples' or 'nations'.[17] In the middle ages most people probably took it for granted that their nation formed a kingdom. For Germans things were less simple. At one level they knew that they were all Germans, living in an empire that had gloriously succeeded to that of Rome and was ruled by an emperor who had precedence over all the mere kings of Europe. But they also believed in their own separate peoples or nations within the greater German nation. Writing probably in the early 1640s, Hermann Conring, who has been

[14] Udalricus Zasius, *Opera Omnia*, 7 vols. (Lyon, 1550; repr. Aalen, 1964–6), i. cols. 444, 973; ii. col. 267; iv. (1) cols. 243–7, 253, 257, 276, 326–7; Steven Rowan, *Ulrich Zasius* (Frankfurt, 1987), 6–10.

[15] This suggests Frederick II, but it should surely be Frederick I: J. Schneidewein, *In Usus Feudorum Epitome* (Hanover, 1595), 14. I am very grateful to the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich, for supplying the text online and to the Institute of Historical Research, London, for getting it and even printing it out for me.

[16] Lucien Hölscher, 'Öffentlichkeit', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–97), iv. 427–30; Brigitte Kasten, 'À propos de la dichotomie entre privé et public dans les testaments des rois francs', in François Bougard et al. (eds.), *Sauver son âme et se perpetuer* (Rome, 2005), 159–201.

[17] Susan Reynolds, 'Nations, Tribes, Peoples, and States', *Medieval Worlds,* 2 (2015), 79–89, online at <http://medievalworlds.net/medieval_worlds>, accessed 23 June 2017.

called the founder of German legal history, accepted that the common laws of Germany in his own day were undoubtedly Roman, but pointed out that all its provinces nevertheless had their own laws and *feudalia instituta*, with those of the Saxons and Swabians particularly well recorded. He cited different opinions of scholars in putting the introduction of the Lombard feudal laws (that is, those derived from the *Libri Feudorum)* in the thirteenth or fifteenth century.[18] It now seems likely that knowledge of it, or at least its vocabulary, had been spreading gradually among professionals since the twelfth century, but whenever it came, adoption of the vocabulary and some of its rituals helped to explain and justify the relation of emperor to princes and princes to their subjects.

During the eighteenth century some German scholars quickly took up the new Scottish and French idea of stages of human history, starting with hunting and fishing, and then an agricultural or feudal stage, which was now generally thought of as past. This posed a problem for German scholars: feudal law was apparently still in force in Germany although, as Johann Justi said, it no longer fitted society and was in ruins. By his time, however, the turning of fiefs into allods, and then the spread of codification, were beginning to consign *Lehnrecht* to that past age in which Justi thought it had fitted society.[19] In Prussia its relics were by 1781 being cared for in a much more modern way in the *Lehnsdepartement* of the Ministry of Justice.[20] Other lawyers, of course, still wrote about the history of *Lehnrecht* as if nothing had changed, perhaps regarding learning about it as good discipline for law students. The word *Lehnswesen* is generally used now to represent a broader view of society and politics than just law, but the first use of it on which I have happened came in F. A. Sorgen's *Chronologie des teutschen Lehnwesens mit anmerkungen und beilagen* of 1764. He thought that the *Lehnrecht* of his own day came out of the oldest German customs, but his chronology simply lists emperors and bits of their legislation. He mentions Conrad II, but not 1037, and

[18] Hermann Conring, *Opera,* 6 vols. (Brunswick, 1730), vi. 77–164 (*De Origine Juris Germanici*, at 77, 167–73); Alberto Jori, *Hermann Conring (1606–1681): Der Begründer der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 2006).

[19] Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, *Die Natur und das Wesen der Staaten* (Berlin, 1760), 8, 269–70, 480–8.

[20] Carl Gottlieb Svarez, *Vorträge über Recht und Staat*, ed. Hermann Conrad and Gerd Kleinheyer (Cologne, 1957), 340, 345, 347.

Frederick I's contact with *die Rechtsgelehrten in Welschland*, but not the Roncaglia legislation of 1258 or trial of Henry the Lion.[21] Meanwhile, however, ever since Johann Schilter (d. 1705) had published an early text of Salic law, other lawyers had been learning much more about the middle ages. Theodor Hagemann, writing in the 1780s, thought that in Germany and Italy from the twelfth century the *Feudalsystem* replaced the earlier *Beneficialsystem,* but he had clearly read much on medieval history about more than German feudal law.[22] The new flexibility of ideas—and language—about it all was shown by Hegel's treatment in his stages of history of what he variously called *Feudalwesen, Feudalität*, or *Feudalverfassung*,[23] and then by Marx when he made the motor of change stages economic. Since Marxist feudalism really shares nothing but its name with the non-Marxist version, however, it falls outside the scope of this article.[24] The confusing use of the same word may explain how fief-holding and vassalage have even crept into some orthodox Marxist writing.[25]

K. F. Eichhorn, who wrote early in the nineteenth century, has been called the father of German legal history,[26] but if he was, Conring must have been its grandfather and have had a number of sons, like Schilter and Hagemann, born well before him.[27] The way that the German historiography of *Lehnrecht* started so firmly in law, including both what would now be distinguished as public and as private law, explains how it has remained more sober and better based on evidence of medieval practice than much that has been has been written in French and English.[28] There the tendency to stress

[21] Friedrich Adolf Sorgen, *Chronologie des teutschen Lehnwesens mit anmerkungen und beilagen* (Frankfurt, 1764), 3, 11–14.

[22] Theodor Hagemann, *Einleitung in des gemeine in Teutschland übliche Lehnrecht* (2nd. edn. Hanover, 1792).

[23] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte: Die germanische Welt*, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg, 1923), 805–18.

[24] Eckhard Müller-Mertens, 'Zur Feudalentwicklung im Okzident und zur Definition des Feudalverhältnisses', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 14 (1966), 52–73.

[25] Reynolds, 'The Use of Feudalism', 213.

[26] *Neue deutsche Biographie*, 4 (1957), 120, 266, 378–9.

[27] Hagemann, *Einleitung,* 91, 111–76, cites many works, esp. from the eighteenth century.

[28] Jürgen Dendorfer, 'Zur Einleitung', in id. and Deutinger (eds.), *Das*

and romanticize vassalage as a close interpersonal relationship—even the strongest bond of medieval society—seems to me to ignore not only the bonds of kinship and neighbourhood but the collective character and solidarities of medieval society and government.[29]

The Nineteenth Century

Much as Hagemann and others had already achieved, a splendid new age of German medieval historiography opened with the foundation of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* in 1819. Then the controversy between Roth and Waitz in the middle of the century both exemplified and encouraged the new critical use of legal sources, and the light they shed on society and government.[30] What made this so important for the history of *Lehnswesen*—and of European historical scholarship in general—was the fact that their arguments were firmly focused on the reading and interpretation of a wide range of early medieval documents. This was, I think, the first time that any European historians had thought so hard about what their documentary sources implied about society and politics. A new age of professional and, above all, critical historical research was emerging, as well as a new sort of study of *Lehnrecht.* Both Roth and Waitz started from law but Waitz's fifty years working on the *Monumenta*, the last nine at its head, gave him a wider view of the earlier middle ages than anyone had yet had. He reflected some of the French ideas when he referred to the interpersonal relationships of vassalage but, though he stressed homage and fidelity, he never (I think) suggested that the relation between lord and vassal replaced collective bonds in medieval societies. The range of sources he cited to trace the use of

Lehnswesen, 19–21; Roman Deutinger, 'Das hochmittelalterliche Lehnswesen', ibid. 471–3, though note the romantic conservatism of Adam Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1809), ii. 93–4.

[29] Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities, passim.*

[30] Paul Roth, *Geschichte der Beneficialwesens* (Erlangen, 1850); id., *Feudalität und Untertanverband* (Weimar, 1863); Georg Waitz, *Abhandlungen zur Deutschen Verfassungs- und Rechtsgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1896); id., 'Lehnwesen', in J. C. Bluntschi and K. Brater (eds.), *Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch* (Stuttgart, 1857–74), vi. 357–67; Georg Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte* (2nd and 3rd edns. Berlin, 1880–93).

words for *Lehen* and *Vasall* through to the mid twelfth century was enormous.[31] He started, of course, from the assumptions of his time about the consistent and technical use of words in the earlier middle ages that could, I suggest, only have come later, with professional law and record-keeping.

In the next generation another stage in the construction of modern ideas about non-Marxist feudalism came with Brunner's proposal that 'vassals' first did their military service as cavalry in Charles Martel's victory over Arab invaders at the battle of Poitiers.[32] Whether this turned out to be probable is perhaps less important than the impetus that it gave to the study not only of German *Lehnrecht*, but of feudalism in general. For French historians cavalry suggested something like nobility and, since Poitiers is in France, it was the Franks of France who saved Europe from the Moslem invaders. For the English the mounted soldiers at Poitiers evoked 1066, when a battle won by cavalry is held to have introduced feudalism to England.

The Twentieth Century

With Brunner the historiography of *Lehnswesen* was set much as it has gone on since. Mitteis summed it up well, concentrating in the German tradition on law and constitutional relationships rather than the more romantic and less well-attested aspects of French *féodalité* and English feudalism.[33] This was not the only difference in what we call 'national' traditions of historiography as compulsory education was established in European states and state-supported universities multiplied. In each European state the idea of feudalism that came to be accepted has been shaped by the changing preoccupations of its lawyers, historians, and students of politics and society ever since the idea had been introduced. The unprecedented depth and breadth of

[31] E.g. Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, vi. 1–138, esp. 112–38.

[32] Heinrich Brunner, 'Der Ritterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehnswesens', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung,* 8 (1887), 1–38.

[33] Heinrich Mitteis, *Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt* (Weimar, 1933); Bernhard Diestelkamp, 'Heinrich Mitteis "Lehnrecht und Saatsgewalt" im Licht moderner Forschung', in Peter Landau et al. (eds.), *Heinrich Mitteis nach hundert Jahren (1889–1989)* (Munich, 1991), 11–22.

the way that the great nineteenth-century German historians used medieval sources makes their assumptions and preoccupations less obvious than those of most of their predecessors and some of their contemporaries. But one shared assumption has remained clear: that something that was described as *Lehnswesen*/*féodalité*/feudalism developed from the early middle ages as a *system* of law and politics that still forms a framework for much of the medieval history of most of the modern states of Europe. What is worrying about this is the strong tendency to teleology, tracing the development of feudalism/*Lehnswesen* largely through the use of particular words, until it reached its complete and coherent form in the twelfth or thirteenth century. This may make it harder to understand earlier medieval society: our understanding of any society at any time is surely not helped by seeing it as merely a stage in the development of something that came later.

After Mitteis the general idea of non-Marxist feudalism and its development remained more or less unchanged for the rest of the twentieth century. Within this framework university systems in different states encouraged historians to concentrate on their own 'national' histories, so that those concerned at all with feudalism—which means nearly all medievalists—seem to have worried less than they might have about the variations within it.[34] Much was nevertheless done on its origins, and also on particular aspects that can be better attested in the more abundant sources that survive from the twelfth century.[35]

But that abundance raises a question that historians of feudalism have not, I suggest, thought about enough. That is the effect of what is arguably the most important development in the history of human law anywhere: its change from being the customary law of a society, applied according to the consensus of assemblies, to being the business and property of professional lawyers. In medieval Europe that began in eleventh-century Italy and then spread north of the Alps from the twelfth, along with what Max Weber called bureaucracy,

[34] Jürgen Dendorfer, 'Was war das Lehnswesen?', in Eva Schlotheuber and Maximilian Schuh (eds.), *Denkweisen und Lebenswelten des Mittelalters* (Munich, 2004), 43–64, above, n. 2.

[35] Erler and Kaufmann (eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*; Otto Brunner, 'Feudalismus', in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, ii. 337–50.

that is, professional administration and record-keeping.[36] This process was clearly beginning in Germany in the twelfth century, notably under Frederick Barbarossa. It was partly the result of contact with Italy, but also of economic growth and the spread of literacy, which enabled northern Europeans, like Italians, to keep more records and use them more systematically.[37] Not that systematic and recorded government was entirely new: tenth- and eleventh-century German kings and emperors had more competent servants, communicated more with local assemblies, and kept more useful records than has always been recognized.[38] Even so, and despite the beginning of changes in the twelfth century, it is difficult to imagine a work like the *Sachsenspiegel* being written much before 1200. Although Eike von Repgow does not seem to have been what we would now call either a professional or an academic, he had spent much time in court and thought hard about what happened there. However much he talked about custom, he was interested and informed about recent changes in the law that he had seen applied there and about the reasons for it all.[39]

From the twelfth century the law that was applied in all but the humblest secular courts in the parts of Europe about which I know anything varied not, just as it always had, as consensus shifted in different assemblies, but as custom was recorded and established in separate jurisdictions under the growing influence of professional judges and lawyers. The new professionalism of lawyers and administrators had profound effects on government and law, but how far the use merely of a new, professional vocabulary of vassals and fiefs affected the actual rights and obligations attached to the land of free men in any kingdom or lordship seems doubtful. Whatever words professional lawyers used, any ruler faced trouble if he tried to

[36] Susan Reynolds, 'The Emergence of Professional Law in the Long Twelfth Century', *Law and History Review,* 21 (2003), 347–66, repr. in ead., *The Middle Ages without Feudalism*.

[37] Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 440–51.

[38] David S. Bachrach, 'Exercise of Royal Power in Early Medieval Europe: The Case of Otto the Great', *Early Medieval Europe*, 17 (2009), 389–419; Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 409–14.

[39] Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand, 'Der "Sachsenspiegel" Eikes von Repgow als Beispiel mittelalterlicher Fachliteratur', *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik*, 51/2 (1983), 2016–26.

reduce the property rights of his free subjects, especially the greater subjects on whom he relied for advice and service.

Two questions that have been too often ignored in discussing feudal law/*Lehnrecht* are, first, how far can we read back from the procedures, rules, and, above all, the words of the age of professional law to the procedures, rules, and words of the period before 1100? Secondly, how far can we assume that they reflect real social relations and ideas after 1100? Much of the history of feudalism has ignored both, but that is rash. Words in any language are liable to mean different things to different people in different contexts and circumstances. When customary law was applied in local assemblies in countries with different vernaculars, and then recorded in Latin written in different monasteries by monks who started from these different vernaculars, there were bound to be variations. Words could not have 'technical' senses because law was not a technique until there were technicians to apply its rules, which is what professional lawyers and administrators were. It is not, moreover, just the words used in the middle ages that we need to think about but ours. Words even in one language, let alone in translation, are still understood differently by different people despite all the dictionaries that we have and they had not. To understand medieval sources, whether in Latin or any vernacular, we need to think hard about the difference between the words we find there, the notions or concepts those words represented for the scribe, and the actual phenomena he referred to, as well as what the modern dictionaries and glossaries tell us about *Lehnswesen* or *Lehnrecht*.[40] Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand discussed the relationship of words, concepts, and phenomena, in the context of medieval social history in 1975, years before I became obsessed with it.[41]

Both the words *feudum/feodum* and *beneficium* could be used in various senses: *beneficium* obviously for many sorts of gifts or favours, while *feudum*, if it was applied to land before the twelfth century, seems to have generally referred to quite small bits, not, in any area I have studied, to the estates of nobles—another word that could

[40] Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 396–474, on the kingdom of Germany, needs revision at several points.

[41] Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand, 'Historische Onomasiologie und Mittelalterforschung', *Frühmittelalterliche Studien*, 9 (1975), 49–78; Reynolds, 'Use of Feudalism', 195–7.

also be used very variously.[42] What is known about the property of nobles in the earlier middle ages does not suggest that most of it had originally come from royal grants or that anyone thought it had. That idea came later, when academics started to apply the conjectural history of the *Libri Feudorum* to all noble property. In the twelfth century academic and professional lawyers began to use the word *feudum* (in any of its variant forms) or, in Germany, *beneficium*, for noble property, but nobles and free men did not lose rights in their property because of this, nor were the new words immediately recognized as having the meanings that later historians would give them. Can we be sure, for instance, that the word *beneficium* in Austria's *Privilegium Minus* of 1156 had already acquired the technical sense of what historians call a *Belehnung*?[43] Since the rights conveyed in the record were not those of the usual historian's model of a benefice or fief, *beneficium* here may have meant simply that it was given by royal favour. When other noble and free property meanwhile acquired new obligations, that was not because of new words but of more systematic and professional law and government. Rather than saying that Frederick Barbarossa, 'feudalized' the kingdom of Germany, I should rather say that he, or his advisers, introduced more professional law and government to it. Thanks to contacts with Italian lawyers, notably at Roncaglia, the new law used some of the vocabulary they had developed from the *Libri Feudorum* but, far from happening at a time of general 'feudalization', this happened at a time when what we call 'feudal' service, particularly in armies, was being replaced in many areas by paid service.

[42] Jane Martindale, 'The French Aristocracy in the Early Middle Ages: A Reappraisal,' *Past and Present*, 75 (1977), 27–42, repr. in ead., *Status, Authority and Regional Power* (Aldershot, 1997); Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 38–45, 444–5, 469–71.

[43] *Dip. Frid. I*, no. 151; also e.g. no. 187. Cf. e.g. Roman Deutinger, 'Das Privilegium minus, Otto von Freising und der Verfassungswandel des 12. Jahrhunderts', in Peter Schmid and Heinrich Wanderwitz (eds.), *Die Geburt Öesterreichs* (Regensburg, 2007), 179–99, and in Dendorfer and Deutinger (eds.), *Das Lehnswesen*, 468; Rudolf Schieffer, 'Das Lehnswesen in den deutschen Königsurkunden', ibid. 79–90; Karl-Heinz Spieß, 'Formalisierte Autorität: Entwicklungen in Lehnsrecht des 13. Jahrhundert', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 295 (2012), 62–77.

As for the word vassal, though often mentioned in discussions of the *Sachsenspiegel*, it does not appear in the glossaries of either part, but it will be easier to know about its vernacular use elsewhere when the new edition of Grimm's *Wörterbuch* gets to V. In Latin, *vassus,* which had anyway had a rather different sense from that of the vassal of feudal historiography, seems to have been gradually replaced by *vassallus*, but that was rare, for instance, in royal diplomas from 1002 until 1158, after which its use multiplied, presumably as part of the vocabulary Frederick's lawyers picked up in Italy. I leave other sources to younger and better qualified Austrian and German medievalists to explore. Meanwhile I suggest that one should notice the words actually used in the source one cites and remember that in France, despite historians' fondness for the word 'vassal', it was rarely, if ever, used after the tenth century in Latin texts until professional lawyers reintroduced it from the late thirteenth, while in the vernacular it meant something quite different.[44] Using the word in any of our modern languages now to imply a whole structure of medieval relationship is surely misleading.

Conclusion

It was very encouraging that Professor Deutinger called *Fiefs and Vassals* a *Weckruf* to resume the study of *Lehnswesen*.[45] *Das Lehnswesen im Hochmittelalter* and other recent German works on *Lehnswesen* have been full of learned, valuable, and thought-provoking work on the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But the title of the book, as well as most of its contents, seems to assume that the word *Lehnswesen* represents a real phenomenon of medieval society, though without actually arguing that it was. My *Weckruf* was intended to show that it was not, but I would have no complaint about reasoned argument that either my whole argument or any part of it was wrong. That should advance knowledge and, even better, understanding. But, if it is not being too ungrateful and argumentative, I question whether Professor Dendorfer is right to think that my use of words like 'government' and 'public welfare' in the context of medieval history was

[44] Venckeleer, 'Faut-il traduire vassal par vassal?'.
[45] Dendorfer and Deutinger (eds.), *Das Lehnswesen*, 463.

anachronistic.[46] These words can be applied to any human society, however differently from any modern societies it is or was ruled or governed and however different its ideas about welfare. Government and public welfare were as much the business of Otto I as of Angela Merkel, though his ideas about both differed from hers. Where anachronism comes in is rather in the notions or concepts in the minds of those who use key words, like fief and vassal, without distinguishing the notions those words convey to them now from the various notions that they *may* have conveyed to all the different people who used them in the middle ages.

Finally, therefore, do we need to put our study of medieval societies into the bulging, battered framework of *Lehnswesen*/feudalism that has been formed out of ideas about *feuda* expressed by an early twelfth-century academic lawyer in north Italy, then variously used in different European jurisdictions, and further elaborated by academic lawyers and historians since the sixteenth century? Does the word, with all the different notions that it has represented to different historians, help us understand the actual phenomena of the particular society, its political and social relations, and its law in practice, at the particular time we are studying? What does anyone who uses the word now mean by it? In particular, does not the whole idea distract attention from the collective, though not democratic, solidarities and action that were so fundamental to medieval society and government?

[46] Dendorfer, 'Zur Einleitung', 18. As for 'ownership', I mentioned the word in order to reject it as misleading for property in any period. Cf. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals*, 51, 53, and ead., 'Tenure and Property in Medieval England', 563–4.

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NATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE: THE MEDIA, GLOBAL NEWS COVERAGE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF HIGH IMPERIALISM

DOMINIK GEPPERT

Ten years ago, when I studied 'newspaper wars' as a way of exploring interaction between the emerging mass press and foreign policy in the quarter century before the First World War, I concentrated on British–German relations, which seemed to me particularly suitable for such an analysis:

> For diplomatic friction due to hostile newspaper articles, critical press commentaries, or caricatures seen as insulting, played a crucial role between Germany and Britain. . . . At the same time the assertion that there was actually no conflict of interests between the two countries, and that these unfortunate 'press feuds' were solely responsible for political discord, became the standard argument of all those seeking to improve relations.[1]

One aspect that struck me when I was researching that book, and that has become even clearer since, is that those 'press wars' and the friction caused by the rise of the press as an actor in international politics cannot adequately be described solely through a bilateral British–German lens. The paradigm of the 'Anglo-German antagonism' has long prevailed not least because it reflected the outlook of the Cold War era and transposed its bipolar and Eurocentric perspective onto the more multilateral international order before 1914.[2]

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[1] Dominik Geppert, *Pressekriege: Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen 1896–1912* (Munich, 2007), 475.

[2] The single most influential study within this school of thought was Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London, 1980).

By now it has been replaced by more varied modes of explanation with a more global reach. This is why I would like to revisit, in this article, some of the material collected for my book on the press wars ten years ago and confront it with more recent historiographical trends and findings.

Within the new paradigms the British and German cases are only pieces in a bigger jigsaw puzzle. Part of that puzzle has to do with the scope and intensity of the media revolution at the turn of the century. It also concerns the relationship between the media and politics and the way in which the media and political actors adapted to each other's needs and characteristics—a process that has been termed the 'mediatization' of politics.[3] Another part of the story focuses on the effects the media revolution had on the expectations of national audiences as well as on the build-up of global or transnational infrastructure, in other words, on the connection between jingoism and transnationalism, between dynamic nationalization and a growing global interdependence.

Historians of globalization have argued convincingly that the two phenomena, nationalization on the one hand and globalization or transnationalization on the other, should not merely be seen as temporally overlapping—the 'global' or 'transnational' twentieth century replacing the 'national' nineteenth—but rather as closely interrelated. In this reading, the progress of globalization does not simply increase the frequency and ease with which national borders are crossed. Counter-intuitively, these transnational interactions are also understood to have aided the formation and consolidation of those very boundaries. Seen in this light, nation-states are not just the precondition and protagonists of exchange, but in at least equal measure also the products of global circulation. The increase in transnational interrelationships, as Sebastian Conrad states, 'can thus be seen as one of the most important factors contributing to the consolidation of national categories'.[4]

It is not the nation-state that ceases to exist, Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzelhuemer have stressed, 'but a certain perspective on

[3] Jesper Strömbäck, 'Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics', *International Journal of Press / Politics*, 13/3 (2008), 228–46, at 230–5.

[4] Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2010), 5.

the nation state which can no longer be upheld'. Löhr and Wenzelhuemer then proceed to ask a series of pertinent questions. How does the nation-state fit into the

> opposing and at the same time closely connected interplay between globalization and fragmentation? How did the state and non-state actors handle problems with a transnational reach? Who were the driving forces that either strengthened or slowed down processes of exchange and interconnection? Which aims and interests did the main acting groups pursue? Did a certain international and organizational framework develop so as to legalize and standardize interactions across national borders and make them more predictable? And how did the nation states react toward the flows of information, technology, knowledge, commodities or capital, which did not stop at their borders?[5]

This article attempts to give some tentative answers to these big questions by analysing a small, but not unimportant aspect of globalization, namely, the foreign news coverage within Europe's mass media between 1880 and the First World War. It will concentrate on three elements that deserve particular attention in this respect: first, European news agencies such as Reuters, Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau (WTB), and Agence Havas of France. Privately run concerns, they functioned as intermediaries that retailed political and economic news not only to the press but also to banks, insurance companies, and business people.[6] Secondly, it will look at the new popular press, which was an expression of the profound transformation of the media that had implications for the ownership and power structures

[5] Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzelhuemer (eds.), *The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Heidelberg, 2013), 1, 5.

[6] The standard reference for the history of Reuters is Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters* (Oxford, 2nd edn. 1999); WTB is covered by Dieter Basse, *Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau 1849 bis 1933: Agenturpublizistik zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft* (Munich, 1991); as there is no comparable scholarly study of Havas, we must still refer to Pierre Frédérix, *Un siècle de chasse aux nouvelles: De l'agence d'informations Havas à l'Agence France Presse (1835–1957)* (Paris, 1957).

both of newspaper publishers and the financial foundations of the press, for the content and tone of its reporting, and for its relationship with politics.[7] Thirdly, it will examine foreign correspondents, whose very profession necessitates the crossing of frontiers and mediation between different national audiences.[8]

To explore the working conditions and impact potential of the press in the age of high imperialism, this article will first analyse the internationalization of the media as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth. It will then contrast the tendencies of internationalization and transnationalization with the increasingly national bent of news reporting within the context of the commercialization of the press and the growing national orientation of foreign correspondents. In a third step, it will look at the interaction between the two processes in two case studies: (1) the phenomenon of the press congress that became a firm part of the new internationalism towards the end of the nineteenth century; and (2) the professional organizations set up from the late 1880s onwards by foreign journalists in the capitals of Europe.

The sources available for dealing with these topics are rather patchy. The private papers of various British journalists, editors, and newspaper proprietors as well as some business and editorial records (for example, from Reuters and *The Times*) have survived.[9] The minute books of the Foreign Press Association (FPA), the association of foreign correspondents stationed in London, can be consulted for the years 1912 to 1914.[10] In Germany, no comparable sets of docu-

[7] See e.g. the recent overview by Frank Bösch, *Mass Media and Historical Change: Germany in International Perspective, 1400 to the Present* (New York, 2015), 77–86.

[8] Norman Domeier and Jörn Happel, 'Journalismus und Politik: Einleitende Überlegungen zur Tätigkeit von Auslandskorrespondenten 1900–1970', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 62 (2014), 389–97; Dominik Geppert, 'Ambassadors of Democracy: British and German Foreign Correspondents in the Age of High Imperialism', in Frank Bösch and Dominik Geppert (eds.), *Journalists as Political Actors: Transfers and Interactions between Britain and Germany since the late Nineteenth Century* (Augsburg, 2008), 35–55.

[9] Reuters Archive, London (hereafter RA); News UK Archive, London (hereafter NUKA).

[10] The minute books are still in the possession of the FPA which exists to the present day.

ments exist. Almost all business records of newspaper proprietors, along with editorial correspondence, were lost in the Second World War. As German journalists tended to be lower down the social scale than their British counterparts, they did not keep private papers or write memoirs. Historians of the press have to make do with government files, especially those of the German Foreign Office, which contain useful material documenting contacts between officials and the media.[11] The archive of the Berlin equivalent of the FPA, the Verein Ausländische Presse, was taken to Stockholm by the Swedish press attaché in 1944, where it has recently been rediscovered in the Rijks Archive; most of the surviving documents, however, date from the period after 1918–19.[12]

Although large parts of the empirical material for this article are drawn from German and British contexts, it should become clear that these are developments that apply to European foreign reporting more generally. Further research concerning Austria-Hungary will have to come to grips with a situation very similar to the one prevailing in Germany: the researcher has to consult government sources kept in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and in the Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv in Vienna.[13] With regard to France, some papers of the Paris association of foreign correspondents, the Syndicat de la presse étrangère, have survived in the archives of the French Parliament, the Assemblée Nationale.[14] In the United States, there are the rich holdings of the Associated Press Corporate Archives in New York.

One good thing about press history is that when the press as an actor was involved, it tended to write rather lavishly about itself. This means that International Press Conferences were widely covered in the international media. The professional organizations set up by the

[11] Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (hereafter PA-AA).

[12] Sonja Hillerich, 'Der Verein der Ausländischen Presse zu Berlin: "Ritter der Feder" oder "nichtamtliche Diplomaten"?', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 62 (2014), 398–410.

[13] See, for a slightly earlier period, the study by Dominik Feldmann, *Von Journalisten und Diplomaten: Die Entdeckung der Presse für die Außenpolitik in Preußen und Österreich 1849–1879* (Berlin, 2016).

[14] See now Sonja Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational: Deutsche Auslandskorrespondenten in London, Paris und Wien (1848–1914)' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Essen-Duisburg, 2016).

foreign correspondents did not feature as prominently. They have, however, left sporadic footprints on newspaper pages and can, accordingly, be traced in press archives today.

I. *Transnational Infrastructure*

Jürgen Osterhammel has reminded us that the globalized production and dissemination of news along with the standardization of reports and the ideology of 'objectivity' were distinctive features of the 'transformation of the world' in the nineteenth century.[15] A crucial ingredient in this process was the dominance of the British Empire over the global traffic in communications. Towards the end of the nineteenth century it at least rivalled Britain's maritime dominance. London was the uncontested news capital of the world. Reuters, the leading British news agency, had a considerable competitive edge over its continental and North American competitors. The dominant position of British companies in the international news and wire business was not least due to the fact that Britain, as the biggest world and trading power, had a particular interest in the expansion of telegraphy, with commercial as well as military and strategic motives coming into play. Since the 1860s private companies such as the Eastern Telegraph Company had been busy laying underwater cables connecting Europe, North America, India, and Africa. The following decades saw the construction of additional connections with China, South America, and Japan. The British government methodically connected its colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific to the British mainland via overhead and submarine cables.[16]

Reuters collaborated with the two other big European news agencies, to the mutual benefit of all concerned, by establishing exclusive areas of operation that largely mirrored the colonial empires and informal spheres of influence of the respective powers. In January 1870 WTB, Reuters, and Havas signed a cartel agreement in which each agency secured exclusive rights for itself. They also agreed to exchange news content for which the recipient would have to pay

[15] Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, 2014), 37–9.

[16] Cf. Paul M. Kennedy, 'Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914', *English Historical Review*, 86 (1971), 728–52.

only the telegraph fee. This meant that Reuters could only offer its customers news content from Germany which it had received directly from WTB, and vice versa.[17] In this way, Europe's Great Powers divided up large parts of the globe for colonies. In much the same way Reuters, WTB, and Havas, and later also the Associated Press in the USA, colonized global news by establishing limited-access territories: Reuters won exclusive rights in South Africa, the Far East, the rest of the British Empire, and the Netherlands and its colonies. Havas received the Romance-speaking part of the Mediterranean and France with its colonies. Germany, Scandinavia, St Petersburg, and Moscow went to WTB. The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Belgium were shared between Reuters and Havas. All other regions —especially Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and the Danubian principalities—were neutral and open to all three contracting parties without restrictions.[18]

Germany had comparatively few international business links. This is why WTB was initially content merely to strengthen its dominant position in central, northern, and eastern Europe, leaving almost all of the regions outside Europe to the French and British agencies. The only exceptions were the few German colonies acquired in the mid 1880s. In two additional agreements signed in 1874 and 1876 respectively, Reuters and Havas settled the distribution of their respective spheres of influence for the rest of the globe: China, Japan, and Constantinople went to Reuters, while Havas secured South America and all of the Mediterranean with the exception of Greece and Egypt, which both parties agreed to share for their exclusive use.[19] In the journalistic sphere, these separate arrangements anticipated by three decades the deal over colonial politics that was closed with the signing of the Entente Cordiale—if not in all of the territorial details, then certainly in the thrust of the agreements.[20]

[17] One copy of the agreement signed on 17 Jan. 1870 in Paris is in RA 1/8818001; a later list of the contractual terms can be found in PA-AA, Europa Generalia 86, R 533.

[18] Cf. Terhi Rantanen, *Foreign News in Imperial Russia: The Relationship between International and Russian News Agencies, 1856–1914* (Helsinki, 1990), 37–46; see also Basse, *Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau*, 48–53.

[19] Agreement of 1/5 May 1874 in RA 1/890503; Agreement of May 1876 in RA 1/8818001. Cf. Rantanen, *Foreign News*, 42–3.

[20] For a re-evaluation of the Entente Cordiale fitting this picture see Paul W.

The allegedly global reach of the news agencies may have been an important element of their advertising strategy. It was not, however, an adequate description of their real operating range. Large parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America were blank areas with regard to both the appropriate telegraphic infrastructure and a network of local correspondents necessary to feed it with news.[21] Moreover, as most of the telegraphic traffic was either transatlantic or followed the sinews of the British Empire, a region as strategically and economically important to Britain as South Africa was considerably closer to London in terms of communications than, say, Romania, which in terms of geography and physical distance was so much nearer.[22]

As telegraphic agencies altered the speed of dissemination and the range of news, the popular press changed its tone and business model. Since their first appearance in the 1880s, popular newspapers had fundamentally transformed the media landscape in many European countries. The most powerful publishers headed media empires that operated internationally and published newspapers in several countries; publishers often had business interests on more than one continent. Lord Northcliffe not only owned numerous papers in England and the Empire, but also published a Paris-based European edition of his tabloid *Daily Mail*. A German edition based in Berlin was planned for 1913. It did not survive the experimental stage only because of the outbreak of the First World War. In order to secure an independent supply of paper, Northcliffe bought huge tracts of forest in Canada. He continued his drive to establish co-operations with popular newspapers in other countries: an agreement with August Scherl, publisher of the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, provided the *Daily Mail*'s Berlin correspondent with access to the proofs of the final edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger* and vice versa, ensuring Northcliffe and

Schroeder, 'International Politics, Peace, and War, 1815–1914', in T. C. W. Blanning (ed.), *The Nineteenth Century*: *Europe 1789–1914* (Oxford, 2000), 158–209, at 195–7.

21 Volker Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten: Wissensproduktionen globaler Nachrichtenagenturen 1835–1939' (unpublished manuscript, Cologne, 2016), 326.

22 Frank Bösch, 'Entgrenzungen? Transnationale Medien und regionale Kommunikation seit dem späten 19. Jahrhundert', in Alexander Gallus, Axel Schildt, and Detlef Siegfried (eds.), *Deutsche Zeitgeschichte: Transnational* (Göttingen, 2015), 223–40, at 227.

Scherl had a competitive advantage over their national competitors in terms of access to national news.[23]

It was not least the representatives of the new popular newspapers that swelled the number of foreign correspondents at the turn of the century. In order to compete with the foreign reporting of the traditional party-aligned broadsheets, the commercial popular papers needed to send correspondents into all the major European capitals. Exact figures and statistics are notoriously hard to come by but the underlying trend is quite clear: traditionally, only a few papers with a nationwide circulation maintained their own permanent representatives in other capitals. In the 1890s, they were joined by some of the more successful papers of the second rank. In the last years before the outbreak of the First World War numerous tabloids and regional newspapers sent their own representatives abroad.

As their number grew, so did the confidence of the foreign correspondents. In 1898, the eminent English journalist Thomas W. Stead claimed: 'The newspaper correspondent is the ambassador of democracy. He manufactures the opinion to which it is the function of the regular ambassador to give effect. It is difficult to overestimate his importance or to measure his influence for weal or for woe.'[24] A quarter of a century later, the Berlin correspondent of the Polish newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*, Gorińsky, expressed the same sentiment when he wrote: 'These days, the reporter from a foreign newspaper is treated as the "ambassador of public opinion" all over the world.'[25]

II. *National Expectations*

Until the end of the nineteenth century it had been common practice, not least for financial reasons, for journalists to write about their own countries for foreign papers. As late as 1891 the then Berlin corre-

[23] Cf. Dominik Geppert, '"The Foul-Visaged Anti-Christ of Journalism"? The Popular Press between Warmongering and International Cooperation', in id. and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity* (Oxford, 2008), 369–89.

[24] Thomas W. Stead writing in *Review of Reviews*, Apr. 1898, 429.

[25] Gorińsky writing in *Rzeczpospolita*, no. 160, 14 June 1923 (morning edition). A German translation ('Die Leiden der Auslandspresse') is available in PA-AA, Press Department, Journalists P27, Generalia, vol. 1, R 121602.

spondent of *The Times*, a Scot called Charles Lowe, remarked disapprovingly that most of the London papers in Berlin and Vienna were represented by German or Austrian Jews.[26] Foreigners generally came to be seen as less and less suitable to fill the position of foreign correspondent. The conviction grew that the work of a foreign correspondent had a patriotic dimension, so that only men of a proven patriotic disposition could be trusted to report back from foreign countries.

Lowe believed it was positively dangerous to send non-Britons abroad to represent British papers. In his memoirs he stated that it was just as unwise 'to entrust an alien with a prominent post in our journalistic army as to appoint one to a high position in either branch of our militant services'.[27] In Germany, the editor Fritz Walz stipulated in 1906 that every foreign correspondent needed 'national instinct and a sense of duty', while Hermann Diez, director of WTB, declared that 'especially in questions of international affairs an excessively critical attitude of the press' towards the government had to be avoided because it 'only strengthened the position of foreign countries and thereby harmed its own nation'; another journalist at the time demanded that every foreign correspondent serve the interests of his paper 'like a diplomatic representative'.[28]

Changes to the composition and mentality of the corps of foreign correspondents were only part of a more general trend towards nationalizing news reporting across the European press. The business strategies of the commercial press were one of the chief causes of this: on the one hand, popular newspapers drove the internationalization of communications infrastructure, but on the other they came to rely more and more heavily on their patriotic appeal to their readers. Unlike the traditional broadsheets, which financed themselves through sales or donations from rich patrons and political parties, the tabloids counted on advertising revenue, which rewarded the highest possible print runs. They targeted not the traditional elites but the lower middle classes, who had gained enormously in both leisure and purchasing power in the decades before the First World War.[29]

[26] Charles Lowe, 'The German Newspaper Press', *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1891, 853–71, at 870.

[27] Id., *The Tale of a 'Times' Correspondent* (London, 1927), 98.

[28] All quotations from Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 44–5.

[29] Cf. Peter Catterall, Colin Seymour-Ure, and Adrian Smith (eds.), *Northcliffe's Legacy: Aspects of the British Popular Press, 1896–1996* (Basingstoke, 2nd

There were, of course, exceptions, but overall a popular paper did better to steer clear of overly close party-political ties if it wanted to preserve its advertising business, and for this reason the tabloids found it difficult to address issues that were controversial domestically. National unity could be much more easily assumed in foreign and imperial questions.[30]

News agencies displayed similar nationalizing tendencies. During the Bismarck era, WTB, as the leading German telegraph bureau, had contented itself with Europe as its sphere of influence, just as the German Reich had done on the political stage. Bismarck's failed attempt in 1887–9 to create a triple alliance of German, Austrian, and Italian news agencies, modelled on the actual Triple Alliance, showed how much the wider European vision dominated his politics to the end.[31] This changed profoundly during the 1890s. Now that the German elites had decided that they, too, wanted to be involved in world politics, its territorial limitations and, above all, its dependence on Reuters increasingly irked them. In January 1898, a Berlin newspaper lamented that 'England's web of cables encompasses the world, and in the centre of the web lurks, like a gigantic spider, Reuters' bureau'.[32]

Britain's dominance of telegraphy and news reporting was not simply a problem for Germany. As early as 1885 France had noticed, first in its expedition to Tongking, then again in 1893 in the conflict with Siam, and another five years later in the Fashoda Incident, that its reliance on the British cable network could be potentially disastrous in a crisis, and had protested accordingly.[33] From at least the

edn. 2000); Hans-Dieter Kübler, 'Zwischen Parteilichkeit und Markt: Die Presse im Wilhelminischen Kaiserreich', in Werner Faulstich (ed.), *Kulturgeschichte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts: Das erste Jahrzehnt* (Paderborn, 2006), 23–46.

[30] Alan J. Lee, *The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855–1914* (London, 2nd edn. 1980).

[31] Cf. Michael Palmer, 'L'Agence Havas, Reuters et Bismarck: L'echec de la triple alliance télégraphique (1887–1889)', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 90 (1976), 321–57.

[32] 'Die Deutschfeindlichkeit des Reuter'schen Bureaus', *Berliner Herold*, 12 Jan. 1898, copy in PA-AA, Europa Generalia 86 no. 1, R 551.

[33] See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics 1851–1945* (New York, 1991), 79, 84.

South African War onwards there was an unending series of complaints about reports by Reuters allegedly twisting or even explicitly falsifying facts. The flames were further fanned when the Russian government blocked the Siberian telegraph line to East Asia during the Russian–Japanese War, with the result that all of Europe's news traffic from the Far East had to run via the British Reuters cable network.[34]

Accordingly, Britain's competitors on the stage of international politics grew increasingly preoccupied with the question of how to improve their position in international communications. The development of the global cable network had initially been driven by commercial impulses, but after the turn of the twentieth century, these were replaced by political, economic, and strategic reasons. This prompted the other European Great Powers, above all, France and Germany, 'to work towards achieving the exchange of news for the press not, as had hitherto been the case, via England, but by their own means, or at least via a route independent of England'.[35]

III. *The Interplay between Nationalization and Transnationalization*

The processes just outlined should not be imagined as contradictory. The transnationalization of communications and the nationalization of news reporting were developments that existed in conjunction, indeed, they frequently overlapped and even mutually reinforced each other. This can be illustrated by looking more closely at two areas where the overlapping and reinforcing of nationalizing and transnationalizing tendencies can be observed particularly clearly.

The first example is the phenomenon of the press congress, which became a firm part of the new internationalism towards the end of

[34] The French press published these dispatches with the sceptical addition: 'de source Anglaise'; cf. Report on the French Press, 21 May 1906, The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), FO 371/166, 99–105.

[35] Max Roscher, 'Das Weltkabelnetz', *Archiv für Post und Telegraphie* (June 1914), 373–89, at 375, copy in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, R 4701/16362. For more details concerning the German Foreign Office see now Martin Wroblewski, *Moralische Eroberungen als Instrumente der Diplomatie: Die Informations- und Pressepolitik des Auswärtigen Amtes 1902–1914* (Göttingen, 2016).

the nineteenth century.[36] Probably the best-known case in point is the Imperial Press Conference of 1909. It was attended by journalists from all over the British Empire who went to London to discuss issues of shared interest: from the high cost of sending telegrams and the monopoly of private cable firms to the role of the press in strengthening the cohesion of the Empire.[37] The conference in London was not the only one of its kind: the media of other countries organized similar events, so that, between 1894 and 1914, representatives of European newspapers met almost annually at international press congresses. The governments and heads of state of various European countries saw these events as important enough to dispatch high-level welcoming committees to greet the media representatives: in Lisbon in 1898 King Carlos and his wife Maria Amelia were in attendance; in Paris two years later it was President Émile Loubet. In Berlin as in London the foreign secretaries did the honours, while Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow also insisted on inviting attendees to a garden party in his Chancellery.[38]

The topics discussed grew out of the increased transnationalization of reporters' working conditions. They included demands for a uniform tariff for press cables, international standards for authors' rights and copyright, improvements in the legal status of journalists' contracts, and the establishment of an international committee of publishers.[39] Speeches stressed the importance of internationalism. There was talk of 'world journalists', of the 'cosmopolitan role of the press', of 'brotherhood and camaraderie' across all borders. The editor of the *Daily Telegraph* described the task of international press events thus: 'Their mission was humanity, the welfare, the culture, the progress of humanity. The sun rose on a better world every day;

[36] Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001).

[37] *Proceedings*: *Imperial Press Conference* (London, 1909); John Wesley Dafoe, *The Imperial Press Conference: A Retrospect with Comment*, privately printed (Winnipeg, 1909).

[38] For more details see Dominik Geppert, 'Zwischen Nationalisierung und Internationalisierung: Europäische Auslandsberichterstattung um 1900', in Ute Daniel and Axel Schildt (eds.), *Massenmedien im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 2010), 203–28.

[39] Cf. Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 53.

human society was ever being lifted upward. . . On the world of the Press the sun never set.'[40]

Closer inspection, however, revealed undertones that hinted at the virulence of nationalist modes of thought and behaviour. Discussions about politics, religion, or race were banned altogether from conferences, as the organizers apparently feared their potentially explosive consequences. There were calls for an international journalistic tribunal of honour, patently in the hope of having an instrument with which to prosecute character assassination across national borders. At the same time delegates passed a resolution declaring that defamatory attacks on other nations or on foreign papers militated against the honour and dignity of the press; this, too, was apparently in response to current troubles.[41]

The tension between transnational professional co-operation on the one hand and national loyalties on the other had an impact on the work of foreign correspondents in the capitals of Europe. As their numbers increased, representatives of foreign media experienced not only a corresponding growth in professional solidarity, but also a need to organize collectively in organizations that would be better able to act on common concerns.[42] From the 1880s onwards foreign correspondents set up their own societies on the model of Paris and Vienna (in 1883). The Foreign Press Association (FPA) in London was founded in 1888. A few years later similar organizations were formed in Rome and Berlin (in 1906).[43]

These associations soon became important forums for networking. They initiated glamorous society events. The FPA opened an

[40] All quotations from *The Times*, 21 Sept. 1909.

[41] Geppert, 'Auslandsberichterstattung', 220.

[42] Other journalists had felt the same need, and had begun to form professional associations in the last decades of the nineteenth century. For Germany see Jörg Requate, *Journalismus als Beruf: Entstehung und Entwicklung des Journalistenberufs im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1995), 222–42; for Britain see Christopher Underwood, 'Institute of Journalists', in Dennis Griffiths (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the British Press 1422–1992* (Basingstoke, 1992), 646–7.

[43] Cf. Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational'; the German association is also analysed by Liane Rothenberger, *Aus Deutschland berichten: Entwicklung, Arbeitsweise und Mitgliederstruktur des Vereins Ausländische Presse in Deutschland* (Münster, 2009).

office in London's exclusive West End which provided access to maps, reference books, address books and writing materials, so that members could use it like a club, as a place to socialize as well as to work. The association organized public lectures on political and cultural topics and several charity dinners a year, with proceeds usually going to a fund for destitute foreign artists and journalists in London. In March of 1914, the traditional spring reception of the Verein Ausländische Presse in Berlin's fashionable Esplanade hotel was attended by over 700 guests from the worlds of politics, diplomacy, business, and the arts.[44] The chief *raison d'être* of the press associations was to improve professional collaboration and help correspondents to network socially. Overcoming the obstacles which many foreign reporters faced in gaining admittance to the press galleries of the parliaments in the capital cities where they worked became a chief priority for many press bodies.[45]

All of this confirms the picture of an increasingly international media landscape where the professional common ground was seen as more important than different national backgrounds. At the same time, however, the forces of a growing nationalization made themselves felt. In order to avoid the domination of their association by members of a single nation, the Verein Ausländische Presse laid down a rule that allowed only one representative per country to sit on its board.[46] Amongst other things, this clause was designed to counter accusations of cliquishness of the kind that had been raised at the founding of the FPA, five of whose nine board members had initially been French.[47] Later, many German correspondents believed the FPA was a mere plaything in the hands of its Russian president Gabriel de Wesselitzky, whom they accused of steering the association into anti-German waters.[48] As a consequence, most German reporters decided to join a counter-organization, the Society of

[44] *New York Times*, 29 Mar. 1914, C2.

[45] Cf. Dominik Geppert, 'The Public Challenge to Diplomacy: German and British Ways of Dealing with the Press, 1890–1914', in Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008), 133–64.

[46] Communication Goldmann to Bülow, July 1906, PA-AA Deutschland 126 vol. 3, R 1481.

[47] Hermann Pollak, *Foreign Press Association in London* (London, 1893), 3.

[48] The German Foreign Office in Berlin regarded Wesselitzky as a Tsarist in-

Foreign Journalists. The rift was only healed in the spring of 1911 after Wesselitzky had left the FPA. The two clubs merged, and a German, the London representative of WTB, joined the board of the FPA as vice-president.[49] As late as the spring of 1914, the representative of *Le Figaro* as president was balanced by two German vice-presidents. The treasurer was Dutch; the secretary another Frenchman.[50]

At times of war, nationalist upsurges tended to overshadow the international character of the press associations. In December 1899, soon after the beginning of the South African War, Hermann Pollak, then chairman of the FPS, deplored that 'jealousy, envy, rancour, bitterness and other uncharitable qualities which have always more or less existed amongst foreign journalists in London, are now playing their disintegrating part in the Association, causing mutual estrangement and weakening all comity and *ésprit de corps* between members'.[51] During the First World War the warring nations expelled enemy correspondents. But the remaining representatives of allied and neutral states also experienced harassment. Even journalists with German-sounding names came under pressure.[52] Antisemitic prejudices against naturalized Jews of German or Austrian extraction often played a part.[53] The FPA adapted its statutes to reflect the new circumstances. 'No journalist of German, Austrian, Bulgarian or Turkish origin', ran the relevant passage at the end of the war, 'should be eligible for membership of the Association.'[54] Something similar happened in other countries.[55]

Media transnationalism had been replaced by a reflection of the warring power blocs. The minutes of an FPA meeting from December 1917 recorded the observation that the war—and, even

fluence; cf. e.g. communication Bernstorff to Bülow, 18 May 1903, PA-AA, England no. 78, R 5682.

[49] Communication Plehn to Mantler, 21 Apr. 1911, PA-AA, England Press no. 73, R 5638.

[50] *The Times*, 24 Apr. 1914.

[51] Quoted in Hillerich, 'Journalismus transnational', 68.

[52] Cf. minutes of the meetings on 12 Nov. 1914 and 4 June 1915, FPA Archive, London.

[53] Minutes, Oct. 1914, FPA Archive, London.

[54] Minutes, 24 Sept. 1918, FPA Archive, London.

[55] German embassy to AA, 9 Dec. 1922, PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 1, R 121602; communication Tucher to Blockzyl, 31

more, the methods of warfare—had changed the situation to the extent

> that there does not seem to be any possibility for years to come of a complete International Association in our profession, and that being the case, we must reconstruct an association which will be as much International as possible and will comprise only the Allies—and by this we mean only the Allies who will remain true to their compact till the end—and the Neutral Association who elect to throw their lot with us after peace is signed, and who contain no member of German or Austrian origin.[56]

The idea of an international community of journalists had become a casualty of war; it remained unthinkable for a long time to come.

IV. *The Media, Global News Coverage, and International Relations*

What does all this tell us about the questions asked at the beginning of this article? First of all, it sheds new light on the differentiation and interconnection between the national, international, transnational, and global aspects of news coverage. News coverage was global in its aims and ambitions though not yet in reality. Large parts of the globe remained *terra incognita* on the map of international news flows, with scarcely any telegraph connections and few correspondents scattered over vast stretches of land. Journalists co-operated in international organizations and faced transnational challenges in their workaday life. However, this did not prevent them from seeing themselves not merely as reporters but as semi-official representatives of their home countries. A process of increasing economic, technological, and cultural integration across national borders co-existed with continuing political and ideological antagonisms, or rather, this process did, in fact, reinforce national interpretative paradigms as points of orientation in an increasingly complex world of interconnected media.

Dec. 1923, PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 2, R 121603.

[56] Minutes, 4 Dec. 1917, FPA Archive, London.

Moreover, far from being the helpless victims of globalization or transnationalization, nation-states and national governments reasserted themselves as powerful actors in a world of increasing cross-border media co-operation. The ways in which they did this varied from country to country. In some countries, such as Germany or France, the state actually owned the telegraphic networks on which the news agencies depended. This meant they needed official permission to send and receive telegrams. But even in the USA, where telegraph wires were owned by private companies, Associated Press was heavily reliant on good relations with the state, not least because government provided it with exclusive news that gave AP a competitive edge over rival news agencies. Governments in other countries acted in a similar way, using the big news agencies as compliant transmitters of government information. Particularly at times of crisis or war, national interests trumped the commercial considerations of news agencies or the media generally. If we look beyond the First World War, it is striking that from the mid 1920s on state control of news agencies intensified even further. Interestingly, that was true not only of authoritarian regimes in Italy, Spain, and Japan, or totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany, but also of France and the Weimar Republic.[57]

In addition, the media and its global news coverage had implications for international relations. To be sure, the media phenomena described in this article did not, by themselves, have a negative impact upon foreign affairs. It would be wrong to overemphasize the confrontational aspects of international press relations. None of the products of the communications revolution necessarily, by itself, intensified international tensions. News agencies profitably worked together, and the same goes for leading papers of the commercial mass press like the *Daily Mail* and the Berliner *Lokal-Anzeiger*. The press was often just the scapegoat politicians and diplomats turned to when they had to explain how international tensions and crises had come about. In any case, the outbreak of the First World War was certainly not the culmination of ever intensifying media tensions. In fact, whilst previous crises in great power relations such as those over Morocco in 1905 and 1911 had taken place in the glaring light of publicity and had been at least partly driven by the media, the crisis

[57] Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 296.

of July 1914 was a typical example of secret diplomacy. Until the very end of July, 'British newspapers were short of information' because events in the Balkans were the subject of secret diplomatic meetings and even the British Cabinet was kept in the dark by Sir Edward Grey.[58] Much the same could be said about the other countries involved.[59]

On the other hand, however, extensive media coverage helped to emotionalize international relations. The media contributed to the development of simmering resentments which any politician who raised the temperature of the national discussion could bring to the boil. The media mirrored and reinforced diplomatic relations. The Entente Cordiale, for example, had a restraining effect on British press coverage of French affairs. Many British newspaper correspondents in Paris did not dare to criticize France too severely for fear of damaging the Entente, whereas British correspondents in Berlin were not under the same constraints.[60] The same could be said of German reporting on Austrian and British affairs respectively. It is part of that picture, then, that the FPA was at pains to ensure that the composition of its board should reflect the constellations of European great power politics.

Apart from that, there were certain parallels or connections between media developments and international relations. News flows did indeed often (but not always) mirror international relations, and media institutions did imitate or adapt to political arrangements. Some examples have already come up in the course of this article, the cartel agreements between Reuters and Havas, for instance, which in some ways anticipated the Entente Cordiale by several decades. One could also think of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. When it was about to be concluded in 1882 and again in 1887, when it was to be renewed,

[58] Adam James Bones, 'British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914', *International History Review*, 35 (2013), 975–92, at 988.

[59] Georg Eckert, Peter Geiss, and Arne Karsten (eds.), *Die Presse in der Julikrise 1914: Die internationale Berichterstattung und der Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg* (Münster, 2014).

[60] They felt free to criticize every aspect of the German—or, more often, Prussian—life they abhorred; cf. 'Germany and the British Press', *New Statesman*, 30 May 1914.

Bismarck toyed with the idea of merging the German, Austrian, and Italian news agencies to weaken French influence, particularly on the Italian press. However, nothing came of the plan.[61]

After the end of the First World War the world of the media remained separated into victors and vanquished. The French foreign press associations remained closed to German and Austrian journalists into the late 1920s. In Rome, the statutes were revised in 1923. The FPA began to re-admit German members in 1926. In the early 1920s the German Foreign Office doubted whether 'the affiliation of foreign journalists is desirable'; it urged avoidance of all steps that 'must lead to a closer integration of foreign correspondents in Berlin'.[62] Along with its colonies, Germany lost its submarine cables. To be sure, Reuters and Havas immediately revived their exchange system with WTB. But the German agency was confined to its own national territory. It was treated as a junior partner and had to pay 50,000 Mark annually for the world news service provided for it by Reuters and Havas.

There even was a media equivalent to the League of Nations in the shape of the Agences alliés founded in 1924 with headquarters in the Havas main office in Paris. It was designed to regulate the exchange of news and provide a platform to discuss technical developments as well as problems of news production. One of its aims was to set up guidelines for trustworthy news, which after the experience of all-encompassing censorship in the Great War was deemed crucial for a stable peace order. The Agence alliés, however, soon faced accusations of corruption and French hegemony.[63] Across the Atlantic, the rise of the USA as a world power was neatly mirrored by the rise of the American news agency AP. Originally not part of the international cartel of the big European agencies, it was able to elbow in later and by the late 1920s, early 1930s had become strong enough to feel itself no longer bound to adhere to the principle of exclusive areas of news coverage. In 1934 that spelled the end of the exchange system the news agencies had successfully practised over nearly seven decades.[64]

[61] Rantanen, *Foreign News*, 44; Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 102.
[62] Undated memorandum by Müller-Heymer [Oct. 1920], PA-AA, Presse-Abteilung, Journalisten P27, Generalia vol. 1, R 121602.
[63] Cf. Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 224–59.
[64] Ibid. 296–324.

Finally, if we take a bird's eye view of the long twentieth century from the 1880s to today, it becomes quite clear that the First World War ended an era marked by a high degree of international integration, in the media as well as in other sectors, of an intensity that would not be achieved again for half a century. In terms of globalization of the mass media, the twentieth century comprised two transformative periods separated by a deep trough: the first in the years around 1900; the second beginning with the revolutions in communications technology from the 1970s to the 1990s comprising the advent of cable television, the explosion of TV shows, live transmission of data and images via satellites, the emergence of wireless telecommunications, and the global use of the internet. Only with these kinds of technological innovations and the new practices that went with them did media coverage truly become global.

In both cases, however, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as a hundred years later, the logic of the mass media drove not only internationalization and transnationalization, but also processes of nationalization. David Reynolds has reminded us of the role played by satellite television in the national penetration and standardization of the media in Asia's vast territorial states, beginning with Soviet state propaganda in the 1970s, and taken up soon after by countries such as India, China, and Indonesia.[65] Satellites both internationalized and nationalized television as a mass medium in the last third of the twentieth century. I suppose a similar point could be made with regard to the impact of the internet in the present. It provides the quintessential transnational infrastructure. But it is still intensely interrelated with national interests and power structures. Moreover, some of today's biggest transnational media corporations, such as the Murdoch empire, strike particularly nationalist tones in the way they cover news and comment on them. In this respect, the world of Northcliffe is not so far away from the world of Fox News or the *Sun*.

What is different, though, is the importance of truth—or perhaps more accurately, objectivity—as a guiding principle for news coverage. Volker Barth has demonstrated convincingly how crucial the alleged objectivity of their news was for agencies such as Reuters,

[65] David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London, 2000), 501–3.

Havas, and WTB. Objectivity guaranteed the quality of their products and maximized the number of potential customers. The claim to objectivity was 'at the core of their business model, it facilitated their working practices, and helped to optimize their processes of production'.[66] It would be difficult to say the same of today's blogosphere or news platforms in the internet.

[66] Barth, 'Wa(h)re Fakten', 333.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

ZUKUNFTSWELTMUSIK: *BETWEEN KRAUTROCK, KRAFTWERK, AND SOUNDS OF (OTHER)WORLDLY 'GERMANNESS'*

MARLENE SCHRIJNDERS

WOLFGANG SEIDEL, *Wir müssen hier raus! Krautrock, Free Beat, Re-education* (Mainz: Ventil Verlag, 2016), 136 pp. ISBN 978 3 95575 052 7. €14.00
ALEXANDER SIMMETH, *Krautrock transnational: Die Neuerfindung der Popmusik in der BRD, 1968–1978* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016), 368 pp. ISBN 978 3 8376 3424 2. €34.99
ULRICH ADELT, *Krautrock: German Music in the Seventies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), viii + 237 pp. ISBN 978 0 472 07319 1 $US 85.00 (hardback). ISBN 978 0 472 05319 3 $US 29.95 (paperback)
DAVID STUBBS, *Future Days: Krautrock and the Building of Modern Germany* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014), ISBN 978 0 571 28332 3. £20.00 (paperback)

Around the globe, the German nouns *Kraftwerk* and *Autobahn* will ring a (synthesizer) bell for those with knowledge of pop music history. Some experts regard the neo-Expressionist pioneers of electronic music as part of the much lesser known Krautrock movement. The authors of the works discussed in this Review Article agree that Krautrock is an underresearched topic which deserves attention. In recent years it has indeed received recognition,[1] especially in the UK, where Kraftwerk performed at the Tate Modern. From different perspectives and with mixed feelings of critique and nostalgia, these four publications highlight the complex history, context, and impact of a marginalized phenomenon which evolves around a conflict regarding 'German identity' or 'Germanness'. Taken together, the books offer a

[1] Ulrich Adelt, *Krautrock: German Music in the Seventies* (Ann Arbor, 2016), 174.

nuanced picture of Krautrock and its legacy, and make a differentiated contribution to a discourse about music, society, and politics which is still relevant today.

The pop-historical journey into the world of Krautrock starts with the seemingly straightforward question about the term itself.[2] Both Krautrock and the term 'Teutonic Rock', which was also occasionally used by the British and American press,[3] have problematic connotations. A broad definition of Krautrock is 'West German experimental music', or 'West German popular music'. Since the early 1970s the label has been used for new groups from West Germany, partly for pragmatic marketing reasons, as Krautrock was a successful export product, particularly in the UK and USA. It is understood as the 'first (West) German contribution to pop music from a non-Anglo-American sphere'.[4] Yet Krautrock is not a fixed musical genre, nor a coherent movement. Adjectives such as progressive, cosmic, futuristic, psychedelic, and synthetic approach elements of this stylistically heterogeneous, boundary-transcending, and (retrospectively) avant-gardist music. Its 'sonic identity'[5] comprises 'a certain emphasis on analogue electronic technology and mechanized repetition',[6] characterized by the term *Motorik.* But Krautrock was much more than that. Hence, it is understood as a catch-all, vague and contested,[7] a mythically charged term[8] for a musical category marked not by unity but

[2] Simmeth contradicts the version that the term 'Krautrock' was invented by the British music press, Alexander Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational: Die Neuerfindung der Popmusik in der BRD, 1968–1978* (Bielefeld, 2016), 54: 'Mama Düül und ihre Sauerkrautband spielt auf' (1969); Faust, song titled 'Krautrock' (1973); David Stubbs, *Future Days: Krautrock and the Building of Modern Germany* (London, 2014), 5: 'no one is absolutely certain who came up with the term, however, it is undoubtedly the product of the British music press.'

[3] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 231.

[4] Ibid. 10, 35

[5] Ibid. 57; Adelt, *Krautrock*, 1.

[6] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 2–3.

[7] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 4.

[8] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 53; Stubbs, *Future Days*, 5, quoting Weinzierl/Amon Düül: 'My definition of Krautrock was always "German musicians trying to sound like American or English musicians"'; 'no German musician of that generation accepts the word "Krautrock", or the word as it is understood by English writers.'

by difference. The experimental approach is considered the glue between the different bands and styles; yet it is an ambivalent attitude.[9] The reviewed books explain how and why.

In his book *Wir müssen hier raus!* Wolfgang Seidel criticizes the label Krautrock, as in his view the emphasis on national origin rather than musical content does not do justice to the artists' self-awareness and rebellion against the commercial and mainstream pop music (industry) of the time. In his plea against embedding Krautrock in a national pop history,[10] and for a better understanding of it as an embodiment of utopian dreams of an alternative society and lifestyle, the 'yearning for a future that never happened',[11] Seidel suggests using alternative notions such as Free Beat and Free Jazz[12] to capture the essence of a transnational Krautrock identity that helped to turn a 'fascist Germany into a normal, Western democracy'.[13]

Transnationality is the focus of Alexander Simmeth's illuminating pop-historical work *Krautrock transnational*. His in-depth analysis is based on profound empirical research. From a well founded, critical–theoretical distance, the author approaches the phenomenon as a new form of cultural expression in the context of a changing political–cultural and pop-cultural landscape in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.[14] The author categorizes Krautrock as pop music which he defines as 'the primary communication space of transnational youth cultures',[15] and in which Krautrock represents an 'innovative and constitutive pillar of pop music'.[16] The book offers a broad, detail-rich overview of bands and artists by focusing on music production, distribution, and reception practices in Germany, the UK, and USA, and highlighting an 'exciting link between cultural industry and counterculture'.[17]

9 Adelt, *Krautrock*, 172–3.
10 Wolfgang Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus! Krautrock, Free Beat, Reeducation* (Mainz, 2016), 123.
11 Ibid. 125.
12 Ibid. 70 New Music, 79 'total freie Musik', 80 'Neueste Musik'.
13 Ibid. 128.
14 Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 11.
15 Ibid. 35.
16 Ibid. 10.
17 Ibid. 27.

Ulrich Adelt investigates the field of tension between Krautrock and national identity in his compelling book *Krautrock*. He provides a fresh perspective by analysing Krautrock as a 'discursive formation' (Foucault) and 'field of cultural production' (Bourdieu). The author investigates how 'national identity gets transformed when it has become impossible to defend',[18] and addresses 'Krautrock's intersections of transnational music production and the reshaping of US popular culture', not by 'providing a purely historical or musical account, but discussing Krautrock as being constructed through performance and articulated through various forms of expressive culture'.[19] Adelt depicts Krautrock as an 'articulation of an unstable German identity'.[20] Although the musical experiments and border-crossings initially addressed a problematic past and 'unfinished identity',[21] he argues, they were finally embedded in a transgressive (in the widest sense) cultural globalization.

In *Future Days*, David Stubbs describes the socio-cultural and historical context of a collective German post-war 'fate' as the starting point for a paradoxical cultural phenomenon.[22] In Stubbs's view, the new music symbolized a new mode of living and (re)constructed a new German identity and culture.[23] Stubbs considers Krautrock as 'one of the corner stones for modern pop and rock music', which offered 'new templates for pop music',[24] and inspired various contemporary genres. It was considered marginal,[25] and is still largely unacknowledged and misunderstood today: 'All the more reason to tell Krautrock's story, not just its role in shaping modern music but how it was born out of the trauma and upheaval of post-war history and the rebirth of a nation.'[26]

In all four works, Krautrock is contextualized within a transnational societal and counter-cultural movement in post-industrial soci-

[18] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 1.
[19] Ibid. 3.
[20] Ibid. 43.
[21] Ibid. 24.
[22] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 22.
[23] Ibid. 21, 22, 24.
[24] Ibid. 4.
[25] Ibid. 3.
[26] Ibid. 9.

eties consisting of the famous 1968 new leftist students and commune-founding hippies, who rejected capitalist (mass-)consumerism, conservatism, patriarchy, bourgeoisie, and Americanization. Adelt and Stubbs depict the time of Krautrock's birth as a societal and musical *Stunde Null*,[27] a *tabula rasa* when a German post-war identity was transformed into a new German identity marked by futuristic elements and references to a (Romantic) past. Adelt views Krautrock as an 'audiotopia' (Josh Kun), a 'new' or 'alternative German' (and perhaps also a non-German?) 'space'. In practice, it meant that instead of playing beat and rock 'n' roll, musicians decided to improvise, experiment, and follow their own anti-commercial, musical DIY path with new visions of present and future realities and sounds.[28] The musicians understood their music as a potential contribution to societal and political change, as the soundtrack of the revolution of the Global Sixties.[29] Stubbs notes that 'the rebellion was domestic as well as international', and that the reaction of the young generation to the 'shadows of the past' was therefore paradoxical.[30] Seidel writes that the young generation wanted to 'get out' of a post-war welfare state that had not learned from its past. Stubbs asks whether this attitude could also be interpreted as escapist, and hence, whether in the end the Krautrockers were not doing the same as the (mainstream) pop music they despised and contested.[31]

The question of 'national identity' and 'Germanness' is a red thread running through all four publications. For Adelt, the 'Germanness' of Krautrock is not necessarily negative, as he considers Krautrock a 'flexible expression of nationality that necessitates moving across borders and contexts', which 'questions fixed notions of what it means to be German'.[32] Both Adelt and Stubbs add that the new German films, for which Krautrock often provided a soundtrack, created a new sense of German identity by first questioning 'German identity' itself.[33] Seidel paints a less positive picture of the 'Ger-

[27] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 42, 46; Stubbs, *Future Days*, 51; Adelt, *Krautrock*, 17.

[28] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 46, Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 198.

[29] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 196, 198.

[30] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 70.

[31] Ibid. 34.

[32] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 6.

[33] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 54–5.

manness' of Krautrock from the point of view of musicians who represented a total de-attachment from national roots.[34] The author points out that, if anything, the musicians did not want to be (considered) 'German' and, instead, were part of a transnational movement.[35] As the different publications illustrate, there is no doubt that they were. Musicians sought inspiration inside Germany and outside its borders. In Simmeth's words, the aim was to overcome 'a German awareness perceived as national' which was seen as 'contaminated' with the past on the one hand and with mainstream *Spießertum* (philistinism) and provincialism on the other.[36]

The conflict of Krautrock, as Seidel points out, was its position between Germanness and anti-Germanness, modernity and anti-modernity, future oriented and revolution oriented socio-political awareness, and nostalgic, spiritual, and 'cosmic' escapism.[37] Krautrock, as such, was a new form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past), a confrontation with the past, present, and future. German bands who played Anglo-American music, as Seidel writes, had an easier job than the Krautrockers, as the rock 'n' roll 'copycats' could position themselves in a transnational context which emphasized their sense of inauthenticity, alienation, and non-belonging (*das Nichtidentitäre*), and freed them from Germany and their German identity.[38] Stubbs, by contrast, depicts Krautrock as the representation of 'a real Germany' with 'possible futures' through the 'potential sound of a new Germany, modern, open, at ease with itself'.[39] But this, in Stubbs's view, referred not just to a new Germany, but also to a new world.[40] Although the Krautrockers were not proud of their nationality, they consciously and ambivalently aimed for change by creating something German in order to then 'de-Germanify',[41] (or re-Germanify) it again.

Seidel and Simmeth both point out that the majority of musicians were reluctant to adopt 'specifically German idioms' and a 'national

[34] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 128.
[35] Ibid. 128.
[36] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 31.
[37] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 66.
[38] Ibid. 83–4
[39] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 32–3, 157, 49.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid. 337.

monopolization' of their music.[42] Seidel contests a retrospective pop-historical 'fascination for a new German other',[43] and the depiction of Krautrock as the symbolic rebirth of Germany.[44] For Seidel, his own (former) politically conflictual[45] Krautrock?,[46] or *politrock*, band, Ton Steine Scherben, referred to the nation only in terms of negation,[47] whereas in his words, the 'Teutonenrock' of some contemporary German rock bands exemplifies the monopolization of 'German identity' to create a 'national soundtrack'. Yet, as Seidel concludes, Krautrock does not run the same risk, for its focus is on producing the 'incomprehensible'.[48] Similarly, Simmeth states that because of Krautrock's plurality, it is less likely to become an authentic identificatory instrument of a national memory culture,[49] albeit only when it is understood as a transnational phenomenon.

Bands such as Kraftwerk, as Adelt remarks, articulated an 'unfinished' German identity comprising semi-ironic depictions of German heritage, which symbolized both 'seemingly stable forms of Germanness', and 'cosmic' or futuristic globalism.[50] The author defines this process as 'deterritorialization' (referring to Deleuze / Guattari): a negation of the nation-state as a stable identifying force,[51] whereas reterritorialization means that non-German subjects identify with Krautrock and its 'global' 'Germanness'. As such, Krautrock 'continuously transgresses spatial borders and defies rigid classifications'.[52] 'Cosmic music', as Adelt explains, symbolized a 'deterritorialized, post-national identity',[53] which re-legitimized German culture precisely because it transcended Germany's borders,[54] while it could also be interpreted as a psychedelic drug-related form of escapism.

[42] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 36.
[43] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 352.
[44] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 18.
[45] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 54–5.
[46] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 34.
[47] Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!* 118.
[48] Ibid. 121.
[49] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 324.
[50] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 17.
[51] Ibid. 2.
[52] Ibid. 10.
[53] Ibid. 70.
[54] Ibid. 123.

From a similar positive transnational approach, Simmeth points out that the contemporary historical significance of Krautrock can only be understood from the perspective of cultural transfer, entanglement, border-crossing, and flow.[55] This comprises both the national and transnational,[56] and is, hence, not a one-way system.[57] Although the nation still plays a role, Simmeth adds, Krautrock comprises regional, local, and global characteristics.[58]

The connotation of Krautrock's 'Germanness' is a matter of (national) perspective as the books clearly illustrate. In the UK and USA, Krautrock is a seal of quality for innovative quality. It was celebrated for its difference, originality, progressiveness, and independence.[59] In 1972, *Melody Maker* described Krautrock as 'new European music' which had never been heard before,[60] and which challenged English and American standpoints.[61] The British and American press used contradictory terms to describe what were perceived as the 'specific German' characteristics of the 'sound of the future',[62] such as, for instance, 'motorisch', but also 'melodic', 'cold' and 'romantic'.[63] Such attributions, as Simmeth explains, were intended to define and categorize the newness and otherness of the phenomenon. Its German origin was the first point of reference, and hence, despite the heterogeneity of the music, it was nationalized as 'German sound'. Its 'exoticism' fascinated young Brits,[64] such as Stubbs, who describes his first encounter with Krautrock. Stereotypical depictions may have influenced the self-understanding of the artists,[65] yet the outcome of the external 'Germanification' was, in fact, a Europeanized Kraftwerk. In the international context, furthermore, Germany was appreciated for its state of the art, innovative studio recording technology

[55] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 29, 31.
[56] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*.
[57] Ibid. 30, 31.
[58] Ibid. 156.
[59] Ibid. 227; Adelt, *Krautrock*, 6; Stubbs, *Future Days*, 40; Seidel, *Wir müssen hier raus!*
[60] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 231.
[61] Ibid. 237.
[62] Ibid. 315.
[63] Ibid. 245.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid. 36.

and expertise.[66] As Simmeth concludes, Krautrock contributed to a crucial, transnational, socio-cultural transfer in which 'high-tech Germanness'[67] was associated with a blossoming music industry of global allure and appeal in a cosmopolitan, modern West Germany.[68] The music, thus, represented a new pop-cultural landscape from which everyone could benefit.

As demonstrated by Adelt, Simmeth, and Stubbs, Kraftwerk par excellence exemplifies how 'Teutonic identity' is constructed deliberately and ambivalently, precisely to question 'Germanness' and 'German identity' and to construct a transnational identity. Krautrock essentially challenged musical, societal, and politics standards and norms, and embodied a concept of globalization. The price of breaking up fixed categories is that such artistic representations are easily misunderstood to the present day.[69] As Stubbs concludes, it is no surprise that the use of clichés by musicians, the external stereotyping by press and fans, and, hence, Krautrock as a phenomenon in general, did not appeal to a German audience as much as it did to a British one.[70]

Adelt's focus on what he considers 'striking parallels to various forms of Krautrock', Kraftwerk up front again, in the musical representations of Donna Summer and David Bowie, further unravels the 'complex web of discursive identity formations [which] clearly extended beyond the borders of Germany itself',[71] and remains influential to the present day. In an international perspective, Krautrock has 'its Germanness in its favour' as it both (positively) confirmed and questioned national identity as well as what pop music can be or do.[72] Kraftwerk may have presented a future which never happened, as Stubbs notes, but the music proved timeless and placeless.[73] The 'Teutonic' or 'Germanic rhythm'[74] was not meant to sync with the

[66] Ibid. 286.
[67] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 139.
[68] Simmeth, *Krautrock transnational*, 318.
[69] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 43–4.
[70] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 39.
[71] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 160.
[72] Ibid. 172–3 (quoting Joe Tangari/Pitchfork).
[73] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 155.
[74] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 30 (quoting Kraftwerk's Ralf Hütter).

crowd or march in line, and, hence, fits into any era,[75] and into any concept of musical, cultural, sexual, or national identity.

Krautrock travelled from bands such as Tangerine Dream, Amon Düül, Faust, Can, and Kraftwerk to Coldplay, Detroit techno, Donna Summer, and David Bowie, and its journey has not ended yet. Elements and ideas of Krautrock have been embraced by international artists with mixed roots and hybrid identities who have integrated and developed them in new, border-crossing sound experiments. It was, indeed, as Stubbs points out, a product of West Germany's unique situation then, 'but today it belongs to the world, to the present and . . . future'.[76] Although many people might not know the term, in the broadest definition, Krautrock has reached a global audience, and is thus a key phenomenon in music history. The publications discussed here make clear that a close reading of a seemingly marginal pop-historical phenomenon such as 'Krautrock' contributes to a better understanding of a much broader socio-cultural and political historical discourse which remains current. Stubbs optimistically concludes that the pejorative connotations of the term Krautrock have been 'semantically' washed off with time.[77] Although the four works suggest that while this might be true for 'Krautrock', the question of 'Germanness' remains relevant.

If anything, the books discussed in this review illustrate the multidimensionality and multi-colouredness of the topic. The lines are blurred between 'being on the inside looking out and being on the outside looking in',[78] and between concepts of 'German' and 'non-German', man and machine, authentic and artificial, 'good' and 'bad', male and female. Music both polarizes and unites; it can connect people through different spaces, times, and categories of identity. The themes presented in and with regard to Krautrock are universal and transnational, and link back to (shared) past traditions and futuristic visions of utopia and dystopia which both confirm as well as move beyond fixed paradigms and stigmas. Although it may sometimes appear naively idealistic, the basic idea seems to be that one does not have to restrict oneself in any way, nor choose sides.

[75] Ibid. 172 (quoting Joe Tangari/Pitchfork).
[76] Stubbs, *Future Days*, 463.
[77] Ibid. 7.
[78] Adelt, *Krautrock*, 129, 123.

Such a sense of artistic freedom allows for an exploration of both old and new territories, and for existential, cultural, societal, and political experiment in the widest sense. The story of Krautrock confirms the seemingly banal idea that a story has, indeed, two sides. In the end, the question Krautrock raises concerns everyone who decides to listen. The answer, the beauty, of Krautrock is in the eye of the beholder, and timeless subject to time and space.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STEFANIE SCHILD, *Der Investiturstreit in England*, Historische Studien, 504 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2015), 324 pp. ISBN 978 3 7868 1504 4. €49.00

The title of Stefanie Schild's *Der Inverstiturstreit in England* (The Investiture Controversy in England) undersells the intention and scope of her work. While the period of Investiture Controversy in England (1100–1107) forms the core of her work, she considers interactions between the kings of England, their Church, and the papacy from the time of the Conquest until the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164). Furthermore, while England remains at the heart of the piece, the work is strongly comparative and draws frequent connections between events and changes in the Empire (and, more occasionally, in France) and those in England. This chronological and geographical breadth provides a thorough overview of the events surrounding the conflict over Investiture and raises some important issues with common narratives.

This book makes a significant contribution to current research trends. It is important for three reasons: firstly, it provides a continental perspective on the insular conflict between Church and State. While this is far from unique, as demonstrated by Schild's extensive German bibliography, this application of the traditions of a national school in the study of a different region is still relatively unusual and forms part of a broader trend towards interaction between different schools. Secondly, Schild does not look at the events and issues of the Investiture Contest in England in isolation, but rather compares them with the corresponding controversies on the continent, looking at the Empire (in some depth) and France (to a lesser extent). This comparative approach is of vital importance to the study of this period in general, and, in this particular case, allows Schild to cast new light on the conflict in both England and the Empire. Again, Schild's work is not unique in this approach, but this is nonetheless an important component within a growing and profitable trend towards a more holistic and transnational view of medieval church history in general and, more specifically, of the Investiture Controversy. And third-

ly, on the basis, in part, of these approaches Schild challenges several elements within the dominant narrative. Most notably, she questions the chronology of events and argues against the imposition of modern terms and concepts.

Der Inverstitursteit is methodical in its approach. In a brief introduction, Schild sets out her core research question: why was the Investiture Contest resolved swiftly and easily in England when compared to the drawn out and embittered conflict in the Empire? Around this core, she highlights a range of further issues within and around the crisis: the causes and chronology of the conflict; the role and relative importance of key figures beyond the king, the pope, and the archbishop of Canterbury, both in England and on the continent; the use of terms such as 'Investiture' and 'Concordat'. Schild then raises issues regarding the implementation of the Concordat of London from 1107 and the impact on the kingdom of England. Finally, and most significantly, she underlines the connection between the Concordat of London and that of Worms in 1122.

The remainder of the work sets out to address these issues over six chapters through a primarily chronological approach. The first two chapters establish the background to the conflict, addressing the rule of William I and William II respectively. Through these chapters, themes of continuity and change from the pre-Norman Church emerge, including the use of episcopal offices for royal power politics through the installation of figures loyal, or at least connected, to the king, alongside the emergence of a tradition of papal lenience towards these practices in England. The significance of the quarrel between William II and Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, with regard to both the subsequent conflict between king and pope, and to William's traditionally poor reputation is also considered.

The next two chapters move into the conflict itself. Chapter three revolves primarily around the identification of the starting point of the conflict between Pope Paschal II and King Henry I. In opposition to the traditional September 1100 origin, Schild argues for an outbreak of hostilities in 1101, represented by the explicit reference to investiture and homage in a letter of Paschal to Henry produced in these months. On this basis, she presents the 1100 dispute between Henry and Anselm as a local affair rather than a formal split between king and pope. This distinction between two related but separate conflicts, the first between the king and the archbishop, the second

between the king and the pope, is a significant and recurring theme throughout Schild's work. The argument here is convincing, although it perhaps places too much emphasis on the identification of a sudden breakdown in the royal–papal relationship.

Chapter four builds on this work to consider the resolution of the conflict. Schild emphasizes a swift end, especially when compared to the corresponding contest in the Empire, identifying a resolution between king and archbishop in 1105 or 1106 prior to its ratification through the Concordat of London in 1107. To explain this, she revisits its themes from her opening chapters, namely that the Norman kings traditionally held a great deal of power over episcopal appointments and that the Church traditionally looked upon this power with tolerance if not approval. Furthermore, by considering the individual circumstances of king and pope, Schild underlines that neither figure sought conflict here and both were generally conciliatory in their correspondence. Schild raises two further important points within this chapter. First, she underlines the role of mediators and advisers, such as Adela of Blois and Robert of Meulan, between king and pope, emphasizing that this was not a binary conflict and seeing greater nuance within negotiations. Secondly, Schild questions whether the Concordat of London resolved the issue of investiture, arguing that in 1107 there was no separation of *sacerdotium* and *regnum*. Instead, the Concordat focused on the issue of episcopal homage.

The fifth chapter provides a wide-ranging and impressive view of the consequences of the conflict and the Concordat of London through the rest of the reign of Henry I, the contested claims of Stephen and Matilda, and, ultimately, the rule of Henry II and his promulgation of the Constitutions of Clarendon. Schild addresses the use of the Church in the politics of these monarchs in turn before returning to consider their relationships with the popes. Through this, she highlights the incomplete solution provided in 1107 and the continued issues surrounding the nature of the bishop's temporal and spiritual authority. This chapter is particularly interesting as it reflects on the changes in England in relation to those on the continent, looking in particular at the fluid and frequently hostile relationships between pope and emperor.

Chapter six develops these ideas further and focuses on the relationship between the Investiture Contest in England and that on the continent, with a particular consideration of the differences and sim-

ilarities between the Concordat of London and that of Worms. In doing so, Schild demonstrates a coherent and evolving strategy among the popes, arguing that the discourse around earlier attempts to resolve the conflict, such as the Concordat of London or the varied interactions between Paschal II and the Emperor Henry V, informed later attempts, such as the Concordat of Worms, and enabled later popes and emperors to achieve a satisfactory compromise.

Schild's conclusion provides a solid overview of her arguments and presents her narrative for the events of the Investiture Controversy in England clearly and concisely. This culminates in a brief reiteration of the connection between the Insular Controversy and that within the Empire.

Taken as a whole, the work is cohesive and well argued. More could be done to set out the structure and direction of each chapter, but the language and written style is accessible and generally clear and concise. The bibliography is extensive and a substantial range of English and, especially, German works have been consulted. The absence of French- or Italian-language material is unfortunate given the scope of the project and somewhat undermines its strength as a transnational comparative study. In a similar vein, a slightly greater consideration of the contest in France and Italy would have been an interesting and worthwhile addition and more could have been done to emphasize the connections, similarities, and differences between England and the continent. Nevertheless, a focus on interaction and comparison is an important and visible theme within this study, and Schild systematically develops complex and well-reasoned arguments, supported by a balanced reading of the primary and secondary sources.

The book serves as a useful introduction to the Investiture Contest and the concepts of *sacerdotium* and *regnum* in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, with a particular emphasis on England but with relevance throughout France and the Empire. Furthermore, it is important reading for scholars of this period in general. The Investiture Contest and the interaction between temporal and sacral power exerted influence across political, social, economic, and military spheres. As such, the ideas Schild counters or promotes have significant potential consequences for many fields of history.

Der Inverstiturstreit in England is an important addition to the study of the Investiture Contest both in England and the Empire.

Schild reconsiders the traditional narrative and develops innovative arguments for the causes and consequences of the changing relationship between king and Church in England. More significantly, she underlines the interconnected nature of the conflict, highlighting both immediate and longer term consequences for events on the continent stemming from insular developments and vice versa. This is a very rich vein for further study and increases the relevance of Schild's book well beyond her immediate theme.

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JENNIFER BAIN, *Hildegard of Bingen and Musical Reception: The Modern Revival of a Medieval Composer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), xiii + 235 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 07666 2. £64.99. US$99.99

Jennifer Bain introduces her volume on the nineteenth-century reception of Hildegard of Bingen and her songs through a personal encounter with Hildegard's music: when in 1991 Bain read the name 'Hildegard of Bingen' on a cassette tape, she presumed that this referred to a modern composer writing music in a medieval style. Subsequently she learned that a figure from the Middle Ages was involved only through feminist and New Age literature, which at that time in the English-speaking world were almost the only approaches taken to Hildegard. This eventually led the author to ask after the historical person behind these layers of reception, above all with regard to Hildegard's musical *oeuvre*. In the book under review Bain examines the rediscovery (or reinvention) of Hildegard of Bingen and her music in the nineteenth century within various religious, cultural, and political movements of that time. Her work meets a clear need in current research on Hildegard, which following the major conferences devoted to her in 1998 at Bingen and on the occasion of her canonization in 2013 at Mainz has concentrated on revealing the historical person of Hildegard of Bingen in her twelfth-century context. This also applies to her musical compositions, which have been re-evaluated through the deconstruction both of twentieth and twenty-first century myths and of the songs identified in the Middle Ages by her personal milieu and currently ascribed to Hildegard in terms of their genesis, the influence upon them of contemporary musical developments, and editing procedures in the creation of written versions.

Bain's book is dedicated to the thus far relatively unexplored period between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century (which is not immediately apparent from the term 'modern' in the title) and shows that Hildegard as a historical figure was the subject of continuous interest, although her musical works have received more attention since the mid nineteenth century.

Bain arranges her study into an introduction on the reception of Hildegard's sequence *O virga ac diadema*, and five chapters on the

Trans. Ben Pope

reception of Hildegard from her death in 1179 up to 1850, on the increasing veneration of Hildegard and her recognition as a composer after 1850, on the revival of chant in Germany, and on the place of these developments in the movements of the *Kulturkampf* era and the reciprocal relationships between the growing attention given to Hildegard and her music and the nationalist and religious–political currents of the second half of the nineteenth century. The conclusion briefly highlights the re-founding of the abbey of St Hildegard in Rüdesheim and the stimulus which this has given to the academic study of Hildegard's works.

In the introductory chapter on *O virga ac diadema* Bain shows that this sequence has repeatedly found prominence since it was mentioned in documents for the canonization process of 1233. It was amongst the first of Hildegard's pieces which the parish priest Ludwig Schneider transcribed from the Wiesbaden Codex (*Riesencodex*) and had performed by a small female choir on 17 September 1857 (p. 22). The modern musical rediscovery of Hildegard of Bingen began with Schneider and was continued by Franz Meyer, who in 1866 posthumously published Schneider's transcription, and by Johannes Schmelzeis, who included a transcription of the sequence by the historian and practitioner of church music Raymund Schlecht in his 1879 biography of Hildegard, *Das Leben und Wirken der heiligen Hildegardis* (p. 24). *O virga ac diadema* also received attention from Dom Joseph Pothier of Solesmes Abbey and from Hildegard's biographer Johannes May (1911), as well as appearing on records from the first recordings by the choir of Aachen cathedral in around 1960 down to Richard Southers New Age version on the CD *Vision* (1994), alongside many taking a period performance approach.

Schneider, Schmelzeis, Schlecht, and Pothier comprise the most important protagonists in the musical reception of Hildegard from the mid nineteenth century. Even beforehand, as Bain shows in her following chapter, Hildegard of Bingen had never been entirely forgotten ever since her death, although she was remembered with varying intensity across the centuries. Beginning with Goethe's famous note on his examination of the *Riesencodex* in the Wiesbaden library in 1814–15, Bain traces a peculiarly German process which imbued the figure of Hildegard with the character of a 'national saint'—for instance, through her inclusion in the Walhalla hall of fame (p. 45)—although her musical output played no part at this stage.

The earliest known modern transcription of Hildegard's songs is that of Ludwig Schneider, who received an episcopal commission to authenticate the relics of Hildegard at Eibingen. Bain is able to re-evaluate and underline Schneider's decisive role in the musical reception of Hildegard with the aid of many contemporary documents (p. 98).

The history of the editions of Hildegard's songs is illuminated by Bain's reflections on their connections with the respective focal points of the French and German revivals of chant. Detailed expositions of the genesis of the *Editio medicea* and its reprinting and of the role of Haberl feel somewhat digressive, not least because specialist studies on these matters are already available. This section would have benefited from a tighter focus on the significant differences, namely on the continuous tradition of the chant in France in contrast to the introduction in Germany through the Reformation of an alternative hymnal tradition. The same applies to the overview of the history of both confessions since the Reformation, which comes across as both too brief and not strictly necessary (p. 121).

In contrast, Bain provides extremely interesting detail on Wilhelm Preger, a Protestant author who in 1874 cast doubt on the authenticity of Hildegard's entire *oeuvre*, a recurring accusation, most recently pursued with a polemical edge in Richard Witt's article 'How to Make a Saint',[1] and who received in the same year an honorary doctorate from the Evangelical Theological Faculty of the University of Erlangen. Bain clearly demonstrates that regardless of the factual position this was interpreted from the Catholic perspective as an attack in the context of wider tensions between the two confessions. In a moment of historical irony, we learn that Preger omitted from his critique the correspondence between Hildegard and Bernhard of Clairvaux (p. 137), precisely the material which is regarded by modern editors as particularly questionable. The many illustrations of the earliest editions of Hildegard's songs contained in Bain's study shed light on the various editorial approaches of the time: from Schneider's transcription with organ accompaniment, through Schlecht and Pothier's attempted facsimiles from the neumes of the *Riesencodex*, to Schlecht and Pothier's translations into rhythmic and square notation

[1] Richard Witt, 'How to Make a Saint: On Interpreting Hildegard of Bingen', *Early Music*, 26 (1998), 479–85.

respectively. The latter visited Wiesbaden several times to study the *Riesencodex* and his series of articles in the *Revue de chant grégorien* contributed significantly to the dissemination and better theoretical understanding of Hildegard's songs. As valuable as this information is, here too the precise descriptions of Pothier's journeys or of the town of Wiesbaden seem largely unnecessary.

Overall, the English-speaking Bain must be accorded respect for having processed a large number of German sources which are difficult to access and not always linguistically straightforward, whilst also being able repeatedly to correct misunderstandings in the Anglo-Saxon literature (for example, the excursus on *merkwürdig* in the context of Goethe's travelogue, p. 41 n. 29). Useful information continually crops up even outside of the main themes (for instance, the fact that the first ever recording of Hildegard's music was made in 1948 by the monks' choir of Saint-Benoit-du-Lac in Québec, and hence with male voices!). The only faults that can be found in Bain's own transcriptions are a few minor imprecisions (such as the unremarked resolution of the quilismae as two equal notes or the possibly transposed syllables 'ley-son' in the Kyrie, p. 186).

The volume is rounded out and made easier to use with a discography, a bibliography of editions, primary sources (including archival) and secondary literature, an index, and a list of figures. The enduring merit of Bain's study consists in revealing and tracing from their modern origins onwards the different modes of reception of Hildegard of Bingen in nineteenth-century Germany, especially in connection with her musical works, and in being probably the first to do so for an English-speaking readership.

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PHILIP N. HABERKERN, *Patron Saint and Prophet: Jan Hus in the Bohemian and German Reformations*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), xii + 334 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 028073 4. £47.99

This work originated in a dissertation by the author, who now teaches in Boston, and sets out to investigate the reception of Jan Hus in the contexts of the Bohemian reform movement of the fifteenth century and the German Reformation of the sixteenth. The programmatic brevity of the chapter headings leaves an impression of contrivance, but by collecting together these titles we gain a rough sense of the varied processes of retrospection and appropriation during the century and a half under consideration: 'The Saint', 'The Founder', 'The Patron', 'The Apocalyptic Witness', 'The Prophet', 'The Catholic', and 'The Exemplar' are the keywords used to mark the changing roles ascribed to Hus.

A comprehensive introduction presents the book's central questions and the current state of the field, establishes the subject matter's potential to produce new insights, and offers a brief overview of the life of Jan Hus. The first of the main chapters is then devoted to the battle over Hus's memory and the interpretation of his personality and career which commenced immediately after he was burned at the stake in 1415. Following some interesting preliminary reflections on theories of *memoria* and *kulturelles Gedächtnis*, Haberkern analyses the early texts which debate Hus and his martyrdom from the perspective of his supporters. Of these, the *Relatio* of Hus's confidant, Petr of Mladoňovice, achieved particular longevity. But from a very early stage the image of a pious Hus, who had achieved a clear affinity to Christ and the saints and who was praised by his followers in songs and sermons, was opposed by an orthodox perspective which vehemently condemned veneration of Hus in any form. This commenced the struggle for control of the interpretation of the person and teachings of the Bohemian theologian. The invocation of 'Saint Jan Hus' (p. 66) played a central role in the Hussite movement, which began to spread immediately after his death, and in the armed conflict which began around 1420. For his followers, the memory of Hus's martyrdom became the foundation on which a new 'Czech church' (p. 67) was to be built.

Trans. Ben Pope.

The second chapter deals with the period 1419 to 1436, which was dominated by the military clashes of the Hussite Revolution. Hus was transformed from *casus belli* to the founder of a stable, Bohemian nationalist Utraquism. Haberkern demonstrates that throughout the long conflict Hus was deployed by both sides as either a martyr and witness to the true faith or as a heretic and false prophet who had led the Bohemians away from their old faith. During the negotiations conducted by the Council of Basel, which produced at least an interim agreement in the *Compactata* of 1436, Hus remained, as previously during the Hussite Wars, a central precursor, patron, and protector of the Hussites' Bohemian–Utraquist church. The following chapter examines the way in which Hus was venerated in this church and the role played by 6 July, the anniversary of his death. New sermons, songs, and prayers recalled Hus as 'patron' of the Utraquist movement. This veneration expanded in the 1470s. Hus was now stylized as a holy warrior for God and the Czech people. Alongside the memory of Hus and his martyrdom, the chalice constituted a central symbol of Hussite–Utraquist identity. Besides the textual witnesses, Haberkern investigates certain Utraquist works of arts which evidence the widespread remembrance of Hus and his enduring veneration as a saint of the Hussite movement. In the late fifteenth century the author sees an increasing use of 'new media' (p. 146) such as illustrations. Thus the fifteenth-century Hussite and Utraquist commemoration of Hus relied very much on the standard forms of medieval saints' cults. July 6 was celebrated as a particularly important anniversary with a special rite.

The first part of the book, with its focus on the Bohemian situation in the fifteenth century, ends on the question of how the commemoration of Hus would change under the completely altered conditions which arose in the Reformation era of the sixteenth century. The initial answer is that commemoration in the form of a saint's cult gave way to a more historically focused memorial culture. The Wittenberg Reformation was associated with a rediscovery of the figure of Jan Hus, beginning with the Leipzig disputation of 1519. Johannes Eck attacked Luther's 'heresy' by accusing him of being a Hussite. This gave Luther cause to engage more closely with Hus's life and teaching. Luther and the evangelical movement subsequently took a positive approach to the Bohemian theologian. In 1520 Luther had *On the Church*, Hus's chief work, printed, and further writings by Hus fol-

lowed. Whilst evangelical authors increasingly represented Hus as a precursor of Luther and an early fighter against the papal Antichrist, the orthodox side saw Luther's proximity to Hus as proof of his heresy.

The increasing interest in Hus during the 1520s is shown by the printing of his works and of eyewitness accounts of his execution and of other events at Constance. Hus's supposed prophecy that he, the goose, would be followed in one hundred years by a swan, or Luther, was especially popular. This legend was taken up and disseminated in the 1530s by Luther and his followers. By this means Hus became a prophetic forerunner of Luther who had proclaimed the German Reformation in advance. When a council was called to Mantua in 1536, evangelical authors repeatedly pointed to Hus and his tragic end at Constance as an example of the conniving of papal councils, the pronouncements of which could not be trusted. As proof, Hus's prison letters from Constance were printed, amongst other texts, in multiple editions. Johannes Agricola penned a play based on Petr of Mladoňovice's version of events which brought the sentencing and mistreatment of Hus to a wider audience.

In the sixth chapter Haberkern turns to the Catholic theologian and polemicist Johannes Cochlaeus, one of the most significant of the publicists and theologians in opposition to Luther and the Reformation. Cochlaeus's strategic aim originally consisted in foregrounding what Hus and Luther had in common in order to prove the heresy of Luther and his followers. This line of argument was employed by many other orthodox authors. But in the mid 1530s Cochlaeus began to redraw his image of Hus. He now emphasized the differences between Luther and Hus. In comparison to Luther, Hus appears as a relatively faithful Catholic, albeit one who eventually had to be executed on account of his heresy. But Hus, Cochlaeus now argued, had adopted much more moderate positions than the Wittenberg heretic. Cochlaeus's answer to the previously mentioned play by Johannes Agricola is a further example of the expertise and originality involved in the polemical sparring around the figure of Hus. In his own theatrical work Cochlaeus stressed the differences between Hus and Luther. The plurality and vitality of the disputes over Hus are well expressed in these battles over his memory and meaning. Haberkern's recognition of a 'shifting strategic imperative' (p. 231) in Cochlaeus's interpretation of Hus is one of the most com-

pelling sections of the book. However, no matter how far Cochlaeus went in his re-interpretation of Hus, his strategy never represented Hus's 'rehabilitation' (p. 239), as a subheading suggests.

The final chapter, titled 'The Exemplar', focuses on the crisis of Protestantism from the mid sixteenth century. On the orthodox side, Conrad Braun and Johannes Cochlaeus warned against placing any trust in and making peace with the Empire's Protestants. The history of Hussitism was ever present as a cautionary example. Simultaneously, an effort was made to present the 'heresy' of Luther and his adherents as singular in its intensity. Luther's death, the Schmalkaldic War, and the Augsburg Interim tipped the Reformation within the Empire into a crisis. On the evangelical side this gave rise to a need for historical self-reassurance. Haberkern describes an 'explosion of historical texts . . . across Europe' (p. 276). Hus was at the centre of many historical works. Matthias Flacius included him in his *Catalogus testium Veritatis*. Haberkern correctly stresses the central place accorded to Hus in the creation of a Protestant historical tradition. The voluminous edition of Hus and Jerome of Prague's complete works compiled by Flacius in 1558 underlines the role envisaged for Hus as a witness to evangelical truth.

The extensive list of sources and bibliography, including Czech titles, makes clear the study's large evidential base and follows the main text together with a substantial index, which constitutes a meaningful and helpful addition to the work. In his choice of sources the author has necessarily concentrated on certain areas. Personalities such as Cochlaeus, Agricola, and Flacius dominate the second half of the study. The opportunity could certainly have been taken to include others who engaged with Hus and thus to complete the picture. But given the broad chronological scope of the study this is perhaps an unrealistic aspiration.

Overall, *Patron Saint and Prophet* evinces a winning formula of clear prose and cogent argumentation. The author indulges repeatedly in playful language, such as when he speaks of an 'early modern "axis of evil"' (p. 164). He is always able to relate the reception of Hus to the major political events of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and to reconstruct its structures in detail. The tremendous significance of Jan Hus in the memorial culture and historical self-positioning of the Bohemian reform movement and the German Reformation is established through a thorough source analysis. The par-

ticular motives underlying each reference to Hus are elucidated with precision and represent a valuable advance in understanding. Brief summaries at the end of each chapter help the reader to follow the thought processes, lines of argumentation, and conclusions. The author also seeks to carry the reader with them through the more complicated issues. Connections with other disciplines, for example, with literary studies, are made with apparent ease and enrich the final product.

The term 'Bohemian reformation' (p. 6) is used by Haberkern as a solid and presupposed concept, although one which is never further defined. Whether or not it might be better with respect to the Hussite movement in Bohemia to speak of a 'reform movement' distinct from the Reformation of the following century remains a matter for discussion. The author nonetheless makes reference to an 'era of the European reformations' (p. 2), a point of view which should be recognized as controversial, at least within German research on the Reformation. The two halves of the study could also have been more closely linked together—as it is, they sit rather monolithically alongside one another. Thus it remains to be seen whether the sixteenth-century Reformation did not, in fact, inaugurate a new phase in the reception of Hus which had few connections with the late medieval Bohemian phase. The multimedial qualities of the commemoration of Hus form a clear focus of the study in the first half, but receive only very cursory treatment in the second. A more incisive investigation, going beyond the well-known examples, would have been desirable here.

Regardless of these queries and points of disagreement, the author has succeeded in producing a thoroughly researched and well thought through monograph which, drawing on a rich source base, provides a lucid overview of the commemoration of Hus in the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries. This represents a first step in closing the still plentiful gaps in research on the reception of Hus. This monograph both establishes a reliable foundation and sets the standard for all subsequent work in this field.

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DAVID SCOTT GEHRING (ed.), *Diplomatic Intelligence on the Holy Roman Empire and Denmark during the Reigns of Elizabeth I and James VI: Three Treatises*, Camden Fifth Series, 49 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society, 2016), xii + 260 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 14798 0. £44.99. $US79.99 (hardback)

Early modern Germany was difficult for the outsider to fathom. The Holy Roman Empire was a complex political entity that did not easily fit the familiar concepts of a monarchical or aristocratic state. The question of where rights and authority actually lay was always a complicated one, and answering it often required a deep familiarity with local customs and traditions as well as religious developments. This lack of straightforward political structures not only troubled political reformers and jurists throughout the entire period but also constituted a major obstacle to diplomatic relations with the Empire. This applies especially to the later sixteenth century, when the right of the Estates to conduct a more or less independent foreign policy was less articulated than during the period after 1648, and when the Reformation had unsettled and complicated the political landscape. To find the proper and most promising addressee for a particular diplomatic request from outside thus constituted a diplomatic effort in its own right. Testimony to this are the enduring yet often agonizingly slow and frequently fruitless attempts to achieve a concerted policy towards the Protestant Estates by the rulers of France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and England.[1]

In addition to his recent valuable contribution on Anglo-German relations during the reign of Elizabeth I, David Scott Gehring has now published an edition of three treatises on early modern Germany and Denmark during Elizabeth's reign. Written during or as a direct result of diplomatic activity within the Empire and Denmark, these treatises dating from 1569, 1588, and 1590 offer pro-

[1] David Scott Gehring, *Anglo-German Relations and the Protestant Cause: Elizabethan Foreign Policy and Pan-Protestantism* (London, 2013); Friedrich Beiderbeck, *Zwischen Religionskrieg, Reichskrise und europäischem Hegemoniekampf: Heinrich IV. von Frankreich und die protestantischen Reichsstände* (Berlin, 2005); Johannes Arndt, *Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande 1566 bis 1648: Politisch-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg* (Cologne, 1998); Paul D. Lockhart, *Frederick II and the Protestant Cause: Denmark's Role in the Wars of Religion, 1559–1596* (Boston, 2004).

found insights into how these realms were perceived through English diplomatic eyes, and into the problems of diplomatic activity with the Empire. *The State of Germany* (1569), convincingly attributed by Gehring to the English diplomat Robert Beale, *A Discourse . . . of Denmark* (1588) by Daniel Rodgers, and *Ane Account of ane Embassie* (1590) by the Scottish diplomat John Skene are, each in its own way, valuable sources for a number of strands of diplomatic history. The astonishing amount of detail the reports contain and their implicit or explicit political agenda, however, often also represent a major challenge for the modern reader. It is convenient therefore, that the book opens with a brief discussion of the wider political background in which these documents were conceived, their authors, and their immediate connection with specific diplomatic settings. In addition, Gehring offers some methodological reflections on their potential value to diplomatic historians using both old and new approaches, and discusses these diplomatic accounts in the context of the wider genre of diplomatic travel writing.

Most valuable of all, however, is the meticulous and untiring effort Gehring has put into the critical apparatus. This is apparent less in the thorough but fairly conventional index than in the work and detail that has gone into the footnotes. They offer bibliographical and biographical information on both the more famous and the lesser known protagonists of the texts, and usually even reference further reading. Additionally, archaic or corrupted place names and other specific terms of the time are usually explained, and Latin passages and expressions are conveniently translated into English. It is mainly this, and the occasional comment on the political background or dynastic intricacies, that makes the texts understandable and useful for the modern scholar. The only thing one could have wished for in addition to the existing apparatus is a short synopsis of each of these texts, which would, for example, have been helpful for understanding some of the more subtle and implicit aims of Skene's political mission in the Netherlands. Nor is there any discussion of how these reports actually shaped foreign policy in England and Scotland at the time, but this might, admittedly, be a theme more suited to research than an edition of sources.

The three texts are very different from each other, and their potential use for historiography varies accordingly. *The State of Germany* was written during a period when English hopes for a treaty with the

Protestant Estates in the Empire were strongly encouraged by the Electors of the Palatinate and traditionally thwarted by the Electors of Saxony. It is no surprise, therefore, that the account focuses on these two courts in particular. The text starts, however, by outlining the structures and political mechanisms at work in the Empire (describing, as it were, its mostly unwritten constitution). It touches on the position of the Emperor, goes on to describe the three Estates of Electors, Princes, and Cities, and then details their chief trading commodities and matters of religion. Most of this account can still be read as a helpful introduction, even today. Much more partial and thus more valuable to the historian, therefore, is the description of the courts of Heidelberg and Dresden. In a very clear attempt to show where English sympathies were supposed to lie in the Empire, the Dresden court and August of Saxony fare much worse than Frederick III in Heidelberg throughout the report.

The *Discourse . . . of Denmark* provides a dense and detailed description of the state of Denmark, chiefly focusing on its dynastic problems and history, and describing the complicated power relations in the country after the death of King Frederick II. Apart from his observations on dynasty and power relations, the author's interest in political geography, trade routes, and trade policies is noteworthy. The text also touches on interesting details from a cultural and religious perspective, mentioning, for example, the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe and the disagreement between the King of Denmark and the Protestant Estates in the Empire after the *Book of Concorde* (1580). The diplomatic intelligence contained in the text, however, as Gehring mentions, was probably of much less use to English diplomats than *The State of Germany* had been twenty years earlier, since hitherto fruitful Anglo-Danish relations declined considerably after 1588.

Richer in detail and remarkable particulars is the third text in the collection. Unlike the other two, it is less a thought-out report than a travel account, with a more flexible and less abstract form. The writing of John Skene, therefore, provides a glimpse of the actual challenges and tribulations of diplomacy in the Holy Roman Empire. It is, for example, interesting to see that diplomacy was often impeded by the absence of the princes from their court, or by the fact that gaining access to the princes was apparently not as certain for a Scottish diplomat at the time as might be assumed. Apart from these specific

problems, diplomats were aware that the German princes 'uses to doe all yer turns with ane partes of tyme, & not suddenlie' (p. 166), which was rendered all the more problematic by 'ye difficultie of convening ye Electors & princes of almaigre duelling so far distant from other' (p. 166). This is a clear indication that the habits of German princes as much as the constitution of the Empire were a great hindrance to effective diplomacy. To this was added, at times, a rather peculiar problem: on more than one occasion, the diplomats were molested by 'ye filthier & common waye of drynking' (p. 178), so much so, in fact, that they once had to refuse a dinner invitation 'for fear of drinking' (p. 170).

Each of these reports, and each in its own way, will be of great benefit to the understanding of English diplomacy in the Holy Roman Empire during Elizabeth's reign. Apart from this specific perspective, however, the reports not only convey a colourful, contemporary picture of early modern Germany and Denmark, but also contribute to answering the larger question of how the Holy Roman Empire was perceived by neighbouring rulers at the time. It would be worth attempting to bring these perceptions together in a comparative perspective, combining, for example, French and English notions of the Empire with Danish and Dutch views, and comparing these with ideas entertained in Rome and Madrid. The ongoing and lively inside discussion of what the Empire actually was, and how it was supposed to work, could in this way be complemented by an outside perspective on how the politics of the Empire could be understood, and thus on how the Empire had to be dealt with at a practical level for anything tangible to be achieved.

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GRAHAM JEFCOATE, *Deutsche Drucker und Buchhändler in London 1680–1811: Strukturen und Bedeutung des deutschen Anteils am englischen Buchhandel,* Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens, Studien 12 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), xxviii + 611 pp. ISBN 978 3 11 031120 4. €139.95. $US196.00

This is a significant volume about printers and bookdealers as agents of cultural exchange between Britain and the continent during the long eighteenth century written by someone who has played a comparable role in this day and age. A literary scholar and librarian by training, Graham Jefcoate has crossed the Channel more than once to work in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the 1980s he was part of a team of bibliographers in Münster that compiled a catalogue of early printed English books in the collections of the university library in Göttingen, a centre of Anglo-German cultural transfer during the Enlightenment period. He then joined the British Library where he enjoyed a remarkable career only to return to the continent in 2002 to take up the directorship of the State Library in Berlin and subsequently of the university library in Nijmegen. Already during his time in Münster Jefcoate developed what became a life-long fascination with German printers and booksellers (but not bookbinders or engravers) who had moved in the opposite direction and set up bookshops and presses in the British capital from the early 1700s to the early 1800s. In the three decades since his first publication on the topic, he has tirelessly followed up every surviving trace and hint of these shadowy figures, and his findings have been published in a succession of articles. During his retirement and helped by the vast digitization projects undertaken by libraries in recent years, he has extended his research even further and published the present volume, which will remain a reference work for a long time to come.

The period under investigation ranges from 1680, the year that saw the publication of the first book containing extensive German text in Britain, to 1811, when interest in all things German had risen to such an extent that a continuous presence of German bookshops in London during the nineteenth century was guaranteed. Few contemporary observers, however, would have foreseen such a promising state of affairs only a few decades earlier. For much of the eighteenth century the German element of the London book trade had rested on very precarious foundations indeed. The first German printer to set

up shop in the British capital was one Johann Christian Jacobi, a supporter of Halle Pietism, in 1709. Yet his business faltered after just eight or nine years, a fate that would also haunt many of his successors. Few German printers and booksellers in eighteenth-century London survived for more than half a dozen years. There were also two prolonged periods (1718/25–49 and 1779–92) when no one with a German background was active in the London book trade. Altogether, only a dozen or so German-speaking printers and booksellers can be traced in the surviving records and they thus form the core of Jefcoate's book. A mere third of this dozen stayed in the business for ten or more years and even they struggled to balance their books, although risky business strategies were often to blame for economic failure. To take just one example: Johann Christoph Haberkorn, in many respects one of the most successful Germans in the London book trade, overreached himself with prestigious publishing projects, ran up huge debts, spent time in a debtors' prison, and eventually had to give up his business. He ended his days in Altona, again working in publishing. Pursuing a career as a German printer in London was obviously a hazardous undertaking in the age of the Enlightenment.

This reflects to some extent the state of the German community in London, which consisted mostly of workers, artisans, and merchants and, according to Jefcoate's perhaps overly optimistic estimate, counted around 30,000 people at the end of the century. Its appetite for German books, however, seems to have been limited. In most cases these migrants from the German-speaking lands of central Europe had left their homes as young men on the search for work. Once arrived in Britain they assimilated quickly into their new environment, marrying local women and bringing up children who, despite the best efforts of a few German schools run by a handful of Protestant German churches in London, gravitated towards the English-speaking majority society in terms of both their language skills and religious inclinations. A pronounced lack of interest in German language and literature in Britain throughout most of the century did not help German booksellers either. Foreign visitors frequently complained about the isolationist mood among many inhabitants of the British Isles, although the presence of German language teachers in London and the repeated publication of German grammars and dictionaries testify to a certain degree of curiosity in German culture, as Jefcoate

demonstrates. Edifying religious literature by mainly Pietist authors enjoyed some success in the first half of the century, while works by authors who are little known or forgotten today, such as Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock and the Swiss-born Solomon Gessner, were noteworthy exceptions in the latter part of the century. If there was a reading public for foreign literature, it was primarily interested in French texts with German books coming a distant second, on a par with Italian titles. This began to change only towards the end of Jefcoate's period, when German literature, and in particular drama, became more fashionable. Again it was a writer who is rather obscure today, the dramatist August von Kotzebue, who led the way.

Most German printers in London therefore did not restrict themselves to printing and selling German books (either in the original or in translation). They also, and in some cases even predominantly, produced publications in English or other languages. Christlieb Gottreich Seyffert, for example, who flourished briefly between 1757 and 1762 imported German books but only published English and French titles, which pandered to the wishes of an urbane audience interested in political topics, or the most recent literary fashions such as novels in the vein of *Tristram Shandy*. Still, none of the German printers and booksellers played in the same league as the twenty or so big firms that dominated the book trade in London (and therefore in the whole of England) during the eighteenth century. Rather they were among the plethora of smaller businesses that were operative during the period. In the earlier part of the century their premises were located mainly on the Strand or in Soho, where part of the London book trade then resided, while at the beginning of the nineteenth century, along with most of their competitors, they had moved further west and settled in St James's or near Oxford Street. In most other respects, too, the German booksellers and printers did not differ much from English firms of the same size. They made extensive use, for example, of English newspapers and periodicals to advertise their wares. Already in the eighteenth century marketing was one of the biggest cost factors in publishing a book. According to Jefcoate up to 30 per cent of the total investment in a title could be spent on publicity.

Given their small number and the uncertainty of their existence, it is surprising how versatile and significant the legacy of these German printers and bookdealers turned out to be. Until the middle of the century, religion was probably the dominant feature of their enter-

prises. It is no exaggeration to say that the trade in German books started in earnest with the arrival of Pietist preachers from Halle in London around 1700. With the help of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and its English printer, Joseph Downing, they started an extensive publishing programme which comprised religious tracts in the German original as well as in English translation. Early on they also enlisted the services of German printers such as Johann Christian Jacobi. The collaboration with German businesses continued well into the middle decades of the century when, for instance, Haberkorn repeatedly printed books for the German Protestant communities in London. Prominent among them were collections of sermons by the court chaplain Friedrich Michael Ziegenhagen, a stalwart of Pietism in London until his death in 1776. Between 1740 and 1760 the Pietists were joined by Count Zinzendorf, the leader of the Moravian Brethren, and his followers, who established a strong presence of their own in Britain and similarly tried to disseminate their ideas through the printing press. They joined forces with local printers such as Haberkorn to publish among others a famous hymn book, the *Londoner Gesangbuch*. From 1749 to 1755 the Moravians went one step further and relocated their main publishing house from Germany to London, as Jefcoate explains in one of his most intriguing chapters. Temporarily set up in Zinzendorf's private home in Chelsea it printed casual and liturgical texts for the Moravian community. Interestingly, when the Moravians plunged into a deep crisis and were fiercely attacked by other Protestant groups after 1753, it was another German printer, Andreas Linde, who led the assault on Zinzendorf. Motivated by his strong attachment to the Pietist cause he printed several of the main invectives against the Moravians.

During the middle of the century religion slowly gave way to more mundane projects as the staple diet of German publishing houses. Haberkorn made his name in English-speaking circles as a publisher of books on architecture and arts and crafts. He worked with, and printed books for, the cabinet maker Thomas Chippendale and the architects William Chambers and James 'Athenian' Stuart. Haberkorn's edition of Stuart's *Antiquities of Athens* (1762) is rightly praised as one of the finest illustrated books emerging from the London print trade during the eighteenth century. Other German printers, in contrast, excelled as cultural mediators. Carl Heydinger,

Haberkorn's successor, published works by Albrecht von Haller and Christoph Martin Wieland which he himself had rendered into English, while Andreas Linde made the translation of works by German and Scandinavian authors his business, again in some cases taking on the role of translator himself. Linde also printed a German translation of William Hogarth's *Analysis of Beauty* (1752) under the title *Zergliederung der Schönheit* (1754). It was, however, Constantin Geisweiler who, despite a very brief spell of only three years (1799–1802) in the London book trade, became the best known printer-cum-translator in Jefcoate's cast. He corresponded briefly with Wieland, Schiller, and Goethe in Weimar, translated several novels and plays from and into German with his wife, and published a journal, *The German Museum*, dedicated to the dissemination of German literature in the Anglophone world.

If processes of cultural transfer between London and the German-speaking lands form one recurring theme in Jefcoate's book, the everyday practice of the international book trade is another. Again and again we learn about the increasing links between German printers in London and the publishing trade in their native country. Although none of the expats explicitly targeted the book market back home, after the middle of the century the knot tightened between London and the Holy Roman Empire. In the early 1770s Carl Heydinger began to visit the book fair in Leipzig which had supplanted Frankfurt as the main emporium of the publishing business in central Europe, setting an example for other German booksellers later in the century. Heydinger's initial visit in 1770 was also the first appearance of a London printer at this trade show since the early seventeenth century, leading to an increase in the number of German books imported into the British Isles. Linde, in turn, produced his translation of Hogarth's work along with a printer in Hanover, with whom he also collaborated on other projects. And from the late 1780s two (English) brothers, James and William Remnant, established an English bookshop in Hamburg and a German bookshop in London. In some instances cross-Channel co-operation came about as a result of necessity. Because of a lack of Gothic type characters in London in 1804, for example, a German book meant for the British market had to be printed in Bremen. Involvement in the international book trade, however, reached beyond ties with the German-speaking parts of Europe. Seyffert, for example, printed a number of scandalous texts

in French, which counted as clandestine literature on the continent and earned him the reputation of an underground printer. His fictitious imprint was used by French and Dutch publishers to conceal their identity while advertising their books to a clientele keen on titles sold under the counter.

These are just some of the discoveries to be made in a book full of insights into London's print culture and Anglo-German exchanges during the eighteenth century. They can be found in all sections of Jefcoate's text, which proceeds in a chronological fashion and is mainly organized by the biographies of the individual printers and booksellers. After initial chapters about the German community in London, Anglo-German cultural relations, and the book trade in Britain and the Holy Roman Empire, Jefcoate devotes a chapter to each of his protagonists, narrating their careers in London (nothing is usually known about their lives before they arrived in the British capital) and describing the various books which flowed from their presses. In places this makes for less than riveting reading since the wealth of detail can be overwhelming. But it is hard to imagine that such a level of documentation will be surpassed any time soon. With little to go on in the secondary literature Jefcoate had to reconstruct the lives and achievements of his heroes from a vast variety of dispersed sources, from (very few) booksellers' catalogues and (numerous) advertisements in newspapers to parish registers, records of prerogative courts, insurance policies, and tax lists. He drew on the odd letter in archives and libraries, chief among them the archives of the Franckesche Stiftungen in Halle, and undertook extensive searches in German and British national bibliographies and library catalogues. Richly illustrated and adorned with an extensive bibliography that comprises all German books printed in London during the period under review as well as the publications by German printers in other languages (pp. 435–581), this is a worthy monument to painstaking historical research.

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ULRICH L. LEHNER, *The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 272 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 023291 7. £19.99 (hardback)

Although the historiography of the past two hundred years has tried to make us believe that there is an intrinsic contradiction between religion and modernism, there are movements that prove the opposite. Among these is the Catholic Enlightenment, a social and intellectual movement of the eighteenth century (and beyond) that has championed modern Western values such as criticism of slavery, women's rights, and ecumenism. In his present book, Ulrich L. Lehner, who has published extensively on the topic over the past decade,[1] takes the narrative to the global level and examines the impact of the Catholic Enlightenment beyond its core regions, meaning first and foremost in the world of overseas Catholic missions.

Lehner does not conceal his intent to convey a message related explicitly and iteratively to present-day papal policies, namely, those of Pope Francis. He provides a narrative of Catholicism from the heyday of the Catholic Enlightenment to the 'dark period' (p. 3) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when an aggressively conservative and ultramontane Catholicism prevailed, and picks up various lost threads with the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s.

How does Lehner tell this story? Chapter one provides an introduction to the major topics at stake, along with some of their important champions: the reaction to Spinozism as a new way of relating science to faith; Jansenism in ecclesiology and devotional practice; the reforms of Pombal and Joseph II as acts redefining relations between church and state; Benito Feijoo as a Spanish example, and Lodovico Antonio Muratori and Pope Benedict XIV as Italian examples of reforming Catholic thought. The following chapters see some of these settings discussed in more detail: chapter two deals with toleration and tolerance, making a clear distinction between the acceptance of private non-Catholic faith and the granting of equal rights to

[1] See e.g. Ulrich L. Lehner, *Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines 1740–1803* (Oxford, 2011; paperback edn. 2013); id., Michael Printy, and Jeffery D. Burson (eds.), *A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe* (Leiden, 2010; paperback edn. 2013); Ulrich L. Lehner and Jeffery D. Burson (eds.), *Enlightenment in Catholic Europe: A Transnational History* (Notre Dame, Ind., 2014).

non-Catholic communities in Catholic states, while chapter three focuses on topics related to women, from female scientists and seemingly liberal views on interrupted sex, love marriages, and abortion to 'proto-feminism in new religious orders' (p. 98).

What follows in chapter four is an attempt to portray Catholic missions in the Americas, China, and India as mindful of the personal and cultural integrity of the indigenous people, with a particularly interesting sub-chapter on bishop John Carroll and North American Catholicism around 1790 (pp. 110–13). Chapter five presents the many ways in which Catholic theology sought to (re-)frame the irrational in the eighteenth century, including Benedict XIV's (1740–58) attempts to create reasonable grounds for the definition of miracles, the redefinition of the liturgical processes, and how the church dealt with the remnants of popular magic. Chapter six assesses the notion of holiness in the Catholic eighteenth century, and although Lehner does not find much engagement with Enlightenment, he detects 'modern' virtues and emphasizes the role of Catholic martyrs and victims (for example, during the French Revolution). Chapter seven tackles the difficult relations between Catholic abolitionism and the widespread practice of slavery in Catholic countries, including the Papal States. In his conclusion, Lehner describes the French Revolution as the beginning of the end of Catholic Enlightenment, portraying members of the Constitutional Church and explaining the rejection of reform Catholicism in the decades and centuries to follow. Not until the Second Vatican Council would some of the main ideas of Catholic Enlightenment resurface, often without reference to their origins.

As mentioned above, the book makes no attempt to conceal its agenda. While Lehner does articulate some caveats and strives for a balanced judgement (for example, on questions of slavery: 'ambiguous record', p. 205), the overall message is nevertheless clear: the Catholic contribution to modernity has been unduly understudied, underestimated, and for the most part has yielded better results, in terms of modern values, than its Protestant (that is, capitalist, nationalist, and imperialist) counterpart. It is obvious that by following this line of argument (positively or negatively), one accepts the overall narrative and is forced to take a clear theological and even political stance. And it is equally evident that this is precisely what Lehner wishes to provoke. More conservative Catholic readers who share the concerns of the 1790s and those of the 1960s alike will probably

disagree, as will proponents of gender or postcolonial studies, who will not see the broader picture of *ancien régime* colonialism and gender determination (of whatever denomination) seriously challenged by individual thinkers and case studies. Moreover, some doubts remain as to whether the outlined narrative can entice such readers seriously to engage (in a positive way) with the wealth of material presented by the author.

This material and its exposition are the strengths of the book. Although for obvious reasons some Catholic Enlighteners have by now starred in more than one of Lehner's books, he has an undisputed grasp of material that has visibly expanded from Europe to embrace several scenarios around the globe and that, as in previous works, combines intellectual with social and political history. The arrangement of the material into topics is original, though not thoroughly coherent and somewhat eclectic, and more conceptual and methodological framing would have been desirable.

This leads to the conclusion that the book can certainly be useful reading for students if accompanied by some complementary accounts (for example, Steffen Martus's *Aufklärung*, which, although published in 2015,[2] totally lacks any Catholic perspective). It might prove helpful to subordinate the somewhat forced focus on 'Enlightenment', which often boils down to an equation with Tridentine reforms, to a less 'Whig' (or rather, 'Conciliarist') narrative of modernity and progress. It is true that no comprehensive history of the early modern Catholic world exists, and Lehner is one of the few historians capable of writing one. It remains doubtful, however, whether there was a coherent 'movement' behind that world, as the book's title suggests, and if so, whether 'Enlightenment' is the best term to describe it.

[2] Steffen Martus, *Auklärung: Das deutsche 18. Jahrhundert – ein Epochenbild* (Berlin, 2015).

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JAN RÜGER, *Heligoland: Britain, Germany, and the Struggle for the North Sea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xii + 370 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 967246 2. £25.00 (hardback)

What is left of Heligoland? A North Sea spa, unadulterated nature, a shopping paradise without duty or VAT—this is how 'Germany's only offshore island' is advertised on the internet. These highlights describe some of the constants that run through Heligoland's changing history. They were made possible by the island's location and the will of its people to defend their chartered privileges against every state into which, without being asked, they were integrated, first as a colony and then as part of a nation-state. In his masterly work, Jan Rüger graphically presents this history, shaped by nature and humans. It shows how this rock in the North Sea could become a 'microcosm of the Anglo-German relationship' (p. 6). Rüger's stated aim is to 'rethink the Anglo-German past' (p. 3) from the point of view of Heligoland, and he achieves it convincingly.

The story told by Rüger begins when a British warship anchored off Heligoland on 4 September 1807. At the same time, the British military was bombarding Copenhagen. The Danish commander on Heligoland took stock of his situation, and surrendered the island to Britain without a fight. The Danish empire shrank a little; the British empire grew. As a strategic bastion, the new northern outpost in the British 'insular empire', as G. F. Leckie put it in 1808, first proved its worth in the struggle against Napoleon's economic blockade and his attempt to gain a continental European empire by force. Later the history of Heligoland acquired a German national colouring, but the historical significance of the island is only revealed in the context of the European empires. This became apparent again when Britain ceded Heligoland to Imperial Germany in 1890, receiving German colonial possessions in East Africa in return, and the two European states demarcated their imperial spheres of influence there. This deal was nationally charged on both the German and the British side, but as Rüger emphasizes, it was above all 'a colonial agreement—a function of the scramble for Africa rather than the Concert of Europe' (p. 86).

What is fascinating about the way in which Rüger links imperial, national, and local history is that these types of historiography are

Trans. Angela Davies, GHIL.

not presented as opposites. Rather, they are interwoven and the people of Heligoland also find their place as actors. They were given no say in the change of their rulers. The regime change in 1807 was normal for Europe at the time—all territorial reforms, implemented first by Napoleon and then at the Congress of Vienna, were undertaken over the heads of the people—and the change of ruler in 1890 was considered normal for the colonies. The people of Heligoland simply had to submit. But they could influence what this actually meant for them in everyday life. The treaty of surrender of 1807 guaranteed the continuation of the existing law, as did the treaty of 1890. Freedom from duties and taxes was among their most important rights. The people of Heligoland successfully stood up for these rights and did not hesitate to defend the 'legal "mish-mash"' that favoured them with 'their own diplomacy from below' (p. 67). The British empire and Imperial Germany here found the limits of their policy of standardization. Nonetheless, incorporation into Imperial Germany represented a profound change for the people of Heligoland. Their island was no longer a colony, but for the first time belonged directly to a nation-state, and its inhabitants were therefore exposed to all the processes of internal nation-building. In addition, British–German relations began to change fundamentally at that time. If Heligoland had 'symbolized Anglo-German friendship' (p. 54) until then, it now became 'a metaphor of Anglo-German rivalry and enmity' (p. 109).

In 1890 the successful deal had been acknowledged by both governments as a sign of friendship, and the majority of the press in both states agreed. In East Africa this closeness revealed itself in a special way. While the handing over of Heligoland was 'well orchestrated' (p. 89), in East Africa things got out of hand. A conflict arose between some soldiers of the Sultan of the Protectorate of Witu and a number of Germans there. It was not clear which side fired the first shot, but the German and the British press spoke of the 'Witu massacre'. Admiral E. R. Fremantle intervened with his troops, imposed martial law on the whole Sultanate, and burned down several villages. 'I am not so satisfied with such wanton destruction', he noted, 'but . . . it is in accordance with African custom' (p. 107). He wanted to restore 'the honour of Europeans, defined in terms of race and gender' (p. 108). The colonial transfer thus began with a punitive action in Witu and a naval review in the presence of the German Kaiser in Heligoland. The twenty-two visits he paid to the island between 1890 and

1914 were intended to help turn the people of Heligoland into Germans. Rüger impressively analyses how difficult this was, and what a Heligoland identity meant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As a British colony, the island had developed into a bridgehead between the British empire and the European continent. During the Napoleonic era it served the King's German Legion as a base. Their loyalty was 'both to the king and to various Germanies that they identified with' (p. 17). In order to pinpoint what was different about Heligoland, it would have been useful if the author had distinguished between the 'various Germanies' and the 'German *Föderativnation*'. Recent research uses this term to underline that before the foundation of the German Reich, a commitment to the German nation could not be equated with the desire for a unified nation-state. Historically, the German nation comprised many states. In its British period, Heligoland was not part of this multi-state German nation but, as Rüger shows, a transnational space. During the Napoleonic era Heligoland became a centre of trade between the British empire and the continent: the president of its Chamber of Commerce came from Hamburg, its secretary was a London merchant, and the Royal Navy was its protective shield. Since the 1830s, the British colony had been on the way to 'becoming more German' (p. 32), as its Governor observed. 'More German' did not mean that it wanted to leave the British empire. Heligoland now became a refuge for writers who wanted to escape the censorship of German states, such as Heinrich Heine, for example, or for those who hoped to revolutionize the German world of states by working from the island.

The people of Heligoland earned much more from tourism than from the exiles. Wealthy people and aristocrats were the first to come from the German states; mass tourism began in the late nineteenth century. Heligoland enjoyed popularity as a pollen-free monument of nature. In its schools, children learned English from German teachers, the administration dealt with the inhabitants in German, the language of the church was also German, and the advice of German lawyers was needed to interpret the laws dating from before 1807. Heligoland was a culturally German part of the British empire. This only became a political problem when the North Sea was no longer regarded as an area of conflict between Denmark and Prussia, but between Britain and Germany. Rüger detects the first signs of this

perspectival change in the Prussian administration in 1855, but it was not until the 1890s that rivalry began to outweigh cooperation.

When the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a diplomat to Heligoland in 1890 to prepare for Germany's takeover of the island, he reported to Berlin that if there were to be a vote, a large majority of the islanders would support the status quo. Only a minority eventually opted for British nationality, and most of them left the island. Those who wanted to remain there as British citizens faced financial penalties. They could not benefit from the tax privileges which the German citizens on Heligoland were allowed to keep in order to make the change of regime palatable to them. And any British citizens who remained on Heligoland had to pay the overseas tax that was obligatory in Imperial Germany.

When Imperial Germany set about 'turning Heligoland into a German Gibraltar' (p. 114), the political mood in Britain changed. Heligoland became a symbol of the 'German problem' and a misguided policy of appeasement, and Heligoland was discovered to be 'a freedom-loving miniature nation, overpowered by militarist Germans' (p. 119). Heligoland had become a 'metaphor for German *Machtpolitik*' (p. 119). In the First World War, people from Heligoland served as soldiers on both sides of the front, and both sides distrusted their national loyalties. The British government weighed up various options for Heligoland after the war: a return to Britain or Denmark, neutralization under the League of Nations—in fact, this would have been a British recolonization—or the complete destruction of the island. The peace treaty left a—demilitarized—Heligoland with Germany. The island became a symbol of Germany's defeat and the failure of its world policy. Nazi Germany was able to build on this. It developed Heligoland into a fortress and turned it into a symbol of British–German enmity. When the Second World War ended, Heligoland was left behind as 'a deserted battle-field, a moon-like landscape of craters and ruins' (p. 203). The peak of destruction, however, was not reached until April 1947, when large amounts of explosives were blown up on the deserted island. The British press admiringly wrote about the 'Biggest Bang since Bikini' (p. 206), while for the German public, Heligoland became a 'metaphor of victimhood' (p. 207). When the island, which served the British Air Force as a site on which to practice bombing until 1951, returned to German administration in 1952, the German government celebrated this as a

homecoming. Heligoland was no longer regarded as standing for German greatness in the past, but was evoked as a symbol of *Heimat* and, at the same time, of a common European future. When the first Heligolanders returned to their island in April 1954, all that remained of the old Heligoland was nature. 'The Heligolanders had finally arrived in Germany' (p. 229). Or perhaps not quite. Today's shopping paradise reminds us of the tax privileges of the past. They have survived all political regimes.

Rüger's work ends with a look at Anselm Kiefer's painting *Hoffmann von Fallersleben on Heligoland*, which marks the island as a 'site of German memory' (p. 223), in which nature also lost its innocence. The many works that have been published on German and European sites of memory so far seem to have overlooked Heligoland. Rüger's book, by contrast, shows us why the changeable history of Britain and Germany is captured on this island as if under a magnifying glass. In order to break open the narrowness of national historiography, Rüger pursued his research in British, German, Danish, Australian, Canadian, US, and Austrian archives, museums, and libraries. Only on this broad basis was it was possible to fit the local history of Heligoland into imperial, transnational, and national contexts. Jan Rüger's work on this small island is historiography at its best.

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BRADLEY W. HART, *George Pitt-Rivers and the Nazis* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), xii + 234 pp. ISBN 978 1 4725 6995 0 (hardback) £65.00. ISBN 978 1 4725 6994 3 (paperback) £16.99

Britain was not unaffected by the crisis of liberal democracy between the two world wars. Here, too, there was a radical right which opposed political modernity and developed an ideology that, while it took much from the European continent, also had home-grown, British roots in the history of ideas. Although the radical right was far from gaining power in Britain and organized fascism in the form of the British Union of Fascists (BUF) was the opposite of a political success story, historical research on this topic is still extremely productive. Three main research approaches can be distinguished. One strand is work on the BUF and its leader Oswald Mosley.[1] A second, building on Richard Griffiths's fundamental study *Fellow Travellers of the Right*,[2] looks at British sympathizers with Italian fascism and especially National Socialism, seeking 'Hitler's Englishmen' in British society. Here the focus is on imported ideology, collaboration, and betrayal by the 'British pro-Nazi Right'.[3] A third approach emphasizes the genuinely British character of the British radical right and concentrates more on its intellectual and social history context as an independent phenomenon.[4]

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

[1] Matthew Worley, *Oswald Mosley and the New Party* (Basingstoke, 2010); Stephen Dorril, *Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British Fascism* (London, 2007); Martin Pugh, *'Hurrah for the Blackshirts!' Fascists and Fascism in Britain between the Wars* (London, 2005).

[2] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany 1933–9* (London, 1980).

[3] Id., *What Did You Do During the War? The Last Throes of the British Pro-Nazi Right, 1940–45* (London, 2017); id., *Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsay, the Right Club and British Anti-Semitism, 1939–40* (London, 1998); Adrian Weale, *Renegades: Hitler's Englishmen* (London, 1994).

[4] Dan Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933–1939: Before War and Holocaust* (Houndmills, 2003); id., *Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain* (Liverpool, 2002); Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories: Britische Konservative im Aufstand gegen Demokratie und politische Moderne (1929–39)* (Munich, 2012).

The book under review here, a biography of George Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers (1890–1966), British landed aristocrat, captain in the Royal Dragoons, and anthropologist, moves between these poles. The title makes clear that the book examines Pitt-Rivers's connection with the Nazis. But in his brief study, the American historian Bradley W. Hart spends a great deal of space looking at the academic and ideological development of his 'hero'. This leads him to the peculiar mixture of social Darwinism, racism, fear of degeneracy, doubts about democracy, and neo-aristocratism that was widespread among some British anthropologists, in the eugenics movement, among many intellectuals, and on the right-wing fringes of the Conservative Party. This ideological cocktail had its roots at the turn of the century, when the optimistic liberal belief in progress was declining, but did not develop its full anti-liberal potential until the inter-war period.

Hart, however, does not attempt to position his topic within the research landscape. In a very brief introduction he tells the reader that his interest is mainly focused on his protagonist. His aim is not to 'rehabilitate' Pitt-Rivers, who was imprisoned in 1940 because of his political views, but to show 'how and why a wealthy aristocrat with scientific pretensions and respectable academic qualifications ended up detained for the first half of the Second World War and his career in tatters thereafter' (p. 6). Pitt-Rivers was never a member of the BUF and certainly never a leading figure of the radical right. But that he was 'largely forgotten in existing historical accounts' is true only in the sense of a general understanding of cultural memory. Hart's source for this is Wikipedia (which now has an entry for Pitt-Rivers). But Pitt-Rivers does play a part in the historiography of the radical right, and especially of the British eugenics movement. No historian before Hart, however, has systematically analysed Pitt-Rivers's extensive papers, which have been in the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge since 2009, and based a biography on them.

Hart's study is chronologically structured and divided into seven chapters, framed by a brief introduction and an equally brief conclusion. The first chapter goes back to the nineteenth century and starts by looking at Pitt-Rivers's grandfather, Augustus Henry Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers (1827–1900), a well-known military officer, ethnologist, and archaeologist whose fame George Pitt-Rivers aspired all his life to emulate, ultimately unsuccessfully. This was not the result of an underprivileged start in life, as Hart points out. The celebrations

for George's twenty-first birthday on the family estate lasted for almost a week, and several thousand people took part. Schooling at Eton was followed by a career as an officer in the 1st Royal Dragoons cavalry regiment, in which he served in the First World War, sustaining a war injury that troubled him for the rest of his life. The second chapter investigates Pitt-Rivers's first intellectual efforts, consisting of a social Darwinist interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy (not untypical for the times), an idiosyncratic reading of Sigmund Freud's and Carl Jung's psychoanalytical theories, and a deeply antisemitic publication on the Russian revolution of 1917. In chapter three we follow Pitt-Rivers to Australia where, initially without any academic training in the subject, he undertook his own field research and produced anthropological works. These earned him respect and recognition among some members of the discipline, especially from the influential natural scientist Arthur Keith, a prominent representative of a racist (and antisemitic) branch of anthropology in Britain.

The fourth (and most important) chapter deals with Pitt-Rivers's involvement in the eugenics movement. Hart describes how Pitt-Rivers rose to become an important figure in international eugenics organizations, and even held a large eugenics conference on his country estate in Dorset. In his own country, however, he increasingly marginalized himself by calling for the British Eugenic Society to take a more radical stand. This progressive self-isolation, mainly because of his radical antisemitism, is also revealed in chapters five and six, which are largely an account of Pitt-Rivers's activities in British pro-Nazi organizations. It is significant that the Germanophile Anglo-German Fellowship refused him membership. Chapter seven deals with the surveillance and imprisonment of Pitt-Rivers by the British security services during the war, causing him great mental and physical anguish. (From prison he wrote a cynical and insulting letter to his cousin, Clementine Churchill, the Prime Minister's wife.) Although the security services did not see him as posing a serious threat, he was not released until 1942. Embittered by the experience of imprisonment, Pitt-Rivers lived unobtrusively on his country estate until his death in 1966.

What conclusions can be drawn from this man's life story? Hart foregrounds Pitt-Rivers's professional career: the author concentrates on his successes (or unrealized potential) as a scholar in particular,

using the academic achievements of his famous grandfather as a benchmark, but also drawing on those of his wives and partners and his sons. (On the whole, the comparison is unfavourable to Pitt-Rivers.) Although certainly interesting for the biography in the narrow sense, this approach leaves any reader with historical interests unsatisfied, for Pitt-Rivers's activities in the inter-war period throw up important questions, in particular, about where ideological lines were drawn within Britain's political culture. Fear of degeneracy, criticism of democracy, eugenics, anti-urbanism, anti-communism, and a fascination with the 'efficiency' of Italian fascism and German National Socialism were not limited to a small group of political extremists. Taking Pitt-Rivers as an example, we could analyse what political and cultural scope the radical right had in the inter-war period. This applies especially to antisemitism, whose importance in inter-war Britain has been tellingly described by Richard Griffiths: 'In the Thirties and Forties a casual social anti-Semitism permeated society. Though seen as innocuous in itself, it formed a social cushion on which far more dangerous anti-Semitic attitudes could flourish.'[5]

Pitt-Rivers's extreme antisemitism and sympathy for National Socialism crossed a line, and he had to pay the social and later also the political and legal price. But what did Pitt-Rivers stand for? How can he be classified in the political culture of the inter-war period? What influence did his publications have on the radial right? The reader is given little assistance in addressing these questions about the political and cultural context, and the historical situation of this man. Nonetheless, this book is well worth reading. It is full of entertaining and lively anecdotes, and is fluently written. Drawing on a rich basis of archival sources, it tells the story of a man who was a member of the Establishment by birth, but ended up on the margins of society because of his political views. It is the story of an eccentric anthropologist, eugenicist, and would-be politician, whose obvious failure implicitly reveals a great deal about the science, society, and political culture of inter-war Britain. The author has written a fundamental book which will stimulate further research. It is to be hoped that it finds many readers.

[5] Griffiths, *What Did You Do During the War?*, 309.

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GREG EGHIGIAN, *The Corrigible and the Incorrigible: Science, Medicine, and the Convict in Twentieth-Century Germany*, Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), x + 291 pp. ISBN 978 0 472 11965 3. US$70.00

In this book Greg Eghigian analyses correctional rehabilitation in the penal systems of three different regimes in twentieth-century Germany. Eghigian's study 'is not a history of the prison. Nor it is a history of penology, criminology, or forensic psychiatry' (p. 10). The author points out that the history of twentieth-century correctional rehabilitation was informed by multiple actors, institutions, and ways of knowing and cannot be accurately represented in a conventional institutional or disciplinary history. As a result, his study offers a history of the correctional imagination in Germany since 1933.

'Correctional imagination' is what Eghigian terms 'the ensemble of ideas, values, policies, practices, subjects, and objects associated with public attempts to reform and rehabilitate criminals' (p. 10). The book's primary aim is to understand how science, medicine, and criminal justice interacted to shape new ways of analysing and managing criminal behaviour and determine the fate of offenders. Eghigian is interested in how states, experts, and the general public projected ideals of good and bad, normal and pathological, corrigible and incorrigible on to correctional rehabilitation. In his study Eghigian follows on from such scholars as Erving Goffman, Joseph Gusfield, Edwin Sutherland, and Michel Foucault, who all studied the process of problematization.[1] But the author neither engages with Foucauldian theories nor draws comparisons with Goffman's 'total institution'.

His approach is to examine both the correctional regime and the treatment of a specific group of offenders in three different twentieth-century German states: Nazi Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). (Male) sex offenders are the subject of examination because they 'were widely considered by both the lay public and experts to be incorrigible' (p. 14). This focus determines the structure of the book, which is divided into five chapters. The first deals with the National Socialist

[1] See e.g. Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order* (Chicago, 1980); Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975* (New York, 2003).

regime and is followed by two each on the GDR and the FRG. Of the pairs, one chapter provides an overview of the correctional system of the regime in question while the second analyses the treatment of individual sex offenders. The study draws on a wide range of sources: Interior and Justice Ministry archives, prison records, forensic patient files from the Charité in Berlin, and contemporary publications including journals.

After a concise introduction, the second chapter begins in 1933. This starting point highlights a fundamental thesis of the book: that a rehabilitative system was part of the Third Reich's penal policy. Passed in November 1933, the Law against Dangerous Habitual Criminals and on Rehabilitative and Preventive Measures is considered by the author as 'marking the start of the contemporary rehabilitative era in German penology' (p. 9). This legislation established a 'two track system of criminal sanctions', differentiating between criminal punishment ('Strafrecht') and executive measures ('Maßregel'). Those deemed incorrigibles were excluded from the national community through preventive detention, while those categorized as corrigibles were reintegrated via therapeutic rehabilitation. Correctional incarceration was understood as a 'schooling in character building' (p. 38). The incorrigibles faced what an official from the Ministry of the Interior described as 'the sharpest weapon in the fight against the sex offender' (p. 42): castration. Experts across a wide range of disciplines (scientists, clinicians, and government officials) were united in their view that this was not an extension of punishment but a preventive safety measure.

The German Democratic Republic's determination to distance itself from Nazi policies and rigorously apply correctional rehabilitation forms the subject of the third chapter. The result, as Eghigian emphasizes, was a huge disparity between ideal and practice. For example, despite the claims of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) that their nation had one of the world's most advanced rehabilitative penal systems, in reality, conditions in East German prisons were grim. The GDR's penal system also underwent a policy U-turn. After an initial apparent return to Weimar reformist ideas of correctional rehabilitation, in the 1950s legal scholars and party leaders came to view crime as a political expression of class struggle. As a result, 'bourgeois' sciences such as criminology and forensics were abandoned.

Instead, productive work increasingly became the focal point of correctional efforts. By the mid 1950s almost every East German inmate was given work. As Eghigian points out, the aim was not to rehabilitate, but to meet economic targets. While his focus is on Germany, it might have been interesting for the author to explore possible parallels here with contemporary communist penal labour systems in the GDR's political master, the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China. The mid 1950s also saw a conceptual swing in the GDR back to the importance of nurture in the formation of the criminal offender. Correctional rehabilitation was now understood as 'Correcting the Disoriented Socialist Personality'. All convicts therefore had to be evaluated, which, in turn, restored the importance of forensic science. Hans Szewczyk, director of the Department of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology at the Charité in Berlin, was the most influential figure throughout the 1960s and 1970s. He institutionalized forensic psychiatry and psychology as empirical sciences and clinical tools in the GDR. Through case studies Eghigian convincingly demonstrates that in the GDR '[c]orrectional rehabilitation within prison walls existed in name only' (p. 86).

Sex offenders in the GDR, the subject of the fourth chapter, were seen by authorities and researchers as primitive relics both of a biological evolutionary past and a more recent historical one. It was believed that male offenders required civilization in the form of modern, scientifically based treatment and therapy. Legal scholar Gerhard Feix predicted that child molestation would 'increasingly disappear from the life of our society in the process of an ever-growing socialist consciousness and the realization of the social lifestyle' (p. 101). This chapter is ground-breaking because of the fascinating insights it provides into medical discourse and practice concerning sex offenders in the GDR. The latter is based on the author's analysis of previously unused forensic files from one of the GDR's prime psychiatric centres, Berlin's Charité, where the 'new psychopathology of sex offenders' was developed. Szewczyk and other scholars expressed frustration with the institutional limits of East German confinement and saw the need to build special indefinite detention centres to hold and treat sex offenders. But such facilities, like the social therapeutic facilities discussed in the FRG (see below), were never constructed. This led to what the author terms 'workarounds' and shortcuts: chronic offenders were preventively detained in mental hospitals.

The FRG had an equally ambitious correctional rehabilitation programme, which forms the subject of the fifth chapter. Following Cold War logic, West German reformers drew their models from the United States rather than the Soviet Union. Despite some continuities from the Third Reich in relation to personnel and experts, correctional rehabilitation in the Federal Republic was reformed. Academics, federal administrators, and politicians combined to create the therapeutic prison despite public opposition. An important part of this more 'social' concept of criminality was the emergence of a new therapeutic invention: social training. This was billed as an economic, non-stigmatizing form of group learning with the aim of allowing offenders better to perform the functions expected of them in the outside world. As the subject of correctional rehabilitation, the West German convict was given the idealized goal of becoming 'a responsible member of a liberal, pluralistic, consumer society' (p. 158). Punishment operated as a form of participatory counselling in democratic and capitalist citizenship, and rehabilitation was renamed resocialization.

The sixth chapter focuses on West Germany's attempt to medicalize sex offenders through the creation of a new institution. They were to be patients in so-called 'social therapeutic facilities', of which eleven were established in the 1970s. These facilities were the fourth possible form of indefinite confinement, alongside psychiatric hospitals, centres for substance abuse treatment, and preventive detention units. According to Eghigian, many inmates considered the facility an improvement on conventional incarceration. Some even spent up to five years trying to gain admission. Unlike castration, which was legalized in 1969, the transfer to a social therapeutic facility was never institutionalized. Like other approaches, social therapy divided offenders into the corrigible and the incorrigible. Thus West Germany's social therapeutic facilities 'helped provide a steady supply of "incorrigible" sex offenders for the preventive detention system' (p. 198).

The author's conclusion is that while the ideals and rhetoric on correctional rehabilitation in each of the three German regimes were very different, in practice there were striking continuities. This also applies to the treatment of sex offenders. Although East Germany banned preventive detention and forcible castration in its constitution, incorrigibles were held by a back-door method in psychiatric

facilities and voluntary castration was allowed. Both outcomes also existed in the FRG. Neither state managed to live up to its rehabilitational ideals. Nevertheless, correctional rehabilitation found a place in all three German regimes and still does so today.

Eghigian is to be lauded for his pioneering use of East German forensic patient files. It is a pity that the relevant section is so brief (only ten pages) and that there is no comparative use of patient files from the FRG. It would also have been interesting for the author to place his pioneering study into the context of the history of East German medicine. Attempts to correct the disoriented socialist personality of sex offenders in the 1950s, for example, coincided with the application of Lysenko's theories of modifying heredity dispositions through environmental factors in East German genetics.

This well-written and vivid book covers the history of German penal systems in a *longue durée* perspective, something that has never been done before. Eghigian draws the conclusion that there was no German *Sonderweg* in the history of correctional rehabilitation. This could be a stimulus for research on the history of penal correction in other countries. His study not only enriches the history of medicine and science but, it is hoped, will also be discussed beyond the disciplinary bounds of history.

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CORNELIUS TORP, *Gerechtigkeit im Wohlfahrtsstaat: Alter und Altersicherung in Deutschland und Großbritannien von 1945 bis heute* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 472 pp. ISBN 978 3 525 30168 5. €50.00

This excellent comparison of the pension systems in post-war Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany provides a milestone in the historiography of social policy. It succeeds in explaining the contrasting concepts of social justice underpinning British and German pension arrangements, details the role of welfare institutions in shaping them, and assesses their impact on social inequality—a topic that has generated a considerable amount of interest in Britain and is beginning to rise on the political agenda in Germany. Several prominent studies of worsening inequality, including Thomas Picketty's international bestseller *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* and Danny Dorling's *Inequality and the 1%,* have focused on the renewed concentration of wealth among a small socio-economic elite in recent decades. By directing his attention to provisions for old age, Torp analyses material trends among far larger groups, including numerous people living at the lower end of the social spectrum. Beyond contributing to the history of social policy, this study significantly enhances our understanding of how inequality has developed since the middle of the twentieth century.

The British state pension system gained its defining features during the Second World War in the wake of the famous report by the Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services under William Beveridge's leadership in 1942. Aiming to alleviate widespread poverty among old people, many of whom had to rely on meagre means-tested benefits for survival, the Labour government introduced a new state pension in 1946, which more than doubled weekly payments to 26 shillings for single retirees and 42 shillings for couples. By offering pensioners a flat, standardized benefit irrespective of their previous income, the new law expressed an ideal of social justice emphasizing equality of treatment, which met with widespread support among British contemporaries. Despite enhanced benefit levels, the new state pensions only partially succeeded in reducing poverty among the old for several reasons. National Insurance contributions were kept at low levels to render them affordable for people on low incomes. While this strategic decision

ensured a wide social reach for the scheme, it gave the state pension system weak financial foundations and ruled out more generous benefits. Moreover, policymakers intentionally designed the pension to provide basic subsistence level rather than material comfort in old age, not least to encourage employees to make private arrangements for retirement, for instance, by joining company pension schemes. Old-age poverty also persisted because the British state pension rose in line with inflation rather than wages and salaries during the 1950s and 1960s. This form of indexation resulted in a widening financial gap between state pensioners and the working population, which experienced significant rises in wages and salaries into the 1970s. To be sure, skilled workers and white-collar employees benefited from an expansion of company pension schemes that complemented the state pension. Unskilled workers on low incomes, however, frequently did not have access to these private pension plans or could not afford them. And finally, women, many of whom spent substantial parts of their lives performing unpaid domestic roles, faced a particularly high risk of poverty in old age because of intermittent employment histories that granted them only severely truncated pension payments. When social scientists forcefully drew attention to persistent and pervasive poverty in Britain in the mid 1960s, they emphasized the deprivation of millions of pensioners on means-tested benefits.

Only in 1975 did the Labour administration under Harold Wilson overcome resistance from the Conservative Party, the private insurance sector, and trade unions to introduce a second state pension, which offered a payment linked to an employee's previous income (State Earnings-Related Income Scheme, or SERPS). SERPS was intentionally calculated on the basis of a comparatively low number of years in employment to ensure women with uneven trajectories in paid employment would profit from Labour's pension reform. And finally, the new pension framework linked state pensions to rises in income rather than inflation to prevent a widening material gap between pensioners and the working population. SERPS and the new indexation, however, did little to alleviate social inequalities because the Thatcher government reversed Labour's changes in pension policy. The renewed decision to raise pensions in line with inflation (rather than incomes) from 1980 meant that a single pensioner received £61.15 rather than £80 per week in the mid 1990s. In 1986 the

Conservative administration also significantly reduced the value of SERPS and encouraged the working population to rely on private pensions for their retirement planning. The consequences of Conservative pension policies were dramatic. By 1994, more than 3 million (or about 30 per cent of) Britons over the age of 60 were entitled to means-tested benefits to prevent them from sinking into serious poverty. Women, low-skilled men, and members of ethnic minorities were particularly likely to live extremely materially constricted lives in old age. Torp shows impressively how pension arrangements fuelled a wider trend towards income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s that has turned Britain into the most socially polarized country in Western Europe by a wide margin. The redistributive policies of New Labour governments under Blair and Brown managed to halt this development, not least by enhancing the incomes of the aged, but income inequality remains at markedly high levels in the UK. Despite a consensus between Labour and the Conservatives to boost state pensions in recent years, the outlook for the growing number of future retirees in the UK is not rosy, not least since private pensions have significantly eroded since the mid 1990s.

Since the pension reform overseen by Adenauer in 1957, the Federal Republic has followed a markedly different path. To fund a costly retirement scheme in a country that possessed no state pension funds after two disastrous wars, politicians drew on the contributions of the working population to pay for an insurance scheme for the aged. The West German pension system, thus, rested on a much-vaunted 'contract between the generations', an arrangement that stipulates an intergenerational redistribution of material resources. In contrast to the uniform rate paid to retirees by the British state, West Germany offered state pensions linked to a person's previous salary level. Beyond eradicating widespread poverty among the old, this approach aimed to reflect the social status individuals had reached during their working lives. Rather than an ideal of justice based on equality, the West German pension system embraced an ideal of justice based on achievement (*Leistungsgerechtigkeit*). Irrespective of their in-built dimension of income inequality, West German pension arrangements proved effective in reducing poverty in old age. Unlike in Britain, in West Germany pensions rose in line with the incomes of the working population, which ensured that during the substantial wage and salary gains of the late 1950s and mid

1970s, retirees profited from the 'economic miracle'. Moreover, the German state pension system commanded far larger resources than its British counterpart, because employees in West Germany paid higher shares of their income into the state retirement scheme than in the UK. As result, German state pensions proved more generous not just for the comfortable middle class (who could boost retirement incomes through private schemes) but also for retirees at the lower end of the social spectrum.

West Germans regarded their pension arrangement as a major political success, extending its coverage to wider groups and preserving it throughout the less auspicious economic circumstances after the mid 1970s. Indeed, the state pension system reached its apex with German re-unification, when the Federal Republic extended its scheme to the former East. This manoeuvre ensured that East German pensioners enjoyed substantial rises in income, but also brought the system close to collapse. Beyond rising longevity, early retirement schemes that compensated for mass redundancies in the West and East resulted in spiralling costs that generated calls for a fundamental reform. Amid high unemployment, a falling share of exports markets, and concern about an aging society around the millennium, the Red–Green government of Schröder and Fischer faced enormous national and international pressure to restore German competitiveness through cuts in the welfare sector. As part of a wider drive for competitiveness, the administration reduced the future value of the general state pension, launched an additional state-subsidized savings scheme (*Riester-Rente*), and encouraged the working population to invest in private pensions. In a nation that has witnessed a general rise in income inequality since the 1990s, this 'multi-pillared' approach to pension provision does not bode well for the majority, since the *Riester-Rente* and private pension schemes rely on returns on capital markets that have proved to be extremely unstable since the dot.com bubble burst in the early millennium.

Torp concludes on a rather gloomy note for future retirees in Britain and Germany. Irrespective of their differing post-war trajectories, both countries' pension systems place much responsibility for retirement provision on the individual rather than the state. Future retirees also find themselves exposed to the vagaries of financial markets in which their savings for old age are invested. As a result, it is no longer possible to speak of substantial parts of the pension system

as a form of social security. The book's sobering end, however, should stop no one from picking it up. Torp situates his primary research in a broad body of quantitative and qualitative work by historians and social scientists to fashion an authoritative account full of insights and food for thought far beyond the issue of pensions. Each chapter includes treatments of general income inequality, many of which are worth reading on their own because they detail indicators including financial factors, residential conditions, health, life expectancy, and indicators of social exclusion. This reviewer, for one, has not encountered a better outline of social inequality in Britain under the Thatcher and Major governments than that offered here. One can only hope that this book will soon be translated into English because it deserves to inform discussions of contemporary history in both the countries studied.

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BARBARA MARSHALL, *Die deutsche Vereinigung in Akademia: West- und Ostdeutsche im Gründungsprozess der Universität Potsdam*, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungen, 49 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2016), 255 pp. ISBN 978 3 428 14876 9. €39.90

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) had traditional universities in East Berlin, Leipzig, Rostock, Greifswald, Jena, and Halle, with technical universities in Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), and Magdeburg. The official statistical yearbook for 1989 records that there were around 131,000 students at 54 higher education institutions, where they were taught by about 20,000 teachers. Not included in these statistics were institutions that must be called ideological universities, that is, higher education institutions run by the Ministry of the Interior, state security, the army, the trade unions, and the Socialist Unity Party (SED). These institutions could also confer doctorates.

The old garrison town of Potsdam had no university until 1990 but, in addition to a film institute, it housed three educational institutions central to propping up the SED system: the Law School of the Ministry of State Security (JHS), the Academy for Law and Political Science (ASR), which trained specialists for state employment, and the largest teacher-training college (PH) in the country. These three institutions de facto merged in 1990 to form the Brandenburg State University, out of which the University of Potsdam grew in 1991, taking over mainly the buildings and infrastructure of the JHS.

Barbara Marshall, who taught German and European politics at the University of East Anglia in Norwich, experienced this reform process at first hand during a stint as guest lecturer at the University of Potsdam in 1992, and went back after twenty years to study this process of university formation. To this end, she conducted numerous interviews with experts and evaluated press reports. She was also able to draw on archival material, but there was far less of it than she had expected. Many documents had never been sent to the archives, others had never arrived, and much of what was there, she was not allowed to see. She was able to fill some of the gaps because many of the actors involved at the time gave her access to their private documents.

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

In many respects, the University of Potsdam was a special case in the process of German unification. Although it was a truly new foundation, it still had to struggle with the legacy of the SED dictatorship for more than twenty years. While theoretically the initial conditions were far more favourable there than in the other eastern *Länder*, nowhere did the process of reform prove to be as contradictory and complicated as in Potsdam. Ultimately, there was one reason for this: in the federal state of Brandenburg, state governments under the Social Democratic Minister President, Manfred Stolpe, a former influential consistorial president of the Berlin-Brandenburg Church, tried to keep as many of the old staff as possible on into the new times, in the police, the administration, the judiciary, and education and research institutions. It has often been suggested that this was connected with the fact that for twenty years Stolpe had closer contact with the Stasi than was usual for a man of the church. But it seems to me that this is an overly simplistic and naive interpretation that underestimates the complexities of the situation. Stolpe was acting as the father of the people, not as a prince or king. His advisers, especially those from the West, were happy with the course he had adopted, which was to leave the past behind and not pay it much heed. This resulted, for example, in a far higher degree of personal continuity in Brandenburg than in the other federal states, affecting even institutions that were de facto new foundations, like the University of Potsdam (p. 136, quotation from Schütte).

This had three tangible consequences: first, there was a disproportionately high number of the old guard filling the university's planned positions; secondly, the middle-range posts were blocked with permanent appointments virtually for years; and thirdly, staffing levels were incredibly bloated by comparison with other institutions. In the winter semester of 1992/3 the University of Potsdam had 865 teachers at all levels for a student body of 7,000. At the University of Siegen there were 570 teachers for 12,500 students; and the University of Düsseldorf had barely 540 teachers for 12,700 students. At the Humboldt University in Berlin, which was undergoing a profound process of reform, 700 lecturers taught 20,500 students (p. 112).

These figures alone demonstrate what had gone fundamentally wrong in Potsdam. This situation burdened the university for almost twenty years because the bulk of positions had been filled with per-

manent appointees. The fact that it was able to become a modern university at all is connected with something to which Barbara Marshall pays too little attention. Despite these difficult circumstances, investors and recognized scholars with international networks were drawn to Potsdam because it was located not in the Mecklenburg lakes or in the Vogtland, but right next to Berlin. The people of Potsdam might be upset by this analysis, especially coming from the pen of a native of Berlin (although one who gained his doctorate in Potsdam), but its location appears to have been a huge advantage for the university, and in the 1990s it exerted a force of attraction so powerful that it cannot be ignored.

Barbara Marshall provides a detailed and engaged analysis of the process by which the university was founded. Although she repeatedly indicates that at the university her project was not universally met with open arms and willing support, she was able to unearth sufficient material and conduct enough interviews to allow her to present a dense and vivid analysis. Again and again she shows how West Germans and East Germans worked with each other, but sometimes also against each other. As a result of the availability of material she concentrates mainly on political science, social science, and history, but this can also be justified in substantive terms because these were the subjects that had a strong ideological taint in the GDR and had to make a new start.

This was, however, anything but easy. The continuity in both teaching and administrative staff mentioned above was one obstacle. Marshall illustrates this by drawing on numerous impressive examples and statistics. Her study is especially important because it shows for the first time in the case of an East German university after 1989–90 how individual West Germans tried to impose their own personnel policy. Particularly grotesque is the case of a named scholar of Romance language and literature who somehow, via two committees, managed to appoint herself to a professorship in Potsdam (p. 145). In another case no appointment was made, but it nonetheless casts light on the atmosphere in the 'wild East', and shows how individual West Germans behaved there in certain cases. A well-known historian intervened in 'the process of appointing a professor and declared his interest in the candidate on the basis of their friendship of more than twenty years' standing' (p. 147). A little later, the chair of the appointments committee wrote about this

incident: 'I have never come across anything like this as a university teacher at three universities and with twenty-five years of experience; rather, it was always assumed that in such a case [of personal friendship] . . . extreme caution was necessary, because academic valuations must be delivered free from personal bias (ibid.).'

The book contains a wealth of such interesting individual cases. The author also analyses overall processes, but no clear picture of the university emerges. The contradictions in its development phase are reflected in this study. It becomes obvious how many burdens from the past the university had to contend with, and that most of its problems stemmed from the fact that its foundation lacked a clear concept. A genuine will for innovation and forces opposing change stood in each other's way and blocked each other for a long time.

Marshall's monograph is a fundamental work for the university history of Potsdam, but it also lays the basis for a history of the transformation of the East German higher education system as a whole. Above all, it should be stressed that the author has tapped many new resources. The numerous interviews with experts that she conducted were a necessary supplement, as many sources were not available to her. Her free use of personal names from the sources is somewhat surprising. While researchers will welcome this, data protectionists may rub their eyes in astonishment on occasion.

It remains to be noted that there are a number of annoying errors in the book. The claim that internal telephone calls within the university were still being monitored in 1994 ('and perhaps even later') is a myth based on the general Stasi hysteria after 1990, and should not exercise a historian (p. 173) because for purely technical reasons alone there was nothing to it. The author writes elsewhere that the historian Joachim Petzold was dismissed by the Humboldt University in Berlin because he had participated in the repression of the 1960s and 1970s (p. 184, n. 722). In fact, Petzold worked at the Academy of Sciences (AdW). Marshall confuses him with Kurt Pätzold, a researcher of fascism. Nor is her assertion that the Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam was transformed into an branch of the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich correct (p. 191). The ZZF is, in fact, an independent Leibniz Institute, which also has links with the university as directors hold a professorship there. Despite such errors, this book by Barbara Marshall is a successful contribution to the history of the transformation of the

East German higher education system, something that has hardly been investigated so far.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Competitors and Companions: Britons and Germans in the World. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute and the Arbeitskreis Deutsche Englandforschung/German Association for the Study of British History and Politics, and held at the Centre for British Studies, Humboldt University Berlin, 19–20 May 2017. Conveners: Julia Eichenberg (Berlin), Daniel Steinbach (Exeter), and Tobias Becker (GHIL).

For obvious reasons, the history of the Anglo-German relationship has attracted a lot of attention. While traditionally the emphasis has been on official bilateral relations, newer studies, looking beyond high politics, have drawn attention to contacts and interactions on many levels and between many groups such as scientists, artists, journalists, students, and businessmen. Some studies have begun to look beyond Europe to account for contacts in the colonial world or international organizations. The conference 'Competitors and Companions: Britons and Germans in the World' set out to survey and expand this research. It focused on the relationship between Britons and Germans by discussing specific examples of competition and co-operation in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, which, in many cases, proved to be two sides of the same coin. 'Competitors and Companions' also functioned as this year's annual conference of the Arbeitskreis Deutsche Englandforschung/German Association for the Study of British History and Politics.

That competition and co-operation were interconnected already became clear in the first panel, fittingly entitled 'Competitive Collaborations'. Axel C. Hüntelmann's (Berlin) paper, 'The Foundation and early Establishment of Public Health Institutions in Germany and Britain around 1900', assessed the relationship between the French Pasteur Institute, the Prussian Institute for Infectious Diseases, and the Liverpool and London Schools of Tropical Medicine, the leading institutions in the field of hygiene and public health before the First

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

World War. Although competing with one another for scientific success and prestige, these institutes—and the scientists attached to them—co-operated closely, exchanging knowledge through conferences, publications, visits, and even on shared expeditions to Africa. Similarly, the 1900s saw news agencies competing for the global market but also sharing news with one another as Volker Barth (Cologne) explained in his talk on 'Competing Partners: The Global Collaboration between Reuters and Wolff, 1859–1934'. Barth described collaboration and competition as feeding into one another and saw commercial considerations, much more than political ones, as a motive behind both. Politics took centre stage in the last paper of the session. Speaking on 'The War of Words in the River Plate: Propaganda in Argentina during the Second World War', Chris Bannister (London) compared the propaganda war between Britain and Nazi Germany in Argentina, which was won by the British Ministry of Information, thanks to larger resources but also to Germany's much less successful efforts to mobilize the expat community.

In her keynote lecture, Gaynor Johnson (Kent) gave a broad overview of 'Twentieth-Century British Foreign Policy and the German Question'. Focusing mainly on diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany, Johnson stressed that these had traditionally been very good up to the late nineteenth century, especially compared to Anglo-French relations, and that the two world wars have come to dominate views of the Anglo-German relationship. She advocated taking a longer term perspective and including France, without which the Anglo-German relationship cannot be fully understood. She ended her talk by characterizing Britain and Germany as both competitors and companions, who were ultimately united by more than divided them.

'Post-War Re-Encounters'—after both the First and the Second World War—were the subject of the second panel. It was opened by Ben Holmes (Exeter) with a paper on '"To give hope must be our mission above everything else": British Humanitarian Aid to Post-War Germany, 1919–1925'. Holmes compared two humanitarian organizations, the Quaker-run Friends' Emergency and War Victims' Committee and the British Save the Children Fund, which both sent money, food, and clothing to Germany after the war. While the latter withdrew after the end of the post-war crisis, the Quakers stayed on, shifting the emphasis from aid to spreading pacifist sentiments. Both,

however, collaborated with German actors on the ground. Tara Windsor (Birmingham) covered roughly the same period in a paper entitled ' "If the students are cooperating today, surely there is hope for tomorrow!": Student Associations and German–British Exchange after the First World War'. Drawing on the National Union of Students of England and Wales and the Deutsche Studentenschaft, Windsor discerned both nationalist antipathies and a renewed longing for exchange and co-operation. In the final paper of the session, ' "Fagin in Berlin Provokes a Riot": Anti-Semitism and Anglo-German Relations in Occupied Germany', Emily Oliver (Warwick) used the screening of David Lean's 1949 film of *Oliver Twist* and the ensuing protests against the antisemitic portrayal of Fagin to explore the situation and the representation of Jews in post-war West Germany. While Germany was, paradoxically perhaps, thanks to the Allies, the safest place for Jews in post-war Europe, many Germans regarded Jews as black-market profiteers and blamed them for antisemitism.

With the third panel, 'Imperial Connections', the perspective shifted from Europe to the non-European world. In imperial Singapore, for instance, Britons and Germans were in close contact with each other, often socializing in the same clubs, as Marine Fiedler (Berne/Paris) demonstrated in her paper, 'Being a "Singaporer" from Hamburg: The Relationships of a Hanseatic Family with the Britons of Singapore, 1840–1914'. On the imperial periphery, class affiliation trumped national origin—until the outbreak of First World War brought the conflict of the European centre to the colonial periphery. Daniel Steinbach's paper, 'Nation—Race—Empire: Britons and Germans in Colonial Africa', had a similar story to tell for East Africa. Compared to Singapore, class played a lesser role here and Britons and Germans, united by racism, even intermarried. Yet here, too, the First World War proved fatal—metaphorically as well as literally—when British troops invaded the German territories. Paradoxically, some of the pre-war solidarity survived into the post-war era, which saw Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck invited to a veteran's dinner in London. The panel was rounded off by Jan Rüger (London), speaking on 'Anglo-German Smuggling; or: Writing Europe into the History of the British Empire'. Rüger distinguished between two schools of historians of Britain: one that interprets Britain's history primarily through an imperial lens with Europe merely as a sideshow, while

the other, largely ignoring the empire, understands Britain as a European power. For his part, Rüger advocated a third interpretation, which would write the empire into Britain's encounter with Europe and Europe into Britain's imperial history.

The final discussion examined the relationship between competition and co-operation in the light of the case studies presented at the conference. It revolved around three overarching themes or perspectives: the economy as driven by competition but also as a driving force for international exchange and co-operation; war as an extreme case of competition but also an extreme case of contact between nations; and finally, culture—identity, language, representations, stereotypes—as a way of producing, expressing, but also of bridging differences. Building on the existing literature on the Anglo-German relationship, the conference showcased current research on this topic and raised new questions for future studies.

TOBIAS BECKER (GHIL)

The Divided Nation: German–German History 1945–1990. Workshop organized by the London School of Economics and Political Science, the German Historical Institute London, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, and held at the GHIL, 1–2 June 2017. Conveners: Dominik Geppert (GHIL/University of Bonn), Stefan Creuzberger (University of Rostock), and Dierk Hoffmann (Institute of Contemporary History, Munich–Berlin).

Since the 1990s there have been repeated calls for research on contemporary German history to look at asymmetrically entangled and parallel developments in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic together. Nonetheless, studies that take both blocs into account and present a differentiated argument while remaining comprehensible to a wider reading public remain rare.

A publication series conceived by Stefan Creuzberger, Dominik Geppert, and Dierk Hoffmann, to be published from 2019 by be.bra-Verlag in Berlin, is intended to close this gap and to develop current research trends further. In the early stages of the project, the editors organized a workshop at the German Historical Institute in London to bring together the historians involved and to provide a platform for a dialogue about questions, reflections, concepts, patterns of interpretation, and developments in German–German history. At this workshop, nine of the seventeen historians involved in the project presented their research projects and outlines.

In his introduction Dominik Geppert (London/Bonn) emphasized that researchers often continue to treat the FRG and the GDR separately. In his opinion, one reason for this is the normative interpretative framework which has been used by various generations of historians. The history of the FRG has long been presented as a success story, while that of the GDR is held up as a negative contrast. In the meantime, a younger generation of historians is increasingly looking at transnational and global aspects, providing new perspectives for research on the two German states, including the old FRG's and the GDR's post-national view of themselves. According to

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL)

The full programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

Geppert, while the concepts and theoretical considerations of what Christoph Kleßmann has called an 'asymmetrically entangled parallel history' ('asymmetrisch verflochtene Parallelgeschichte') and Konrad Jarausch's notion of a 'plural sequential perspective' ('plurale Sequenzperspektive') are generally accepted as providing an integrating perspective, we still lack empirical studies and illustrations that could put 'flesh on the theoretical skeleton'. One aim of the planned series is to remedy this shortcoming.

Franz-Josef Meiers (Münster) looked at the behavioural patterns of delimitation and system competition, parallelism and co-operation, and entanglement of German–German foreign policy (or policies) during three periods (1955–1968, 1969–1984, and 1985–1990/91). His questions concerned the German–German room for manoeuvre within the European security system, arms control, and the different vested interests in crisis situations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He paid special attention to structural similarities between the USA and the Soviet Union, despite system competition and dependencies. Meier's working hypothesis is that despite all the differences in the social and political structures of East and West Germany, similar solutions could have been found for a German–German security policy.

Jörg Echternkamp (Potsdam) examined relations between the military and society, and between militarism and pacifism in Germany after 1945. An observation of the military in both blocs, caught between autonomy and heteronomy, could reflect delimitation, mutual perceptions and influences, and provide information about real and alleged threats. A German–German view of ideas of war and peace could also indirectly point to the issue of belonging to a German nation, however this is defined. Another aspect that occupied Echternkamp was how the two German states dealt with their common militaristic past, veering between delimitation and continuing lines of tradition. The paradigm shift in security policy and its impact on the newly formed Bundeswehr after reunification was the end point of Echternkamp's deliberations.

Tim Geiger (Berlin) turned to diplomatic history, in particular, the symbolic and representational content of German–German summits and state visits. These had produced images, he said, that have become an integral part of the collective memory. Geiger outlined five encounters, from the conference of prime ministers in June 1947, to the 1970 meetings between Willy Brandt and Willi Stoph in Erfurt

and Kassel, Erich Honecker's visit to Bonn in 1987, and the meetings between Helmut Kohl and Hans Modrow in Dresden and Bonn in 1989–90. Geiger's main emphasis was on the 1970s and 1980s because there were no official meetings between top East German and West German politicians between 1947 and 1970.

Frieder Günther (Potsdam) presented a comparative investigation of the administrative structures and cultures of the two German states in a diachronic perspective, whose aim was to elucidate the systemic specificities of each state and to clarify the differences. As he took special note of cultural characteristics in East and West, his focus was on the everyday work of administration, the processes of decision-making, and the structures of communication between authorities and staff.

Henning Türk (Potsdam) analysed the challenges facing energy policy (including raw materials shortages after the Second World War, the oil price crisis, and the difficulties of securing the energy supply in general) in both the FRG and GDR. He also looked at what options were open to each state within its political and economic system. In addition to parallels in the German–German energy supply, he also discussed entanglements and co-operation in order to identify the actors and institutions involved in this field, and to see what impact external factors had.

A narrative history of German media after 1945, Christoph Classen's (Potsdam) subject, focused on the contrasting understanding of democracy in the two German states and their different political motives in using media as an instrument of political propaganda in the Cold War. Entanglements and parallels have not been the subject of much research in this area so far. Classen therefore illuminated the developments that spanned the divide, and looked at processes of medialization. These transformed the culture of entertainment and information in East and West German society, with unintended consequences for politics. Because of their social and cultural impact, Classen argued, the media can be seen to have had a share in the decline of socialism and the global spread of consumer-oriented societies.

Andrea Brait (Vienna) dealt with German–German competitive thinking about the dominance of history from the first years after the Second World War. Among other things, she focused on the processing of the Nazi past in museums, monuments, and public discourse.

In this context, she looked at the ups and downs in historical consciousness, for example, the widespread disaffection with history during the 1960s and 1970s, the re-emerging interest in it from the 1980s, and attempts to influence this re-awakened interest through social policy and policy for history.

Christoph Neumaier (Potsdam) presented a comparative analysis of the role of women in East and West German society. On the basis of their roles as housewives, mothers, and workers, he discussed the development of the social policy framework and influential factors in the form of legislation and reforms from the post-war period to reunification. He also examined the relationship between women who worked outside the home and the emancipation movement.

In her project outline, Jutta Braun (Potsdam) compared organized sport in the two countries, contrasting the sports clubs of the FRG with the workplace-based sporting associations in the GDR. She focused on the relationship between sporting culture and regional profile, and asked what mechanisms made it possible to identify with elite sportsmen and sportswomen in East and West. The influence of the Stasi on sport and the GDR's record of doping were contextualized in the bigger picture of German–German system competition through sport.

From the perspective of an eyewitness and political scientist, Anthony Glees (Buckingham) asked, in the closing discussion, to what extent German–German history, with its specific entanglements, parallelism, and mutual demarcations, was continuing the interpretative pattern of a German *Sonderweg*. What other subjects might be suitable for a history of German–German entanglement, parallelism, and demarcation was also discussed. Mention was made of the confrontation with the Nazi past, consumption, and a social history and history of mentalities of daily contacts across the inner-German border. These constructive suggestions were gladly adopted by the series editors.

VICTORIA THUM (Bamberg)

Moralizing Commerce in a Globalizing World: Multidisciplinary Approaches to a History of Economic Conscience, 1600–1900. Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 22–24 June 2017. Conveners: Felix Brahm (GHIL) and Eve Rosenhaft (University of Liverpool).

The relevance of this conference, organized by Eve Rosenhaft and Felix Brahm at the German Historical Institute in London, needs no explanation. The question of the relationship between commerce and morality is an important one on both a global and an individual scale at a time when involvement in commercial networks and activities in a globalized context is still growing. In historicizing the subject, the conference offered a wide range of reflections on the matter from early views on the emergence of a 'commercial society' to contemporary working conditions, although it focused mainly on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The growing interaction with distant countries and the intrusion of related economic matters in everyday life during the early modern period left its traces in various forms of public discourse. Yusuke Wakazawa (York) showed how its consequences were perceived within Europe, based on the example of Tobias Smollett's epistolary novel *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*, published in 1771. The disproportionate growth of cities involved in international trade, the exhibition of luxury on the one hand and increasing social inequality on the other were, among other changes, interpreted as signs of a growing imbalance within the body politic. The epistolary structure of the novel, as Wakazawa stressed, reflects the fragmented perception of a reality that was ever more complex and difficult to grasp in its entirety. Similarly, Joyce Goggin (Amsterdam) pointed towards fictionalization as a means of dealing with a financial world that had

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The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

a deep impact on personal lives. At the same time it was perceived as more and more abstract and beyond human control, as expressed in early literary reflections on the spectacular failure of the financial bubble created by John Law. These reveal many parallels with contemporary fictionalizations of financial success and failure.

More and more impersonal economic structures that seemed to be detached from the lives of the greater part of the population and from political control apparently generated mistrust in the protagonists of these developments and towards the forces of attraction a globalized economic order exerted on societies in general. This mistrust can even be traced on the margins of the international trading centres, as Justus Nipperdey (Saarbrücken) outlined in his talk about the German Cameralists. Their fear of the consequences of economic freedom in terms of social inequality and mistrust of the figure of the merchant, who was suspected of working solely for his own interest, while they continued to trust monarchical governments alone to regulate economic structures and working conditions for the common good, exemplified contemporary concerns about changes in society brought about by the emergence of a new globalized order based on liberal principles.

But while these early criticisms seem to lend themselves easily to drawing parallels with modern criticism, historians should not ignore the moral and religious attitudes on which economic enterprise was based during that period. In this respect, Aaron Graham (London) showed that even in a business with as negative connotations as the arms trade today, moral values such as trust and public benefit were perceived as essential in business connections that were still mainly based on family or friendship. Highlighting the examples of two contractors, he outlined how concern about 'fair prices' and the public good was passed down and was intended to guide actions at all levels within the business hierarchy. Richard Huzzey (Durham), for his part, suggested stressing the religious motives behind abolitionism, and putting these at the origin of the belief in free labour that is usually cited as the abolitionists' leading principle. He showed that the deeply religious language used in the abolitionist campaigns in Britain, many of whose arguments were based on the Bible, concepts of sin and virtue, and even apocalyptic visions, led to the argument that real prosperity could only derive from a new type of 'moralized commerce' more in line with divine providence and justice.

But Enlightenment discourse—based as it was on a strongly moralized language focused on the 'common good' and 'public happiness'—did not necessarily imply that its values were considered universally applicable. When it came to distant countries and cultures, the *lumières* revealed their inherent tendency to apply 'civilizing' methods to societies apparently less developed. This means that enlightened discourse could easily be used to justify the establishment of imperial structures in line with expanding economic interests. This was demonstrated by Laura Tarkka-Robinson (Helsinki) in her talk on how reports written by East India Company employees in the eighteenth century contributed to shaping a new orientalism. This was based on the Enlightenment's obsession with national stereotypes and an idea of historical progress that helped to justify the establishment of imperial structures in southern Asia. Similarly, a former official of the Dutch East India Company apparently did not see any contradiction in morally justifying a land reform benefiting Javanese farmers to allow them to pursue their personal interest in fostering public happiness and wealth, while at the same time sharply condemning the Chinese merchants in the area. He loaded their pursuit of their own private interests with negative connotations and pictured it as diametrically opposed to the common good, as Blake Smith (Chicago/Paris) explained. Thus where national economic interests were concerned, moral language could be used to promote one's 'own' interests, while at the same time denegrating 'others' for not meeting allegedly universal principles. Sarah Lentz (Bremen) offered another interesting example of the pursuit of national economic interest based on moral arguments in her talk on Prussia's sudden involvement in the abolitionist discourse around 1800. Here the invention of beet sugar by a Prussian scientist seemed to offer an alternative to slave-produced cane sugar at the same time as it opened up prospects of wealth for its producers and the state.

Parallel to these difficulties in separating moral claims from economic interests on a national level at times of economic expansion, it is also difficult to draw a clear line between moral considerations and the pursuit of business interests at company or individual level. In this context, Aske Laursen Brock (Canterbury) drew attention to the motives behind merchants' involvement in social institutions in seventeenth-century London. At a time when companies were growing and coming under criticism for being increasingly detached from the

common weal, donations, but also investments in manufactures that provided work for the poor, became a means of accumulating moral capital, thus serving the image of companies and the public benefit at the same time. Again, what was morally at stake in one part of the world was not necessarily so when it came to distant countries. Joseph Kelly (Liverpool) cited the illuminating example of the British Imperial Brazilian Mining Association. While Britain itself had already abolished slavery, this company continued to employ slaves in Brazil. Stockholders clashed over this issue in 1841 and, again, it is difficult to discern whether it was out of genuine moral concern or concern for the company's public image. Both sides relied on moral arguments to justify their position. The defenders of slave labour alleged that the company had transferred knowledge and capital to a country lacking in both, and that to free the slaves would only mean exposing them to re-enslavement by Brazilians under much worse conditions. In the end, the company continued to rely on slave labour in a distant country, even after slavery was condemned in Europe.

A completely different view of this paternalistic treatment of slaves was offered by Jake Richards (Cambridge), who gave a rare insight into former slaves' attitudes towards Western authorities' attempts to determine their working conditions. After the abolition of the slave trade on the British side, 'liberated Africans' were put to work as apprentices on large land holdings, mainly in South Africa and the Americas. Taking the example of three liberated slaves, Richards showed how they used the limited possibilities they had to express their discontent at this display of paternalism that prevented them from choosing their own path in the transition from slavery to free labour. While the authorities hardly had the means to prevent these apprenticeships from turning into de facto re-enslavement, they still reacted with contempt towards the Africans for not corresponding to their views on political economy.

As became apparent on various occasions, moral arguments were often used to stabilize the existing order rather than change it. In this context, Andrés Spognardi (Coimbra) showed how attempts by Portuguese governments to alleviate the miserable living conditions of the working class and overcome growing social inequality, regarded as a consequence of exaggerated liberalism, by facilitating the foundation of co-operations in 1876 were mainly a means of anticipating and thereby controlling socialist movements, and thus of

maintaining social peace and the existing hierarchy. This use of moral language to stabilize hierarchical rule also applies to imperial structures and exploitative methods of production. This issue was also vital in Kim Sebastian Todzi's (Hamburg) paper on Germany's involvement in the African liquor trade at the end of the nineteenth century. Moral arguments that were used to criticize the detrimental effects of alcohol on African society clashed with the financial interests of traders and authorities, who likewise used moral arguments based mainly on the civilizing effects of free trade in Africa. Growing pressure on merchants ultimately had no effect because of vested interests, not least those of governments, in maintaining the income provided by duties derived from colonial trade.

While in this case it was the profits made by institutions directly involved in exploitative methods of production that resulted in these structures being maintained, another talk raised the question of consumer responsibility in this respect. Prices were a determining factor in the development of modern industry, as the creation of a new market of affordable goods for the emerging middle classes and labourers led to an increasing pressure on production costs, as Jennifer Davis (Liverpool) explained in her keynote lecture on the relationship between the establishment of trademarks and working conditions in the British textile sector. The search for cheaper production processes led to large-scale outsourcing to workshops employing unskilled labourers with miserable working conditions inside and outside Britain. At the beginning, trademarks were intended to allow the origins of a product to be traced. But misuse, exceptions, and 'deceptive marketing' helped to strengthen the position of large proprietors who were increasingly able to hide exploitation of workers behind their public image. By contrast, attempts by trade unions to establish their own trademarks certifying fair working conditions did not flourish, mainly because of price differences.

This talk touched on many issues that are still at the centre of debates on working conditions today, which was further illustrated by the second keynote lecture, delivered by William G. Clarence-Smith (London), and by Benjamin Möckel's (Cologne) contribution to the final discussion. Both opened up paths for the further development of the conference theme. Clarence-Smith introduced the attitudes of different African and Asian cultures towards forced labour in the pearl trade, and suggested looking at non-European discourses, such as

Muslim abolitionism. Möckel pointed to the need to deal with the moralizing views of contemporary slave-owners, who often depict themselves as victims of globalization and free market ideas, and whose attitude towards their labourers might contradict Western human rights movements, but not necessarily their own cultural values.

The conference concluded with this turn towards a more globalized consideration of moralizing views on commerce. It had exposed a variety of subjects from the emergence of a 'commercial society' to contemporary moral debates related to commerce, such as fair trade, price policy, forced labour, consumer responsibility, and the role of governments in establishing moral codes for business, all of which, as was shown, have a long history that can be traced back to earlier stages of a globalized trade.

ALEXANDRA GITTERMANN (Hamburg)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year's postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to Dr Felix Brahm, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the second allocation for 2017 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Matthias Bähr (Dresden), Totes Kapital? Die Ökonomie des Leichnams auf den Britischen Inseln (1550–1850)
Philip Bajon (Frankfurt am Main), Der Luxemburger Kompromiss und die Entscheidungskultur in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1966–1993
Cornelia Dreer (Kassel), Das Polychronicon von Ranulph Higden: Wissen, Weltchronik und Weltkarte
Bianca Frohne (Bremen), Experiences of Pain in the Early and High Middle Ages
Julia Held (Constance), The Asian Minority between Integration and Exclusion: Citizenship and Nationhood in Transitional East Africa, *c*.1945–1972
Axel C. Hüntelmann (Berlin), Rechnungswesen und Buchführung in

der Medizin: Kalkulative Praktiken, administrative Techniken und medizinisches Wissen in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1750–1950
Bastian Knautz (Mainz), Zwischen Eurosklerose und Relance: Die Europäische Gemeinschaft auf dem Weg zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte 1983–1986. Eine multinationale Betrachtung
Felicia Kompio (Berlin), Revolution der Straße: Urbane Massenpolitisierung in den 1820er und 1830er Jahren als europäisches Phänomen
Justin Mathew (Göttingen), Geographies of Accumulation and the Urban Question in a Colonial Port City: Cochin, Southwest India 1860s–1950s
Lena Rudeck (Berlin), Zwischen Vergnügungen und Unmoral: Westalliierte Soldatenclubs in Deutschland als Begegnungsorte von Besatzer_innen und Besetzten, 1945–1952
Jakob Schönhagen (Freiburg im Breisgau), Geschichte der Weltflüchtlingspolitik, 1950–1973
David Templin (Hamburg), Vom Elendsviertel zum 'Urban Village' der Mittelschicht? Verfall und Aufwertung innerstädtischer Altbauquartiere in Hamburg, London und Wien, 1918–1985
Nikolai Wehrs (Constance), Elitenherrschaft im Zeitalter der Massendemokratie: Die Rolle des Civil Service in der politischen Kultur Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert
Michael Zeheter (Trier), Eine Konsum- und Kulturgeschichte des Mineralwassers in Europa, von 1830 bis in die Gegenwart

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Heritage, Decolonization, and the Field: A Conference. Organized by the German Historical Institute London, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and the UCL Institute of Archaeology, to be held at the GHIL and the UCL Institute of Archaeology, 26–27 January 2018. Conveners: Rodney Harrison (UCL), William Carruthers (GHIL), Indra Sengupta (GHIL), and Andreas Gestrich (GHIL).

The development of heritage as a distinctive, international field of governance regulated through institutions such as UNESCO, ICOMOS, ICCROM, and the IUCN is closely linked to practices of decolonization and fieldwork. Taking cultural heritage alone, anthropolo-

gists, archaeologists, architects, and engineers worked across the decolonizing world in countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Pakistan, making the development of this new form of governance a reality; so too did experts from area studies, government survey agencies, and philanthropic organizations. This work helped to (re)-constitute the fields to which these practitioners were connected, creating new disciplinary assemblages, new forms of knowledge, and rearranging the relationship of fieldworkers to the places where they laboured. At the same time, this process was not simply a product of decolonization; in fact, it had its origins in knowledge practices which were often closely connected to practices of colonial governance and the complex administrative relationship between colonies and metropoles. These older, colonial practices were simultaneously reconstituted and entangled within these newly emergent disciplinary assemblages and knowledge practices as decolonization gathered pace.

Yet despite increased interest in the histories and practice of cultural and natural heritage, there is little understanding of how their interconnection with decolonization and the field actually took place. How did these three things work together to make heritage governance a reality? How did decolonization shape the form of that governance and the sorts of fieldwork that took place? How, vice versa, did these forms of fieldwork and governance shape decolonization, and how also did colonial practices play a role? Moreover, how (if at all) do the answers to such questions vary across time and space? If we are to understand the relationship between heritage, decolonization, and the field—and, by extension, the development of heritage governance itself—providing answers to these questions is a necessity, as is considering the methodologies which we might use to make these answers effective.

In Global Transit: Jewish Migrants from Hitler's Europe in Asia, Africa, and Beyond. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German Historical Institute Washington, DC to be held in Kolkata/India, 14–16 February 2018. Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington), and Indra Sengupta (GHI London).

The German Historical Institutes in London and Washington, DC along with the newly established Branch Offices of the Max Weber Foundation in Delhi, Beijing, and Berkeley, CA are organizing a conference on new perspectives on Jewish flight and exile from Nazi Europe. Most of the scholarship on this topic has so far focused on the flight and emigration of Jews from Germany and Austria and on the destinations where the largest numbers ended their journeys: the United States, Central and South America, and Palestine. The most recent additions to this extensive scholarship focus on previously neglected places of refuge, particularly in Africa and Asia, and also consider Jews from outside the Third Reich who were forced to flee Europe.

Building on that scholarship, this conference aims to expand the geographical, temporal, and conceptual lens on Jewish forced migration. This approach promises to offer new insights not only into the experience of the refugees but also into the reach of anti-Semitism and racism against the backdrop of colonialism and war. Many refugees travelled long and circuitous routes, which could take weeks, months, or, if longer stopovers were involved, sometimes years, with the final destination often unforeseeable.

During this conference we would like to pay special attention to neglected temporal and spatial aspects of forced migration from Nazi Germany and occupied Europe. We will focus on the destinations and processes of migration, giving particular attention to colonial and semi-colonial settings and the transit phase of migration. We are particularly interested in three main themes/areas of inquiry: (1) economic and humanitarian aspects of emigration and escape; (2) encounters with race, racism, and colonialism; and (3) multi-directional encounters and knowledge transfer in colonial and semi-colonial wartime contexts and their aftermath.

We wish to address common research gaps and questions and to situate them in the context of general migration history. Framing emigration, exile, and refugee history as an entangled history in colonial contexts and situating it also in the history of the 'Global South' can serve as a special prism for better interpreting processes that extend beyond Jews and Jewish history. In this way, we would like to extract these histories from often rather victim-centred narratives and explore more forcefully the interactions with people outside the refugee/migrant communities as well as differences within these

communities themselves. By doing so, we hope that the conference will contribute to shaping a new field of research—migrants' knowledge in historical perspectives.

The Challenge of Brexit: Historical Narratives of Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and the Institute of Contemporary History, Munich (IfZ), to be held at the IfZ, 19–21 April 2018. Convenors: Andreas Gestrich (GHIL), Michael Schaich (GHIL), Martina Steber (IfZ), and Andreas Wirsching (IfZ).

The outcome of the Brexit referendum sent shockwaves through continental Europe and also through parts of the UK. While some believe that the end of Britain's membership in the EU will lead the UK into economic and social decline, others rejoice in national independence and predict a shining future for Britain in the world. However that may be, the decision for Brexit underlines Britain's rejection of further European integration. It is highly significant and marks a historic turning point in British and European history.

For many this monumental decision came as a surprise. Since then intellectuals and commentators have been searching for an explanation. For historians the Brexit decision was no less of a surprise than for other intellectuals, and they are no less challenged by it. It fundamentally questions common interpretations of twentieth-century history: about globalization, Europeanization, the power of neo-liberalism, the welfare state, nationalism, identity, and democracy. This is true for interpretations of European history in general and of British history in particular and, above all, for the understanding of Britain's place in Europe.

This conference will take up the challenge. It asks how Brexit changes our views of twentieth-century British history. Do we have to revise established narratives of how Britain has developed since 1945? How can we conceive of Britain's place within European history? What does Brexit mean for our understanding of European integration?

The conference will discuss these questions by putting the British case into a wider European and transatlantic perspective. It will inte-

grate political, social, economic, and cultural history approaches to unfold the complexities and ambiguities of twentieth-century British history. Finally, it will think about historical trajectories and contingencies in Britain's relationship with its European neighbours.

Contested Borders? Practising Empire, Nation, and Region in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute, 26–28 April 2018. Convenors: Levke Harders (Bielefeld University) and Falko Schnicke (GHIL).

Brexit, the Basque country, Kashmir—the drawing of social and spatial boundaries, the question of belonging, and the creation of identity are at the heart of many current debates. They are based on general political, social, and economic developments and the historical experience of individuals. This is why the drawing and negotiating of borders is a relevant topic for historical research. Although borders (are intended to) define geographical and cultural spaces and possibly also political communities, there is nothing 'natural' about them. Rather, they are the outcome of specific historical conditions. Thus the emergence of the European nation-states and empires was accompanied not only by the drawing of borders, but also by the establishment of political and social borders and boundaries relating to identity politics. Nation-states and empires, therefore, are seen as the central categories of European modernity and beyond. We argue, however, that processes that occurred before and beyond the creation of nation-states equally influenced inclusion and exclusion. The categories of belonging and non-belonging were created at (post)imperial, national, regional, and local levels, and involved various actors. For some years, the social sciences have used 'belonging' as a productive concept in researching these processes of negotiation. At a theoretical level and as a methodological instrument, however, 'belonging' has not been clearly defined.

This conference intends systematically (1) to contribute to the definition of 'belonging' as a research concept, (2) to explore the region as a category of historical research, and (3) to combine regional analyses consistently with perspectives drawn from the nation-state and (post)imperialism, as recent literature has repeatedly demanded, and

(4) to contribute to overcoming a widely criticized 'methodological nationalism' via transregional and transnational approaches. We will examine how belonging is created, as well as instances of suppressed or prevented belonging, and the political, social, and personal hierarchies associated with them. How were inclusion and exclusion created? What role did the different forms of boundaries between empires, states, nations, and regions play? What actors were involved in the creation of belonging, in the drawing of borders, and in crossing them? Fractures, resistance, and interrogations can be used to reveal lines of conflict and demonstrate the elementary functioning of the politics of belonging and the logic behind them. We are interested both in specific local/regional and state practices of belonging, and in the concepts inherent in them.

In the nineteenth century continental Europe was characterized by dynastic developments, a number of wars, and shifting boundaries that thus became, in part, ambiguous. Both the Franco-German border and the borders of (and within) the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire can be described as 'entangled borderlands' during this period. Their ambiguities had a considerable impact on the economy, politics, and social structure, and they were changed, among other things, by cross-border migrations. After the First World War the right of popular self-determination placed the drawing of borders on to a new legal footing. In its specific application as a legal principle, this new instrument had varying and sometimes paradoxical effects on the negotiation of borders and nationality. This can be traced, for example, by looking at the British Empire, which from the outset was a complex system of hybrid affiliations. With the transition to the Commonwealth, the question of belonging was complicated in a new way, for example, when India had to position itself between 'Western values' and non-aligned status, or when newly created republics in Africa were represented by the Queen along with the monarchies of the Commonwealth. Moreover (sociological and ethnographic) research on migration and citizenship is increasingly examining these everyday processes of negotiation and focusing on its actors (migrants, marginalized groups, civil society, authorities, etc.).

Obituary Peter Wende

On 26 July 2017 Peter Wende died in Frankfurt at the age of 81. He had been Professor of Modern History at Frankfurt University since 1972, and was director of the German Historical Institute in London from 1994 to 2000.

Peter Wende studied history, English, and politics at the universities of Hamburg, Leicester, and Frankfurt. He gained his Ph.D. from Frankfurt university in 1965 with a thesis on the dissolution of the ecclesiastical states of the Holy Roman Empire as reflected in contemporary journalism. In it, he investigated in detail the arguments for and against the retention of the ecclesiastical states that had been debated by the wider public around 1800. In 1972 he completed his *Habilitation*, also in Frankfurt, under Otto Vossler. In this highly respected work, Wende systematically reconstructed the radical positions of the German *Vormärz* along political lines. His intention was to make a contribution not only to the study of the origins of political democracy in Germany, but also to the historical contextualization of the radical democratic trends of the 1970s. This work is dedicated to his 'honoured teacher Otto Vossler', a historian who kept his position under the Nazis, but maintained a clear intellectual distance from the regime. Vossler had written his Ph.D. on Mazzini, his *Habilitation* was a study of American revolutionary ideals, and he published important work on the 1848 revolution and Rousseau.

In his further academic work Wende remained closely wedded to the themes of revolution and reform. While Vossler's interests tended towards the Romance world and the USA, Wende turned towards Britain, looking first at the radical traditions of the seventeenth-century English revolution, and then at wider periods of British history. In the years that followed, he took an ever broader view of British history, and wrote a number of authoritative overviews and introductions to the study of British history. His *Geschichte Englands* was first published by Kohlhammer Verlag in 1985, and was re-issued in a revised and expanded new edition in 1995. Britain's position and role in Europe and the world also occupied Wende more and more. His history of the British empire was published in 2008, but drew on a much longer engagement with the subject.

When Wende was appointed director of the German Historical Institute and moved to London with his wife, Margot, on 1 September

1994, he was not only a well-known expert on nineteenth-century German history, but also a leading figure in German research on British history. Wende took over the London institute in difficult times, when it was not clear whether it would survive the major financial crisis it found itself in. With great purpose and energy Wende brought the institute back on to an even keel. He finally completed the transition by which responsibility for the institute passed from the Verein zur Förderung des britisch-deutschen Historikerkreises, which was dissolved in 1993, to the new legal and administrative structures of the Stiftung Deutsche Historische Institute im Ausland. Among his aims as director was to give the institute a stronger profile in research on British history by integrating it more strongly into the British academic scene, and to intensify the academic dialogue within the institute. He achieved these aims through the edition he initiated of reports by British envoys at German courts in the nineteenth century, which has become a highly regarded model of diplomatic history with a cultural history orientation, and by producing publications to which all institute fellows contributed, such as the volume on modern English kings and queens which he edited. Wende's tenure as director in London ended just as the institute underwent a major review by the German Science Council. The review committee endorsed the course taken by Wende and the priorities he set, and confirmed that the institute was doing excellent work and had gained a firm place in the British and German research landscape. Wende had made a major contribution to this success by his own academic work and the work that he initiated at the institute.

In August 2000 Peter and Margot Wende returned to Frankfurt. The following years of productive retirement saw the publication of several books, including Wende's big history of the British empire, which came out in 2008 with Beck Verlag. The staff of the institute remember Peter Wende and his time as director with gratitude and affection. His liberality and humour, his ability to motivate his staff, and the judicious policy by which he tied the institute closely into the British and German research scene left a lasting mark on the institute and helped it to progress. Peter Wende will be greatly missed at the German Historical Institute.

Andreas Gestrich (GHIL)

LIBRARY NEWS

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