Bulletin

German Historical Institute London

Bulletin

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THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE AT FORTY

ANDREAS GESTRICH

The German Historical Institute London was officially opened at a ceremony on 4 November 1976. At the time, the Institute was accommodated in rooms at 26 Bloomsbury Square, and so the ceremony was held at Senate House, University of London. The founding Director was Paul Kluke, emeritus Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Frankfurt. Since his Ph.D. on British army policy before the First World War,[1] Kluke had specialized in British and Commonwealth history. On the British side, Geoffrey Dickens, Director of the Institute of Historical Research and an eminent historian of the Reformation, had actively supported the founding of the Institute. Kluke and Dickens were both members of the Association of British and German Historians that had been set up in 1968 on the initiative of Carl Haase, then Director of the State Archives of Lower Saxony, and which, since then, had been working towards setting up an Institute in London.

In Britain, many colleagues showed great openness towards the founding of the Institute, and they were also interested in academic cooperation. These British colleagues included many Jewish emigrants who were teaching history in Britain and now approached the Fellows of the new Institute and offered support. The extent to which Britain's membership of the European Economic Community but also Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* contributed to the willingness of British historians to work with German colleagues and institutions is reflected in Dickens's opening address. For Dickens, fighting against Germany in the Second World War was a formative experience. Having served as a captain in AA Command in the Royal Artillery and then, after 1945, as a brigade intelligence officer and press officer in Lübeck, he perceived the opening of a German Historical Institute in Britain as a 'symbol of that deepening trust and friendship which during these last thirty years has grown up between our two nations.

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

[1] Paul Kluke, *Heeresaufbau und Heerespolitik Englands: Vom Burenkrieg bis zum Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1932).

This friendship threatens nobody and it has grown within the context of an ardent desire for world peace and for a Europe which should truly accept the brotherhood of peoples and renounce the whole spirit of conquest.'[2] The members of the new Institute were very lucky to be greeted by their British colleagues in exactly this new spirit of friendship and cooperation. So the Institute was immediately able to present itself not only as a centre of German research on British history, but also as a platform for intensive and exciting academic exchange.

Dickens added, however, that in future the Institute would have to look beyond bilateral relations. Its academic perspective should be European, he suggested, and contribute to undermining the Cold War: 'Likewise this new institute has been conceived in genuine scholarly exchanges, and mutual regard: not in any spirit of nationalist propaganda. It clearly seeks to display the intellectual benefits which we can give to one another, and indeed give to all men of good will and with enthusiasm for learning. Let us now look forward to that even happier day when this institute will also be readily used in a relaxed atmosphere by Russian and Polish visitors and, of course, by those coming from the German Democratic Republic. Any situation narrower than this would not satisfy our sort of idealism. The fraternity of scholarship cannot be limited to members of the European Economic Community.'[3] At that time, nobody could know that in just over ten years time, the Berlin Wall would fall, that as early as 1993 a German Historical Institute would open in Warsaw, and that it would be followed in 2005 by one in Moscow—all this was as unpredictable as that in 2016 a majority of the British people would vote to leave the European Union.

From the start, the Institute took Dickens's exhortation to adopt a European perspective on the history of Britain and Anglo-German relations seriously, and it has always been open to academic exchange across all borders. Countless conferences, research projects, and publications have been devoted to international comparisons. At the same time, the Institute's research perspectives from the outset went beyond European contexts, and from the start, the Institute had the British Empire and Commonwealth, as well as the processes of

[2] Geoffrey Dickens, 'The Other Miracle', *Latest from Germany*, 42 (1976), 2.
[3] Ibid. 2–3.

decolonization and also globalization in its sights. This part of the Institute's work has been systematically expanded over the past decade with collaborative research projects on India, the opening of a branch office in Delhi, and exciting projects on African and global history.

So where does the Institute stand on its fortieth anniversary? It can certainly be proud of its achievments as a research institute and as an intermediary institution between German and British academia, supporting hundreds of young scholars from both countries and hosting high-profile academic events. The Institute's various series have published more than eighty monographs and a similar number of conference proceedings. To this we can add countless other monographs, edited volumes, and essays written by the Institute's Fellows and scholarship-holders. Many of the Institute's publications and conferences have boosted research in Britain and Germany in important ways. Most of its former Fellows hold professorships or other academic posts in Germany, Britain, or the USA.

But it would be wrong to rest on our laurels. In this anniversary year, we look both backwards and forwards. We have therefore asked two long-standing members of the Institute, Professor Peter Alter and Professor Lothar Kettenacker, who were there at the founding of the Institute in 1976 and, in their function as deputy directors, helped to influence the Institute's development, to look back at the start-up period and share with us their visions for the Institute's future. We have also asked Professor Richard Bessel, who for many years served as a member of the Institute's Academic Advisory Board, and Professor Andreas Fahrmeir, also a long-standing Board member and its current Chairman, to give us their assessments of the Institute's significance for British research on German history, and German research on British history respectively. These contributions are published here as a small, anniversary addition to the current *Bulletin*.

In our own view, where do the challenges for the future lie? We cannot yet tell what impact Brexit will have on the Institute administratively (residence permits, work permits, taxes, and so on), and as far as research is concerned, the situation is similarly unclear. Will Britain be able to 'buy in' to the European Research Area and the various European programmes for funding research? Or will it look to, and hope for, more global collaborations beyond Europe? The voices that we hear in British academia are as divided as they are in busi-

ness. But at European level, Brexit will presumably result in more limited bilateral or multilateral cooperations with Britain assuming greater importance again. The GHIL's significance as a platform for exchange in the humanities in post-Brexit Britain will certainly not decline. On the contrary, in this context of growing bilateral collaborations, it is, therefore, most likely to increase, and in any case, the GHIL will in future remain firmly committed to its role as an intermediary institution.

Even though the Institute has a wide research agenda reaching from the Middle Ages to the present day, Brexit will certainly make us all revisit several areas of British and European history and engage with new topics and historical interpretations. The Institute's Special Research Areas as well as the new International Centre of Advanced Studies 'Metamorphoses of the Political' in Delhi, of which we are founding partners, will continue to contribute relevant research not only to our understanding of these recent events, but also to British history in general in a wider European and global context. In our endeavour to contribute cutting-edge research we will continue to cooperate with partners in Britain, Germany and worldwide in the spirit of Geoffrey Dickens's 'in genuine scholarly exchanges, and mutual regard: not in any spirit of nationalist propaganda', but 'with enthusiasm for learning'.

We are deeply grateful to all our British, German, and international colleagues who have supported us and our work over the past four decades. It is the lively academic and personal exchange with them that makes working at the Institute so exciting and rewarding and also gives younger scholars in particular a unique opportunity to strengthen their international networks. And, finally, we are grateful to the Max Weber Stiftung and the German Ministry of Education and Research for not only granting the Institute complete academic independence, but also providing us with the administrative and financial framework without which we could not do the work we are doing, let alone realize our visions for the future.

ANDREAS GESTRICH is the current Director of the German Historical Institute London.

INTERVIEW WITH
LOTHAR KETTENACKER AND PETER ALTER, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTORS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Professor Andreas Gestrich (G): Gentlemen, thank you for your willingness to tell us about the beginnings of the German Historical Institute London from your point of view as former Deputy Directors. There was a long run-up to the official opening of the GHIL on 4 November 1976. Lothar Kettenacker, what can you tell us about this?

Professor Lothar Kettenacker (K): The idea of establishing a German Historical Institute goes back to Carl Haase, then Director of the State Archives of Lower Saxony. His initiative resulted first in the founding of the Association of British and German Historians (Britisch-Deutscher Historikerkreis, BDHK) which, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, organized conferences and granted scholarships for Ph.D. students as well as one for a post-doc, who turned out to be me. My project was to study the British government's wartime planning for post-Second World War Germany. In January 1972 the BDHK set up a small office in Chancery Lane, close to the Public Record Office, which was also in Chancery Lane at that time. That was the nucleus of what later became the GHIL. The first Research Fellow apart from me was Wilhelm Lenz from the Hanover State Archives, who was compiling sources on Anglo-German history in British archives since 1500.

G: And what preparations did you make for establishing an institute in London?

K: Essentially, our preparations consisted of organizing conferences and finding suitable accommodation. Once the German Federal Budget of 1975 provided funds for the BDHK as the association sponsoring the new Institute, the office moved into two floors of 26 Blooms-

bury Square. No doubt, Bloomsbury Square was the best possible location for such an institute, but from the point of view of space, this modest accommodation could not provide an adequate home for the Institute in the long run.

G: The establishment of the Institute in London had been preceded by the founding of German Historical Institutes in Paris and Rome, which could have served as models. But in London things took a different course. The legal structure and the research focus of the London Institute differed clearly from those in the Paris and Rome Institutes.

K: This was mainly due to the Verein which had been formed, a body consisting of German and British historians and archivists, and a British librarian as well. As the official recipient of funds from the West German Federal Ministry of Research, the Verein ran the Institute. In other words, it supplied the Institute's constitutional famework from the start. But this also suited the Ministry of Research, which at that time did not wish to create additional civil service positions (like those in the other institutes). What the Ministry had in mind was the legal constitution of an association, along the lines of the Max Planck Society.

G: Did the fact that the Institute was not a department of the West German Federal Government but a private foundation funded by the government make it easier for British historians to get involved?

K: Yes, you can certainly say that. Even if some British historians were not fully aware of all the subtleties of the Institute's governance, they knew that politically and academically it was completely independent. That stood the Institute in good stead in terms of its reception in the host country, especially at the beginning.

G: Peter Alter, you arrived at the newly founded Institute in 1976. In the meantime, Britain had joined the EEC. As you saw it, what expectations did British academics have of the Institute?

Professor Peter Alter (A): For British expectations and the role of the Institute in the 1970s we must first look at the general situation. The

Institute opened soon after the oil crisis. The years 1976 to 1978 were hard ones in Britain; we just have to think back to the 'winter of discontent'. Inflation was rampant and things were pretty chaotic. I remember that during the winter months we sat in our offices with candles on our desks because the electricity kept going off. Outside, the pavements were covered in garbage bags—it was an extremely difficult situation. For the Research Fellows who came over at that time, Britain was still very foreign. Some had trouble getting used to conditions here.

For our English colleagues, everyday life was not easy either in those years. Nonetheless, many took a genuine interest in the new Institute. A number of well-known historians quickly established contact with us: James Joll, Geoffrey Dickens, Richard Evans, John Röhl, Paul Kennedy, and Volker Berghahn were among them, as were Tony Nicholls, David Blackbourn, Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, Ian Kershaw, and William Carr. I should also like to mention the German immigrants of the 1930s who taught and researched history here, such as, for example, Francis Carsten, Charlotte Jolles, and Arnold Paucker. They approached the Institute immediately, and encouraged us in many respects. They also made sure that the Research Fellows were integrated into the local academic community.

G: Can you give some specific examples of this?

A: About every four weeks, the Carstens gave a dinner, when they had visitors from abroad. When they were expecting guests, they always invited members of the Institute too. That went on until Francis's wife, Ruth, died in the early 1990s. Arnold and Pauline Paucker, too, with their many interests, always tried to bring people into contact with each other. And Charlotte Jolles took a very great interest in modern German history. She, too, was very hospitable. Sometimes three or four of us visited her, she would prepare some dinner, and we would talk about all sorts of things. That was very helpful in this early phase of the Institute's existence, especially for the young Research Fellows who came over here.

G: Norbert Elias was a regular guest at the Carstens' home, as they were close friends. Do you remember their meetings?

A: No, I never met Norbert Elias. I only knew that he and Francis Carsten had been friends before their emigration. Curiously, many emigrants who were or became historians, later lived in Hampstead. Nicolai Rubinstein and Francis Carsten were neighbours; they had gone to the same secondary school in Berlin, and then they met again in London.

G: In the early years of its existence, the Institute moved several times, until in 1982 it was able to move into its current building at 17 Bloomsbury Square. How important for the Institute and its staff was this central location, lying between University College London, Birkbeck, the LSE, King's College London, and the British Library?

A: No other location was possible for the Institute; it had to be in this area of the capital. No other area was ever discussed, as far as I remember. When the staff saw this building for the first time, we were very impressed by its size. The official opening was held in 1982, in the presence of the Duke of Gloucester, a cousin of the Queen. Half an hour before the beginning of the event, he drove up on a motorcycle, dressed in full leathers, and got changed in an office. We liked his nonchalance very much.

K: This area was chosen for two reasons. First, the aim was to have enough space for the Institute in the long term. The Library, in particular, was growing and needed more room. Secondly, we wanted to attract students and lecturers, and so only this central location came into question. Geoffrey Dickens, Foreign Secretary of the British Academy and one of the Institute's most influential founding fathers, repeatedly pointed this out.

G: The GHIL Library, with German history as the focus of its collection, provides a service for British historians of Germany. Lothar Kettenacker, how was this decision made?

K: We German historians at the Institute were primarily interested in researching the history of the British Isles. But in the long term, the Institute could only succeed if it also catered for the interests of the British academic community. At that time, European history was becoming popular at British universities, and a library of German

history was a great attraction, especially as the British Library could longer afford to buy German historical literature comprehensively, as it had done before 1914. If we had not provided this service, the Institute would have remained an ivory tower of German research for ever.

A: We must, of course, also take into account that even then, in the 1970s, there were more British historians interested in German history than German historians interested in British history. It therefore made sense to establish an Institute in London. The concentration of universities in London, Oxford, Cambridge etc. plus the existence of research institutes was unique. The service offered by the Institute included hosting conferences at which German and British historians could meet more often. Many knew of each other only through publications; now they could see each other in person at a conference or lecture organized by the Institute.

G: Your time as deputy directors also covers the Institute's transition to a new legal structure. Initially, the German Historical Institutes in Washington and Warsaw joined the Verein which ran the London Institute. Finally, in 2002, all the German Historical Institutes were transferred to the care of a new Foundation, German Humanities Institutes Abroad (Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland), now the Max Weber Foundation. What impact did this have on the Institute?

K: All this happened in the background, out of necessity, because in many respects, especially as far as the administration was concerned, the Verein proved to be unequal to the new challenges of running the institute. The transition began in London, where the inadequacies of the old legal structure were all too obvious, but had a greater effect on the institutes in Paris and Rome, which had been much more closely tied to the Ministry. For us in London, the Foundation merely meant a consolidation of legal and administrative structures. The change was not based on larger academic considerations.

G: The GHIL was founded at a time when Britain had just joined the EEC. It was very clearly a West German establishment. Did the work of the Institute change from 1989 as a result of reunification?

K: I don't think that British historians ever perceived the Institute as a West German institution in the narrow sense. Their interest in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich related to the whole of Germany. In Britain, however, German reunification brought a short-lived increase in interest in the German nation-state based on latent anxieties relating to the question: has the wretched Bismarck empire reawakened? The British media, of course, approached us frequently at this time, but more important than what we could say were the views of British historians—I am thinking especially of Paul Kennedy—who could reassure the British public that they had nothing to fear from this reunified Germany.

A: Personally—I worked at the Institute until 1994—I did not see reunification as a dramatic turning point. What changed was that while we had many visitors, we suddenly also received visits from students and historians from the former GDR. But this was not perceived as anything sensational. They were just visitors, like those from the USA or Canada. There was a generous programme of scholarships, which gave us contact with young historians from the former GDR. This was nothing dramatic, but it was a new experience for us.

G: If you look back over the history of the GHIL, Peter Alter, what do you see as its greatest achievements as a mediator between German and British historiography?

A: Well, I am not a judge. As a participant observer, I would say that the Institute's main function was and is to provide a meeting place. It has always been highly successful in doing this in various ways: through lectures and conferences, or simply by giving people the chance to run into colleagues and students in the Common Room or the Library. Research Fellows often taught at universities in and around London, fostering the interest of British students in German history. I think that is very important. I have some doubts about the GHIL's publications because I have a feeling that academic publications, in general, address a very small audience. And German-language books on British history are not much noticed by Anglophone historians. In the early years of the Institute, cooperation with German emigrants was very important. We early had a close rela-

tionship with the Leo Baeck Institute and the Wiener Library, whose users then also sought out the Institute. I found this chance for reconciliation extremely satisfying in the Institute's early days. I think the Institute was very successful in this area.

G: Lothar Kettenacker, how would you like to see the Institute develop in future?

K: From the start, the Institute fostered bilateral exchange. Wolfgang Mommsen as Director had already wanted to liberate himself from this approach in the concepts of the conferences he organized, and to a large extent he succeeded. In my opinion, in the long term, this bilateral axis will no longer be enough to justify the Institute's existence. The Institute must go beyond this phase of reconciliation, something that can now be taken for granted. After the surprising result of the recent referendum, it is certainly appropriate for the Institute to continue promoting awareness of the significance of Europe. It is really about seeing Europe as a whole. In academic terms, this can be achieved by contributing to comparative political or social and cultural history. The Institute should perhaps do more to ensure that the awareness of Europe that is certainly present in the younger generation reaches the media and the public. The debate about Brexit has shown how much influence the popular press in particular has in this country (as it did, incidentally, before 1914). This has to be countered. How, in what way, I cannot say; that will require detailed consideration, also in view of the oppressive aspects of a modern media democracy. This is where I see the Institute's future tasks.

A: I would start with a historical argument. In the nineteenth century, basically until 1914, Germany was considered to be the country of science and scholarship. The fact that Britain today again sees Germany as a country of science and learning, including historiography, is certainly among the Institute's achievements. I find it difficult, however, to say how this should be developed in future. Although they will always be a core component of the Institute's work, bilateral relations can no longer be pursued as closely as before—here I definitely agree with Lothar Kettenacker. The much vaunted comparative perspective should, really, drive all historical work, and this is

already happening. What 'European' means is difficult to define. What is European historiography? How can one be a European historian? One always starts out from one's own perspective, including the national. To expand this is difficult, although one should always try.

K: The European Union should not be reduced to the increasingly disputed model of the USA. Europe should be perceived as an area of historical experience which, in the long term, will lead to a common understanding. This need not be based on a theoretical construct of Europe, but can simply draw on the investigation of various phenomena, such as, for example, industrialization. Mommsen had already attempted to demonstrate this by a comparative study of the welfare state. Another example could be the relationship between state and church in various countries, and now the problem of Muslims from different countries in Britain, France, and Germany. We should help to establish something like a European public by developing a European historical consciousness.

A: I could put this even more simply. In the everyday life of someone who lives in Cologne, cities such as Amsterdam, Brussels, London, and Paris are just as important as Berlin, perhaps even more important, because they are simply so close. If that is so in everyday life, then as a historian I have to keep this in mind and work accordingly. This means that national boundaries and spaces of reference are outdated. As a historian, therefore, one should try to reflect these facts in one's own work, even if it is sometimes difficult.

G: That is precisely what the Institute it trying to achieve today with its many multilateral projects and activities. Peter Alter, Lothar Kettenacker, many thanks for speaking with me.

THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON AND BRITISH RESEARCH ON GERMAN HISTORY

RICHARD BESSEL

In 1998 the then Director of the German Historical Institute London, Peter Wende, described Francis Carsten, who died in June of that year, as 'the doyen of British historians working on Germany'.[1] Carsten, whose photograph can be found (along with some of the books he donated to the Institute) in a glass cabinet in its Library, had been one of the founding fathers of the London Institute when it was established in 1975 under its first Director, Paul Kluke. Peter Wende's description was fitting in so many respects: like many 'British historians working on Germany', Francis Carsten was born outside of Britain (in his case, in Berlin); his work, from his earlier publications on early modern Prussia to his later books on twentieth-century Germany, challenged orthodoxies then prevailing among historians in Germany and made a substantial impact on our understanding of German history; and he became a stalwart supporter and beneficiary of the German Historical Institute, then located on Russell Square.

The example of Francis Carsten is illustrative of the relationship of the London Institute with historians in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Many 'British historians working on Germany', like Francis Carsten, have come from outside the British Isles—including, the current Regius Professors of History at both Oxford and Cambridge, Lyndal Roper and Christopher Clark respectively, both of whom serve as members of the *Beirat* of the London Institute. Other British historians of Germany, who challenged the then accepted ways in which the history of Germany was understood—one thinks of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (both now in the United States)—found a ready platform at the London Institute. For decades, new approaches to German history were developed in the United Kingdom, and the German Historical Institute London has offered a powerful forum and catalyst for these approaches.

[1] Peter Wende, 'Francis L. Carsten, 1911–1998', *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, 22/2 (Nov. 1998), 124.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were a turning point. This resulted from the fortunate and productive juxtaposition of the coming of (academic) age of a (then) young generation of historians of Germany, born after the Second World War and having profited from the expansion of the British university system in the 1960s, and the arrival at the recently established London Institute of Wolfgang Mommsen as its Director. Mommsen put the Institute on the map in an emphatic manner. He brought to London young German historians keen to challenge accepted approaches and to make common cause with colleagues in Britain, and who later became prominent figures in German history departments. And he sponsored events that proved to be historiographical milestones. One such was the conference on the 'Social History of the Reformation' held in London in May 1978. In his report on the conference, Thomas Brady began by observing that 'not so long ago the idea of an Anglo-German conference on the social history of the Reformation would have been thought a pipe-dream'.[2] Advised by the former Director of the Institute of Historical Research in London A. G. Dickens, and bringing together British, German, American, Irish, Swiss, and Austrian participants, Mommsen seized the opportunity to shape new understandings of early modern Germany.

A year later the London Institute organized the famous Cumberland Lodge conference on the 'Structure and Politics of the Third Reich'.[3] The sharp debates at that time, with Tim Mason (the author of the terms 'structuralist' and 'intentionalist' that surfaced at the conference) and Hans Mommsen on one side and Karl-Dietrich Bracher and Klaus Hildebrandt on the other, framed discussion of the National Socialist dictatorship for years.[4] Some three decades

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[2] Thomas A. Brady, Jr., ' "Social History of the Reformation", "Sozialgeschichte der Reformation": A Conference at the Deutsches Historisches Institut London, May 25–27, 1978', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 10/1 (Spring 1979), 89–92, at 89.

[3] See the book that resulted from the conference: Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *Der 'Führerstaat'. Mythos und Realität: Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches = The 'Führer State'. Myth and Reality: Studies on the Structure and Politics of the Third Reich* (Stuttgart, 1981).

[4] See Richard Bessel, 'Functionalists versus Intentionalists: The Debate Twenty Years On *or* Whatever Happened to Functionalism and Intentionalism?', *German Studies Review*, 26/1 (2003), 15–20.

later the discussion was taken up anew, when the Institute held its conference on 'German Society in the Nazi Era', at which some veterans of 1979 (including Jane Caplan and Ian Kershaw) were present and which took up current debates on the meanings of the *Volksgemeinschaft* for understanding the 'Third Reich'.[5] By 2010 the historiographical landscape had shifted, away from the more class-based and structural interpretations that had held sway in 1979 towards a more cultural focus and one that put the murder of Europe's Jewish population at its centre. What had not shifted, however, was the importance of events organized by the German Historical Institute London.

The importance of the London Institute for British colleagues has not been limited to facilitating links among established scholars and offering opportunities for British colleagues (including this author) to organize conferences drawing participants from across Europe and indeed from around the world. From Wolfgang Mommsen's participation in the conferences on German social history organized by Richard Evans at the University of East Anglia in the late 1970s to more recent programmes designed to help aspiring young scholars, the Institute has played a vital role in promoting the research of younger colleagues. The Institute's Postgraduate Students Conferences give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same or similar fields — a programme that is now entering its third decade. For medievalists, the Institute joined with its sister institution in Washington beginning in 2005 to bring together British, American. and German Ph.D. students and recent Ph.D. recipients. The Institute's annual Workshops in Early Modern German History, organized with the UK's German History Society, have an even longer history: starting in 2002, they have established themselves as the principal forum for cross-disciplinary discussion of new research on early modern German-speaking Central Europe.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Institute's activities have extended ever more beyond the UK and Germany, offering historians working in the British Isles increased opportunities to develop transnational perspectives. During his term as the Institute's

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[5] See Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (eds.), *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives* (Oxford, 2014).

Director, Hagen Schulze gave its activities an increasingly pan-European focus, perhaps best characterized by another milestone conference at Cumberland Lodge, on 'European *Lieux de Mémoire*' held in 2002. In more recent years, and particularly since the arrival of its current Director, Andreas Gestrich, in 2006, the London Institute has extended the scope of its activities far beyond Europe. Transnational approaches are now all the rage, and the Institute sees the history of the British Empire and Commonwealth, colonialism and the colonies, as a central research focus, and recently has stretched its institutional reach to India. Not only has the Institute become a magnet for German scholars working in this area and profiting from access to the archival resources available in and around London and collaboration with British colleagues; it has also become a forum for British scholars whose interests extend far beyond German history. Many of the subjects of conferences organized by the Institute in recent years reveal this broader, global focus, from the 2006 conference on 'Removing Peoples: Forced Migration in the Modern World' to the more recent gathering on 'Remembering (Post)Colonial Violence: Silence, Suffering, and Reconciliation' held in 2014.

Today, half a century after its establishment, the German Historical Institute London remains a vital resource for historians of Germany working in the UK and Ireland, and a vital link with German colleagues—in order to explore the history not just of German-speaking Europe but, increasingly, of the world.

RICHARD BESSEL is Professor Emeritus of Twentieth Century History at the University of York and was for many years a member of the GHIL's Academic Advisory Board.

THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON AND GERMAN RESEARCH ON BRITISH HISTORY

ANDREAS FAHRMEIR

It is obvious, of course, that this attempt to describe relations between the German Historical Institute London and German research on British history is highly subjective. Given that the GHIL has produced more than a hundred volumes in its various series, and taking into account all the reviews and articles that have appeared in the *GHIL Bulletin* and the numerous books which its Research Fellows have published elsewhere, rather more differentiation (and a great deal of research) would be required to present a definitive picture. And given the GHIL's long-standing and close relations with other German historical area studies which relate to Britain or the British Empire (whether organizations such as the German Association for the Study of British History and Politics (ADEF), the Centre for British Studies at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and the Prince Albert Society, or university history departments in Germany, where much work on Britain has been and is still being done) it is no easy task always to differentiate the GHIL's role precisely from that of other individual or collective actors. Finally, and this is the most important limitation, any brief, broad-brush sketch will not do the GHIL justice because it must, in part, suppress what is most valuable about the Institute, namely, that it allows individuals to undertake research distinguished by its originality and distance from dominant trends. In this narrative, this means, for example, that studies of Empire, which, over the last forty years have gone in very different directions and thus cannot easily be subsumed under one of the Institute's programmes, are not visible enough.

If we look at the research primarily on British history undertaken at the Institute or published by it, and take these limitations into account, then two main areas of interest emerge. The first one is, fairly obviously, Britain's international relations with Germany, which is therefore almost equally divided between the GHIL's contribution to research on Germany and on Britain. The main emphasis has been,

again unsurprisingly, on the most intense conflicts, that is, the First and Second World Wars, the run-up to each, post-war planning, and the occupation periods in both cases. In addition, research has been done on Britain's relations with the world of German states before unification in 1871, in particular, the edition of reports by British envoys to the German states in the nineteenth century, and on English foreign policy in the Middle Ages. Beyond this, the GHIL has always been a place for reflecting on the state of the history of international relations in general. It has held conferences on new methodological and theoretical approaches to the history of international entanglements and on the everyday practices of diplomacy. And it has produced pioneering publications on political aspects of the cultural history of foreign policy.

The second main area of interest which, it is my impression, covers much of the work produced at the GHIL, is an offspring of the *Sonderweg* debate. The main issue here is not the diplomatic, military, or mass media origins or causes of conflict and cooperation between Britain and Germany. Rather, work in this area has looked at the specific qualities of British and German political structures, ideas of the state and constitutions, systems of social security (and social control), social organization, ideas of nation, ways of organizing and encouraging research, and more strongly in recent times, forms of cultural understanding and self-confidence that in Germany made the political catastrophe of National Socialism possible, while in Britain they strengthened resistance to totalitarian challenges. Many of the studies produced at the GHIL, and under its influence, have drawn direct comparisons. Others have contrasted research findings based primarily on a German or continental European example with a British perspective, for example, on criminality, poverty, and deviance, on the development of political programmes and semantics (especially in relation to national movements and the staging and legitimization of rule), or the constitution of social groups such as the aristocracy and the middle classes, along with their role in politics.

In both areas, the research undertaken at the GHIL reflects wider movements in the field, for example, in questioning what has long been considered established about the 'Anglo-German antagonism' at sea, or in the press before 1914; in the transition from social history to more cultural history approaches; in the ever increasing openness towards comparisons that go beyond Europe (not least the spe-

cial attention paid to supporting projects on India in recent years); and in opening out the temporal framework within which the structural peculiarities mentioned above must be seen to beyond 1945, a period when the differences to be explained cannot, of course, be described so easily.

This embedding in wider debates makes it difficult to identify specific approaches that go beyond the individual choices of researchers and could be termed a GHIL house style. The GHIL has never had a monopoly on implicit or explicit Anglo-German comparisons, or on the thematic and methodological themes mentioned above. And the research on British history undertaken or published by the GHIL forms part of a large and lively field that is only to a small degree influenced by research in Germany. Any attempt to make a judgement about what initiatives in this context emanated primarily from the GHIL, were picked up by it from elsewhere, or even brought there from other areas would rightly be highly controversial.

Yet it seems to me that, in the German context, the density of the empirical material on which the studies originating at the GHIL draw, and which is thus made available for future research, is a quality that stands out. This results, naturally, from the conditions which the Institute can offer its Fellows—scholars often have the chance to spend several years (rather than a few months) researching in the archives—but also from the close dialogue with an academic culture whose methodological and theoretical concerns and approaches differ from those in Germany. Thus a focus on new empirical insights can help to facilitate an Anglo-German dialogue.

That disjunctions in the research interests of German and British scholars have had a significant impact on the contribution made by the GHIL is also clear if we look at the areas in which the Institute's research profile in British history has been more low key. Given the UK's role in transforming the world through industrialization, this could apply to economic history, which must surely count as one of the most internationalized branches of history, and one in which the synchronization of approaches and preferred methods across borders is far advanced.

It is also possible that a concentration on Anglo-German comparisons with an end point in contemporary history has helped to reinforce the obvious focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After all, it is less clear what the study of historical periods before the

existence of a 'state' that was comparable with other 'states' could contribute to the central research themes, especially as the extent of entanglements, connections, and mutual influence between England and Germany were less obvious and therefore seemed less central in the early modern period and the Middle Ages. The GHIL has made important attempts to identify Anglo-British themes for these periods and, in general, to address the issue of common cycles in the history of Britain and continental Europe, thus questioning certain assumptions about British peculiarities. But against the background of the Institute's many research activities, these initiatives are perhaps a little less prominent than others.

Regardless of whether the *Sonderweg* debate experiences a renaissance (possibly, under the impact of Brexit, taking a different tack by focusing on British peculiarities, as Bernd Weisbrod has already suggested), or whether, after the renewed debate on the First World War, the history of international relations is resurgent, especially in Germany, and perhaps therefore gains more ground at the GHIL again, the central research questions that have shaped the GHIL will certainly remain relevant—and that is good news. At the same time, there is a chance to look at areas which, against the background of the Institute's traditions, might seem to be relatively new.

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ARTICLES

LIFE CYCLE AND INDUSTRIAL WORK: WEST GERMAN AND BRITISH PATTERNS IN TIMES OF GLOBALIZATION

Lutz Raphael

Labour history has recently returned to the stage of historical research. This comeback, after at least two decades of intellectual stalemate and general neglect, owes a great deal to new ideas and projects which have adopted both the global and the cultural turn in recent historiography. The world of labour beyond the familiar eastern and western varieties of industrialized countries is now much more present. Yet notions and discourses framing the experiences of work and industrial relations have been scrutinized more carefully in a comparative perspective. Thus the agenda of contemporary European labour history has been thoroughly renewed.[1] This article presents results and reflections from an ongoing comparative study of the working classes in West Germany, France, and Britain at times of de-industrialization. But I do not use the term 'de-industrialization' in the title of my article, and perhaps it is worth explaining why.

There is no generally accepted definition of 'de-industrialization', but there is a general consensus that it describes the decline (in relative and/or absolute terms) of employment and added value in the

[1] Two places where the international dimension of this renewed labour history can be observed are the Institute of International Social History in Amsterdam <https://socialhistory.org/>, acessed 12 Aug. 2016, and the International Research Center Work and Human Lifecycle in Global History at the Humboldt University in Berlin <https://rework.hu-berlin.de>, accessed 12 Aug. 2016.

manufacturing sectors of national economies, especially by comparison with the service sector.[2] The term de-industrialization often appears when a name must be given to a trend, or to a whole period when manufacturing industries were shrinking and losing jobs, and whole branches of industry were disappearing. This has been going on for more than forty years in western Europe, and it is still happening. It started in the second half of the 1970s when the long boom came to an end. After 1945 the manufacturing, mining, and construction industries had grown constantly, attracting the largest numbers (both relatively and absolutely) of the national workforce. Both the 'old' and many of the new industries profited from this boom. This was true even of Britain, whose growth was much less glorious than that of West Germany or France during the first thirty years after the Second World War. The late 1970s and the 1980s mark a kind of watershed—jobs in manufacturing, mining, and construction were starting to disappear while whole branches of industry entered a crisis. From the British perspective, de-industrialization is the key word for critical analysis. It often combines a nostalgic look at the good old times of industrial Britain and the short-lived rise of the British working classes from poverty to affluence from the 1930s to the 1970s with a critical inquiry into growing social inequality in this country since the 1980s. This kind of interpretation is shared by many German scholars, although it loses some of its relevance when the still high level of output in manufacturing is taken into account, especially when it comes to exports. From a German perspective, therefore, de-industrialization is a relative term, while 're-structuring' and 'renewal' are other notions that could be introduced into the debate. The end of old industries such as mining, shipbuilding, and textiles was only one aspect of a broader process by which manufacturing was transformed when markets were changing.

[2] On the notion itself and the economic debate see Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: Industrial Change in a Turbulent World* (London, 1986; rev. edn. 2011); Stephen Bazen and Tony Thirlwall, *Deindustrialization* (Oxford, 1992); and Royce Rowan Turner, *The British Economy in Transition* (London, 1995). There is a large literature on this subject in Britain, less so in the other country under consideration here. See M. T. Wild and Philip N. Jones, *De-Industrialisation and New Industrialisation in Britain and Germany* (London, 1991).

It is important to remember that de-industrialization in western Europe and elsewhere is not the uniform outcome of an evolutionary trend towards a new economy based essentially on service industries with the financial sector at its core and apex: different paths lead to different forms of mixed economies combining the manufacturing and distribution of goods, services, and knowledge.[3] The differences loom large throughout Europe, and Britain and Germany are good examples to illustrate this.

De-industrialization, therefore, was just one outcome of the economic transformations taking place at global level. Since the 1970s the internationalization of markets and production chains, paired with the development of a common European market, has given rise to fundamental shifts in the international division of manufacturing. In the title of this article the conventional but ambivalent notion of globalization is used to cover these trends that changed the world of business and of work. To cut a very long and complex story short, four trends can be identified: the spread of new digital information and communication technologies; the transfer of production sites to new places mainly in Asia but also in Latin America; new forms of organizing work at factory level; and new models of management. All this changed the profile of industrial work. The term 'post-Fordism', coined by contemporary economists and sociologists, was intended to bring together the different dimensions of these changes.[4] As one single capitalist production regime has never existed,[5] 'post-Fordism' has been nothing but an umbrella term for a whole set of

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[3] For a more detailed comparative analysis of this socio-economic framework see Lutz Raphael, 'Industriearbeit(er) nach dem Boom: Bundesrepublikanische Entwicklungen im westeuropäischen Vergleich', in Sonja Levsen and Cornelius Torp (eds.), *Wo liegt die Bundesrepublik? Vergleichende Perspektiven auf die westdeutsche Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2016), 207–31.

[4] Cf. M. J. Elam, 'Puzzling Out the Post-Fordist Debate: Technology, Market, and Institutions', *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 11 (1990), 9–37; Klaus Dörre, 'Gibt es ein nachfordistisches Produktionsmodell?', in Mario Candeias and Frank Deppe (eds.), *Ein neuer Kapitalismus*? (Hamburg, 2008). For a synthesis of this approach based on empirical data from Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK see Max Koch, *Roads to Post-Fordism: Labour Markets and Social Structures in Europe* (Aldershot, 2006).

[5] This notion, too, is the subject of critical debate among social scientists and, like the term 'globalization', it is used as a useful abbreviation for the struc-

very different regimes of industrial production that were taking shape, worldwide, from the 1970s and 1980s. To speak of globalization allows these transformations in western Europe to be placed in their international contexts. The redistribution of market shares in manufacturing was part of a wider process of internationalizing production chains and of a further push in technological innovation. We can therefore regard the 1980s and 1990s as a period of experimentation, when new clusters and patterns of industrial production were created worldwide.

Two contradictory views seem to exist about the impact these transformations had on the life cycles of billions of industrial workers worldwide over the last thirty to forty years. One interpretation may best be subsumed under the heading 'precariousness',[6] or, for those going further in their critical inquiry, 'informalization'. Despite a trend towards growing diversity in production regimes at national, branch, or even factory level, many sociologists of work describe and generally criticize a general trend towards deregulating how and when work in factories is performed, who does it and at what price.[7] The acceleration of production cycles seems to operate like a low tide in an estuary, drawing back all kinds of social regulations, moral restraints, and the habitual patterns by which work is organized in

tural links between forms of production in manufacturing (at the different levels of companies, plants, branches, and nationwide), patterns of industrial relations, and forms of political and social framing (mainly welfare politics). The debate concentrates on the macro levels of national frameworks but the notion is used here in a more flexible way, allowing for different varieties at regional or branch level.

[6] Again, there is no generally accepted definition of this category. Its use varies substantially from country to country. See Jean-Claude Barbier, 'La précarité, une catégorie française à l'épreuve de la comparaison internationale', *Revue française de sociologie*, 46 (2005), 351–71.

[7] Comparative studies mostly refer to the member states of the OECD. Empirical data is less easy to get and even more difficult to compare for industrial work and labour markets in Latin America, Africa, or South Asia. General overviews and case studies have been published on a regular basis by the International Labour Organization (see the World Employment Programme since 1975). For the post-socialist countries of eastern Europe since 1990 see Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova, 'Labour Market Flexibility in the Transition Countries: How Much is Too Much?', *International Labour Review*, 140 (2001), 293–325. For a particularly striking example of

societies. As far as the worlds of manufacturing, mining, and construction industries are concerned, experts critically discuss the trends corroding the status of the industrial workforce and changing the patterns of workers' lives. At least three of these may head a list of general trends. First, we see a trend towards more flexible work contracts that allow employers to engage their workforce in accordance with the ups and downs of demand. This, of course, is an old and yet ever young dream of managers and shareholders, namely, to cut costs and save capital during a slump. Secondly, there is a trend towards reducing the social costs of work, such as employers' contributions to social insurance systems or housing and other social investments that are not in their own discretionary power. Thirdly, we can identify a trend towards avoiding high wages via outsourcing or global production chains.

This kind of interpretation is criticized by those who defend the upward dynamics of globalization on the working conditions of industrial workers. It is mainly economists who stress the long-term trends towards higher skills and higher wages in manufacturing worldwide. From very different starting points and levels of socio-economic affluence, this culminates in a trend towards stabilizing working lives. In this liberal view, rising opportunities in labour markets and individual options for higher qualification are driving forces transforming market flexibility into life stability. But there is another element: in many societies flexibility and insecurity as the overall patterns for working lives are rejected for moral or political reasons.[8] This kind of social resilience has resulted in the placing of legal or moral limits on dismissals, and in preferences for stability of staff and clear rules of seniority, but also in political consensus on welfare regulations protecting older workers, the unemployed, and families from the risks of the new globalized economy. All of these aspects function like buffers against the pitfalls of the labour markets, and they are of vital concern for our topic. We can think about the effects

growing informality see Kamel Bouadam and Hakim Meliani, 'Analyse exhaustive de la politique de l'emploi en Algérie', *Studia UBB Oeconomica*, 56 (2011), 74–97.

[8] Sandrine Cazes and Peter Auer, *Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility: Evidence from the Industrialized Countries* (London, 2002); Peter Auer, 'The Resilience of the Long-Term Employment Relationship: Evidence from the Industrialized Countries', *International Labour Review*, 139 (2000), 379–408.

that pension schemes, unemployment benefits, and the wage hierarchies of skill and seniority established by collective bargaining have on the life courses of workers. Central to this are welfare regulations and legal labour regulations established in the different countries. The semi-official, yet awkward, term for this is 'flexicurity', used by international organizations interested in a more global realization of these trends.[9]

What did this all mean for the life cycles of industrial workers in western Europe? A comparative view may allow us better to understand the differences and similarities in these transformations. The following article will concentrate on the relationship between work and life cycle. This implies that other important aspects, such as family and household structures or national welfare regimes, are not discussed in detail. Consequently, what follows is a far from comprehensive view of the changing life cycle patterns among industrial workers, or, more broadly, what we might call the working classes linked to these kinds of jobs. This study explores the relationships between life cycles or work biographies and such aspects as levels of unemployment and job insecurity, the loss or gain of working skills, wages, age, and gender.

A comparative analysis needs a starting point to describe transformations. That is in itself a problem. I shall resolve it in the classic manner by presenting an overly simplified picture of the relationship between life cycle and industrial work in West Germany around 1970. My analysis will thus take into consideration only one group of employees, the largest one, that of blue collar workers, leaving aside technicians, engineers, and managers. The years around 1970 were the time when blue collar workers, who were predominantly male all over western Europe (about 70 per cent in construction, mining, and manufacturing industries), could look back on stable working lives. The majority had experienced upward mobility in their firms or jobs, and all had profited from increased material comfort and consumerism. In the 1960s and 1970s, for the first time in West German society, their life cycles were fundamentally similar to those of white collar workers in private or public services. Most had left school at

[9] Sonja Bekker, Ton Wilthagen, Per Kongshoj Madsen, Jianping Zhou, Ralf Rogowski, Maarten Keune, and Andranik Tangian, 'Forum: Flexicurity — A European Approach to Labour Market Policy', *Intereconomics*, 43 (2008), 68–111.

the age of 14, but a growing number had received a vocational train-
ing and started their working lives as skilled workers at the age of 17
or 18. Social welfare protected them in case of illness or invalidity,
and the pension system gave them a realistic chance of a comfortable
retirement after the age of 65, as life expectancy had passed the age
of 70 for men and 75 for women.

But alongside this kind of what we may call a standard life pat-
tern, at least two very different models also existed. The first was
rather old, but changed character under the impact of affluence and
consumerism: female blue collar workers, who were in the minority,
had quite different work experiences and life expectancies from those
of their male colleagues, brothers, or husbands. In 1970 many started
factory life as unskilled workers without any qualifications or voca-
tional training, and they often quit the factory as soon as possible,
that is, after marriage or the birth of their first child. Some returned
ten or fifteen years later, often on a part-time basis, and again as
unskilled workers. There was no well-defined moment of retirement,
but women could expect to benefit from their husbands' pensions
and to survive them by at least five years.[10]

In 1970 there was a third group of blue collar workers whose life
cycle pattern was also different: the migrant workers who had been
recruited en masse during the 1960s and the early 1970s all over west-
ern Europe. At this time they were predominantly male, relatively
young, and often unskilled. The proportion of the industrial work-
force that they made up was still growing: up to 15 and 20 per cent
and even higher in some branches.[11] Some had taken their first steps
into working life in their home countries, but unemployment and
low wages had interrupted their careers. The best way to describe the
very different life cycles resulting from this kind of labour migration
is to call them 'suspended', since a large majority sought to accumu-
late savings and lived a provisional life in order to return home and
continue a working life there. Rates of return were high, but the num-

[10] Christine von Oertzen, *Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen: Geschlech-
terpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948–1969* (Göt-
tingen, 1999).

[11] In 1973 migrant workers represented around 22 per cent of the workforce
in mining, the metal industry, and construction in West Germany. Karin
Hunn, '*Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück . . .': Die Geschichte der türkischen
'Gastarbeiter' in der Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen, 2005), 213.

ber of those starting to bring their families to Germany was constantly growing.[12] Migrant workers who stayed longer in West Germany often worked continuously in one factory, thus starting to share a common working experience with their German colleagues and having a job/work biography comparable to that described as the first variant. As unskilled workers they profited from the booming business cycle in the manufacturing industries, producing the new products of mass consumption on a large scale, from cars to TVs and washing machines.

How were these different life cycles changed by the transformations from the mid 1970s? Information gathered by the Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) in a representative Panel Study of more than 12,000 German households since 1984 allows us to take a closer look at the real life cycles of manual workers. This is possible because the same households were interviewed year on year, making information available about their work situation over a period of more than twenty years.[13] This data allows us to combine a more detailed look at the social fabric of work biographies with statistical evidence that enables us to measure the frequency of such biographical patterns. If the information about the past collected at the time of the first interview is added, individual biographies run from the start of working life to retirement, covering up to forty and more years of working life. This ongoing research project works with the statistical information collected about more than 3,000 people from the working classes in (West) Germany, but this article will focus on 630 work biographies that provide very detailed information over longer periods of fifteen and more years. These biographies have been analysed in two complementary ways. Elementary information about job situation, qualification and skills, age, gender, and nationality has been studied quantitatively. As a result, different types of work biographies were constructed that provided a starting point for selecting a smaller number of individual cases whose biographies were reconstructed using all the information available in the SOEP panel data. This two-step procedure made it possible to embed individual life courses in their larger social contexts without eliminating the indi-

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[12] Ibid. 343 ff.

[13] See <https://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.221178.en/about_soep.html>, accessed 12 Aug. 2016.

vidual variety behind the collective clusters of work biographies of a
certain type. In a first step data was divided into four different cate-
gories: first identifying five different age cohorts,[14] secondly, differ-
entiating between workers of German and Turkish origin/back-
ground,[15] and thirdly separating men and women. The sample rep-
resents households, yet the majority of women had jobs in other sec-
tors of the economy, or, indeed, had no job at all. Only a small minor-
ity of women worked in manufacturing industries, and only these
were analysed in this context.[16] The fourth category was that of job
continuity. As a proxy variable, the frequency of job changes, includ-
ing a change in branch and/or job category was taken from the
SOEP.[17] In this sample of work biographies the very different situa-
tions of the various branches of manufacturing in West Germany
were well represented: about 10 per cent worked in metalworking in-
dustries or construction, and about 5 per cent in tool-making, chemi-
cal industries, or the automotive industry respectively. All other
branches were represented by less than 3 per cent of the biographies.[18]

How did those who acquired relative stability and affluence at the
end of the 1970s fare in the new era characterized by the return of
mass unemployment, a general reduction of jobs in industry, and a
return of the business cycle with its regular ups and downs? Let us

[14] Those born before 1945; 1945 to 1954; 1955 to 1964; 1965 to 1969; and 1970
to 1979. This makes it possible to take changes in labour markets into account
for the different age cohorts of industrial workers from 1975 on.

[15] There were 473 and 163 individuals, representing 74 and 26 per cent
respectively of all biographies. Migrants' biographies were therefore over-
represented in this selection, making it possible to have enough cases to
observe variation among this group that represents 17.2 per cent of the
subtotal of 3,565 cases of the SOEP (year 1985) defined as 'manual workers'
(from unskilled to masters/foremen).

[16] Ninety-four of 405 women's biographies have been taken into account; 62
of German origin, 32 of Turkish origin. The total number of men's biogra-
phies is 636; 473 of German background, 163 of Turkish origin.

[17] The overall majority of cases represented no such change at all and this cat-
egory has been used to take a closer look at the specific conditions of precar-
iousness and job insecurity.

[18] Construction (10.2 per cent); metal industries (9.6 per cent); chemical in-
dustries (5.1 per cent); vehicles (4.3 per cent); tool-making and engineering
industries (4.3 per cent); electrical goods (2.4 per cent); furniture and timber
(2.6 per cent).

first look at those entering this period ten years or more after they had started working. Born between 1930 and 1945, these workers were in the middle of their working lives when economic turmoil hit their enterprises. The first thing that strikes one when examining this data is that most of them continued to work in manufacturing. Many even continued their careers in the same firms that had employed them in 1975.

The work biography of A., a joiner born in 1939 and living near the city of Bremen, is easy to sum up. In the late 1950s (1957), after finishing his apprenticeship, he was employed as a skilled worker. From 1965 he worked in the same factory in the automobile industry, and during the 1980s and early 1990s he was a foreman or leader of a work team. In 1996 at the age of 57 he was dismissed, probably as a part of a plant agreement, and was then unemployed for twenty months before getting an early retirement settlement. His real wages had been rising during the 1980s but after his fiftieth birthday his monthly pay started to go down (by about 17 per cent).[19]

A second biography, chosen from the group of unskilled workers, presents a more dramatic variant of such a work biography: M., a Turkish metalworker living in Dortmund, had been working in the same mechanical engineering factory since 1967, when he was 26, as an unskilled worker operating various tool machines. He was dismissed in 1990 at the age of 49. A long period of unemployment began and M. was eventually unemployed for more than 85 months, a full seven years, before being accepted on an early retirement scheme in 1997 at the age of 56. The end of his working life coincided with a dramatic change in his personal life: his marriage broke up at the same time. He was divorced in 1990, and lived alone from then on. In economic terms his situation changed drastically: he lost up to 60 per cent of his earlier monthly income.[20] This may be an extreme case, but it is part of a larger pattern of work biographies. Technological change and international competition led to a huge loss of jobs for unskilled workers. Among the more than 230 manual workers in West Germany born between 1946 and 1965 whose careers are reported for more than fifteen years in the panel data and analysed in detail, migrant workers represented about 9 per cent, but they were

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[19] Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (hereafter: SOEP) ID 85201.
[20] SOEP ID 572101.

particularly hard hit by these changes. Of this group, one in four in this age group ended his working life before the age of 60, some very early in their 50s. Older workers, in general, were regarded as unable to cope with the introduction of new technologies, and were more likely to be made redundant than their younger colleagues. For German workers this moment often came at the age of 57 or 58 or later. The reasons for this difference between migrant and German workers are yet to be investigated.

In most cases, redundancy at this age meant the end of a working life that had started at the age of 15. Early retirement was perceived as ambiguous: it prevented further deterioration in health, opened new options in private life, but also cut people off from social networks and sociability centred around the workplace. M., like many others whose files were examined for this study, regularly insisted on his good relations with his colleagues. We should keep in mind that M. was one of those whose life cycle in 1970 may be described as having been 'suspended', meaning that decisions about the future were postponed, be it marriage, transfer of the family, or the search for a decent home. But during the 1980s and early 1990s, when this first generation of mainly Turkish blue collar workers had more or less involuntarily opted to stay in West Germany permanently, they faced a dramatic turn in their life cycle, cutting them off from their new social surroundings. This could even result in sudden exclusion from social life and contacts. This social fact has rarely been seriously discussed in debates about immigration, generational conflicts, and integration over the last thirty years in Germany.

The picture is a mixed one, but continuity prevailed up to the age of 50. Obviously both the introduction of new technologies and new production regimes on the one hand and the closure of older factories while downsizing 'old' industries, on the other, produced the same effect: they both meant a general farewell to the older, old-style blue collar worker (called *Malocher* in German).[21] It resulted in a dramatic rejuvenation of the remaining workforce that was more open to, and better prepared for, the new high quality production regimes and their increasing demands for flexibility, but also communication and technical knowledge. This intergenerational change was espe-

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[21] Cf. Wolfgang Hindrichs, Uwe Jürgenhake, and Christian Kleinschmidt, *Der lange Abschied vom Malocher* (Essen, 2000).

cially dramatic in branches and factories where manpower was drastically reduced over short periods of time, as was the case, for example, in the steel industry or, to some extent, in the car industry. French, British, and German oral sources tell us a great deal about the conflicts resulting from the dramas of 'social ageing' and 'generational shift'.

What about the young workers, those who entered the job market after 1975? Their life stories read a little differently, the range of variants seems to get bigger, and some may suggest a general trend back towards greater precariousness. Among this age group, job changes involving a change of branch or craft were more frequent than among the older age cohorts, and these changes more often than not included periods of unemployment. But closer study of their work biographies supports another interpretation: a more twisted, but largely successful path into a stable job in a medium-sized or larger enterprise seems to be a common feature for the majority of young skilled workers born between 1965 and 1975 whose careers have been reconstructed. They profited from the trust that West German managers, engineers, and foremen/masters enjoyed in the dual system of vocational training. It offered them the chance to recruit young workers at a very early stage and to integrate them into their strategies of technological innovation and adaptation. The upward mobility that had been characteristic of the boom years did not end in 1975 or 1980, but continued to be the realistic horizon for younger skilled workers who often replaced the older ones.

B. was born in 1958, lived in Duisburg, and started his working life after nine years of schooling and a three-year apprenticeship as an electrician or expert in industrial electronics. He was one of those who, after their apprenticeship, were taken on by their firms as skilled workers. From then on, he continued his career in the same enterprise, probably the Thyssen steel plant fifteen minutes away from his home. In 1993 he became head of a work group, having taken a 'master course' preparing him for supervisory functions (from 1990 to 1993). In 1996 he officially changed status, receiving a promotion from manual worker to an intermediary employee with supervisory functions. His salary rose constantly, and in 2002 at the age of 45 he earned three and a half times as much as he had in 1985. In the interviews for the SOEP he was regularly asked about his job satisfaction. In 1985 and again in 1990 and 1992 (during his training

course) it was very high but after that fell to a miserable three points out of ten. The risk of a blocked career frustrated the young man until 1996, when he received his internal promotion.[22] Internal promotion continued to be an important means of upward mobility, opening up the chance of a professional career for industrial workers. This was all the more important as external options for change were becoming rarer for workers, and they often had to move away to other regions where job opportunities in their trades could still be found.

Changes, however, also occurred in this zone of stability. Young men entered the industrial workplace a little later because schooling was extended, with a tenth or eleventh year added to the traditional nine years before beginning an apprenticeship. And retirement continued to start earlier, but it is too early to say anything definite about this: most of these workers are still employed.

D., born in 1969 near Göttingen, left school after ten years (with a *Realschule* diploma), did an apprenticeship in industrial painting, and started working in his trade at the age of 20, in 1989. But he soon quit his job and became unemployed before restarting his working career as an operator in a glass factory. Continuity at the work place and in family life (he was married in 1991 at the age of 22) seem to be two sides of the same coin and in 1996 he became a homeowner after a steady rise in his monthly wage during the first ten years of work.[23] At the age of 37 in 2006, D. was promoted to foreman. But—and this indicates another change in the life course of industrial workers during the late twentieth century—wages no longer continued to grow, and over the next ten years D.'s monthly wages fluctuated widely between €1,700 and €2,300, depending on his employer's business cycle.[24]

D.'s biography contrasts sharply with that of a young man born in 1966, who lived first in Wuppertal and later in Düsseldorf. F. had a very unsteady working life until the age of 29, when he started a new job as a driver in a steel factory, later becoming an operator in the smelting sector of the same factory. Before he finally found this job, F. had spent twelve years looking for a good job for an unskilled young male like himself. He was dismissed four times, returning

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[22] SOEP PID 110101.
[23] From €1,063 to €2,000 or (inflation-adjusted) from €1,000 to €1,589. Ibid.
[24] PID 57205.

more or less regularly to periods of employment. Here, again, the start of a more stable working life and a personal relationship went together. In 2001 we received the latest news: at the age of 35, F. was still in the same job and in the same relationship.[25]

This biography presents another situation that was not completely new, but that had spread considerably since 1975: the emergence of a world of precariousness and instability mainly affecting unskilled workers, especially those who had migrated to Germany during or after their school years. If we compare their biographies with those of their older cousins or fathers, who had arrived in Germany in 1965 or 1970, we can see the difference. Changing production regimes made it much more difficult for them to find a stable position, as the number of jobs for unskilled workers in manufacturing was shrinking dramatically. Now much more time and, often, social capital was needed to enter the high wage zone of industrial production. Often branches such as motor repairs or the construction industry offered these young men their first jobs. Some of these careers ended in stability and regularly rising incomes. But we also see that the jobs they did were more exposed to the business cycle, and they had to be flexible. In this case we should not forget that there was a long period of instability between the end of school and the stable years of continuous industrial work, lasting from the ages of 15 to 30. It is quite interesting to see that this pattern of an extended period of youth, remote from regular waged work, is one that also developed among students, especially among those seeking professional jobs in media, culture, and social services.[26]

What about women? A look at the working lives of women in manufacturing industries since the 1970s does not offer much that is new. Most women stayed in these industries for four, five, or six years, often doing unskilled work; their working lives were interrupted by marriage, birth, or dismissal. In terms of biography, instead of work biographies it would be better to speak of social or household biographies in the sense that part-time work done by wives was dependent on the rhythms of their households or their families, the

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[25] SOEP PID 563701.
[26] On the changing patterns of (academic) youth and their later entry into working life see Andreas Wirsching, *Abschied vom Provisorium: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 1982–1990* (Stuttgart, 2006), 316, 317.

age of their children, or their husband's job situation, rather than on an individualized work cycle. This life cycle pattern was common to Turkish and West German women from the working classes.[27] We should add that new female work cycles took shape, but mainly in the service industries, education, or the health sector, whereas in industry the number of female skilled workers remained very small. There is only one group whose parallel biographies suggest some kind of pattern: women workers re-entering their trades after a divorce or being widowed, or starting a second career in their thirties or later.[28] Again, only a small number (re)turned to manufacturing.

G., born in 1966 of Turkish origins, entered the labour market at the age of 20 after nine years of schooling and three years in an apprenticeship. She started in small retail shops, first full-time and then part-time, before getting married and pregnant at the age of 23. Her working life in manufacturing started only in 1999 after her divorce, when she moved from Düsseldorf to Augsburg in Bavaria with her child. At the age of 33 she began a new job as an unskilled worker in electrical engineering that allowed her to make a modest living for herself and her child.[29] We received good news in 2007: at the age of 41, she had accumulated enough resources to become a homeowner.[30]

It is time to compare these individual and collective biographies with findings from other western European countries. While my project also deals with France and Britain, my comparison in this study will focus on British experiences. We may start with an elementary but necessary observation. In the two decades between 1972 and 1992, Britain lost 2.3 million jobs in manufacturing, mining, and the construction industries. About 24 per cent of all jobs in these sectors were lost per decade. Between 1992 and 2002 this part of the national economy lost another 544,000 employees, but the shrinkage was smaller in relative terms, amounting to 13 per cent in this dec-

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[27] In the selected sample this group represented one-third of all women in both subgroups (94 of 275 women of German origin, and 39 of 130 women of Turkish origin respectively). SOEP data set.

[28] They represent about a quarter of all women's biographies (99 out of 405 women).

[29] Income in 2000s: about €1,800/€1,200–1,500 (inflation-adjusted). SOEP PID 565403.

[30] Ibid.

ade.[31] This means that the risk of losing a job in manufacturing industries during the first two decades was about 80 per cent higher in Britain than in West Germany, where the number of industrial employees shrank by about 13 per cent per decade from 1972 to 2002, amounting to a total loss of about 1.9 million jobs. Therefore, the types of working biographies strongly affected by insecurity or precariousness in the West German panel data should be found much more often in Britain. In this respect work biographies from the old industrial centres in the northern and western regions of Britain show more similarities with the biographies of east German industrial workers after 1990, when a large proportion of GDR factories were simply shut down and manufacturing disappeared in many regions of eastern Germany.

In Britain, the available social data is somewhat different, as the British Household Panel Survey did not start until 1991. A direct comparison is therefore not possible, and the dramatic transformations of the Thatcher years cannot be reconstructed via the kind of biographical data used for the German case. But both statistical and biographical information exists that helps to fill the gap. The much larger and geographically very condensed loss of industrial jobs between 1979 and 2000 meant that the trend towards early retirement by industrial workers was even stronger than in West Germany. A regional study of the mining areas of Yorkshire came to the conclusion that in the mid 1990s, about 40 per cent of former miners under 65 were unemployed, ill, or in some kind of pre-retirement scheme.[32] An ex-miner and strike activist in 1984–5 declared in an interview: 'Maggie Thatcher closed the pits, right enough, but I think she saved my life. I was 51 when I finished and I would have had another fifteen years underground if they'd stayed open. But what would I have been like with another fifteen years underground?'[33]

The situation of British miners was a specific one, but this statement best illustrates the ambiguities of this social ageing of an entire age cohort of manual workers from the different branches of manu-

[31] Own calculations on the basis of the ILO data base on industrial occupation. This data refers to official estimates.
[32] Royce Turner, *Coal was our Life: An Essay on Life in a Yorkshire Former Pit Town* (Sheffield, 2000), 22, 27.
[33] David Hall, *Working Lives: The Forgotten Voices of Britain's Post-War Working Class* (London, 2014). Interview with Terry Sargeant, 460.

facturing to construction. Often those born before 1940 did not enter the new worlds of digitalized work places or machinery. Instead, they were turned into early pensioners whose health was unstable or bad enough to make them veterans who had escaped in time from their strenuous or unhealthy work places. At the same time, they lost a social world of solidarity and comradeship that had given sense to their individual life cycles. In the case of Britain their working lives have become an integral part of the collective memory of a kind of foreign industrial country that has been lost since the 1980s.

Somewhat different and more ambiguous are the working lives of those who had entered the cycle of accelerated de-industrialization in Britain since the late 1970s at the ages of 40, 35, or younger. They all had to adapt to the shrinking chances of finding work in their industrial branches or in the kind of trade they had learned. Statistics drawn from the Labour Force Survey (established since 1975) may help to shed some light on their realities. If one compares data on the length of employment from 1975 with that from 2000, it is clear that for all age cohorts (25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64) the percentage of those working for longer periods with the same employer was generally falling. Still, a majority of workers in manufacturing industries were in stable jobs, and had often worked for more than twenty years at the same company.[34] Here we see similarities with the German work biographies. British workers who found jobs in the remaining manufacturing industries, in the newly established sectors such as electronics and electrical engineering, or in new car plants may have experienced life cycles similar to those of their (West) German counterparts. But British social reality was characterized more by a widening gap between those still working in the manufacturing sector, often for many years, and the growing number of those entering a new but much more unstable world of jobs in the service industries. The number of those who ran the risk of losing their wage levels after dismissal and of living through longer periods of unem-

[34] In 1975, 50.5 per cent of manual workers aged between 25 and 34 had been working for the same employer for more than 5 years; in 2000 the figure was still 37.5 per cent. For older workers the changes were less dramatic: in 1975, 63.1 per cent of those between 55 and 64 had been working for their current employer for more than 20 years, and in 2000 they were still in a strong majority at 58.2 per cent. Own calculations; data from Labour Force Survey, UK Social Data Archives.

ployment was higher, and the type of working biography we have just seen in the case of unskilled and migrant workers may have been familiar to a larger number of British industrial workers during the 1980s and 1990s. At least the statistical evidence suggests that low wages were more common in British than in German manufacturing, and the risk of dismissal was generally higher.[35]

But similarities are clear when it comes to the situation of working women. In both countries, even at times of de-industrialization, life cycles in manufacturing work remained strongly gendered. Continuity of employment and skilled work was a prerogative of men, while flexibility and low wages for unskilled work were typical of women's lives. But these patriarchal patterns of labour division were eroding under the double impact of economic globalization and female emancipation, opening up the life cycles of both men and women in work for remodelling. This, however, happened predominantly outside the world of industrial work.

As in Germany, in Britain the proportion of women working full time in manufacturing remained very small and got even smaller at times of shrinking job opportunities. They represented 27.1 per cent of the intermediate and lower levels of the work force in manufacturing, mining, and construction in 1975, and 24.4 per cent in 2000, many working part time.[36] Often these wives or sisters from working-class families stabilized the household income at periods of accelerated shift in local or regional economies towards service industries. The rise in Britain of the 'all-work household rate', to use the jargon of the social sciences, was remarkable: from 58 per cent in 1977 to 66.6 per

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[35] In 1995 low paid employment among skilled trades in the UK was 17.9 per cent and among operators it was 22.8 per cent (source: Labour Force Survey). See Geoff Mason, Ken Mayhew, Matthew Osborne, and Philip Stevens, 'Low Pay, Labour Market Institutions, and Job Quality in the United Kingdom', in Caroline Lloyd, Geoff Mason, and Ken Mayhew (eds.), *Low Wage Work in the United Kingdom* (New York, 2008), 41–95, Table 2.2, 46; in West Germany in 1995 low wage work in manufacturing was 8.9 per cent and 13.2 per cent among skilled workers. Data in Gerhard Bosch and Thorsten Kalina, 'Low Wage Work in Germany: An Overview', in Gerhard Bosch and Claudia Weinkopf (eds.), *Low Wage Work in Germany* (New York, 2008), 19–112, tables at 33 and 37.

[36] Labour Force Survey 1979 and 2000.

cent in 2006.[37] In the West German case this had become a relatively new but attractive model in working-class households of the 1970s. British working-class families were not far from this, but more often wives had to find part-time or temporary jobs to make up for the lower wages in British factories, and to cope with rising inflation during the 1970s and high levels of unemployment during the 1980s.

Sharp contrasts emerge when we consider the situation of young workers, those starting their working lives in manufacturing during the 1980s or 1990s. At this point we find the most striking difference between the West German and the British case. West German manufacturing industries developed their new regimes of diversified quality production during these decades of transformation, relying more than before on the use of a skilled workforce trained outside the general school system. This was quite rare in Britain. Flexibility and high quality, the two pivotal elements in the new international division of industrial production, were sought by employing a skilled workforce throughout German factories, and reducing the number of unskilled workers. A study comparing thirty-nine German and British factories producing components for the car industry at the end of the 1990s shows big differences in the skill levels of their respective workforces. In Britain only 3 per cent of the shop floor workers were skilled, whereas in the German plants 40 per cent were in this category, and management assigned them more complex tasks than was the case with their British counterparts. Even among the higher ranks of the workforce, there were more engineers and technicians in German factories than in British ones. As a result German wages were higher, and we may conclude that the rank and file probably also had more stability and upward mobility.[38]

The background to these differences at the plant level is more general: craft apprenticeship training systems in Germany operated on a scale at least ten times greater (per head of population) than in

[37] Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth, 'Two Sides to Every Story: Measuring Polarization and Inequality in the Distribution of Work', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, A, 171 (2008), 857–75, at 859.
[38] Karin Wagner and Geoff Mason, 'Restructuring Automotive Supply-Chains: The Role of Workforce Skills in Germany and Britain', *International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management*, 5 (2005), 387–410, figures at 397.

Britain.[39] It was precisely during this period of 'post-Fordism' that the notion of craft or trade lost much of its practical meaning for younger people entering the job market in Britain. We should not forget that even in British factories skill levels were rising, but it was negotiated at a much more individual level than in Germany. As apprenticeship systems were not regulated at national level, only local niches or pockets of older systems survived. Therefore the gap between those classifying themselves as skilled workers, who were often protected by the wage rates negotiated by their trade unions, and those who had completed an apprenticeship was widening during these decades.

In Germany from 1960 to 1990, about half of the young people doing an apprenticeship acquired their vocational skills in manufacturing.[40] The 'craft' of a skilled worker was adapted to the new levels of knowledge and multiple skills required by manufacturing under new technological conditions. Whereas in Britain the divide between the world of professional jobs (restricted to those with a degree) and all others was widening, in Germany the intermediary level of work skill of the *Facharbeiter* (skilled worker) was getting closer and closer in status to that of a technician, and it was becoming more important both in the sense of strategic impact in production and of numbers in the workforce. I am therefore tempted to translate the generic German notion of *Beruf*, central to the self-esteem and social position of skilled manual workers in manufacturing, by the English term 'profession' and not as 'trade', and surely not by what in English is meant by the generic term 'skill'. This consideration opens up a more general debate on the shifting languages of knowledge and work during these decades in both countries.

In any case, first of all, the apprenticeship system opened a future in manufacturing to a section of young working-classes males, and unemployment rates among them were significantly lower than in those European countries where such systems did not exist, or had faded away under the impact of de-industrialization.

In the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s empirical studies by the official German Federal Office of Work used its own detailed data on the

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[39] Hilary Steedman, 'A Decade of Skill Formation in Germany and Britain', *Journal of Education and Work*, 11 (1998), 77–94, at 80.

[40] Hasso Henninges, *Ausbildung und Verbleib von Facharbeitern* (Nuremberg, 1991), 11.

workforce employed in enterprises, which produces a better under-standing of the contexts. Let us compare the situations in 1970 and 1992. Out of 100 trained skilled workers, only a minority were work-ing in this category, and this group shrank to about 40 per cent in 1992. In the 1980s and early 1990s a rising number were employed in jobs as unskilled workers, totalling 17 per cent in 1992, but a much larger and growing minority (from 18 to 27 per cent) added a further job qualification to their apprenticeship and were working as techni-cians, engineers, or in middle management.[41]

German manufacturing industry relied heavily on the skilled workforce available when it entered this period of adaptation to new technological standards and new market situations. The system of apprenticeship that in Germany and some other European countries survived the Fordist period may be seen as one of the main single fac-tors that explain why stability of life cycles was so strong and con-tinued even for those age groups entering the industrial labour mar-kets in the 1980s and 1990s.

In light of these empirical findings and by means of a comparison we may better understand the links between collective work biogra-phies and the changing patterns of manufacturing in western Eur-ope. In West Germany, the diversified quality production regimes that replaced the mass production regimes of the boom era offered a great variety of options for management, capital, and trade unions to adapt established patterns of work, and hence the careers and life cycles of industrial workers, to the new conditions of the internation-al division of industrial labour. Stability of employment was main-tained, but it came at a price: workers' dependence on their firms and their business cycles increased dramatically. The other price for this kind of social contract was a considerable reduction in jobs and a rad-ical rejuvenation of the work force. As we have seen, this drastically changed the life cycle of older workers and created another group of unskilled workers whose working lives now returned to the patterns of precariousness we know best from the proletarian biographies of earlier periods.

The British case offers us insights into the disruptive effects that a radical economic reorientation away from manufacturing had during the 1980s and 1990s. Social ageing via pre-retirement but also the

[41] Ibid. 92.

informal forms of long periods of unemployment or illness were the fate of a much larger proportion of the working class, and it was strongly intermingled with a widening generation gap because all the younger youth cohorts tended to turn their back on the 'old' crafts and trades. Finally, the number of industrial workers, skilled or unskilled, who started a new life cycle as workers in the service industries, was much higher than in the German case. Often it was more or less a reinvention of a working life, for better or for worse. This represents another type of working biography that still needs to be explored.

One aspect is crucially missing from this article: how these life courses were seen and lived by those affected by them. The kinds of sources used here do not permit deeper insights in this respect. In the British case the voices of those who had to cope with, and often had to pay the price for, the effects of de-industrialization are much more present in the public debate and the history culture now openly discussing the consequences of 'de-industrialization'.[42] The stories of (West) German workers are more private and, at best, present in the regional collective memories of a lost manufacturing past.[43] In a comparative perspective they show us many cultural and political differences, but also a very strong attachment to the same values of industrial production and group solidarity based on a shared working experience.

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[42] Tim Strangleman, ' "Smokestack Nostalgia," "Ruin Porn" or Working-Class Obituary: The Role and Meaning of Deindustrial Representation', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 84 (2013), 23–37.

[43] But in both countries the life experiences of working people are available in the form of oral history interviews, interviews, and written notes in contemporary social studies. They are often collected at regional or even local level. In Britain much more is open for public use and available at a national level. See e.g. the collection of interviews in the British Library Sound Archive: <http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Industry-water-steel-and-energy>, acessed 12 Aug. 2016, or <http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Food>, accessed 12 Aug. 2016.

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A MYTH OF UNITY?
GERMAN UNIFICATION AS A CHALLENGE IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

Martin Sabrow

At first glance, the title of this article seems slightly inappropriate, since myth and historiography are not really compatible. In everyday language, myth means 'a distortion of reality, a deformed, false image of a historical process or person, a bloated balloon of legends to be pierced by the historian's scalpel'.[1] Such a 'bloated balloon' also contradicts Germany's extremely sober and down-to-earth political culture that is perfectly embodied by its chancellor, Angela Merkel, and best described by the term 'without alternative'. In his recent book on German myths, the well-known political scientist Herfried Münkler described the country as a largely myth-free zone compared with its European neighbours and the United States. Consequently, his study only briefly touches on the Bonn republic and it completely ignores the Berlin republic. Instead, it is mostly dedicated to master narratives of bygone times such as Luther's 'Here I stand, I can do no other', the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg, and the Day of Potsdam.

Indeed, if we follow Münkler in understanding myths as historical master narratives which 'express the self-confidence of a political entity', generate 'trust and courage', and lay the foundations for a shared national identity,[2] then despite all attempts by the media and other 'memorial entrepreneurs', not even the peaceful revolution of 1989–90 ever acquired the power of a pride-engendering myth, although it undoubtedly possessed the potential to do so. Neither the courageous conductor Kurt Masur, who helped to diffuse the explosive situation on 9 October 1989 by calling on the citizens of Leipzig to adhere to non-violent forms of protest, nor the two Stasi officers

[1] Matthias Waechter, 'Mythos', Version: 1.0, *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, 11 Feb. 2010, <https://docupedia.de/zg/Mythos>, accessed 26 Aug. 2015.
[2] Herfried Münkler, *Die Deutschen und ihre Mythen* (Berlin, 2009), 9–10.

Edwin Görlitz and Harald Jäger, who decided on their own to open the barrier at the border crossing point at Bornholmer Straße only one month later, nor the brave pastor of Leipzig's St Nicholas church, Christian Führer, who had been holding prayers for peace since 1987 that later became the pivotal point for the Monday mass demonstrations against the regime—none of these brave people have ever been considered heroic figures who could populate a mythical narrative of German unification.

Finally, empirical evidence also belies the mythical qualities of any account of the unity of the two Germanys. Twenty years after *Spiegel* magazine asked 'Has German unity become just a myth?', the question can be answered unambiguously. Regarded as a distant utopia or political delusion for about twenty years, it simply became a fact. In the year of its twenty-fifth anniversary, the level of unity and integration may still raise many questions, but certainly not the mere political act of reuniting the two countries on 3 October 1990.

Will this article founder on the problem that German unity is not a myth but a reality? Perhaps the very fact that it is so readily accepted as a historical fact should make us suspicious. The power of historical myths has always rested on the belief that their advocates and contemporaries consider them not as a delusion but as a reality, as a fact that cannot be questioned. This assessment should cast doubt on whether the German present really is a largely myth-free zone. Thus the question continues to be: German unity—a myth or not?

The Teleological Transition from Contingency to Continuity

In a review of Tom Holland's *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, Michael Sommer recently defended the British author's proposition that spontaneous, irrational, and often hazardous behaviour by individuals can dramatically change history. Sommer called it a 'truth that historians do not like to face', noting that 'they painstakingly search for sense and system in something that often stubbornly defies systematization; blocking out contingency is the historian's "vocational disease" '.[3]

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[3] Michael Sommer, 'Caesar als Aufmischer der Geschichte', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 Aug. 2015.

The unification of 1990 represents precisely such a transition from contingency to continuity. When the socialist experiment suddenly ended and the GDR dissolved into Western society, those who did not share the 'blessings of the late born' were ripped out of their familiar mental landscape in a way they had not anticipated. The unopposed erosion of the SED regime in 1989–90 and the development towards German unity both happened at a breath-taking pace, and were unforeseen by any politician. Both processes exceeded all political expectations and strategies, went beyond the public imagination, and also gave the lie to the prognostic abilities of German social and political scientists. A statement by Hans-Otto Bräutigam, the Federal Republic's permanent representative in East Berlin, perfectly demonstrates everybody's cluelessness. As late as January 1989 he stated: 'I cannot see that the GDR is under any external pressure to reform.' Even after a change in leadership and generation, he went on, there would be no change in policy. The GDR was not a country for dramatic change. Democratization as understood by the West was virtually unimaginable.[4]

Erich Honecker was also profoundly convinced of the GDR's stability when he declared at a conference held on 19 January 1989 to mark the five hundredth anniversary of Thomas Münzer's birth: 'The wall [Berlin Wall] will still be standing in fifty and even a hundred years if the reasons for it have not been removed.'[5] Western experts on the GDR thought along the same lines and Gert-Joachim Glaeßner encapsulated them when he stated in 1988: 'In the fifteen years of the Honecker era, the GDR has gained international standing and inner stability.' Even one year later, in 1989, he was still able to maintain his analysis without any criticism. According to him, what was important was for the GDR to 'consolidate its achievements and to set the points for a crisis-free development of GDR society up to the turn of the century. Not without good reason, the GDR is able confidently to take stock of the Honecker era.'[6] As with scholars, so with politicians:

[4] Quoted from <http://www.2plus4.de/chronik.php3?date_value=02.01. 89 &sort=000-000>, accessed 24 Sept. 2015.

[5] *Neues Deutschland*, 20 Jan. 1989, quoted from <http://www.2plus4.de/ chronik.php3?date_value=07.07.89&sort=000-000>, accessed 2 Aug. 2016.

[6] Joachim Glaeßner, *Die DDR in der Ära Honecker: Politik – Kultur – Gesellschaft* (Opladen, 1988), 11; id., *Die andere deutsche Republik: Gesellschaft und Politik in der DDR* (Opladen, 1989), 73.

in 1989, Zbigniew Brzezinski, summing up the 'failed communist experiment', called the GDR the only Eastern bloc state with relative stability and the potential for economic development.[7]

After 1989, German historians quickly agreed to regard this failure with a shake of the head and to explain why contemporary analysts did not see the end of the GDR coming in terms of regrettable moral indifference or professional blindness. The upheaval of 1989–90 was a dramatic turning point that radically transformed the thoughts and actions of contemporaries and gave them a new benchmark that no historiography could ever have anticipated. It gave way to a ground-breaking new perspective, and 1989 became the end point of a historical development that challenged people to reorganize their understanding of the world. It absorbed its own historicity to such an extent that any counter-factual view became pointless. The irresistible power of this turning point steers the retrospective reorganization of historical knowledge. It has opened up new intellectual horizons that the discipline cannot cope with and has transformed what was once considered impossible into something that, in retrospect, was inevitable, thereby making previously popular studies on the German question irrelevant. The power of the factual rapidly replaced the old paradigm with a new one, and historians reacted by making helpless attempts at an explanation while desperately trying to find an answer to the question of why they had not seen it coming. Exaggerating polemically, Klaus von Beyme once described 9 November 1989 as the Black Friday of the social sciences.[8] The self-conception of historiography as a scholarly discipline, however, has remained intact; it has, indeed, redoubled its efforts to restructure its diachronic orientation towards the epochal turning point of 1989.

Only in retrospect do the many hidden omens of the approaching fall of the Eastern bloc come together to form a recognizable and meaningful pattern. Today it all seems so obvious to us. We can only imagine the last general secretaries of the various Soviet satellite states as anachronistic gerontocrats who, at some point, lost touch

[7] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Das gescheiterte Experiment: Der Untergang der kommunistischen Systeme* (Vienna, 1989), 239.

[8] Jens Hacker, *Deutsche Irrtümer: Schönfärber und Helfershelfer der SED-Diktatur im Westen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1993); Klaus von Beyme, *Systemwechsel in Osteuropa* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), 36. Most recently see also Eckhard Jesse, 'Das Ende der DDR: Essay', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 33/34 (2015), 18–25.

with reality and were simply overtaken by events. Not without reason did the saying 'He who comes late is punished by life' become the swan song of state socialism, with the picture of Gorbachev showing Honecker his watch as its iconic symbol. Regardless of its actual historical relevance, the caesura of 1989 has acquired a power that is still actively shaping not only historiography but also our 'world of meaning'.[9] It thus discredits any possible alternative historical developments that can barely be imagined. The path to German unity has become a sacrosanct master narrative of the twentieth century that it is now one of the key components of Western identity—and this is exactly what gives it a mythical significance.

The Teleological Ordering Power of the Unity Narrative

This master narrative turned 3 October 1990 into the endpoint of a long and arduous path that finally resulted in Germany's reunification. Although Francis Fukuyama's overstatement that the end of the Cold War equalled the end of history was a triumphant prophecy that was quickly abandoned,[10] the years 1989–90 are still seen as a historical benchmark on which all political acting was concentrated. In the introduction of the German Unification Treaty we read:

> The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic,
> Resolved to achieve in free self-determination the unity of Germany in peace and freedom as an equal partner in the community of nations . . .
> In grateful respect to those who peacefully helped freedom prevail and who have unswervingly adhered to the task of establishing German unity and are achieving it . . .
> Have agreed to conclude a Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity.[11]

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[9] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, NY, 1966), 59–61.

[10] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London, 1992).

[11] <http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm? document_id=78>, accessed 1 July 2016.

These words perfectly demonstrate the great power of this teleological hindsight as a leading paradigm that has absorbed not only all historical alternatives, but also the former validity of Germany's division and the existence of two German states as a benchmark of contemporary history.

The mythical quality of this narrative presents a challenge to contemporary history. After 1990 the policy of détente was subjected to intense criticism because it was no longer asked whether it had made German–German co-existence easier, but whether it had held fast to the aim of German unity. Egon Bahr, for instance, who died in 2015, was accused of wheeling and dealing enthusiastically with those in power while giving the cold shoulder to the powerless in the GDR opposition. Questioned by a Federal Commission of Enquiry in 1994, Bahr tried in vain to claim that the SPD's German policy had aimed to stabilize the GDR while simultaneously working towards unification. This is what he said: 'Destabilizing goals could not be reached without stabilizing factors. Kennedy put it this way: you have to recognize the status quo if you want to change it.'[12] Former GDR civil rights lawyer Gerd Poppe responded with the crucial counter-question of whether this was not a final example of hindsight? 'If you already saw it that way at the time, and if the aim was supposed to be destabilization, why were some oppositional groups still accused in 1989 of having a destabilizing and therefore destructive influence; some even called it an influence that threatened the peace.'[13] At the same meeting, the Commission's chairman, Rainer Eppelmann, speaking for the opposition in the GDR, also subjected himself to the master narrative of 'unity' when he self-critically admitted: 'For the time being, we understood the talks about "German Unity", which happened earlier in the East and then later in the West as well, as a weapon in the struggle. As a short-term political goal German unity was not an issue for us.'[14]

The teleological power of the unity myth of a lasting and predestined unity of the two Germanys is most strongly expressed when it

[12] *Enquete-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland*, vol. v, pt. 1 (Baden-Baden, 1995), minutes of the 52nd session, 3 Nov. 1993, p. 756.

[13] Ibid. 794–5.

[14] Minutes of the 52nd session, 3 Nov. 1993, 737.

silences opposing options. For example, the dream of a Third Way, of a democratically revived GDR, which was once widespread amongst the West German left and the GDR opposition is barely remembered. The revolutionary upheaval of 1989–90 has not established itself as a site of memory that represents people's hopes for a democratic form of socialism that could reconcile capitalism with the benefits of the GDR's planned economy. Instead, it represents, in present public memory, a movement for national freedom and unity that culminated in the end of the forty-year division of Germany. Public memory is dominated by a narrative that sees the opening of the border on 9 November 1989 from the point of view of German unification on 3 October 1990.[15] From a perspective that interprets the peaceful revolution as a linear chain of events that led from freedom to unity,[16] contemporary ideas and scenarios of a socialist and democratic GDR are marginalized and seen as the weird fantasies of outsiders who had lost all contact with the people and political options in the given situation.

However, this is a retrospective distortion of what really happened. Contemporary accounts teach us just how strongly the idea of unity of 3 October 1990 overshadowed the hope for freedom of 9 November 1989. In the autumn of 1989, many observers of the radical changes in East Germany and the mood of rebellion they unleashed were quite understandably convinced that the overall consensus among the people of the GDR was in favour of turning their country

[15] Gerhard A. Ritter, *Wir sind das Volk! Wir sind ein Volk! Geschichte der deutschen Einigung* (Munich, 2009), stands for an interpretation that sees the peaceful revolution primarily from the point of view of German unification.
[16] One example among many: 'Für die Deutschen ist sie schon deshalb etwas Einzigartiges, da es die erste Revolution war, die erfolgreich die Ideen von Freiheit und Nation miteinander verband. Unmittelbar und ohne Umwege ging aus ihr die Bundesrepublik als ein geeinter Nationalstaat hervor. Schon deswegen ist sie "unsere Revolution". Aber auch weil sie sich im Zusammenhandeln und –wirken von West und Ost vollzog und vollendete.' (For the Germans it was unique because it was the first revolution that successfully linked the idea of freedom with that of nation. The Federal Republic emerged from it as a unified nation-state directly, without detours. For that reason alone it is 'our revolution'. But also because it took place and was completed as a result of East and West acting and working together.) Ehrhart Neubert, *Unsere Revolution: Die Geschichte der Jahre 1989/90* (Munich, 2008), 13.

into a 'socialist-inspired alternative to the consumer society of the FRG',[17] one that tried to leave behind both Stalinism and Thatcherism.[18] This interpretation dovetails with numerous statements published by opposition groups founded around 1989: 'It is not about reforms that do away with socialism, but about reforms that will continue to make it possible in this country', declared an artists' resolution of 18 September 1989, revealing what the majority of the political opposition was thinking and hoping for during the SED regime's final crisis.[19] 'No one ever demanded the end of socialism, no one ever thought of the end of socialism.'[20] Even if individual opposition groups were pursuing very different ideas of a Third Way, there can be no doubt that the movement was generally oriented towards 'an alternative socialism', not 'an alternative to socialism'.[21]

[17] This is Hubertus Knabe's view of the common viewpoint taken by the texts critical of the regime that he edited in an anthology published in Dec. 1989. Hubertus Knabe, 'Die deutsche Oktoberrevolution', in id. (ed.), *Aufbruch in eine andere DDR: Reformer und Oppositionelle zur Zukunft ihres Landes* (Reinbek, 1989), 9–20, at 19.

[18] 'In East Germany, New Forum and other groups are beginning to polarise along new lines. Some seek to influence the reform wing of the ruling Communist Party in a more social democratic direction. Others want to fight for a distinctive third camp, socialism based on new forms of popular democratic planning, and on social and co-operative ownership—equally opposed to Stalinism and East European-style neo-Thatcherism.' John Palmer, 'Eastern Bloc in Search of a Third Way', *Guardian*, 22 Nov. 1989, 23.

[19] Quoted from Christoph Geisel, *Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg: Das politische Selbstverständnis der DDR-Opposition in den achtziger Jahren* (Berlin, 2005), 68–9.

[20] Frank Eigenfeld, 'Bürgerrechtsbewegungen 1988–1990 in der DDR', in Andrea Pabst, Catharina Schultheiß, and Peter Bohley (eds.), *Wir sind das Volk? Ostdeutsche Bürgerrechtsbewegungen und die Wende* (Tübingen, 2001), 65–78, at 68.

[21] Sung-Wan Choi, *Von der Dissidenz zur Opposition: Die politisch alternativen Gruppen in der DDR von 1978 bis 1989* (Cologne, 1999), 116. As an example of the research literature that cites a great deal of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the socialist opposition's goals were teleologically watered down see also Dirk Rochtus, *Zwischen Realität und Utopie: Das Konzept des 'dritten Weges' in der DDR 1989/90* (Leipzig, 1999), 201 ff.; Geisel, *Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg*, 55 ff.; Thomas Klein, *'Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!': Die Politisierung der Unabhängigen Friedensbewegung in Ost-Berlin während der 80er Jahre* (Cologne, 2007), 512 ff.

How incompatible this idea of a Third Way was with the aims and interests of the protesting masses became clear in the first weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall when the number of GDR citizens in favour of 'a path towards a better, reformed socialism' dropped from 86 per cent to 56 per cent of the population, while those in favour of unification rose from 48 per cent to 79 per cent within only four months.[22] At the same time, the leading opposition group Neues Forum proclaimed as its goal 'that something like a GDR identity should emerge which, after forty years of decrees from above, might now have the opportunity to grow from below'.[23] In the period that followed the hope for an improved form of socialism in the GDR became the irrelevant opinion of a tiny minority that did not play any significant part in the first free elections for the People's Chamber on 18 March 1990. At the same time, the ever louder calls for unity in East Germany started to put pressure on politicians not only in Bonn and Berlin, but also in Moscow, London, and Paris, who had been hesitant so far.

It is true that the power of teleological narratives and the challenging task facing historians of dealing with contingency have given German unification some features of a myth of contemporary history. To some degree this relativizes the initial proposition that Germany is a largely myth-free zone. Yet there is no doubt that the efficacy of this myth can hardly be compared with other national myths of unity, such as the Italian Risorgimento or the Polish rebirth of 1918, at least not yet, and it has nowhere near the status of the unification of the German empire in 1870–1. But the question is why?

Challenges of Unification

A first and fairly obvious reason for the low appeal of any mythological account of German unity is, of course, that over the past quarter of a century political unity has not led to any real, heartfelt unity in society. To the present day, the project of unification has proved to be a political rather than a societal success story, and the controver-

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[22] Peter Förster and Günter Roski, *DDR zwischen Wende und Wahl: Meinungsforscher analysieren den Umbruch* (Berlin, 1990), 53, 56.
[23] *Mitteilungsblatt des Neuen Forum*, no. 5, 14 Nov. 1989, quoted from Geisel, *Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg*, 148.

sial Day of German Unity on 3 October is seen more as a holiday when the state celebrates itself than one celebrated by the people, as recent surveys have unanimously shown.[24] In particular, the often traumatic experiences resulting from biographical breaks caused by the transition have barely penetrated public consciousness. It took twenty years for the self-proclaimed Third Generation East, a group of people who were children or teenagers in 1989, to insist on addressing these experiences. And it was only in 2015, twenty-five years later, that an exhibition at the German National Museum of History entitled 'Alltag Einheit' focused on East Germans' experience of having to adjust rapidly to an entirely different system. The daily lives of East Germans changed dramatically in the wake of reunification. Three years after the GDR adopted the German Basic Law, fewer than one in three workers still had their old jobs.

It is only with the benefit of hindsight that it becomes clear how bumpy the path to inner unity has been, and how often it has led to a dead end. Shortly afterwards, however, West Germany was also subjected to far-reaching changes as the result of globalization, medialization, and digitization. To a certain extent, therefore, it is legitimate to speak of intertwined changes in a doubly divided history, in which the neoliberal reconstruction of the socialist society after 1990 eventually led to analogous 'co-transformations' in the West.[25] It was only in East Germany, however, that language, values, and certainties changed drastically and, along with them, people's work lives, their overall outlook, and familiar hierarchies and concepts. In a historically unprecedented way, the unification of Germany not only seized the future of most East Germans, but also took hold of their past.

After 1989 'memory mania', a strong desire to come to terms with the past, quickly replaced the partial consensus on keeping silent about the burdened past after 1945. It prevented any professional continuity of the old GDR elite with an inexorable harshness that contrasted strongly with the resolute reintegration of German postwar society. It is no coincidence that nothing undermined the repu-

[24] Vera Caroline Simon, 'Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Festakt und Live-Übertragung im Wandel', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 33–34 (2015), 11–17, at 12.
[25] Frank Bösch, 'Geteilte Geschichte: Plädoyer für eine deutsch-deutsche Perspektive auf die deutsche Zeitgeschichte', *Zeithistorische Forschungen*, 12/1 (2015), 98–114; Philipp Ther, *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent: Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa* (Frankfurt am Main, 2014), 97.

tation of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State
Security Service of the former GDR as much as the fact that among
almost 2,000 people employed by his agency, forty-seven former
Stasi employees were still in their jobs as drivers or doormen in 2009.

From a socio-political and economic point of view, the result of
the German unification project is ambivalent, as is the scholarly ver-
dict. Today, the infrastructure of Eastern Germany is generally
assessed as good. But its financial power is still lower and its unem-
ployment rate higher than that of West Germany; in 2015 the East
had an unemployment rate of 9 per cent while in the West it was 5.7
per cent. And as far as the economy is concerned, companies tend to
use the five new federal states mainly as production sites and sales
territories while keeping their headquarters in the West.

The delegitimization of the SED dictatorship, the debate about
whether the GDR was an unjust state, a rogue state, and the public
equation of the Nazi regime with the SED regime were additional
factors that sustained cultural differences between East and West—
and probably even intensified them. Twenty-six years after the
peaceful revolution of 1989, many East Germans still feel like 'sec-
ond-class citizens'.[26]

Yet over the last ten years, conflicts about German unity have
become noticeably less intense. On earlier anniversaries, the public
and media discourse was dominated by the theme of how unification
had actually divided the country and failed. In the 1990s the key term
was *Vereinigungskrise* or 'unification crisis'. On the fifteenth and
twentieth anniversaries, it was all about how the *Treuhand* had failed
and how the once promised 'flourishing landscapes' had become
abandoned landscapes: the emphasis was on division rather than on
unity, and unification was generally discussed as a burden and a nui-
sance. These times are apparently over. Unification has lost its
pathos, but also its potential to enrage. In 2015 we witnessed an in-
creasingly pragmatic approach with the public discourse tending
more and more to accept a continuing 'diversity in unity'. Scholars
would call this the 'simultaneity of convergence and difference . . . in
the political and social culture' of present-day Germany.[27] Euphoria

[26] Richard Schröder, 'Versöhnung—mit wem? Warum die Linke nicht aus-
gegrenzt ist', *Der Spiegel*, 9 Nov. 2009.
[27] Everhard Holtmann and Tobias Jaeck, 'Was denkt und meint das Volk?

and disappointment team up in a pragmatic arrangement while the term 'unification crisis' is viewed as an anachronism.[28] In East Germany, trust in institutions and the overall acceptance of the political system still clearly lag behind West German levels, but the former gap in identification with the German system has become smaller and smaller. In autumn 2014 'democracy as we find it in Germany' had the support of 90 per cent of the population of Western Germany, and 72 per cent of that of Eastern Germany, that is, 31 per cent more than in 1991.[29] Today in both East and West, four out of five Germans think that the advantages of German unification 'all in all . . . outweigh' the disadvantages, and a vast majority of the East German population confirms that they have personally benefited from unification.[30]

Talking about the End while Facing a New Beginning

There is a third factor that detracts from the power of the myth of German unity, and this is the historical burden that the history of German unification bore. The conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation brings us back to the question of whether or not the West promised Moscow that NATO would not expand eastwards during German unification and the Two Plus Four talks. The Greek crisis has revived concerns about Germany becoming too strong again within Europe—the same concerns that in 1990 turned Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterand, and Giulio Andreotti into firm but ultimately powerless opponents of German unification. The radicalization of the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) is largely attributable to strong East German support for a political leader from Saxony who took over the party in the early summer of 2015, forcing the former spokesman from the West to step down. In addition, the xenophobic

Deutschland im dritten Jahrzehnt der Einheit', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 33–34 (2015), 35–45, at 36.

[28] Jesse, 'Ende', 23.

[29] Holtmann and Jaeck, 'Was denkt und meint das Volk?', 37.

[30] The corresponding figures are 77 per cent of the East Germans against 62 per cent of the West Germans; ibid. 42.

Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident), although it is an all-German phenomenon, is largely supported by those in East Germany who are disappointed by German unification. The movement does not stand for a cohesive right-wing extremist ideology, but addresses diffuse feelings among the lower middle classes—and they mostly attract people from the rural regions of eastern Germany.

Frank Richter, director of the Saxon Regional Centre for Political Education, has conveyed this diffuse feeling of always losing: 'They are dancing at the opera ball in Dresden. The wolves howl in the Lausitz. Now we are going to the demo.'[31] This gives expression to a dissatisfaction specific to those East Germans who have still not come to terms with the politically liberal state of things that assailed them during German unification and made them feel emotionally alienated. Two hundred and fifteen out a total of 359 attacks on refugees and their homes took place in the East; and although only 17 per cent of recent acts of violence in Germany were xenophobic in nature, 60 per cent of these occurred in the East.[32] 'Dark Germany' (to quote an expression coined by the later Federal President Joachim Gauck) rears its ugly head mainly in those places where people could not express themselves freely in the public sphere before 1989, and where life was not dominated by the culture of a civil society as it had developed in the West. This came to the fore more assertively than anywhere else in the context of the refugee wave in the summer of 2015, when cries such as 'We are the vermin' in the 'valley of the susceptible' could be heard in southern Saxony. The hateful graffiti daubed on refugee accommodation and the arson attacks from Berlin to Dresden to Usedom cannot be understood without looking at the history of the division and re-unification of the two Germanys. Every day it becomes more apparent that German reunification has not been the crowning finale but rather the sinister beginning of a story that is still unfolding, as the tragedy of the refugees stranded at the edge of fortress Europe has taught us. 'Strange as it may seem, the fall of the

[31] Frank Richter, 'Der Pegida-Komplex und die politische Kultur des Landes', <https://www.slpb.de/fileadmin/media/OnlineWissen/Texte/DH123_Richter.pdf>, accessed 1 Sept. 2016.
[32] Quoted from Florian Flade, Michael Ginsburg, and Karsten Kammholz, 'Osten wehrt sich gegen Nazi-Image', *Welt am Sonntag*, 30 Aug. 2015.

Berlin Wall was not the beginning of unlimited freedom for Europe, but introduced an era of fences', as *Der Tagesspiegel* recently put it.[33]

Positive and Negative Memory

The last and most deeply rooted reason for the limited power of the unity myth lies in the nature of German historical culture. The German dominant culture of remembrance places less emphasis on obligations arising from tradition than on the liberating break with it. The German dialogue with the past has become cathartic and not mimetic. Nowadays it thrives primarily on dissociation and overcoming, not on traditional obligations and the longing for continuity. The lines involved are clearly drawn: they distinguish between the Western culture of distancing oneself from the past and a culture of affirmation as seen, for example, in Russia or Turkey. There commissions have been created to defend the imperialistic perception of history before Stalin, a fifty-six metre high bronze statue of Peter the Great has been erected on the banks of the Moskva river, and criticism of the Armenian genocide or former complicity in the persecution of the Jews is considered an attack on national honour.

This way of dealing with the past, as critical as it is obsessive, reveals a certain mindset: the more unpleasant the memory is, the less it evokes pride in the past. The more intensely German memory culture holds on to it, the more it generates shame and pain. Therefore it is not the heroes who are at the centre of our present historical culture, but the victims. Our time is characterized not by proud narratives about unity and freedom, but by historical traumas suffered by some and inflicted by others. The paradigm shift from historical heroization to historical victimization is not, of course, only a German trend, but more generally an Occidental one. It is most understandable in the way that the Holocaust has become the key reference point in Western self-understanding, at least since the famous Holocaust conference in Stockholm. More than forty European countries took part in this conference, which laid the foundations for the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and for a pioneering declaration which reads as follows: 'The Holocaust (Shoah) funda-

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[33] Silviu Mihai, 'Mauert sich Europa ein?', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 Aug. 2015.

mentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning.'[34]

Today's predominantly victim-centred commemorative culture has replaced the evocation of glory by dealing with historical guilt. The associated shift from a mimetic culture of pride to a cathartic culture of coming to terms with the past makes it much more difficult for the symbols of a glorious past than those of a dark past to come to the fore in the public sphere. 'Is it possible to exhibit freedom?' asks the Rastatt Memorial Centre, one of Germany's key memory sites 'for the freedom movements in German history', which was founded with reference to the 1848 revolution.[35] It is no coincidence that the planned 'monument to freedom and unity' that is to be erected at Berlin's Schlossfreiheit already has a very troubled history. After an unsuccessful first attempt, the Bundestag decided in 2007 that the monument would be inaugurated in 2014, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Peaceful Revolution. It could not be completed on that symbolic date, however, for reasons that were more historical-political than structural in nature.

The monument to unity, which resembles a giant see-saw (and is known colloquially as the *Einheitswippe*), is mocked in public as 'the elephant of the nation'. It has been likened to a toy 'that was desired for a long time, but seen up close just in time'. The malice displayed by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* towards this 'public entertainment installation' symbolized the difficulty of strengthening public awareness of the value of positive memory: 'It does not rock, it does not work.'[36] The inauguration of the monument was therefore first postponed until the twenty-fifth anniversary of German unity in 2015, and then obviously skipped again, as has become apparent.[37]

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[34] Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration>, accessed 1 Sept. 2016.

[35] <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/imperia/md/content/dienstorte/rastatt/lerngang_freiheit.pdf>, accessed 10 Apr. 2015.

[36] Andreas Kilb, 'Der Elefant der Nation: Das Einheitsdenkmal wird endgültig zur Farce', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 July 2014.

[37] 'It is still unclear when the planned monument to freedom and unity in Berlin will be inaugurated. This was announced by the Senate Administration

'The see-saw is hanging in the balance', taunted the same newspaper again and suggested a radical solution: 'It will be expensive, it gives the wrong impression, and it has no facilities for wheelchair-users. Would it not be better to stop the construction of the monument to unity in Berlin?'[38]

As this example shows, the main reason for the weakness, even failure, of a new German myth of unity and national pride is not the critical objection of historiography, but the culture of commemoration of our post-national German nation. In an age of ever increasing individualization and transnationalization, this has come to distrust all collective symbols and no longer believes in the power of principles such as 'Volk' and 'unity'. This scepticism goes hand in hand with the state's cautious approach to the anniversary of German unification in the first years after 1990, caused by clear concerns about a new and perhaps somewhat gloating patriotism. With this in mind, Federal President Roman Herzog warned his fellow countrymen in 1994 'not to our keep love for our country secret for a moment, but to express it very quietly'.[39] The leading German daily newspapers' doubtful comments about the planned monument to unity point in the same direction: 'Big bowls, especially if one can read on them "We are *one* people" or "We are *the* people" [the people par excellence, one could ask?], can evoke unpleasant memories of the fire bowls at the Nazi Party's rallies in Nuremberg.'[40]

The concept of a monument to unity has, in the meantime, been cancelled. But even if it had been erected, it would not have testified to the power of the unity myth; rather, its statement would have turned into its opposite, as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* had already predicted during the debate about its plausibility: 'There may be a certain truth for particular periods included involuntarily in the monument. At the same time, the whole monument with its church congress-like anti-individualism shows the people up there

on Thursday.' 'Verzögerungen im Bau: Berliner Einheitsdenkmal kommt später', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 29 May 2015.
[38] Niklas Maak, 'Berliner Einheitsdenkmal: Die Wippe auf der Kippe', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 Aug. 2015.
[39] Quoted from Simon, 'Tag der deutschen Einheit', 12.
[40] Niklas Maak, 'Berliner Einheitsdenkmal: Die Wippe auf der Kippe', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 Aug. 2015.

that they can only stand there because the mass is carrying them from underneath. This is perhaps a realistic picture of the desperate aesthetic and political state of things in the Berlin republic.'[41] This kind of carping may sound ironic, but it exposes the core of our present historical culture, which has bowed out of the idea of the nation, and is now laying the foundations for future historical myths. These will be shaped by the idea of having to come to terms with even the most painful past, rather than by trying to glorify just parts of it.

[41] Simon, 'Tag der deutschen Einheit', 12.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

NATIONAL SOCIALISM, ISLAM, AND THE MIDDLE EAST: QUESTIONING INTELLECTUAL CONTINUITIES, CONCEPTUAL STAKES, AND METHODOLOGY

NILS RIECKEN

STEFAN IHRIG, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 311 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 36837 8. £22.95. US$29.95

DAVID MOTADEL, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 500 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 72460 0. £25.00. US$35.00

FRANCIS R. NICOSIA, *Nazi Germany and the Arab World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), xiv + 301 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 06712 7. £60.00. US$95.00

BARRY RUBIN and WOLFGANG G. SCHWANITZ, *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), xiii + 360 pp. ISBN 978 0 300 14090 3. US$35.00

The historical relationship between National Socialism, the Middle East, North Africa, and Islam are currently a highly politicized issue. Shortly before a recent trip to Germany, Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, publicly ascribed a central role in the genesis of the Holocaust to Amin al-Husaini. Al-Husaini, a Palestinian politician and Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, is notorious for his cooperation with the National Socialist regime during the Second World War. Netanyahu claimed that al-Husaini had encouraged Hitler to take the final decision regarding the murder of the European Jews.[1] After

[1] Ronen Steinke, 'Judenvernichtung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Netanjahus Großmufti-Theorie', *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (2015), published electronically 21 Oct. 2015 <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/judenvernichtung-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-netanjahus-grossmufti-theorie-1.2702002>, accessed 21

much controversy Netanyahu stated in a Facebook post that 'the deci-
sion to move from a policy of deporting Jews to the Final Solution was
made by the Nazis and was not dependent on outside influence'.[2] He
elaborated on why he had made his initial statement: 'It was impor-
tant for me to point out that even before World War II it was the
Mufti who propagated the big lie that the Jews intend to destroy the
al-Aqsa mosque. This lie lives on and continues to exact a price in
blood.' He ended the post by saying: 'The Mufti was a war criminal
who collaborated with the Nazis and who opposed the creation of a
Jewish state in any boundaries.'[3] Thus Netanyahu presents the histor-
ical relations between al-Husaini and the National Socialist regime as
eminently important to current political affairs between the Israeli
and Palestinian administrations. Even though he no longer ascribes to
al-Husaini a central role in the genesis of the Holocaust, he still views
the figure of al-Husaini as having a violent impact on the present.

Netanyahu's controversial statements and the reports about them
in various media form part of a wider, global debate on the historical
relations between Islam, anti-Semitism, and violence. Historical
claims are crucial to this debate. Netanyahu advances claims about a
transregional history of violence and religion. The controversy not
only demonstrates the political stakes involved in this debate, but
also points to the need to attend to the global dimension of the ques-
tion at hand.[4]

Oct. 2015; Christian Wagner, 'Vor Besuch in Berlin: Netanyahu empört mit
Holocaust-Äußerung', *Tagesschau* (2015), published electronically 21 Oct.
2015 <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/israel-netanyahu-103.html>,
accessed 21 Oct. 2015.
[2] This and the following quotations can be found in <https://www.face-
book.com/Netanyahu/posts/10153262682842076>, published electronically
30 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Jan. 2016. See also 'Judenvernichtung im Zweiten
Weltkrieg: Netanjahu zieht Hitler-Großmufti-Theorie zurück', *Süddeutsche
Zeitung* (2015), published electronically 31 Oct. 2015, <http://www.sued-
deutsche.de/politik/judenvernichtung-im-zweiten-weltkrieg-netanjahu-
zieht-hitler-grossmufti-theorie-zurueck-1.2716942>, accessed 18 Jan. 2016.
[3] <https://www.facebook.com/Netanyahu/posts/10153262682842076>,
published electronically 30 Oct. 2015, accessed 18 Jan. 2016.
[4] E.g. in 2015 newspapers reported that an interest group in the United States
had put advertisements on metrobuses in Philadelphia. These depicted a
meeting between Husaini and Hitler in 1941 with the text: 'Islamic Jew-
Hatred: It's in the Quran.' See <http://www.welt.de/kultur/article

The four historical studies under review here—*Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* by Stefan Ihrig; *Islam and Nazi Germany's War* by David Motadel; *Nazi Germany and the Arab World* by Francis Nicosia; and *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* by Barry Rubin and Wolfgang Schwanitz—demonstrate that these issues have found great resonance in academia. To be sure, the authors themselves more or less explicitly acknowledge and respond to the political dimension of the object of their studies. What looms over all these books is the question of how historical ways of representing history in general, and Islam and the Middle East in particular, have a lasting impact on the present. In other words, these books are elements within the 'public life of history'.[5] Accordingly, my overarching question regarding these four studies is: how do they enhance our understanding of this issue, in which politics and history are very much intertwined? In the conclusion, I will ask, in particular, what their renderings of this history can contribute to the present-day controversy.

In spatial terms, they all demonstrate the importance of acknowledging the transnational and global dimensions of the history of National Socialism by developing, in different ways, a transregional outlook. Motadel, Nicosia, and Rubin and Schwanitz also include North Africa. Ihrig focuses on views of Turkey in Germany and Motadel extends his analysis to the Balkans and the Eastern Front. Temporally, the four books are primarily centred on the Second World War. They all consider continuities with the Kaiserreich, the First World War, and the Weimar Republic. Rubin and Schwanitz extend the scope of their analysis to the second half of the twentieth century and the present, discussing the legacies of al-Husaini's cooperation with the National Socialist regime in Middle Eastern politics. Ihrig frames his analysis as a response to present perceptions of Turkey in Germany.

The four books differ in how they conceptually frame their analysis of the relationship between Germany and the Middle East. They all consider the role of ideology, yet their assessment of its effectiveness in policy varies. While both Nicosia and Motadel work on for-

139063786/Mit-Adolf-Hitler-gegen-die-Islamisierung-Amerikas.html>, published electronically 2 Apr. 2015, accessed 18 Jan. 2016.

[5] Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'The Public Life of History: An Argument out of India', *Public Culture*, 20/1 (2008), 143–68.

eign policy, Nicosia primarily discusses National Socialist racialist worldviews, but not Islam. In contrast, Motadel focuses on Islam as a political field in National Socialist foreign policy ('Islampolitik'). Ihrig analyses right wing and National Socialist racialist perceptions of Atatürk and Turkey, while Islam and religion are not central issues in his study. Rubin and Schwanitz strongly emphasize the role and power of ideas and Islamism as an ideology.

In *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Rubin and Schwanitz aim to show that Nazi Germany and the 'radical forces' (p. ix) of Arab nationalism and Islamism were 'partners due to common interests and a set of parallel ideas' (ibid.). Thus they seek to reveal a 'secret' of Middle Eastern history, namely, that the 'same radical vision' (p. 254) embodied by al-Husaini and others has continually, profoundly, and pervasively shaped modern Middle Eastern history and its dominating political actors, such as Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Yasser Arafat. They state that they do not want to imply that by sharing this vision, these actors and groups were simply 'Nazis or fascists' (p. 86). Nevertheless, in their view it is not only al-Qaida, Iran's 'Islamist regime', the Baʿth governments in Iraq and Syria, Hamas, the PLO, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood who are shaped by this vision. 'The dominant exponents of the Arab world's mainstream discourse' (p. 254) also share this vision, according to Rubin and Schwanitz (who, however, do not define what they view as 'mainstream' in this regard). In any case, they see the radical nationalists and Islamists as having triumphed over their 'more moderate Arab and Muslim rivals' (p. x).

A key element in Rubin's and Schwanitz's understanding of this radical vision is their view of al-Husaini's role in the genesis of the Holocaust. They argue that al-Husaini played a key part in the genesis of the Holocaust. The caption they give to a picture of the meeting between al-Husaini and Hitler on 28 November 1941 sums up the point they want to make: 'Hitler in conversation with Grand Mufti al-Hajj Amin al-Husaini, November 28, 1941. At their meeting they concluded the pact of Jewish genocide in Europe and the Middle East, and immediately afterward, Hitler gave the order to prepare for the Holocaust. The next day invitations went out to thirteen Nazis for the Wannsee Conference to begin organizing the logistics of this mass murder' (p. 6). They thus read the temporal proximity between al-Husaini's meeting with Hitler and the sending of the invitations to

the Wannsee Conference as proof that al-Husaini was instrumental in the genesis of the Holocaust.

Unfortunately, they do not situate their argument within the wider academic debates that extensively discuss the multiple factors in the genesis of the Holocaust even before November 1941. In this way, temporal proximity remains their only argument. They go as far as to view Hitler's eliminatory anti-Semitism as 'Middle East-influenced': 'While Germany had its own long history of anti-Semitism, Hitler developed the Middle East-influenced idea of staging a systematic jihad-style struggle against the Jews' (p. 59). When they assert that Hitler first 'merely' wanted to deport the Jews to Palestine and that it was al-Husaini who pushed for their systematic murder (pp. 93–4) and thus 'contributed to the Holocaust doubly, directly, and from the start' (p. 94), they ignore decades of research on the genesis of the Holocaust which has widely discussed the dynamics of this process.[6] Rubin's and Schwanitz's approach is a form of intentionalism, but they do not engage with the now already historical debate between functionalist and intentionalist approaches. While it is true that the Holocaust as such was not a ready-made plan from the start, it is clear that many dynamics played into its eventual deadly implementation. Besides, National Socialist ideas about deporting German Jews had had deadly implications from the start. To explain this implementation by referring to a meeting between two men relies on a somewhat problematic model of the history of ideas.

In my view Rubin and Schwanitz paint an all too homogenous picture of the effects of al-Husaini's actions then, afterwards, and until today.[7] They detect his influence everywhere within the 'modern Middle East'. Methodologically, they conceptualize ideas and political and cultural spaces as homogenous units. They view ideas

[6] See e.g. Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews,* vol. ii: *The Years of Extermination, 1939–1945* (London, 2007); Ulrich Herbert and Götz Aly (eds.), *Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945: Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998); Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalin 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1992); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 1989).

[7] Marc Baer has recently described Rubin's and Schwanitz's approach as a 'conspiracy theory': Marc David Baer, 'Muslim Encounters with Nazism and the Holocaust: The Ahmadi of Berlin and Jewish Convert to Islam Hugo Marcus', *American Historical Review*, 120/1 (2015), 140–71, at 143, n. 7.

themselves as effective causes. Thus they tend to short-circuit ideas and actions and situate ideas as stable units within mere duration and within a homogenous space called the 'modern Middle East'. For instance, they assert the basic continuity of 'Islamism' as an ideology from the Kaiserreich to the present day. Another example is how the Muslim Brotherhood appears as one and the same and in ideological congruence with al-Qaida, the PLO, Nazi Germany and al-Husaini in the Second World War, Iran and Hezbollah (p. 250). Of course, it is possible to ask about such connections within the framework of a history of ideas or intellectual history. But if everything seems seamlessly connected to everything else, one has to question to what extent this approach contributes to greater analytical clarity. Such unstated assumptions about continuities and homogeneity are deeply problematic, as practitioners of intellectual history and global history have pointed out.[8] As Ihrig emphasizes in his conclusion, 'we must always be wary of alleged traditions and continuities' (p. 230).

It is one of the great achievements of the books by Ihrig, Motadel, and Nicosia that they puncture such assumptions about alleged continuities and ideological homogeneity, while not giving up on the question of continuities and the life of ideologies altogether. As mentioned before, they address the question of continuities from the Kaiserreich to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Moreover, they point to the relative consistency of the regime's policies towards and imaginations of Islam, and its view of the New Turkey.

Ihrig's, Motadel's, and Nicosia's approach challenges that of Rubin and Schwanitz on multiple levels. Based on meticulous archival studies and careful reasoning, their works demonstrate the differences between the regime's images of Muslims and Islam, images produced in propaganda campaigns, policies actually implemented in different war zones, and the reception of National Socialist propaganda in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. In *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, the differences between these fields are not always entirely clear, but the analysis in the books by Ihrig, Motadel,

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[8] See e.g. Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris, 1969); Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, 'Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten—Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt', in Sebastian Conrad, Shalini Randeria, and Regina Römhild, *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, 2013), 32–70.

and Nicosia renders these differentiations visible. In particular, Nicosia and Motadel draw attention to the power asymmetries dividing the German regime as an imperial power. They persuasively argue that the German regime sought to conserve or widen not only its own imperial power, but also valued French, Italian, and, for a while, British imperial interests in the Middle East and North Africa much more highly than the desire of Arab politicians for independence and sovereignty. Thus Motadel and Nicosia argue that al-Husaini was not as important for the regime as Rubin and Schwanitz claim when they state that the 'Nazis were eager for this partnership' (p. 4). Moreover, Motadel and Nicosia make clear that in the meeting between Hitler and al-Husaini in 1941, Hitler and the German regime did not, on several occasions, grant al-Husaini's wish for an official declaration of Arab independence, although, as Rubin and Schwanitz suggest, they might have done so in secret (p. 6).

In his *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, Ihrig indirectly relativizes al-Husaini's role by showing that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that is, Atatürk, was far more important ideologically for Hitler and the far right than al-Husaini. Ihrig argues that perceptions of the 'New Turkey' played an important and hitherto overlooked part in Hitler's and National Socialist imaginations as well as in media debates in Germany before and during the Third Reich. By looking at the 'entangled, transnational aspects of that history' (p. 9), Ihrig seeks to change 'our' perception of National Socialism itself (p. 6) and the history of Germany and National Socialism more generally (p. 9). In the six chapters of his book he aims to show that 'a remarkable unity and conformity of discourse existed from the earliest Nazi, far-right and nationalist deliberations about Turkey in the early 1920s until the end of the Third Reich' (p. 7).

To prove his point Ihrig uses a particularly fascinating type of source that gives access to more widely shared discourses: newspapers. Through extensive research on print media Ihrig provides us with valuable insights into public debates in newspapers from the 1920s to 1945. Given the scope of his reading of a vast quantity of documents, it is understandable that he limits his analysis to newspapers of the right and the National Socialist party, and explicitly excludes newspapers of other ideological orientations, such as Communist or Social Democratic ones (pp. 6–7), even though such a comparative perspective would have been highly interesting.

According to Ihrig, we should view Atatürk as 'an important, if not paramount, influence on Hitler' (p. 105) in the 1920s and 'a key influence in the evolution of Hitler's ideas about the modern *Führer* and about himself as a political leader' (ibid). He explains that, in fact, 'Atatürk's story was *the* perfect *Führer* story for Third Reich authors' (p. 148). With his successful revolution, Atatürk seemed to embody a real *Führer* figure for them, displaying a 'no compromise' attitude and a soldierly spirit. Moreover, New Turkey represented a victory over the church (pp. 184–7, p. 225). Ihrig emphasizes the central role of Atatürk's successful establishment of Turkey on 29 October 1923 rather than Mussolini's march on Rome in October 1922 as a model for the Hitler Putsch of 8 and 9 November 1923. Besides, Ihrig explains, the fascination with Atatürk had already begun in 1919 with the outbreak of the Turkish War of Independence. Importantly, he stresses that the genocide against the Armenians constituted another model for the National Socialists: 'The Armenian Genocide, as perceived by the Third Reich, must have been a tempting precedent indeed.' The temporal and geographical proximity, the identification with New Turkey and its policies along with the perception of a *völkisch* rebirth through genocide and lack of international repercussions—all these factors, in Ihrig's view, support his argument and call for a 'reevaluation of the role of the Armenian genocide in the genesis of the Holocaust' (p. 207).[9] He is, however, careful to point out that this argument about models does not imply a 'Noltean' view—referring to Ernst Nolte and the *Historikerstreit*—that would relieve the National Socialists of their responsibility. Even though his use of the term 'origins' (p. 228) in this regard might evoke, against his intentions, the notion of a direct and determining influence from outside, he generally calls for an entangled view of the history of National Socialism beyond a nationally conceived framework of analysis.

In *Islam and Nazi Germany's War* David Motadel examines how 'German authorities conceptualized and instrumentalized religion for political strategic ends' (p. 10). Drawing on an extraordinarily wide range of archival materials in several countries he analyses how

[9] Ihrig's most recent book, *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass., 2016) deals more extensively with this issue but is not reviewed here.

German authorities—the *Wehrmacht*, the SS, the Foreign Office, the Propaganda Ministry, and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories—'engaged with Islam in an attempt to build an alliance with Muslims in Germany's occupied territories and in the wider world' (p. 4). Moreover, by looking at German policies towards Muslims (p. 3) and 'Germany's engagement with Islam during the Second World War' (p. 313), Motadel seeks to contribute to a history of 'Berlin's religious policies in the Second World War' (p. 5). Situating his book within international history, he aims to further 'our understanding of religion as an instrument in world political and military conflict more generally' (p. 10) through the study of 'politics of religion in conflict and war' (ibid.). After briefly outlining Germany's imperial policies towards Islam before and during the First World War, Motadel, in three parts titled 'Foundations', 'Muslims in the War Zones', and 'Muslims in the Army', painstakingly traces the German authorities' efforts to mobilize and recruit Muslims for their aims (p. 12). He proves his overall point that Islam played a 'significant role' (p. 244) in German policies by tracing these policies in detail, not only in one area, but also in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Eastern Front.

Motadel demonstrates how the German regime attempted to recruit Muslims by using propaganda and pamphlets, and to involve them in their war efforts by forming Muslim *Wehrmacht* and SS units. His comprehensive approach allows Motadel to contextualize policies towards Muslims within a wider interpretative framework. He is thus able to situate al-Husaini's notorious Muslim *Waffen*-SS ('Handžar') division, his cooperation with the SS, and the creation of imam institutes in Göttingen, Dresden, and Guben within the National Socialist regime's wider attempts to recruit Muslims by virtue of a certain image of Islam. He shows in detail how the *Wehrmacht* and the SS tried to cater to what they perceived as the needs of Muslim military divisions, such as specific dietary, prayer, and burial practices. Notably, they also employed military imams whose assigned task was to 'maintain discipline and fighting morale' (p. 264). While pointing out that thousands of Muslims fought on the German side, he qualifies this observation by highlighting that thousands of Muslims fought for the British Empire (p. 114). Moreover, he makes clear that individual motives for joining German troops were diverse: captured soldiers from the Red Army tried to escape from

prisoner of war camps, recruits in the Balkans and the Crimea sought arms to protect their families, and others were motivated by nationalism, religious hatred, or anti-Bolshevism (pp. 221, 251). In this way, Motadel supports his argument that Muslims followed their own agenda while involved in German policies toward Islam (p. 5). Likewise, in his view German propaganda was far less effective than the German authorities had hoped (p. 114), and German broadcasts had little impact at the time (pp. 107–13).

Motadel provides overwhelming evidence for his argument that the regime's motives in employing Islam for its own ends were 'material interests and strategic concerns'(p. 56). At several stages he highlights the regime's pragmatic stance in this regard. He argues that its policies towards Islam were the result of 'short-time planning' (p. 315). Moreover, he plausibly suggests that while 'religion seemed to be a useful policy and propaganda tool to address ethnically, linguistically, and social heterogeneous populations' (p. 55), the focus on religion allowed the regime to avoid any nationalistic language. In this way, he points out, the regime could distance itself from Arab nationalists' claims to national independence. At the same time, he makes clear that al-Husaini, in fact, had little influence on Berlin's policies (p. 281), thus effectively dispelling ideas about al-Husaini's central role and a 'fusion of horizons'[10] between Arab politicians in Berlin and the National Socialist regime. Islam itself seemed to fascinate Hitler and Himmler in so far as, for them, it embodied a soldierly and military spirit (pp. 60–3).

Motadel's emphasis on the pragmatic character of the regime's policies regarding Islam and Muslims parallels Francis Nicosia's argument in his *Nazi Germany and the Arab World.* Nicosia similarly concludes that there was 'no "synthesis" or "fusion" of German interests and those of Arab nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, or the political and intellectual elites in the European-controlled Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa' (p. 13). Nicosia, who has published widely on this topic, in this book re-examines the National Socialist regime's intentions and foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa. He focuses on two issues he regards as inter-

[10] For this notion see Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven, 2009); and, critically, Götz Nordbruch, '"Cultural Fusion" of Thought and Ambitions? Memory, Politics and the History of Arab–Nazi German Encounters', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47/1 (2011), 183–94.

connected: 'the geopolitical interests and ambitions of Hitler's National Socialist regime and its racial ideology and "world view" ' (p. 1). He situates both issues within the framework of German ambitions and German foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Based primarily on research in German archives, Nicosia's work provides valuable insights into interactions between the members of the German regime, especially the Foreign Office and the SS, and Arab politicians in Berlin and beyond.

Taking up his own argument about the 'ideological and strategic incompatibility' of the National Socialists and Arab nationalists,[11] Nicosia shows time and again that the German regime never intended to grant independence to Arab countries, but wanted to preserve the status quo of imperial rule (pp. 13, 140–1, 162, 222, 257, 270). Nicosia's description of Germany's lack of military support for Rashid al-Kilani's *coup d'état* in Iraq exemplifies this general position on the part of the National Socialist regime. On the contrary, writes Nicosia, the regime was very careful not to disrupt what it viewed as the claims of France and Italy as imperial powers (e.g. pp. 141, 194, 271, 277). Like *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*, *Nazi Germany and the Arab World* argues, in my view convincingly, that the regime's foreign policies were shaped by a fundamental asymmetry of power. Nicosia positions himself against recent literature that portrays al-Husaini as 'the Arab equivalent to Hitler or to other top Nazi party officials' (p. 180). He points to the lack of a common horizon of interests in various respects, and explains that the governments of the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and National Socialist Germany oscillated between indifference and rejection regarding the Arab world (p. 276). He also shows that al-Husaini at first seemed to be of strategic use to the German Foreign Office and then, after it had lost interest in him, to the SS. But, as Nicosia emphasizes, al-Husaini came to realize that the German regime would not agree to Arab independence and sovereignty (p. 262). Nicosia interprets the Muslim *Waffen*-SS division mentioned above as 'a German idea, a European creation, meant for the support of Germany's war in Europe' (p. 263). As such, he points out, it had nothing to do with the

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[11] Francis Nicosia, 'Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933–1939: Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12/3 (1980), 351–72.

National Socialist regime's policies in the Middle East and North Africa (p. 263). He makes clear that the regime's policies in the region were characterized by a 'degree of aloofness and improvisation' (p. 18, see also p. 22).

The four books make abundantly clear that the history of the Second World War cannot be told without taking account of the trans-regional entanglements of the National Socialist regime. They all tell a story about relations between National Socialist Germany, North Africa, and the Middle East. As already mentioned, however, they conceptualize these connections along different lines. Whereas Rubin and Schwanitz frame them in terms of parallels and direct influences, Ihrig, Motadel, and Nicosia make clear why we have to distinguish clearly between the position and interests of the National Socialist regime on the one hand, and the position and interests of actors in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus on the other.

Ihrig, Motadel, and Nicosia look at their subject mainly from the perspective of German authorities and documents and call for further research on Arab responses to National Socialist propaganda during the Second World War.[12] I very much agree with their plea for greater attention to be paid to Arab perceptions and responses. However, and this leads me to my conceptual point of critique, I think that a study that acknowledges the entangled history of these responses could benefit from a stronger engagement with, first, conceptual discussions of religion and, secondly, with the history of Orientalism and racism within imperial formations.

All four books show clearly how deeply embedded German officials' images of Islam were in what we have come to call Orientalism, that is, a certain discourse about the imagined entity 'Orient'. Ihrig interestingly describes, with reference to Edward Said, how German newspapers used a 'de-Orientalized' language to describe the 'New Turkey' (p. 27). Motadel points out that the German authorities conceptualized Islam and the Muslim world as a homogenous unit (p. 4). Rubin and Schwanitz explain that German officials erroneously believed that 'Islam's doctrines would be implemented by its adherents' (p. 43). One might have wished for a broader discussion of these

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[12] Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, 7; Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*, 114; Nicosia, *Nazi Germany and the Arab World*, 5–7.

issues, for while these historical studies show that German officials ascribed 'fanaticism'[13] and 'passiveness'[14] to Muslims, they do not situate these images within the wider history of Orientalism. This history is integral to contemporary, globally disseminated discourses that link Islam, Arabs, and violence with each other—which leads us back to Netanyahu's statements.

All four books demonstrate the importance of imperial and Orientalist imaginations in the historical entanglements between National Socialist Germany, policies for Islam, and Germany's war zones. But my point is that the crucial issue for understanding these connections and their impact on the present is a conceptual one. If the discussion about the historical use of religion in National Socialist policies towards Islam, the Middle East, and North Africa is detached from the conceptual question about the foundational concepts of our analysis—such as Islam, religion, and history—as well as the imperial history of these concepts, it becomes difficult to address the question of how these concepts themselves are part of history and power relations.[15] But to speak of religion today while analysing the entangled history of National Socialism, the Middle East, and Islam implies being involved in conceptual legacies within and outside academia. To debate Islam, religion, and history as concepts implicated in an imperial history might help us to address the role of conceptual frameworks in representations of the past.

My point is that in order further to enhance our understanding of the relationships between National Socialism, the Middle East, North Africa, and Islam, we have to work through concepts used now and then, such as Islam, religion, and history. Moreover, these conceptual issues point to the problem of positionality, that is, of situated knowledge. All four books address the problem of the producers of representations of Islam, religion, and history—ideologues and especially Orientalists. Implicitly, all four books thus touch upon the problem of positionality. To think about concepts and positionality

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[13] See e.g. Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*, 18–19, 51, 105, 134; Nicosia, *Nazi Germany and the Arab World*, 4; Rubin and Schwanitz, *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 19, 78.

[14] Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*, 28.

[15] On the need to historicize foundational concepts, see Joan W. Scott, 'The Evidence of Experience', *Critical Inquiry*, 17/4 (1991), 773–97, esp. 796–7.

implies understanding individual recourse to concepts, first, as situated within wider discursive practices which themselves have a history and, secondly, as enmeshed in epistemological, historical, and political claims. Pondering the conceptual stakes and legacies of the concepts that we use to analyse the entangled history of National Socialism, the Middle East, and Islam may help us to further a methodological discussion about transregional perspectives on the relations between National Socialism, the Middle East, and Islam as well as about the repercussions of these relations in the present.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FIONA J. GRIFFITHS and JULIE HOTCHIN (eds.), *Partners in Spirit: Women, Men, and Religious Life in Germany, 1100–1500*, Medieval Women: Texts and Contexts, 24 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), x + 430 pp. ISBN 978 2 503 54096 2. €100.00

This collection of essays is dedicated to the question of how men and women lived and worked together in medieval religious houses. This starting point may surprise some readers, given the common assumption that religious women in particular lived in strict enclosure and that men were not allowed to enter their convents, except, that is, for clerics who said mass for the women, spiritual fathers who heard their confessions and gave them pastoral guidance, and male relatives who had a special right to visit their sisters and daughters. All of which brings us directly to the heart of the matter. The issue addressed in this volume originates in the prohibition on women taking higher orders and in the close connections between religious women and their secular relatives which arose not least from their financial affairs. Considering that cohabitation was a common and everyday situation in female monasteries and collegiate churches, the subject has hitherto received insufficient attention from researchers. Yet the problems of cohabitation, particularly the threat it posed to the women's celibacy, were repeatedly addressed in medieval letters, hagiographical and historical texts, charters, sermons, visitation records, and the normative texts of monasticism, as Fiona J. Griffiths (New York) and Julie Hotchin (Canberra) show in their introduction (pp. 1–46).

The volume gathers together essays which investigate the everyday routine of male–female relations within male and female monasteries which were not double houses, using case studies from German-speaking Europe between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries. The editors have attempted to compensate for any thematic lacunae through brief sketches in their introduction.

Trans. Ben Pope.

Elsanne Gilomen-Schenkel (pp. 47–74) uses high medieval necrologies from south-western Germany and Switzerland to show that religious women lived alone or in small groups at many monasteries which had previously been believed to be houses solely for men—a phenomenon already pointed out by Irma Bühler in her dissertation (published 1928–30) on the basis of necrologies from early and high medieval Benedictine monasteries in Bavaria. Gilomen-Schenkel uses the 'Helvetia Sacra' to ascertain that many double monasteries in Switzerland originated from these small groups of religious women. Indeed, we may add that the same phenomenon can be found right across southern Germany, and wherever Benedictine houses drove and anchored reform in the high Middle Ages.

Conversely, a surprising number of men lived in the Premonstratensian female houses of Füssenich and Meer in the diocese of Cologne during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as Shelley A. Wolbrink (pp. 171–212) can show. In addition, an entire network of abbots, priors, clerics, and lay brothers supported the women's houses in religious, liturgical, and economic matters.

Relations between male and female religious in the era of the Benedictine reforms and the reformation of the Augustinians in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were particularly close and intellectually intensive. The Codex Guta-Sintram from the Augustinian double monastery of Marbach-Schwarzenthann in Alsace, as presented by Susan Marti (pp. 75–107), is an example of close cooperation between the sexes. However, the manuscripts from the Benedictine double houses of Interlaken, Admont, and Engelberg are not so straightforward, in Marti's view. There is no essay dedicated to the Benedictine double monasteries in this volume. The editors have attempted to compensate for this with an extended discussion in their introduction (pp. 8–10). The references here make no mention of the only comprehensive synthesis to date, by Hedwig Röckelein.[1] In the discussion of the term 'double monastery' (pp. 12–13) there is no reference to the fundamental work of Stephanie Haarländer,[2] who

[1] Hedwig Röckelein, 'Frauen im Umkreis der benediktinischen Reformen des 10. bis 12. Jahrhunderts: Gorze, Cluny, Hirsau, St. Blasien und Siegburg', in Gert Melville and Anne Müller (eds.), *Female 'vita religiosa' between Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages: Structures, Developments and Spatial Contexts* (Berlin, 2011), 275–327.
[2] Stephanie Haarländer 'Doppelklöster und ihre Forschungsgeschichte', in

suggests alternative and more appropriate terms, such as 'dissociated' (*dissoziiert*) and 'symbiotic' monasteries. The is also no consideration of the close cooperation between female Benedictines and August-inian canons which is particularly visible in the Saxon dioceses of Hildesheim and Halberstadt in the twelfth century, and which enabled the women to participate indirectly in debates at the innova-tive cathedral schools of northern France.[3]

Whilst contemporary misogynistic texts from the reforming cir-cles of the high and late Middle Ages and many modern researchers both describe the 'cura monialium' (the provision of pastoral care for women by men) as an inconvenient and burdensome task for clerics, medieval records of day-to-day life reveal a different picture. Communication between male clerics and their female charges does not seem to have been so entirely hierarchical as is commonly assumed. Many clerics understood their task more as a service for the women, into which they entered voluntarily, as Fiona Griffiths (Guibert of Gembloux and Hildegard of Bingen, pp. 145–69) and Wybren Scheepsma (the fourteenth-century Dominican Hendrik van Leuven as spiritual leader of the Beguines, pp. 271–302) are able to show, because they hoped to gain an alternative path to God through the religious women or to profit from the women's unique spiritual gifts.

Anthony Ray seeks to fathom the general conditions of the cura monialium within the Cistercian Order from the exceptional case of a thirteenth-century correspondence between blood relatives, Thomas of Villiers and his sister, Alice of Parc-les-Dames, both Cistercians (pp. 213–36). However, most female Cistercians would not have received similar external pastoral care, since they were, in general, in no way incorporated into the Order. Responsibility for their cura lay not with Cistercian abbots and monks, but with local bishops, parish clergy, and the abbots of other orders. The female mendicants of Strasbourg sought to select their confessors via their

Edeltraud Klueting (ed.), *Fromme Frauen – Unbequeme Frauen? Weibliches Religiosentum im Mittelalter* (Hildesheim, 2006), 27–44.

[3] On this see Hedwig Röckelein, 'Die Auswirkung der Kanonikerreform des 12. Jahrhunderts auf Kanonissen, Augustinerchorfrauen und Benediktinerin-nen', in Franz J. Felten, Annette Kehnel, and Stefan Weinfurter (eds.), *Insti-tution und Charisma: Festschrift für Gert Melville zum 65. Geburtstag* (Cologne, 2009), 55–72.

secular relatives, as Sigrid Hirbodian shows (pp. 303–37). They were only denied this freedom within the strict observant communities, where their orders named spiritual fathers from their own ranks. The semi-religious Beguines sometimes also took the initiative in finding spiritual advisers and friends, such as secular clerics or parish priests, as Jennifer Kolpacoff Deane has discovered to be the case for many houses of Beguines in Würzburg (pp. 237–70). Through the examples of the *Sister Catherine Treatise* and *The Pious Miller's Wife*, Sara S. Poor concerns herself with spiritually gifted women in the fifteenth century outside of religious institutions, who — although followers of the apophatic (or 'negative') theology of Meister Eckhart — themselves entered into the social role of teacher, even though this was in contradiction to the teaching role of the church (pp. 339–65).

Collegiate churches for women occupy a special place amongst female religious houses. From the outset they featured less strict boundaries between the sexes than did the rigorously cloistered female communities. As Sabine Klapp shows from the example of the collegiate church of St Stephen in Strasbourg (pp. 367–400), they were augmented by canons, who can be found in almost all *Frauenstifte*[4] from at least the twelfth century and who, we may add, determined to a large extent the economic and administrative affairs of these *Frauenstifte* in the late Middle Ages. In the case of the female collegiate church of Gandersheim, which is not considered in this volume, it could have been demonstrated that only a handful of the canonesses' prebends were occupied, and that the small number of canonesses did not even live in the convent. The canons alone governed and directed matters locally.

The volume closes with a summary essay by John W. Coakley which takes us away from the everyday and the routine. He addresses an extreme situation for religious men and women in the experience of mystical ecstasy, visionary rapture, and sanctity. Coakley debates the proposition — which has found a mixed reception amongst researchers — that women, who were excluded from the Church's teaching mission during the Middle Ages, could only attain authority as teachers through visionary and mystical experiences.

[4] Note by the translator: Griffiths and Hotchin explain in their introduction (p. 7) that *Frauenstifte* were houses of canonesses, and that the *Frauenstift* was 'a religious institution for which no comparable English term exists'.

For Coakley, it is beyond doubt that there were gender-specific strategies of authorization and gendered understandings of these same strategies.

The essays in this volume come without exception from the pens of experts. Most are based on the authors' extensive study of the sources over many years. This accounts for the high quality of the articles. In each essay the printed and unpublished sources are separately identified alongside the academic literature. A highly relevant theme in the study of monasticism and piety in the Middle Ages has finally been given systematic treatment and a well-founded discussion. For this we are greatly indebted to the editors!

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KATHRYNE BEEBE, *Pilgrim and Preacher: The Audiences and Observant Spirituality of Friar Felix Fabri (1437/8–1502)*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), xviii + 270 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 871707 2. £60.00

At the heart of Kathryne Beebe's book lie the four works in which the Dominican Felix Fabri recounted his two pilgrimages to the Holy Land. Fabri was born in Zurich in 1437/8, entered the Dominican convent at Basel in 1452, and was a member of the convent at Ulm from 1468 until his death in 1502. He travelled to Jerusalem for the first time in 1480, and in 1483–4 he journeyed via the Holy Land to St Catherine's monastery in Sinai and to Cairo and Alexandria. He described both journeys in four texts, each intended for a different audience. The first journey became the basis for a vernacular poem, the *Gereimtes Pilgerbüchlein*. He also wrote up his second journey in the vernacular in the *Pilgerbuch* and dedicated this work to his noble patrons, whom he had accompanied on the journey as their chaplain. He worked from Latin notes which he had made on wax tablets along the way. These notes were also the basis for his most important work concerning his pilgrimages, the *Evagatorium in Terrae Sanctae, Arabiae et Egypti peregrinationem*, which he set down in Latin for his confrères at Ulm. Finally, in 1492, he wrote a fourth text for cloistered nuns, which again describes his pilgrimage in the vernacular. This text was intended to serve as a foundation for spiritual exercises, and presents a set of instructions for a virtual pilgrimage. Later it was given the title *Geistliche Pilgerfahrt oder die Sionpilgerin* or simply *Sionpilger*.

Beebe's book investigates these four works by Fabri and places them in their historiographical context. Fabri's other works are all mentioned by Beebe at most in passing: this is the case as much for his central historiographical work, the *Descriptio Theutoniae, Sueviae et civitatis Ulmensis*, which was originally conceived by Fabri as part of his *Evagatorium*, as for his many sermons and tracts. He was, in fact, reckoned amongst the most important preachers of his time, although most of his sermons are believed to be lost. The author dedicates to all of Fabri's writings which are not pilgrimage accounts exactly one page in a section of the introduction entitled 'Fabri's

Trans. Ben Pope.

Works', and only a further five pages in chapter 2 on 'Fabri's Writing'.

Beebe begins her study with the question of why Fabri repeatedly described the same pilgrimage: 'to understand *why* this was so: who these audiences were; how Fabri approached them in his writings; and how they received and read his pilgrimage accounts' (p. 1). The 1483–4 pilgrimage was also recorded in writing by other members of the party, for instance, by a secular cleric from Mainz called Bernhard von Breidenbach and in a very brief account by the knight Georg von Gumppenberg. Only Fabri set down the journey in writing in three different versions. Beebe treats Felix Fabri's accounts as exemplary cases, on the basis of which it is possible 'to understand pilgrimage literature in general, not simply Fabri's works, on their own terms' (p. 3). Her objective is 'to offer a new understanding of the nature of the relationship between the late medieval reader and writer, and her or his world' (p. 3).

In chapter 1 the pilgrimage routes to the Holy Land which were known at the end of the Middle Ages are introduced, along with the state of research on Felix Fabri's pilgrimage accounts and medieval pilgrimages in general. This chapter also deals with the various genres of writing—from itineraries to diaries—in which pilgrimage accounts are found.

In chapter 2 we learn more about Fabri's education within his order as well as about the positions which he held in this order. His mental horizons are also convincingly delineated, along with his extensive preparation for his second pilgrimage with the aid of the contemporary pilgrimage literature. In this chapter the transmission of the four pilgrimage accounts is studied in depth, and comparisons are made with the authors of other accounts (Ludolf von Sudheim, Hans Tucher, and Bernhard von Breidenbach).

Chapter 3 focuses on the audiences for Fabri's pilgrimage accounts: 'the different audiences . . . must be understood in the context of Fabri's multiple responsibilities in the communities in which he was a member' (p. 95). Beebe introduces Fabri's corresponding literary techniques. For instance, he deliberately tried to pique the interest of his readers, and in the *Evagatorium* in particular he sought to provide his confrères with an engaging text for use in education. In the *Pilgerbuch*, written for his noble patrons, he was also envisaging later public readings at court, which needed to include amusing

anecdotes, not least because maids and servants were amongst the listeners.

In chapter 4 Beebe asks after the '*actual* readership of Fabri's texts' (p. 129). To this end she again draws upon the transmission and reception of the texts with impressive breadth, and investigates (for example) Fabri's copyists and their interventions in the text. She also pursues the question of why the accounts were so seldom printed and are hardly ever found in the particular religious houses for whose inhabitants they were written. In this context she continually returns to the intriguing observation that the readers of Fabri's texts are not necessarily to be found in the same places as the copyists and printers who brought the texts into circulation. The fifth and final chapter is centred on the *Sionspilger* as a 'virtual pilgrimage' which Fabri composed at the urging of the observant Dominican nuns at Medingen and Medlingen. Here the author tackles the charged relationship between nuns, Dominican reform, and *die deutsche Mystik*. In the conclusion (chapter 6) she emphasizes the 'the two poles of [Fabri's] identity, pilgrim and preacher' (p. 211), which were above all shaped by his membership of the Dominican Order. The volume is rounded out by three maps of Fabri's pilgrimage routes and an appendix on the transmission of the texts in question, as well as an index which covers mostly people and places, but also some abstract nouns (for instance, the terms 'printing' and 'pilgrimage' are included).

It must be said that, to her credit, Beebe has resisted the temptation to re-narrate Fabri's texts and above all—contrary to what we unfortunately find all too often in other treatments of Fabri—she refrains from emphasizing the comical and exotic passages (for instance, his description of a *Rhinocerus*). Beebe has instead produced a scholarly study with a defined problem and methodology, and has thereby made an important contribution to historical research. Her focus in this respect is on the production and reception of the pilgrimage accounts. The strength of the study undoubtedly lies in the comprehensive investigation of the manuscript transmission of the four pilgrimage accounts from Fabri's pen.

The theme of 'observant spirituality' which is announced in the title could have been an opportunity for new discoveries concerning the later phases of the Observant Movement; however, the present study rarely goes beyond the research which has recently been pur-

sued by Johan Van Engen and James D. Mixson in particular. Overall it is notable that Beebe, as with many researchers before her, considers chiefly the travel literature amongst Fabri's works. She does so extensively, and also offers many new details along the way. However, Fabri's total body of work remains overshadowed by this dominant interest, and his importance for the Dominican Observant Movement in the second half of the fifteenth century receives no fundamental re-evaluation.

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This substantial volume is adapted from Christina Brauner's recent doctoral thesis on early modern West Africa. Its subtitle highlights the focus upon intercultural diplomacy along the Gold and Slave Coasts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Brauner depicts the slaving zone and shows how Europeans, Africans, and Euro-Africans created a new coastal culture. After a review of the historiography of the coast including the histories of the main European slaving companies, she discusses whether Europeans' views of concepts such as 'kingship' were appropriate to the African setting. She also examines elements of culture, such as rituals or taboos, to reconstruct coast culture without using a purely Eurocentric viewpoint.

Diplomatic interactions, as Brauner highlights, were not merely between Europeans and Africans, but between different groups in both camps. There was also a Euro-African culture at the coast with a 'lengua da costa' (coast language). The customs of the coast grew up out of the mixing of different cultures. In addition, there were Euro-Africans themselves who often held various posts as translators, traders, or other sorts of intermediary. Brauner reminds the reader that most of the primary source material used in studies of the coast comes from European archives. Hence the coast is seen through a European lens, even though African and Euro-African cultures were predominant. Brauner aims to reintroduce African views and also to show how developments in Europe and the wider Mediterranean affected the European frame of reference. Given the long time span of the study, covering the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were numerous changes in power relations, personnel, and culture itself.

Brauner begins by providing an overview of the scholarship on pre-colonial West Africa. In this period, West Africa could be divided into various 'coasts' (for example, the Slave Coast and the Gold Coast) as well as different kingdoms (for example, the Kingdom of Allada or Dahomey). Brauner has set out to investigate how diplomacy functioned between different African and European powers. In

addition, European slaving companies were quasi-state entities. Aside from other independent European traders and the occasional missionary, slaving companies constituted the European presence in West Africa. They were the reason for European interest in the politics of the coast and sometimes proved to be a source of friction between Africans and Europeans. Crucially, the 'European' forts were built on land which was only rented from African leaders. To add to the complexity, a wide variety of European states were represented at the coast at one time or another. The Portuguese arrived first and their cultural influence lasted long after their actual power had faded. For instance the 'lengua da costa' was a type of pidgin Portuguese. After the Portuguese came the British, French, Danes, Dutch, and representatives of much smaller entities such as the Brandenburgers.

Brauner has done a thorough job of researching a variety of national archives in different languages. The sheer scale of the primary and secondary sources consulted is impressive. Many histories of the African coast centre upon one European country's history (and archives), which tends to create a skewed impression. Just as Atlantic history can focus upon one particular European nation (for example, French Atlantic history) the history of the coast often becomes a national story. This approach has its advantages, but the rich pattern of coastal culture was based on the interaction between many cultures. The African coast was dotted with European forts and settlements which often lay very close to each other. The town of Ouidah, for instance, housed three such forts. The proximity allowed African leaders to keep an eye on the Europeans but also to force them to compete with each other. Europeans may have been writing their documents whilst living right next door to each other, but their records have been dispersed across a variety of European archives. Brauner has tackled the distancing effect and tried to reintegrate some of the material to bring the coast back to life.

Brauner explains that Europeans tried to understand African culture with regard to their own social norms. She cautions that this does not necessarily mean that African social structures or cultural practices had a direct European equivalent. As Europeans had kings and kingdoms, they tended to see Africa in the same terms. Europeans also drew on their Orientalist ideas about 'the East' and particularly the Ottoman Empire. This was particularly apparent in

European critiques of African 'tyranny' or 'immorality'. At other times, Europeans also likened certain African regimes to republics. However, a chief or head of an African group might not be a king or even the leader of a republic in the European sense. They had religious functions which meant that they were really 'Priest–Kings'. For instance, they were also closely connected with a system of 'taboos'. One taboo forbade anyone to see the 'king' drink. A child who broke this taboo was killed. This action, whilst correct within the local culture, clearly broke European taboos about the sanctity of human life. Such incidents could lead to a king being conceptualized by Europeans as a tyrant or a barbarian. Some European observers queried whether local chiefs should even be 'dignified' with the name 'king'. Kingship to Europeans was necessarily accompanied by splendour in the form of great buildings, thrones, crowns, and other accoutrements. African leaders lived in a style very different from Versailles. However, their power was expressed to their people and to their European visitors in other ways. They obliged Europeans at the coast to attend rituals and 'palavers' or discussions. They controlled access to the hinterland from which slaves were brought to the coast. Europeans did not make forays far inland. Insulting remarks about Africans hid the real dependency which Europeans had on their hosts' continued favour.

European sources tend to be particularly good at pointing out differences rather than similarities. For example, the African rules of succession were different from European norms. Often kingship descended down the female line. The king's sister's son succeeded the king. This provoked much comment amongst Europeans, but was founded upon the idea that early modern societies could not prove paternity but only maternity. Other high status roles were also allocated differently. Europeans were surprised to find that the 'headsman' or executioner was also 'prime minister' in European terminology (p. 144). One European observer explained this by stating that the two roles had co-existed in earlier times in Europe. He believed that this was evidence of African backwardness, presuming that the Africans were on the same developmental path as the Europeans, if a little further behind them.

This idea is a forerunner of the 'civilizing project' view which Europeans undertook to change African societies 'for the better'. The project was only possible when European power started to outweigh

African power, which was not the case in the early modern period. Rather, the Africans trained the Europeans to their customs to a certain extent. There was a complex gift economy which Europeans had to learn in order to trade successfully. The distinction between 'gifts' and 'tolls', however, always remained a little vague. Gift-giving by Africans was a sign of friendship but also underlined the African ruler's own status. Gift-taking might be seen as a tax, whether fair or unfair, by Europeans. Sometimes the Europeans were presented with a gift in return which was worth more than their gift. This was a ceremonial statement of a patron–client relationship.

The written sources give only glimpses of how Africans viewed Europeans. They tend to focus on instances where Africans reacted strongly to something. For instance, an African 'king' took exception to a Dane's powdered wig. The pigtail of the wig was interpreted as the white man's 'tail', which in other animals would not be on the neck (p. 175). This vignette highlights how strange early modern Europeans might seem to Africans and, arguably, also to modern Europeans. 'Civilized' customs such as wig-wearing were continued with, even though wigs were presumably unsuitable for the African climate. European sources tend to focus on descriptions of 'the other': African housing, clothing, customs, and rituals receive great attention. In doing so, the sources rarely mention those things which Europeans took for granted, such as the wearing of pig-tailed wigs.

African leaders, such as the 'King' of Dahomey, were able to tolerate European customs. The king allowed each European visitor to salute in the manner of his own country rather than following Dahomian tradition. Africans also altered European practices to suit local customs, such as the use of European national flags in parades. Clearly the original meaning of the flags had changed. The blending of cultures is perhaps more difficult to divine than when cultures clashed. The use of pawns (human hostages as a guarantee for good faith) meant that Africans were sometimes housed and educated in European forts for long stretches of time. The European sources discuss how to profit by educating a high status person in European ways, but say little about how that person might affect the Europeans themselves. African influence on Europeans seems harder to uncover, and yet it must have happened.

Brauner has set herself a very difficult task: investigating intercultural exchanges by using archival evidence from only one side.

The Africans and Euro-Africans seem to have left little written evidence of their own. Their words and actions are recorded by the pens of European writers. Brauner fully acknowledges this problem but has done a fine job of critically assessing these primary sources and noting their biases. It might have been useful to try to include some evidence which was not European in origin. Archaeological excavations, for instance at the abandoned town of Savi, might have shed some more light on African ideas. This is a minor quibble however. Another small quibble is the lack of an index by subject. There are indices by person and place and a helpful glossary. These are small points to take into account if a translation is ever published. All in all, this is a detailed and well-produced volume which stresses the mixing of cultures at the coast and makes important points about the biases in the European primary source material.

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ANNE MARISS, *'A World of New Things': Praktiken der Naturgeschichte bei Johann Reinhold Forster*, Campus Historische Studien, 72 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2015), 459 pp. ISBN 978 3 593 50477 3. €56.00 (Paperback)

It is noteworthy when a book's argument is based on such diverse eighteenth-century examples as Europeans who drew lines in the sand on the island of Tanna to claim control over Pacific commercial exchange; a missionary's need for books in the southern Indian town of Tranquebar; and the display of Asian plant seeds in the German city of Halle. These historical case studies are interlinked because of the biographical complexity of the book's historical protagonist, Johann Reinhold Forster, on the one hand, and the author's methodological claim for writing a global history of Enlightenment knowledge on the other. By combining the richness of historical case studies with a deep commitment to methodological reflectivity, Tübingen historian Anne Mariss presents a highly readable book on the history of science that will be of interest to a wider, non German-speaking readership.

The author explores how the men involved in James Cook's second voyage (1772–5) encountered 'a world of new things', as Forster, a German natural scientist and member of Cook's crew, enthusiastically wrote to the English scholar Thomas Pennant. Mariss approaches Enlightenment naturalist scholarship by examining the actual practices that shaped the production of eighteenth-century knowledge. In line with recent research on the production of knowledge, she posits that Enlightenment natural history emerged from the global exchange of information and objects. Given that current researchers' claims for global history often fall short of their achievements, *A World of New Things* is a remarkable contribution to recent debates on global/local history and the production of science. Knowledge about nature, Mariss argues, was the product of various and interrelated spaces of encounter, such as ships, universities, and the republic of letters, all of which shaped the scientific community's social boundaries. This approach challenges historians' understanding of the centres and peripheries of the Enlightenment world by drawing our attention to networks. The exchange of things, Mariss claims, stimulated new approaches to object-centred research in the late eighteenth century. The author thereby emphasizes the impact of artefacts, texts,

and images on the production of knowledge through processes of negotiation, translation, and transfer. These processes turned the production and conservation of Enlightenment science into a fragile material and sensory enterprise.

The book begins with a biographical sketch of Forster, a global agent as well as a networker across Europe generally and between Germany and England in particular (ch. 2). By situating Forster within a scientific community, Mariss stresses that eighteenth-century scholarly disputes affected his reputation and caused historiographical lacunae. While plenty of research focuses on Forster's son, Georg, a naturalist in his own right, a prominent Enlightenment writer, and, later on, an ardent supporter of the French Revolution, Johann Reinhold's biography and work are widely forgotten. This is even more surprising in light of the large number of available sources. Mariss draws on journals, diaries, treatises, and correspondences to show that the Forsters' natural history was teamwork practised by father and son as early as their 1765 Russian journey. Drawing on handwritten and printed sources from Johann Reinhold's time in Warrington and Halle, where he taught at the Dissenter's College and university, Mariss then outlines Forster's conceptual approach to natural history (ch. 3). An empirical examination of nature, Forster believed, was essential to understanding God's creation and promoting human progress. Over decades, Forster contributed actively to contemporary scientific debates on topics ranging from biblical explanations for the presence of fossils to the impact of fire and water on the geological development of the world. He knew how to play the social game of science, manoeuvring between discourses, clientele and patrons of various nationalities, and how to criticize or incorporate scientific positions.

In chapter 4, the book's core and greatest strength, Mariss examines Cook's ship as a diverse social space that shaped the local production and global circulation of knowledge. In a thorough analysis of Forster's ships journal, Mariss reconstructs natural history as a shared enterprise performed not only by the scientists but also by other members of the crew and by the indigenes whom the travellers encountered. Sailors and Polynesians, who participated in the networks of circulating objects through their maritime, linguistic, and local knowledge, cooperated, competed, and came into conflict with travelling scientists. However, the scientists' scholarly descriptions of

the voyage and their publications silenced these actors' contributions to the production of Enlightenment knowledge.

Mariss similarly defines the politics of plant classification as part of the Europeans' global 'bioprospecting' efforts. When Forster consulted his copies of Linnaeus and Buffon, Mariss argues, he decontextualized local botanical knowledge and represented it in accordance with European discourses. These discourses drew the boundaries of both the legitimacy of knowledge and the acceptance of people's ability to participate in a scientific community. The author's reconstruction of Forster's book holdings during the voyage is a further merit of the study. Later in the same chapter Mariss examines the mobility of natural artefacts. Since their material fragility endangered the epistemic status of knowledge, the dissection and depiction of animals and natural objects were common means of preserving, constituting, and mobilizing natural historians' knowledge. Such taxidermic and visual practices not only represented knowledge but also shaped its production through aesthetic idealization.

Finally, chapter 5 connects the world of global mobility with Halle, where Forster was appointed to the university's chair of natural history in 1779. Mariss shows that this German university was by no means a static entity, but a vivid agent of eighteenth-century global botany. The botanical garden and natural cabinets, both symbols of the university's enlightened ideal of education, enabled object-centred teaching and represented academic prestige. Forster ensured the supply of natural artefacts through his active correspondence and the mutual exchange of goods with the Danish–Hallensian mission in Tranquebar, India. Professors' households were also places of shared work in the production of knowledge. They provided space for the division of labour and the exchange of ideas between scholars and students, wives, children, and servants. Such teamwork, however, not only mirrored the global reach of their networks but also reflected social inequality in forms of collaboration and sociability. One wonders, therefore, about the absence of sources that might indicate the contribution that Forster's daughter made to her father's natural science enterprises. Is the absence of Antonia, who even travelled to Surinam, really due to Forster's disapproval of her 'independent' lifestyle, as Mariss suggests, or is it the result of the silencing logics of the textual production of male and Enlightenment scientific knowledge?

By connecting Forster's global travels with his local institution, Mariss also provides broader conclusions about academic cultures and scientific paradigms. The academic institutionalization of natural history led to its differentiation into a variety of disciplines. Yet Mariss further argues that the availability of natural artefacts, which were classified, sorted, and ready to be compared with each other in European cabinets, enabled the emergence of the nineteenth-century scientific evolutionary paradigm. Though one might wish for a more detailed discussion of this observation, *A World of New Things* is a central contribution to the history of Enlightenment science. Mariss demonstrates that enlightened knowledge was not simply a product of reason, but of visual, material, and tactile experiences. Eighteenth-century scientists shared a fascination for nature, which was also the product of passionate competition in hunting for and collecting natural artefacts that was shared by various protagonists of a wider *Faszinationsgemeinschaft* (Martin Mulsow). The representation of knowledge, however, silenced a variety of mainly non-European, non-male, and non-academic protagonists who participated in its production through the exchange of plants, animals, minerals, and other natural items.

The book's argument would have benefited from a thorough material examination of some of the objects collected during Cook's voyages. A study of these artefacts, which are today exhibited in museums worldwide, would promote an object-centred dialogue between historians, museologists, and anthropologists that could further challenge the social logics of Enlightenment science. Such research, for instance, could outline the extent to which the European scientists' practices relied on Pacific cosmopolitanism (Nicholas Thomas), that is, the exchange of objects and mobility of protagonists in non-European encounters and networks. In fact, this is only one way that Mariss's study could stimulate future research. Her book rehabilitates the work of Johann Reinhold Forster and prompts historians to continue rethinking the global connectedness of Enlightenment science as well as its local contexts. There was no linear increase in knowledge, but natural science was the product of the global dynamics of knowledge, the precarious mobility of artefacts, and the contingency and conflicts of history.

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WOLFRAM SIEMANN, *Metternich: Stratege und Visionär. Eine Biografie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2016), 983 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 68386 2. €34.95 (Hardback)

This is the book historians have been waiting a long time for: ninety-one years to be precise or, in other words, since Heinrich Ritter von Srbik published his massive two-volume biography of Clemens von Metternich. As Wolfram Siemann points out, every subsequent biographer has relied on Srbik to a greater or lesser extent, discouraged from further research by the consoling thought that it had all been done. It is with a mighty sigh of relief that we can now consign Srbik's turgid volumes, with their rambling sentences and interminable paragraphs, to the charity bookshops. Has anyone actually read every one of his roughly half-a-million words? Siemann probably has, but he himself needs only two-thirds of that number to deliver ten times more and, moreover, to do it fluently, lucidly, and engagingly.

Not the least of the problems with Srbik, as Siemann points out, was his racist *Weltanschauung*, leading him to assert that for Metternich, too, the 'overriding' concept was race, although, alas, he was also guilty of occasional 'unGerman' lapses and a general tendency to underestimate the moral energies of the German *Volk*. It comes as no surprise to discover that Srbik joined the NSDAP in 1938 following the *Anschluss*, a course of action, it can be assumed with confidence, his subject would not have endorsed. From the other end of the political spectrum, Metternich has always been pilloried for imposing black reaction on Europe after 1815, in a vain attempt to turn the clock back to the old regime.

Siemann assaults these positions root and branch in a sustained revisionist exercise. He brings to bear on his multiple targets the heavy-calibre ammunition he has assembled from the '*Acta Clementina*', Metternich's voluminous personal *Nachlass* located in the National Archive in Prague, together with the Metternich family archive also to be found there. With very few honourable exceptions, previous biographers have relied heavily on the eight volumes of memoirs and papers edited by Metternich's son Richard and published in French, German, and English in the 1880s. If only occasionally unreliable, they represent only a fraction of the whole. Among those whose factual errors and interpretative misjudgements are now cor-

rected by Siemann are Adam Zamoyski, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Alan Palmer, Paul Schroeder, and Matthias Schulz (the last-named is treated with special severity).

The old legends are still being repeated, by Manfred Rauchensteiner, for example, who in his contribution to a sumptuous volume published to mark the bicentenary of the Congress of Vienna, asserted that Metternich was largely responsible for Austria's catastrophic decision to declare war on Napoleon in 1809. Like so many before him, he was just repeating the verdict of Srbik, who had declined to investigate the archival material dealing with this episode because it was 'simply vast' (*schier unermesslich*). Yet, as Siemann points out, Manfred Botzenhart had done the necessary work in the Viennese and Prague archives back in 1967 and had shown that Srbik's assertion was completely unfounded and the opposite of the truth.

This demolition and site clearance form only a small part of the project. Siemann is, in fact, generous to most of those he criticizes, recognizing the achievement of Paul Schroeder, for example, and even finding some laudatory words for Srbik. His main task, however, is to recreate the Metternich revealed by the sources, not the ogre demonized by his opponents, past and present. The reconstruction begins in the family home with the rehabilitation of Metternich's father. Intelligent, learned, good-natured, and enlightened, Franz Georg von Metternich gave his son the best possible start, always treating him with affection and taking care that he received the best possible education from his tutors. Often away from home on Habsburg business, he wrote frequently, ending his letters with 'my dear and excellent Clemens, you are my friend, my confidant, and I cannot say how happy I am to have you as my child'. On his death in 1819, he was eulogized by his son as 'the best father and the truest friend'.

It was thanks to this excellent relationship that the younger Metternich acquired early practical knowledge of the world of politics and diplomacy. At the tender age of 7 he accompanied his father to the election of the Habsburg Archduke Max Franz as coadjutor to the Archbishop of Cologne. After 1791 he was often in Brussels, where Franz Georg had the thankless task of trying to run the Austrian Netherlands in the face of internal unrest and external aggression. By then, Clemens had already experienced the French Revolution at first hand in Strasbourg, where he was a student from

1788 to 1790. He was an eyewitness when the town hall was stormed 'by a drunken mob which saw itself as the people', as he put it. Hostility to revolution inside France was intensified mightily by direct experience of the revolution exported by French armies after 1792.

As the self-appointed liberators swept across Europe, they revealed the Janus face of the Revolution—sublime objectives pursued by inhuman means, culminating in Napoleonic world war and unprecedented physical devastation and loss of life. As Siemann reveals so clearly, what made this rupture so painful for Metternich was the depth of his attachment to the Holy Roman Empire. As the scion of an ancient Rhenish aristocratic dynasty, his inherited belief in the eternal validity of imperial laws and institutions was outraged by the destructive intrusion of raw power red in tooth and claw. Principled offence was heightened by private affliction, for the French conquests robbed the Metternichs of much of their property. Only the Bohemian estate of Königswart kept them afloat in the dark days following the invasions and allowed Clemens to win the hand of the well-connected and rich Eleonore von Kaunitz.

In 1794 he went to England for the first time, as a member of an Austrian delegation seeking a loan. He was well prepared, having studied the English language at Strasbourg. Siemann argues that the importance of this visit has not been given the recognition it deserves. Srbik allotted one short (for him) paragraph to the episode; Siemann gives it thirty-five pages, labelling the section 'The Journey to Great Britain: The Keystone in the Young Metternich's Political Cosmos'. If he did not arrive as a *tabula rasa*, he argues, it was the experience of English institutions, especially Parliament, and English political philosophy, especially Burke's, that turned him into the conservative Whig he remained for the rest of his days. In 1819 he told Dorothea Lieven that if he had not been what he was, he would have liked to have been an Englishman. Arriving in London in 1848 after an absence of thirty-five years, he commented that it felt as though he had never been away, adding 'this great country is, as it has always been, strong because of its impregnable conviction of the value of the law, order and that form of liberty which can only truly exist if it rests on these pillars'.

Napoleon claimed that he, too, believed in the need to temper liberty with law and order. Metternich was well placed to see how

fraudulent was the Napoleonic project. From 1806 to 1813 the two men were in constant contact, indeed, no other non-French person was so close to Napoleon for so long, or, one might add, brought such dry-eyed objectivity to assessing him. Always ready to acknowledge his enemy's charm, charisma, and even genius, Metternich could also spot the worms that were to devour the bud. He also had the patient intelligence to wait until they had done their work before orchestrating the *coup de grâce*. Siemann finds the perfect illustration to summarize his strategy in Brecht's story of a Mr Egge, who is forced to provide hospitality for a brutal invader, who asks: 'Will you serve me?' Mr Egge does not reply but stoically provides everything demanded for seven years, by which time his uninvited guest has grown so obese that he keels over and dies. It is then that Mr Egge answers 'No'.

Siemann makes a convincing case that it was Metternich who played the decisive role in forming and then maintaining the coalition which finally destroyed Napoleon. Especially illuminating is his account of the patience and skill needed to keep onside the mercurial but indispensable Alexander I, a loose cannon if ever there were one. After reading Siemann's gripping, masterly account of the decline and fall of the Napoleonic Empire, one has to conclude that it would not have happened without Metternich's guiding hand. Not for nothing did Castlereagh call him 'the prime minister of the world'. Yet his role in the campaign of 1813 has been 'either totally ignored or only patchily acknowledged (*punktuell betrachtet*), and always underestimated and misinterpreted'. Strikingly original is Siemann's rediscovery of Metternich as military commander, especially before and during the climacteric battle of Leipzig.

These are only some of the many important revisions Siemann has made. They continue into the period after 1815. It is here that the rehabilitation of his hero may prove most controversial, although he certainly scotches the black legend of liberal and nationalist historiography. As Siemann observes, seeing the situation through Metternich's eyes makes for a more sympathetic understanding of his policies. Karl Sand's brutal stabbing of August Kotzebue in the presence of the victim's 4-year-old son was only one of many acts of political terrorism across Europe. As the Emperor Francis I warned, Metternich was at the top of the list of targets. It was a spectre which followed him for the rest of his life. When he learned in his English exile

in 1848 that the Austrian Minister of War, Count Baillet von Latour, had been lynched and hanged from a lantern in Vienna, he commented: 'Murder is a bad weapon; blood cries for blood, and its nature is to pollute not purge whatever it touches. May God help poor humanity!' He was opposed neither to civil liberties nor national representation, although the experiences of 1789 to 1815 convinced him that they must be compatible with order—his last recorded words were 'a rock of order' (*un rocher d'ordre*).

Due attention is also paid to Metternich's private life, to his relations with his three wives and numerous lovers. It was typical of his kindly good nature that he should have remained on good terms with the latter even after physical relations had ceased. Repeating the good example set by his own father, he also took good care of his numerous children, acknowledging the daughter he had with Princess Bagration and bringing her to live with the rest of his family. His broad intellectual interests are also recounted, including his correspondence with Joseph Haydn, whom he met several times in London in 1794; his acquisition of a copy of Canova's 'Cupid and Psyche' by the sculptor's own hand; and his interest in the natural sciences, which went well beyond the level of a dilettante. More surprising is the revelation that Metternich was a successful industrial entrepreneur, developing his Bohemian estate at Plaß (Plasy) into an iron manufacturing business, turning out rails, wheels, and various household goods and employing several hundred miners and foundry workers.

So rich is this wonderful book in insight and information, so brilliantly does it illuminate Metternich's exciting times, that no review can hope to do justice to its author's achievement. Every general history of the period between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 will need to be rewritten. It is a long book but consistently stimulating, entertaining, even enthralling. It is earnestly to be hoped that an English translation will be forthcoming.

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TAIT KELLER, *Apostles of the Alps: Mountaineering and Nation Building in Germany and Austria, 1860–1939* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016), xvii + 283 pp. ISBN 978 1 4696 2503 4. US$29.95 (Paperback)

Taking the politicization of the Alps as its main focus, Tait Keller's book seeks to explore 'the paradox that Europe's seemingly peaceful "playgrounds" were battlegrounds where competing visions of Germany and Austria clashed' (p. 3). The author presents three threads to his story, the first of which is the 'account of humans in nature', as increasing numbers of middle-class tourists flocked to the Alps from the mid nineteenth century onwards in search of 'respite from the stress and strain of industrial development and the hustle and bustle of city life' (p. 3). A second thread follows the development of mass tourism, with 'humans shaping nature'. Hikers, mountain-climbers, and spa resort visitors 'brought the modern world with them when they civilized the crags' (p. 3). At the same time, these social and economic transformations possessed an overtly political dimension, which provides the final thread to the narrative: 'nature as a national symbol.' Thanks to the 'the labors of "apostles" of the Alps, the mountains came to serve as 'hallowed ground for the secular nation' (p. 4).

Keller divides his narrative into two parts, containing four and three chapters respectively. Part One provides a panorama on the 'opening' of the Alps between 1860 and 1918, whereby the first chapter focuses on the emergence of Alpine associations in Germany and the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, prior to a process of merger to form the 'German and Austrian Alpine Association' in 1873–4. Here, and in the next chapter, Keller outlines the widespread impact of Alpinists on the natural landscape through the construction of mountain-huts and pathways, while a burgeoning infrastructure of roads, railways, and hotels made the Alps more accessible to the affluent bourgeois tourists who thrilled in the romantic vistas. Chapter three explores some of the tensions arising out of these changes, resulting from the unease that some Alpinists felt about the scale and pace of transformation, especially with the development of skiing as a new form of commercial activity. Arguments in favour of conservationism possessed an evident class dimension, however, with some sections of the Alpine movement rejecting the presence in

the mountains of socialist outdoor groups such as the Austrian Friends of Nature (*Naturfreunde*). Chapter four then outlines how the First World War interrupted the flow of tourists, but led to the intensification of human intervention into the Alpine environment after Italy's entry into the war in May 1915. The respective armies on each side of the front line built new access roads or cable connections, excavated into the stone and ice, and detonated peaks such as the Col di Lana, permanently scarring the landscape.

Part Two of the book describes the attempts at 'dominating the Alps' from 1919 to 1939. Chapter five explores the aftermath of the war and resentments caused by border revisions after the Paris peace treaties (notably, the cession of South Tyrol to Italy). Heightened German nationalist claims to the Alps were accompanied by moves on the part of radical sections of the Alpine Association towards the exclusion of Jews from membership (a trend that accelerated and deepened through the 1920s and 1930s). Chapter six discusses the renewal of tourism in the inter-war period, which proved a difficult process in a testing economic climate. Public work programmes, such as the construction of the Großglockner road in Austria, affirmed anew the 'modernization' of the Alps. This was further fuelled by the genre of Alpine films, many of which glorified the events of the war and an ideal of heroic manhood battling to conquer nature. Chapter seven sketches the intensification through the 1930s of the trends described in the preceding two chapters, as well as looking at the role of Alpine groups in pressing for *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria. Finally, the conclusion offers a brief epilogue on the situation after 1945, rather than reiterating a firm argument that binds together the two main themes identified in the title. Indeed, it is the lack of a fully convincing analytical combination of these two themes that comprises a weakness of this book.

If much of the story that Keller tells is familiar in outline to scholars of the region, he nonetheless provides a useful overall account of developments, filling his narrative with verve, enthusiasm, and numerous interesting vignettes. He effectively synthesizes a good deal of research, while making an original contribution through his extensive use of association periodicals and focus on the work of Alpine activists. In several places, however, the analysis could be more systematic and rigorous. To take a couple of examples: the author cites the role of Alice Schalek as an embedded journalist for a

Viennese newspaper on the Alpine front in the First World War, and the 'spirit of unity' she perceived among the local troops (p. 99). Yet, while suggesting that Schalek 'saw only what she knew from her comfortable bourgeois upbringing' (p. 107), he does not make it sufficiently clear that she was a notorious pro-government propagandist with friends in the Army High Command (Karl Kraus provided a scathing depiction of her activities in *The Last Days of Mankind*). Similarly, the work of South Tyrolean writer, mountaineer, and film star Luis Trenker, described here simply as a 'movie star and veteran' (p. 109), is mentioned without underlining how Trenker's work in the 1930s and early 1940s was bound up with NSDAP film organizations. Such details matter when it comes to the question of 'nation building', but ultimately Keller fails to contextualize this subject convincingly. He jumps too readily between 'German' and 'Austrian' areas of the Alps without looking in detail at the national movement of the 1860s, the subsequent evolution of German nationalism in Austria after 1866–7, regional dimensions of nation-building, and the national competition between Germans and Slovenes, as well as Italians, regarding the Alps. To suggest, for example, that 'Alpine enthusiasts did not think in terms of regional identities' (p. 48) is to overlook the findings and nuances of recent scholarship. Use of relevant works by Dieter Langewiesche, Julia Schmid, and Heidrun Zettelbauer, among others, would have enabled a more effective contextualization of nation-building in the German Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. Instead, Keller provides a sweeping overview, which often seems to blur the social and political specificities of the different states.

On balance, therefore, Keller is a more effective guide to the mountaineering than the nation-building side of the story, but his work constitutes a solid overview and an enjoyable read.

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Nationale Identität der deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung Tirols 1860–1914 (2000), and editor of *Glanz — Gewalt — Gehorsam: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie (1800–1918)* (2011); *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (2007); and *Different Paths to the Nation: Regional and National Identities in Central Europe and Italy, 1830–70* (2007).

DOMINIK GEPPERT and FRANK LORENZ MÜLLER (eds.), *Sites of Imperial Memory: Commemorating Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), xvi + 280 pp. ISBN 978 0 7190 9081 3. £75.00

The 'memory boom' (Jay Winter) is still going strong. Along with public debates since the 1980s, the ways in which collectives establish and reshape their relationships to the past has become a major research topic in history, the social sciences, and cultural studies. Notwithstanding this unbroken trend, the topic's treatment has evolved considerably over the past three decades — to such an extent that some have started to distinguish several waves in the study of collective memory. Although the modern nation-state is still the dominant analytical framework in memory studies, scholarship has also turned to other contexts. Thus for nearly fifteen years there has been a debate about transnational forms of memory, particularly in the contexts of international Holocaust commemoration and European integration. Likewise, and following a general trend in academia, the colonial past has come to the fore. Here, too, most scholarship remains ensconced in a national framework, focusing on the question of how colonialism is publicly remembered — or not — in a given country. That is, it centres on postcolonial, national memories of colonialism. Some scholars, however, have started to study public remembrance in the context of colonialism itself, whether focusing on a metropole or a colony. They argue that empires, that is, globally the most important form of political rule up to the Second World War, were no less dependent on mechanisms of symbolic integration, including memory politics, than nation-states.

Sites of Imperial Memory is an important contribution to this emerging field (and less 'a first foray', as the editors put it in their introduction). The book brings together thirteen fine case studies that explore the intersections between colonialism and memory in a variety of European and non-European contexts. The editors achieve this breadth by drawing on an extremely broad concept of colonialism that tends to equate colonial and imperial rule. The cases range from several British, French, German, and Dutch-controlled colonies (notably India, Kenya, Zimbabwe/South Rhodesia, Algeria, Indonesia) and their respective metropoles to Austria-Hungary, tsarist and Soviet Russia, and post-war Japan. The editors and authors bring

these diverse cases into conversation with one another by going back to a foundational concept in memory studies: a topography of collective memory organized around different 'sites'. Originally coined by the French historian Pierre Nora, 'sites' or 'realms' of memory (*lieux de mémoire*) have become one of the internationally most popular ways of framing national — and recently transnational — memory cultures. A huge part of their appeal resides in their conceptual malleability and temporal openness. 'Sites of memory' come in all (material and immaterial) shapes, from a physical site such as a battleground to an abstract idea. They are not bound to any specific period, but permit a long-term perspective on their transformations.

Some contributions in the present volume address memory either in colonial or postcolonial times, although the majority skilfully combine both dimensions. Surprisingly, though, the most pressing research gap in this vast field does not take centre stage in the book. Only two essays focus on the mechanisms of memory-making under colonial rule: Xavier Guégan's piece on photographic reproductions of colonial statues in India and Algeria; and Berny Sèbe's study of how imperial heroes were created in British and French Africa. Both underscore the great interest that a huge number of actors, in the colonies and metropoles alike, attached to creating a usable symbolic memory landscape in conquered territory. Probably because of the ambitious scope of these comparative pieces, which also link colonies and metropoles, the colonial situation itself remains rather obscure in each case. Sèbe seems to be more concerned with developing a generalizable model of imperial heroization than with examining its local or regional preconditions and variations. Guégan's comparison does not do justice to the enormous differences between the two colonies. The different political power structures and the presence or absence of settler populations, for example, had a considerable impact on colonial politics of remembrance. Taking such structural factors into account from the start would have revealed much better candidates for a Franco-British comparison (for example, between African settler colonies such as Algeria and South Africa or South Rhodesia).

In a laudable departure from the dominant trend, most of the studies centring on the postcolonial period take non-European countries as their subjects. Maria Misra's piece on India and Winfried Speitkamp's on Kenya emphasize the complexities of national mem-

ory-making in formerly colonized countries. Speitkamp's analysis of the changing ways in which the Kenyan state and public dealt with the memory of the 1950s Mau Mau uprising and its repression by the British shows how complex ethnic and other societal divisions in Kenya continued to matter after independence. Likewise, Misra's survey of Indian dealings with the legacies of British rule since 1947 points to ambiguous and conflicting images of the Raj conveyed in media ranging from official monuments to Bollywood movies. This diversity of elite and popular interpretations has made a coherent commemoration of Indian victimhood under British rule almost impossible. In a slightly less contested example of national remembrance, Barak Kushner's essay on post-war Japan as a former colonial metropole explores the ways in which Japanese war crimes and the Allied trials were addressed. Based on four case studies of monuments in Tokyo that were created or reshaped after 1945, Kushner shows that the Second World War's imperial dimension remained largely off limits in a dominant discourse of self-victimization.

In an essay on Germany that spans the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to demonstrate the changeable meanings of sites of memory, Katja Kaiser argues that Berlin's Botanic Garden and Botanical Museum first served as places where German colonialism was popularized among the German public. After the country's defeat in the First World War, these sites became places to foster the memory of Germany's colonies and revisionist visions of their return. After the country's defeat in 1945 and its Cold War division, however, the colonial dimensions of these sites largely disappeared from their self-portrayals.

The majority of contributions avoid a clear focus on one side of imperial memory; they seek to cover both the question of memory-making under imperial rule and the aspect of post-imperial memory. Three case studies delve into the changing fates of prominent representatives of empire as sites of memory. Victor Endhoven's essay on the first Dutch Governor of the Dutch East Indies, Jan Coen (1587–1629), Richard Goebelt's study of Lord Clive (1725–74), and John Stuart's piece on David Livingstone (1813–73) all uncover complex, multi-sited processes of imperial mystification and post-imperial demystification. Even if colonized populations play only a minor role in all these stories, the authors nonetheless identify a variety of actors involved in the shaping of imperial icons—actors at local or national

level, in the metropole and in the colonies, and as representatives of the state or of non-state interests, for example, missionaries.

Complementing the essays on the commemoration of colonizers are two that focus on the memory of anti-imperial resistance in Central and East European empires. James Koranyi's study retraces the tortuous history of a monument in Arad (now in Romania) commemorating thirteen rebellious generals in the 1848–9 Hungarian revolution. First erected in the context of Hungarian imperial nation-building at the end of the nineteenth century, the monument was removed after the collapse of the Habsburg empire by Romanian authorities and reassembled but not reinstalled by the Communists after 1945. Only after the Cold War did it become a public site of memory again. Stefan Creuzberger's essay turns to the northern Caucasus and retraces the shifting ways in which the anti-tsarist rebel leader Imam Shamil was remembered in the tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet eras. Shamil was commemorated as an honourable adversary in imperial Russia, and Soviet historians wrestled with the ambiguities of his Islamic resistance movement. He has recently become an object of national pride in the region.

Although not the focus of these case studies, all of them suggest that public memory in imperial contexts revealed a complexity that went beyond any simple dichotomy between colonizers and colonized. Thus figures of anti-imperial resistance could be refashioned into objects of official imperial memory, while the colonized participated in commemorating certain colonizers (as can be seen in the lasting memory of Livingstone in Zambia). Shraddha Kumbhojkar's case study of an obelisk set up by the British in West Indian Koregaon in 1820 elucidates such complexities in exemplary fashion. Originally meant to commemorate the military exploits of the British Battalion in 1818, the site was gradually transformed into a rallying point for low-caste activists in their struggle against regional high-caste rulers and for the emancipation of the Dalits (or Untouchables). This appropriation began in the early twentieth century, before independence, when activists started to commemorate their ancestors' involvement with the British side in the 1818 battle.

If most of the book engages with the classic focuses and forms of public commemoration (great men and battles, monuments and commemorative rites, and, in one case, a museum and public garden), its final essay looks at a commodity. Frank Uetkötter considers how rub-

ber became a plantation-based crop throughout the colonial world and suggests that it might one day be reworked as a site for memories of bio-piracy, violence, and colonial exploitation.

Sites of Imperial Memory contains a mine of new insights and perspectives. It provides a panorama of inspiring case studies from various imperial contexts, covering both metropoles and colonies, and demonstrates how rewarding it can be to anchor memory studies more firmly in the field of imperial history. The volume is particularly strong when it comes to exploring the multiple ways in which the use of symbols and public memory in colonial times intersected with the construction of memory after empire. It contributes less to understanding the role that memory played in settings of transcultural colonial rule, especially with regard to interactions across the colonizer–colonized dichotomy. At the same time, some contributions indicate that memory can help us to gain a more complex and dynamic picture of colonial situations and imperial forms of cultural integration and disintegration. To this end, it may be helpful to disentangle more clearly the two sides of imperial memory combined in this volume (memory under empire and memory of empire) and to consider the question of public remembrance during colonialism as a research subject in its own right. Although the *lieux-de-mémoire* approach offers a fitting conceptual framework for the broad panorama presented in this book, researchers may also find it fruitful to use other concepts as they seek a more systematic understanding of how memory and colonialism intersected and of the extent to which collective forms of remembrance played similar and different roles in national and transnational contexts.

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MARTIN BÖHM, *Die Royal Air Force und der Luftkrieg 1922–1945: Personelle, kognitive und konzeptionelle Kontinuitäten und Entwicklungen*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 91 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), 392 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 78240 3. €39.90

One of the most surprising trends in historical writing in Germany since reunification has been the remarkable rise of military history from unwanted step-child to an enticing field for doctoral students. Although historians of the early modern period have never felt any need to justify their interest in war and conflict, for those whose interests were located in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries any research related to war and the military caused an understandable feeling of aversion for many years for reasons too obvious to outline here.[1] But if the rediscovery of military history has presented numerous topics for further investigation, historians have usually restricted themselves to specifically German subject matter. Moving into the terrain of the history of other European nations has seemed extremely daunting. For this reason alone, Martin Böhm's book on the Royal Air Force in the period 1922 to 1945 is to be warmly welcomed.

Böhm's declared aim is to consider the impact of the concept of 'air control' in the early 1920s on subsequent attitudes to strategic bombing during the Second World War. That the RAF officers were heavily influenced by their experiences in punitive attacks in Mesopotamia in the 1920s and 1930s is hardly a new discovery, nor is the significance of the concept of strategic bombing for their institutional fight for survival, which provided the perfect justification for their independence from the British Army and the Royal Navy. Thus the attempt to consider 'cognitive processes' and 'personnel continuity' as one route to understanding the RAF's approach to the strategic bombing of Germany presents more than a few challenges in terms of originality, given the extensive literature on the history of British air power which already exists in English.

Of course, the whole question of strategic bombing has been given a huge stimulus by Jörg Friedrich's deliberately contentious book,

[1] For further thoughts on this issue see 'Stand der Militärgeschichte: Interview mit Alaric Searle (Salford, UK)', in *Portal Militärgeschichte*, 27 (Sept. 2012) at <http://portal-militaergeschichte.de/searle_interview>, accessed 28 July 2016.

Der Brand, a work of popular, 'incendiary history'.[2] But regardless of what one makes of its message, and the way in which that message is conveyed, it has led to a number of scholarly works in the German language which have been original and innovative. The comparative study of British and German populations under aerial attack in the Second World War by Dietmar Süß is probably the most notable,[3] but there have been other books which have considered air warfare from very different angles, in particular, the monographs by Stefanie Schüler-Springorum on the Condor Legion and Christian Kehrt on the interaction between German pilots and their machines.[4] Hence there is more than enough justification for a book in German on the Royal Air Force, given that German historians should consider not just the broader role of air warfare in the history of the Third Reich, but also those air forces which bombed German cities into ruins during six years of total war.

Yet therein lies the challenge. On the one hand, it is important that German military historians range beyond the safety of their own national history; on the other, this presents considerable difficulties in attempting to make an original contribution to subject matter which has already been well excavated by other countries' own historians. Beyond the practical consideration that few British historians, for instance, will take note of monographs on British military history written in German, penetrating beneath the surface of another culture can often be extremely difficult. Despite the risks, on balance it is well worth writing a book in German on air warfare which makes no apologies for examining the Royal Air Force as a military organization.

Böhm's study, based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Potsdam, is rigorously researched, making use of government and service files from the National Archives, Kew, the RAF Museum, Hendon, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, the Imperial War Museum, and the British Library. Like many German doctoral

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[2] Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg, 1940–1945* (Munich, 2002).

[3] Dietmar Süß, *Tod aus der Luft: Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England* (Munich, 2011).

[4] Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, *Krieg und Fliegen: Die Legion Condor im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg* (Paderborn, 2010); Christian Kehrt, *Moderne Krieger: Die Technikerfahrung deutscher Militärpiloten 1910–1945* (Paderborn, 2010).

theses, this work takes great care to provide suitable contextualiza-
tion. As a result, the opening section, which runs to 126 pages, cov-
ers already extremely well-trodden ground. Its main purpose is to
explain the institutional background to his study, namely, that the
RAF was faced with a crisis at the end of the First World War: the
British Army and the Royal Navy wanted to see the new arm of serv-
ice dissolved, so they could secure its aircraft for themselves. The
RAF required a mission—the most obvious one was strategic bomb-
ing; and the doctrine of bombing to attack the enemy's morale was
developed by the RAF in Iraq during the period 1919 to 1932. More
or less all the points covered in this section will be familiar to British
air power historians and those working in the field of imperial and
colonial history. While the author has supported his summary of the
secondary literature with a range of primary documents, very little
can be considered new here. Still, for the German reader, Böhm pro-
vides an excellent overview.

Even in the section of the book entitled 'Kognitionen', there is
much to be found that has already been dealt with by the English-
language studies of the history of the Royal Air Force. What this sec-
ond significant segment of the book does do, however, is to provide
considerable insight into the motivations and perceptions of RAF
officers who participated in Air Control over Iraq during the period
of the British mandate. It emerges from the sources which are
analysed that while the pilots spared little thought for those on the
ground hit by their bombs, there was a gradual shift in the use of offi-
cial language towards terms such as 'minimum necessary force',
which sought to mask what was actually taking place. Throughout
this period, though, the RAF remained focused on its claim that such
bombing raids exerted a 'moral effect' on the opponent. Böhm's cen-
tral thesis is that this experience in Iraq, based on a perception of the
inhabitants of Mesopotamia as 'uncivilized peoples', would later be
transferred to the strategic bombing of Germany. Officers adhered to
the view that the 'Hun' only understood force, in much the same way
as the people of Iraq needed to be subjected to punitive raids if they
refused to comply with British rule. This rather one-sided thesis is
supported by quotations from lectures and other documents
authored by air force officers.

One of the most interesting sections of this part of the book con-
cerns the 'Charlton Affair' (pp. 211–17). Air Commodore Lionel

Charlton was an RAF officer who had served with the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War and, following a year as an attaché in Washington, was appointed to the post of Chief Staff Officer of the Iraq Command at the beginning of 1923. In September 1923 Charlton sent a complaint about the bombing to his superior. Following his conscientious objection to Air Policing, Charlton recommended that local forces needed to be better integrated with those of the British since he thought that the bombing campaign undermined the position of Britain's main ally, King Faisal. But Charlton's complaint was immediately ordered to be kept secret and he was sent back to England. What had changed his mind was a visit to a military hospital where he saw for the first time the actual destructive effects of the bombing on the civilian population. According to Böhm, this was the only case in which an officer objected to air control on moral grounds. Lectures at the Staff College were held merely to reinforce the doctrine of the 'moral effect' of bombing upon an opponent, although he does refer to those civilians who objected to the strategic bombing of Germany during the Second World War.

In the final section of the book, Böhm seeks to support his thesis by documenting how many officers who held key positions during the Second World War had served in Iraq and, thus, were strongly influenced by the early doctrine of coercive bombing of the RAF. The reasons for the unquestioning adherence to this doctrine were personnel continuity, cognitive dissonance, group think, and a peculiarly British form of elitism. As many air power historians would accept, the actual value of air policing in Iraq was limited, the accuracy of the bombing indifferent, and there was an overall failure to draw the correct lessons from the conflict. Moreover, the Iraq experience flowed into early field manuals, while it was further cemented through the study of 'lessons learned' at the RAF Staff College, before being enshrined in directives and the 1940 RAF operations manual. There is much here which is correct in Böhm's analysis.

Nonetheless, the argument about personnel continuity is not entirely convincing. Among the Home Command appointments made between 1920 and 1935, 34 per cent had Iraq experience; from the Home Command appointments between 1936 and 1945, 45 per cent had been on active service in Iraq. Furthermore, the approach adopted appears simply to select those documents which best support the central thesis. To reduce British decisions to launch the

strategic bombing of Germany simply to the Iraq experience is rather myopic, as many factors played a role. At the same time, the obsession with calculations as to bomb tonnage, and square miles of housing and factories destroyed, was a mentality which was as much a reflection of the dynamics of total war. Indeed, it was a similar story in the First World War when it came to tonnage of artillery shells, not to mention 'body counts' during the Vietnam War. One cannot help feeling at times that much of the evidence has been 'cherry-picked' to support the main argument, with material which might have demonstrated that the RAF was competent in other areas, or that other individuals or forces were driving strategic bombing, conveniently ignored. While one cannot expect the author to have gone into the wider dimensions in any detail, one or two caveats to his thesis might have reassured the sceptical reader.

Yet, despite the somewhat one-sided treatment of the subject matter, this book is definitely worth reading. It will, hopefully, convince other German military historians to venture beyond more familiar national themes. The debate over the air war during the Second World War should be widened so that it is seen as a question of comparative European history rather than merely national 'cultures of memory'. This said, German historians of the air war would be advised to treat some of Böhm's conclusions with a little caution.

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LAUREN FAULKNER ROSSI, *Wehrmacht Priests: Catholicism and the Nazi War of Annihilation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), xii + 336 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 59848 5. $39.95 £29.95*

How could it be that in the midst of the inferno of the mass murder of Jews and Russian prisoners of war on the Eastern Front, Catholic priests in good conscience proclaimed the Christian message to German soldiers? This is the question asked by the American historian Lauren Faulkner Rossi in her study *Wehrmacht Priests: Catholicism and the Nazi War of Annihilation*.

Faulkner Rossi's question must be seen in the context of a noticeable increase in interest among historians in the connection between Christianity and the war of annihilation that has emerged in Holocaust research. Against this backdrop, Faulkner Rossi and other historians have rediscovered the Archive of the Catholic Military Bishop (Archiv des katholischen Militärbischofs) in Berlin. Faulkner Rossi's dissertation, supervised by Omer Bartov and published in April 2015, is essentially based on an analysis of this archive. Although it has been accessible to the public since 1978, it has until recently been used mainly by church and military history specialists. But those who realize that it contains an almost complete collection of the personal papers and reports of Catholic priests who took part in the Second World War as military chaplains can understand the heightened interest that has recently been bestowed on the archive and its collections.

The reports and diaries of the *Wehrmacht* chaplains in this archive raise the hope of gaining some insight into what they knew about the Holocaust and how they were able to justify, both to themselves and to their soldiers, a war that has gone down in history as a racial war of annihilation. The founder of the archive, George Werthmann, served as the leading field vicar-general of the Catholic chaplaincy during the Second World War. He preserved, organized, and commented on the documents of his *Wehrmacht* chaplains because he had the intention of writing a book one day about the history of Catholic pastoral care in the field.[1] Werthmann's historico-political interest

[1] Monica Sinderhauf, 'Katholische Wehrmachtseelsorge im Krieg: Quellen und Forschungen zu Franz Justus Rarkowski und Georg Werthmann', in

was in protecting the *Wehrmacht* chaplains from any criticism after the war, indeed, to present them as a thorn in the side of National Socialism and a bulwark of Christianity standing up against the Nazis' intention to deconfessionalize the *Wehrmacht*.[2]

Only a few months before the publication of Faulkner Rossi's book, Martin Röw published his dissertation, *Militärseelsorge unter dem Hakenkreuz*, an empirical study which is also based largely on documents from the Archive of the Catholic Military Bishop. This leads to striking overlaps between the two books, for example, in Röw's section on 'Deviance',[3] and Faulkner Rossi's on 'Failed Priests and "Brown Priests" ' (pp. 162–7). Both reflect in detail on the contents of Werthmann's file 'Schwache Brüder' (weak brothers). Yet whereas in his book Röw asks how more than 750 Catholic *Wehrmacht* priests and chaplains[4] made sense of a war whose crimes must have been obvious to them at least since the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, Faulkner Rossi focuses on a much larger group of more than 17,000 soldier priests, even though organizationally they had nothing to do with pastoral care in the *Wehrmacht* and mostly served as ordinary soldiers in the medical service. What matters to her is why Catholic priests took part in a criminal and genocidal war in the first place.

To answer this question, Faulkner Rossi begins with an overview of the state of research on the attitude of German bishops in the

Karl-Joseph Hummel and Christoph Kösters (eds.), *Kirchen im Krieg: Europa 1939–1945* (Paderborn, 2007), 265–93, at 271.

[2] Dagmar Pöpping, *Kriegspfarrer an der Ostfront: Evangelische und katholische Wehrmachtseelsorge im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945* (Göttingen, 2016), 202; ead., ' "Allen alles sein": Deutsche Kriegspfarrer an der Ostfront 1941–1945', in Konstantin Lindner, Ulrich Riegel, and Andreas Hoffmann (eds.), *Alltagsgeschichte im Religionsunterricht: Kirchengeschichtliche Studien und religionsdidaktische Perspektiven* (Stuttgart, 2013), 173–86, at 173; Dagmar Pöpping, 'Die Wehrmachtseelsorge im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Rolle und Selbstverständnis von Kriegs und Wehrmachtpfarrern im Ostkrieg 1941–1945', in Manfred Gailus and Armin Nolzen (eds.), *'Zerstrittene Volksgemeinschaft': Glaube, Konfession und Religion im Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen, 2011), 257–86, at 257.

[3] Martin Röw, *Militärseelsorge unter dem Hakenkreuz: Die katholische Feldpastoral 1939–1945* (Paderborn, 2014), 232–8.

[4] This figure is based on information provided by the former archivist in the Archive of the Catholic Military Bishop, Monica Sinderhauf. Sinderhauf, 'Katholische Wehrmachtseelsorge im Krieg', 267.

Weimar Republic. According to the top down logic of the Catholic Church hierarchy, this attitude was typical of all Catholic priests and seminarians, who saw the bishops as their spiritual leaders and role models (p. 63). As the author rightly highlights, the German bishops defended the concordat and the rights it guaranteed the church, but failed to speak up for the victims of Nazi racist policies. This kowtow to the Nazi regime is explained by the author as an amalgam of German nationalism, religious anti-Semitism, and a fear of Russian Bolshevism (pp. 45–6).

The following chapter on pastoral care in the *Wehrmacht* describes its basic structure, whose special feature was the 'exempt' position of field bishops. This meant that field bishops were not part of the German bishops' conference, but under the sole control of the Army High Command. Field bishops had no institutional connection with the church. The role and character of the shady Catholic field bishop Franz Justus Rarkowsi and his leading field vicar-general, Georg Werthmann, who was the real strong man of Catholic pastoral care in the *Wehrmacht*, are discussed.

Beyond these well-known facts about Catholic pastoral care in the military during the Second World War, Faulkner Rossi wants to stress George Werthmann's particular historical significance more than previous research has done. Yet her statements about Werthmann are problematic, as she draws mainly upon the comments he himself made after 1945. Thus, for example, we read that Rarkowski cooperated enthusiastically with the Nazi regime whereas Werthmann sought to protect the independence of *Wehrmacht* pastoral care from anti-Catholic interventions by the Party and the SS. In contrast to Rarkowski, Werthmann showed more reserve vis-à-vis National Socialism according to Faulkner Rossi (p. 77). If, however, we read the assessment of Werthmann by the district leadership of the Nazi party in Berlin, which set the course for his professional career after 1933, we see that Werthmann was definitely receptive to National Socialist ideas.[5] One suspects that this contrast between the Nazi-friendly bishop and the anti-Nazi field vicar is based on a myth made up by Werthmann. Going back to this, after 1945 he was able to develop the narrative of Catholic military pastoral care unimpeded

[5] Berliner Kreisleitung to Amt für Beamte Gau Bayerische Ostmark, 25 Feb. 1936 (Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 9361-V, 399901).

by the shadows of the past, all the more so as Rarkowski had died in 1950 and was thus an ideal scapegoat for the mistakes made by Catholic pastoral care in the field during the Nazi period.[6]

The next chapter, on *Priestersoldaten*, that is, the 17,000 to 18,000 Catholic priests and seminarians who did not work in pastoral care, is largely a continuation of the chapter on *Wehrmacht* priests and chaplains. Although the author explains at the start of her work (p. 16) that she intends to concentrate on those born during or after the First World War, her evidence is drawn from the documents of *Wehrmacht* priests and chaplains—the youngest of whom were born between 1905 and 1912—who were not, like many of the soldier priests, shaped by the Hitler Youth.

Yet the difference between soldier priests and *Wehrmacht* chaplains was considerable. Whereas the latter were officers, the soldier priests served in the rank and file, several levels below that of officer. Not least this difference in status, living conditions, and earnings is what made the office of *Wehrmacht* chaplain so appealing. Priests spent one week on a course at the Army High Command in Berlin to become officers in the *Wehrmacht*. This was an opportunity from which Catholic clergy in the largely Protestant-dominated German army had so far been completely excluded.[7]

The author goes on to describe the anticlerical policy of the Nazi regime, which was also reflected in the increasingly restrictive treatment of the *Wehrmacht* chaplaincy during the war. This policy culminated in the establishment from 1944 of National Socialist Leadership Officers (Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffiziere, NSFO), who were meant to have quite similar functions to those of *Wehrmacht* chaplains in 1939. The NFSOs were also intended to increase the 'inner fighting strength of the troops', but this was to be achieved by drawing on National Socialist ideology rather than the Christian religion. The goal was to turn German soldiers into fanatical fighters for National Socialism. Faulkner Rossi highlights that Werthmann and his *Wehrmacht* chaplains certainly felt their professional work was threatened by this competition. But as the military historian Manfred Messerschmidt established in 1969,[8] NSFOs

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[6] Pöpping, *Kriegspfarrer an der Ostfront*, 201.

[7] Pöpping, 'Die Wehrmachtseelsorge im Zweiten Weltkrieg', 269.

[8] Manfred Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination* (Hamburg, 1969), 474.

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emerged on the scene too late to seriously endanger the existence of the *Wehrmacht* chaplaincy.

The question of why Catholic priests willingly took part in a criminal, genocidal war dominates the last two chapters. Of course, the author knows that Catholic clergy was obliged to serve in the *Wehrmacht*, even if they were not generally found among the fighting troops. What she means is: why did the clergy not become conscientious objectors, and why did they not accept the death penalty for their refusal? The author admits that the clergy could not have known in 1939 that the *Wehrmacht* would become a criminal organization (p. 66), but that does not prevent her from repeating her question.

Behind this question lies the accusation that the clergy at the time were acting morally wrongly because, in her opinion, the Christian faith required conscientious objection and thus an acceptance of the death penalty, that is, 'martyrdom'. Unfortunately, according to Faulkner Rossi, even after the war these priests did not realize that martyrdom would have been the only correct Christian response to their conscription into the *Wehrmacht* (p. 190). But anyone who makes such claims must be prepared to be disappointed by historical reality—and not only in relation to National Socialism.

According to Faulkner Rossi, during the further course of the war, especially in the racial war of extermination in Poland and the Soviet Union, the main concern of Christian charity should have been to stand up for the Jews, prisoners of war, and the local civilian population who fell victim to the policy of extermination of the *Wehrmacht* and the SS. But as the author correctly points out, the Christian commitment of the Catholic *Wehrmacht* chaplains was concentrated solely on their own people. A particularistic morality—so her argument could be summed up—is no morality at all.

Finally, how does Faulkner Rossi answer her most important question, why Catholic priests did not become conscientious objectors in 1939? She lists a number of factors: patriotism, cowardice, a desire to conform, and a Catholic authoritarian and state-directed thinking that resulted in an inclination to trust in, or at least accept unchallenged, orders from higher authorities (pp. 150–1). But she also takes the retrospective accounts by Werthmann and his *Wehrmacht* chaplains extremely seriously. What the priests wanted to do, it was claimed, was to provide pastoral care to Catholic soldiers

out of pure humanity. Although the author describes this answer as short sighted, she accepts it. Here doubts may arise as to whether the *Wehrmacht* chaplaincy, which was located right on the intersection between religion and politics, acted from motives of pure human charity. It would have been very illuminating here if the author had investigated the concrete impact of the anti-Bolshevism that she herself elsewhere identifies as an essential element of the worldview of Catholic clergy (pp. 46, 110, 156). The anti-Bolshevism of *Wehrmacht* chaplains was expressed, for example, in sermons during the Eastern campaign, which revealed a totally different side of *Wehrmacht* pastoral care, one that had less to do with the spiritual well-being of their own soldiers than a hatred of the enemy motivated by religion. Not least, in a weak moment after the war Werthmann himself admitted to this aggressive aspect of his activities and expressed his regret about it.[9]

Another aspect which turned the church and its priests into active and positive supporters of the war also remains untold: the church's hope of evangelizing millions of young soldiers who, as a rule, had long been alienated from Christianity and whom the church could no longer hope to reach in civilian life, as Messerschmidt has emphasized. This hope was probably a reason why both main German churches, which were worried about their survival under National Socialism, saw the war as a chance to win back ground in German society.[10]

Frequent statements about the growing harshness of the war awakening the religiosity of the soldiers, which are found in accounts of pastoral care and activity reports by *Wehrmacht* chaplains, can be interpreted against this background. Brushes with death, fear, and pain increased the importance of religion, especially during the war in the east. Faulkner Rossi reports this but not in connection with evangelization. The emphasis on their successes among sick and

[9] 'Wir haben alle Deutungen der allein Gott zustehenden Hoheit des Gerichts an uns zu reißen versucht und gingen in vermessener Selbstgerechtigkeit an die äußere Vernichtung des Bolschewismus.' Memorandum Georg Werthmann, 19 July 1945 (Archiv des katholischen Militärbischofs, Berlin-Mitte, SW 120).

[10] Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Zur Militärseelsorgepolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 1 (1969), 37–85, at 53.

dying German soldiers, and even members of the SS, was probably also intended to cast their work in a positive light.[11]

The author's discussion of the influence of the theology of 'corpus christi mysticum' (the mystical body of Christ) on soldier priests and seminarians is interesting. Promoted by the spiritual leader of the Catholic youth movement in the 1920s, Romano Guardini, and Pope Pius XII's 1943 encyclical, *Mystici Corporis Christi* (*On the Mystical Body of Christ*), which encouraged emulation of the sufferings of Christ, this doctrine glorifying suffering in war significantly shaped the self-image of soldier priests and seminarians (p. 162).

Faulkner Rossi does not explore how this glorification of suffering in the specific context of the war developed into something like an obscene victim theology, which offered soldiers the sacrificial death of Christ as a model for their own death in battle. Although the author speaks of a victim ideology, she refers only to the period after 1945, when Catholic clergy responded to the Allies' accusation of collective guilt by pointing to the victimization of Germans (p. 213). While this sounds plausible, the victim ideology had been established during the war, for example, in announcements made by the *Wehrmacht* chaplains in brochures and in sermons to the soldiers, as the theologian Heinrich Missalla stated in 1978, pointing to the example of Catholic sermon aids.[12] Nor is there any discussion of the important belief in life after death, which *Wehrmacht* chaplains used to ease or transfigure the death of soldiers, and which Martin Röw rightly described as 'the functional core of the *Wehrmacht*'s pastoral care'.[13]

The author's emotional fixation on the moral failure of German priests during the Second World War ensures that her valuable approaches and findings, in the end, remain superficial. Her handling of the sources, contemporary testimonials and accounts that were often written decades after the war, and which are all treated as equally important, fits in with this, as does the fact that the distinc-

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[11] Pöpping, 'Allen alles sein', 174–7.

[12] Heinrich Missalla, *Für Volk und Vaterland: Die Kirchliche Kriegshilfe im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Königstein im Taunus, 1978), 172; cf. also Antonia Leugers, *Jesuiten in Hitlers Wehrmacht: Kriegslegitimationen und Kriegserfahrung* (Paderborn, 2009), 186–7.

[13] Röw, *Militärseelsorge unter dem Hakenkreuz*, 315.

tion between soldier priests and chaplains is not always clearly drawn.

Ultimately, Faulkner Rossi delivers a moral treatise based on a historical example rather than a historical study of the morality of Catholic clergy. Anyone who would like to gain deeper insights into the daily working life, thinking, and feelings of Catholic *Wehrmacht* priests during the Second World War is better served by Martin Röw's study.

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ANDREAS W. DAUM, HARTMUT LEHMANN, and JAMES J. SHEEHAN (eds.), *The Second Generation: Émigrés from Nazi Germany as Historians. With a Biobibliographic Guide*, Studies in German History, 20 (New York: Berghahn, 2016), xiii + 473 pp. ISBN 978 1 78238 985 9 (Hardback) $120.00. £75.00

When looking at German-speaking émigré historians who fled from Nazi rule, we can broadly distinguish between two generations: the first generation, who had trained as historians in their German-speaking countries, and the second generation, who escaped as children or teenagers and then studied in the countries of reception. While the story of the first generation, especially in the USA but to a smaller extent also elsewhere, is well-researched,[1] the second generation is not.[2] This is all the more remarkable because many of these émigrés not only played a prominent role among historians in their new home countries, but also considerably influenced the West German *Zunft* of historians in the post-war period. The volume under review here fills this research gap admirably. Based on a conference held at the GHI Washington in 2012 coinciding with the Institute's twenty-fifth anniversary, the volume consists of more than twenty essays grouped into five thematic parts. In his highly instructive introduction Andreas W. Daum lays the ground and deals with

[1] For the first generation see Gabriela A. Eakin-Thimme, *Geschichte im Exil: Deutschsprachige Historiker nach 1933* (Munich, 2005). For the USA see Catherine Epstein, *A Past Renewed: A Catalog of German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (Cambridge, 1993) and Hartmut Lehmann and James J. Sheehan (eds.), *An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (Washington, 1991). For the UK see Christhard Hoffmann, 'The Contribution of German-Speaking Jewish Immigrants to British Historiography', in Werner E. Mosse et al. (eds.), *Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-Speaking Jews in the United Kingdom* (Tübingen, 1991), 153–75. For Palestine/Israel see Robert Jütte, *Die Emigration der deutschsprachigen 'Wissenschaft des Judentums': Die Auswanderung jüdischer Historiker nach Palästina 1933–1945* (Stuttgart, 1991).

[2] So far, the existing literature consists of a number of articles and fascinating autobiographies by several members of this generation, such as Peter Gay, *My German Question: Growing up in Nazi Berlin* (New Haven, 1998); George L. Mosse, *Confronting History: A Memoir* (Madison, 2000); and Fritz R. Stern, *Five Germanys I Have Known* (New York, 2006).

the second generation collectively, describing their origins, migrations, research interests, and identities, and contextualizes these findings. There are 107 second-generation émigré historians in North America, slightly more than the 98 of the first generation. Daum stresses that despite the diversity of backgrounds to be found among them and the fact that they are far more 'Americanized' than the first generation, a certain 'distinctiveness' (p. 30) has remained.

The first part of the volume offers autobiographical testimonies by second-generation émigrés, namely Klemens von Klemperer, Walter Laqueur, Peter Paret, Fritz Stern, Georg G. Iggers, Gerhard L. Weinberg, Hanna Holborn Gray, Peter Loewenberg, and Renate Bridenthal. In their insightful contributions, a number of common characteristics emerge: several contributors stress the importance of first-generation émigré scholars—historians but also others—along with American historians for their intellectual formation. All address the question of identity and express varying degrees of connectedness with their former German or Austrian homes, while at the same time stressing their firm grounding in the USA. The memoirs also chronicle the hardships that some of the émigrés and their families experienced during their flight from Nazism. Thus they serve as a counterbalance to a historiography of intellectual emigration which often focuses on success stories. All autobiographers did eventually succeed, but emotional and psychological costs should not be forgotten. A noteworthy feature is the strong political impetus which Iggers and Bridenthal show, for instance, and which made them active members in American political and social movements from the 1950s on.

The contributions by Catherine Epstein and Volker R. Berghahn in the second part offer conceptual insights into the second generation. Epstein describes the group as a whole, underlining some of the issues mentioned in the autobiographies in the previous section. She ends her essay with a discussion of the role the Holocaust played as a research topic. She argues—somewhat differently to Herf and Aschheim—that 'while these émigré historians' works were key for the analysis of the German cultural antecedents to the Holocaust, it is striking that none of them researched the details of the Holocaust per se' (p. 149). Instead, they made their biggest contributions to the *Sonderweg* thesis. Berghahn deals with the second generation in a broader conceptual and analytical way and thus offers an over-arch-

ing contribution, complementing other contributions in the volume which are more focused on individual scholars. Especially fruitful is his discussion of the theoretical concept of generation and his observations on the question of return.

The writing of history by émigré historians is the topic of the contributions by Steven E. Aschheim, Jeffrey Herf, Helmut Walser Smith, Doris L. Bergen, and Marjorie Lamberti in the third section of the volume. In his essay, Aschheim picks up the argument of his *Beyond the Border*,[3] and compares and contrasts social historians in West Germany with émigré historians in the USA and their 'reinvention' (p. 186) of German cultural and intellectual history. His main point is that both historiographical projects 'represent significantly different, emotionally fraught confrontations with a traumatizing past' (p. 179). Whereas the social historians, perhaps out of 'unconscious, filial loyalty' (p. 182) to their academic fathers, were more preoccupied with structures than with people and their minds, the opposite holds true for the émigré historians. In the same vein, Herf stresses the contributions by the second generation to research on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism, and their achievement in bringing these topics from the periphery to the centre of historiography. Bergen also deals with the contribution made by Raul Hilberg, Gerhard Weinberg, and Henry Friedlander to research on the Holocaust. She chronicles their achievement, especially when it comes to bringing the topic to the forefront of research, widening the scope of sources, establishing a certain writing style, and opening up the field.

The contributions by Smith and Lamberti treat the achievements of two individual historians. Smith deals with Peter Gay's *oeuvre* and argues that the basis for much of his work was laid in the 1950s, 'in a context at once American and émigré European' (p. 211). He chronicles Gay's work first on the Enlightenment and then on Weimar cultures and argues that his research on Germany can be seen in the context of his reconnection with Germany in the 1960s. Lamberti's contribution deals with Gerda Lerner, who was even more of an outsider in American academia as she was not only a Jewish refugee, but also a woman. Lerner contributed significantly to the rise of women's history in the USA, was politically active on the left, a member of the

[3] Steven E. Aschheim, *Beyond the Border: The German–Jewish Legacy Abroad* (Princeton, 2007).

peace movement, and served as president of the Organization of American Historians in 1981. Lamberti addresses the relationship between the refugee experience and the work as a historian, which is an open or underlying topic in many of the contributions in this volume. Here she makes the important point that Lerner, who had become thoroughly Americanized, even losing her fluency in German, began in her autobiographical statements from the 1990s on to stress the close link between her experience as an 'outsider' and the situation of the women she researched, who were defined as 'the Other' (p. 250). This observation underlines the fact that the relationship between biography and work is indeed complicated and that the narratives which the émigré historians construct concerning these questions often change over time.

The fourth part offers comparative and transnational perspectives, dealing with the other two main countries of reception, that is, the UK and Israel, and the impact of the second generation on West German historiography. Shulamit Volkov points out that the situation in Israel differed markedly from that in the UK and the USA because until her generation started their academic careers, 'every faculty member in Israel was an émigré' (p. 262). The special situation of Israel as a young state accounts for the fact that, in all cases, a long time elapsed between the immigration of the second generation and the start of their academic careers. Peter Alter's description of the setting in the UK shows that the situation there was easier than in Israel but more difficult than in the USA. He points out that, unlike the first generation, the second generation left a visible mark on British historiography with many also acting, like their counterparts in the USA, as bridge-builders between their new home and Germany.

The contribution by Philipp Stelzel deals with the émigrés' impact on German historiography, an essential question since most of them at some point interacted with West German colleagues and wrote on German history. Stelzel argues that 'the second-generation émigré historians supported the interpretive and methodological diversification of the German historical profession, the former most notably during the *Fischer-Kontroverse*' (p. 288). But it is interesting to note the 'non-reception' (p. 297) of their studies in intellectual and cultural history, even though their idea of an ideological German *Sonderweg* would have tied in well with the social and political concept of a

Sonderweg advanced by German historians in the 1970s. Contrary to the explanation put forward by Aschheim in this volume, Stelzel argues that this non-reception by West German social historians might not be the result of 'ulterior motives' (p. 298), but rather of the fact that 'historians of Wehler's generation associated intellectual history—or rather *Geistesgeschichte* and *Ideengeschichte*—with an older German historiographical tradition . . . which they considered either potentially apologetic or simply not very fruitful heuristically' (pp. 297–8). In their personal commentaries at the end of this section, Gerhard A. Ritter and Jürgen Kocka stress the importance of the émigré historians for their individual development as historians and the modernization and diversification of West German historiography as a whole.

The last part of the book provides a biobibliographic guide to the second generation. In the introductory chapter to his part, Daum offers a detailed discussion of the methodology which is of value not only to the present volume but also for other researchers pursuing similar projects. The subsequent biographies by Daum and Sherry L. Föhr provide for the first time a detailed overview (more than 110 pages long) of the second generation in North America, offering information on biographical and family data, professional careers and activities, archival holdings, *Festschriften*, and autobiographical writings. The biographies are well researched, highly informative, and reveal the diversity of the émigré historians' experiences. They are a valuable resource and a starting point for further research, especially on those émigrés who are less well known. The biographies are followed by a selected bibliography on the topic.

Several questions recur throughout volume: the first concerns the relationship between the émigrés' biographies and their research interests. In the introduction, Daum cautions against establishing 'a direct causal connection between the experience of emigration and the research émigrés undertook years later' (p. 4), but a number of essays establish just such a connection. Personal experience might not have been the primary motive for the choice of a particular research topic, but perhaps became apparent as a motive only in hindsight, as Lamberti demonstrates in Lerner's case. In addition, such a connection does not necessarily 'invalidate' such research, as Georg G. Iggers points out (p. 91). A second debated question is the role which the Holocaust and/or the *Sonderweg* played in the re-

search carried out by second-generation scholars, and whether they were, indeed, more preoccupied with 1933 or 1941–2. Since the contributions in the volume deal mainly with Stern, Mosse, Gay, Laqueur, Hilberg, and Friedlander, a comparison with the work done by fellow émigré historians might help to contextualize this question and provide a broader basis for an answer.

The volume also raises a number of questions which merit further research. One concerns the specific situation of women, who faced additional obstacles when compared with men. It is interesting that 19 per cent of the second generation in the USA are female, whereas in the corresponding group in Israel and the UK, women are more or less absent. What conditions led to this greater success of women in the USA? How closely related was their academic success to the introduction of women's studies, where several, such as Lerner and Bridenthal, left their mark? It would also be worth shedding further light on those refugees who were not racially persecuted and their specific experience. Likewise, the implications of political involvement, and in a number of cases, teaching at black colleges would also be worth exploring.[4] So far, the involvement of émigrés on the left has been stressed, but that of those who were politically conservative would also merit further research. Finally, when looking at their influence on German historiography, it would be interesting to explore their impact in the GDR, to see whether it was indeed as marginal as present research suggests.

Like the volume on the first generation published twenty-five years ago by Lehmann and Sheehan, this book sheds new light on a hitherto little-researched subject and will remain a standard work for years to come. It provides an admirable overview of the very heterogeneous second generation in the USA, and will certainly stimulate further research in the field.

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[4] For teaching at black colleges see Gabrielle Simon Edgcomb, *From Swastika to Jim Crow: Refugee Scholars at Black Colleges* (Malabar, Fla., 1993).

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Thirteenth Workshop on Early Modern German History, organized by the German Historical Institute London in cooperation with the German Historical Institute Washington and the German History Society, and held at the GHIL on 6 May 2016. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Jenny Spinks (University of Manchester), and Michael Schaich (German Historical Institute London).

The thirteenth workshop on early modern German history, hosted by the German Historical Institute London in early May, brought together thirty-four historians from Austria, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the USA. Participants ranged from Ph.D. students at various stages in their research to early career and established scholars. The ten papers included cultural, economic, environmental, and transnational histories, and studied a wide range of social classes, confessions, and practices from the fifteenth to the late eighteenth century, both across continental Europe and in the German Atlantic. Though diverse, the papers were organized into four thematic sessions which stimulated interesting questions and compelling dialogue amongst the participants.

The day began with a session on 'Social Elites and Learning', chaired by Jenny Spinks (Manchester). Jill Bepler (Wolfenbüttel) opened the workshop with an insightful examination of how early modern German dynastic women used the content and physical features of books for personal devotion and to exert both confessional and political authority. Women directly influenced their sons by commissioning and writing books with specific content, sometimes personalized with inscriptions or even a portrait. They also hoped that their influence would continue over later generations, and therefore created books as valuable heirloom objects with elaborate bindings, and preserved them in archives, *Kunstkammern*, libraries, and family collections. For these women, books offered a gendered space,

The full programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

documented family and social networks, and were revered as sacred objects and evidence of miracles.

Shiru Lim (UCL) gave an overview of her ongoing research regarding the public and private correspondence between monarchs and men of letters in the late eighteenth century. She explored the potency of publicness as seen through Frederick II and highlighted the presence and rivalry of multiple, sometimes oppositional publics. She looked at Frederick II's secret role in writing *Anti-Machiavel*, heavily edited by Voltaire, and how he desired to stop its publication when he became king. The open secrecy of Frederick's involvement led to criticism when his actions did not match his theory of governance. As demonstrated through his writing, correspondence, and the prize essay competition at the Berlin Academy, he desired to be both monarch and *philosophe*.

After a short break, Michael Schaich (GHIL) chaired the second session, which explored 'The Worlds of the Nobility'. Ben Pope (Durham) began the session with an outline of his recently-completed Ph.D. research on relations between townspeople and the rural nobility in late medieval Germany. He first described the movement of patricians to rural areas and underscored the significance of their resulting animosity and rivalry with townspeople. He considered the hypothesis that the perception of increased hostility gained momentum initially as part of a political programme of princes and nobles, only later becoming a common model for understanding these dynamics. He then posed questions regarding the process of identity formation, and proposed a further project to study the development of the ideas of antagonism between town and nobility in the hopes of providing new perspectives on town, nobility, and wider society.

Elena Taddei (Innsbruck) examined the relationship between the Este Dynasty in the Po valley and the Habsburgs, emphasizing their entanglement and dense network in early modern times. Her study focused on the significance of geography, cultural transfer, self-perception, and awareness of others. She described the complex network of relationships between dynasty and empire as created and maintained by material and cultural exchange through marriage, correspondence, ambassadors, visits, and gifts. Her paper was followed by an interesting discussion on the themes of strategy, gendered correspondences and presents, the relationship of the Este dynasty with France, and early modern linguistic barriers.

Christian Gepp (Vienna) provided the perspective of economic history to the workshop in his examination of eighteenth-century noble entrepreneurship in the establishment of factories. He outlined his ongoing dissertation that investigates the development of the estates Holíč and Šaštín in the Habsburg monarchy and their economic rise under Francis Stephen of Lorraine (Emperor Francis I, 1745–65). The administrations of both estates were structurally similar, and both factories had a positive economy. He stressed that the development of manufacturing was not autonomous, but should be viewed in light of a mercantilist perspective by studying accounts as a whole, rather than by year.

After enjoying a refreshing lunch and conversation, we reconvened for a session on 'Social and Religious Practices and Attitudes', chaired by David Lederer (NUI Maynooth). Markus Friedrich (Hamburg) presented the framework of a future project conceptualizing and writing the history of obedience. Previously studied in the context of social discipline, obedience, Friedrich alternatively suggested, has a broader and an older history, with specific early modern manifestations. Obedience in the early modern period was viewed principally as a positive value that enhanced freedom, and could be separated into three types: good (not forced), childish, and bad (mercenary) obedience. Furthermore, disobedience was sometimes a form of higher, or super-obedience—viewing oneself as obedient to God above princes. The study of obedience can thus contribute to understanding the early modern world, and provides a cross-cultural focus for the study of people in their different social constructs.

Ryan Crimmins (Oxford) presented from his ongoing research into the role of religious conviction and confession in a military context through the generalship of Gustav II Adolf and Johann Tserclaes von Tilly in the Thirty Years War. In response to both overtly confessional and religious historiography, he addressed the extent to which armies can be seen as confessional. By examining the religious infrastructure, observance, and practice in these armies, he illustrated the influential role that confession, authority, law, and morality played in battle and military structure. Religion affected the military through the piety of generals, the army consistory and chaplains, and the confessional practices of singing or chanting when entering battle. He hopes to continue to study a wide range of armies in order to understand the overall role of religion in the military during the Thirty Years War.

Contributing further to the scope of the workshop, Sky Michael Johnston (University of California, San Diego) discussed society in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century German lands as seen through people's perceptions of weather and the relationship between groups connected by weather. He suggested five potential structural themes for his research: theological views, scientific and proto-scientific understandings, popular belief and practices, actual weather events, and a comparative view of Catholic and Protestant beliefs and practices. Johnston closed with a case study of Luther's view of weather, including his lectures on Genesis as the framework of nature and his view that weather was overall a blessing that revealed God's goodness. Luther saw storms as a cosmic struggle between angels and demons who lived in clouds, rainbows as a result of God's hand, and bad weather as a curse tied to the increase in sin and the coming apocalypse.

Bridget Heal (St Andrews) chaired the fourth and final session, which centered on 'The German Atlantic'. Benjamin M. Pietrenka (University of California, Santa Cruz) examined the private and public dynamics of the Moravian *Gemeintag* (Congregation Day) services and correspondence networks throughout the early eighteenth-century Atlantic world. The *Gemeintag* service was a dialogue between preacher and congregation, and blended traditional elements of corporate worship with nontraditional personal elements, such as letters, diaries, and testimonies. In a case study of Moravian missions to Greenland, a female indigenous convert had written a letter regarding her faith. The letter, which focused on Christ as a blood-sacrifice, was then shared with Moravian congregations during their *Gemeintag* services. This blood and wounds piety served as an evangelical method for conversion, and gives insight into the spirituality, hierarchy, and communication practices of the Moravians.

James Boyd (Cambridge) concluded the workshop with his paper on the creation of German networks in the early modern Atlantic, and examined whether their impetus was religious or secular in nature. Although previous studies have argued that religion was the main influence on migration until the 1730s, he maintained that religious networks provided assistance to major commercial modes and did not drive later migration. Post 1709, Germans migrated more for economic reasons, and went to Pennsylvania because of the established government and trade hubs. He emphasized the importance of

credit-based travel available to German immigrants, largely promoted by Johann Christoph Saur in Germantown and supported by Caspar Wistar, who bought land and instituted a commercial transit system. He therefore concluded that it is not suitable to generalize the importance of religious networks.

This was another successful and rewarding workshop, with engaging contributions from all participants on diverse topics, geographies, and chronologies. Each paper was followed by lively discussion and stimulating questions that both challenged and encouraged the presenters. Overall, the day provided an insightful survey of both recent scholarship and developing approaches to early modern German history and drew on common themes such as material culture and power relations. After its September 2016 meeting at the University of Newcastle, the German History Society will meet next in September 2017 at the University of St Andrews. We are hoping for a very strong early modern presence. For further details, see the website <http://www.germanhistorysociety.org/conference/>.

HANNAH BRISCOE (St Andrews)
REBECCA LOTT (St Andrews)

Cultures of Intelligence. Conference co-organized by the University of Potsdam, the University of Leeds, the University of Mannheim, and the German Historical Institute London, and held at the GHIL, 9–11 June 2016.

Until recently, historians of national intelligence systems have focused mainly on the institutional and organizational aspects of the field. But national intelligence systems have never developed fully independent institutional lives. They have, on the contrary, always operated within their respective national strategic cultures, which are not static but bound to the context of national traditions and values, geographical conditions, and their respective countries' ever-changing strategic objectives (military, social, and political). Thus this conference set out to investigate the current state of our understanding of national, international, transnational, and comparative cultures of intelligence. Culture was understood to include the role of intelligence services in society and/or the state, the representation of intelligence in the public sphere and among the members of the military/intelligence community itself, as well as the interests, assumptions, and operating procedures of intelligence. The conference marked the conclusion of two projects on Cultures of Intelligence funded by the Gerda Henkel Foundation and the AHRC and coordinated by Sönke Neitzel (University of Potsdam), Philipp Gassert (University of Mannheim), Andreas Gestrich (GHIL), and Simon Ball (Leeds).

In his opening remarks, the German Historical Institute's director and the conference host, Andreas Gestrich, welcomed participants to the Institute, introduced them to the project's underlying ideas, and revealed initial results and hypotheses. Speaking for everyone involved in the ambitious project, Gestrich said that he was looking forward to these results being scrutinized in the light of the participants' research on cultural aspects of intelligence.

Proceedings began with a stimulating keynote lecture delivered by Peter Jackson (Glasgow). In his address, he combined his work on intelligence structures in inter-war France and Britain with his methodological studies of intelligence culture. Jackson highlighted similarities but also several key differences between British and French

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

intelligence structures during the inter-war years and beyond. On the one hand, they shared traditions of liberalism and democratic representation and both tended towards an increasingly large bureaucracy and bureaucratic professionalization. On the other, they were widely different in their approach to national intelligence. In France, intelligence was always subject to legislation while in Britain, despite its tradition of democratic representation, intelligence was controlled by Army regulations and kept out of legislative and, thus, public view. This difference, according to Jackson, was the essence of the differing cultures of secrecy in Britain and France.

Thursday's panel on US intelligence was opened by discussing Philipp Gassert's (Mannheim) paper, which contextualized the development of American intelligence within a broader political and cultural framework. Before the First World War, espionage and intelligence work were widely regarded as 'un-American', an assessment reinforced by public opposition to the domestic surveillance of 'enemy aliens'. In contrast, the experience of the Second World War was widely perceived as a 'success story' for American espionage. While the curtailment of the intelligence apparatus after 1918 reflected the isolationist mood in the USA, the 1940s discourse on internationalism caused a shift in the discourse on intelligence. The foundation of a central intelligence agency in peacetime was a logical consequence. Thus the USA emerged from the two world wars with different narratives regarding the war effort in general and the use of intelligence in particular.

Bernhard Sassmann (Mannheim) then examined the interconnectivity between bureaucratization processes and public discourses with regard to US intelligence. By focusing on three key phases—the aftermath of the First World War, the 1930s, and the period from 1945 to 1947—Sassmann showed that not only did shifting public debates concerning threat perceptions affect institutional developments, but government and intelligence officials also conducted press campaigns on behalf of intelligence organizations and tried to influence public debates. Sassmann concluded that from 1900 to 1947 this reciprocity was a distinctive feature of US intelligence and its discourses.

Simon Willmetts (Hull) analysed the particular relationship between the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and cinema during the Second World War. Hundreds of Hollywood filmmakers served in the organization and were central to an extensive and systematic use

of motion pictures by the OSS, which both profited from and contributed to the establishment of cinema as an 'objective' medium. Not only did film become a more important part of military planning, but original footage was utilized as evidence in court for the first time during the Nuremberg trials and played a crucial role in the prosecutors' case.

On Friday, the panel on British intelligence opened with a discussion of Simon Ball's (Leeds) paper, which focused on relations between the changes in the reputation of British intelligence services and the effective participation of intelligence officers in (proto-) professional discourses from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the Cold War. In the case of military intelligence, these debates yielded merely organizational accounts. The 1940s, however, were marked by a profound change; Ball emphasized that 1942 was a 'year zero', when military intelligence became a 'definable field' with perceptible boundaries and enjoyed increased prestige.

R. Gerald Hughes (Aberystwyth) elaborated further on the influence of former professionals on academic discourses and methodological issues in particular. By reflecting on how to define 'intelligence culture', Hughes proposed building on existing concepts of 'political culture' or 'habitus' and 'group thinking'. There was 'no need to reinvent the wheel', since the evolution of bureaucratic entities has been a field of scholarly research for decades and offers useful accounts.

Professional discourses on intelligence in British military periodicals from 1919 to 1939 were the main focus of Michael Rupp's (Potsdam) paper. During the inter-war period in Britain, which was characterized by 'fundamental uncertainty', hegemonic overstretch, and the search for a strategic concept, British military experts addressed the problem of cooperation among the three services at strategic level. In this context, Rupp argues, the issue of intelligence was one part of a triangular discourse concerning strategy and operations, which served as a framework for discussing the outlines of a 'joint' intelligence system at national level.

The morning panel was concluded by the discussion of Jérôme aan de Wiel's (Cork) paper that traced the development of the domestic intelligence functions in the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police from the nineteenth century to 1922. Inspired by Joseph Fouché's efforts in France, the British implement-

ed an extensive police system as part of their attempt to control Ireland. In addition to targeting republican and agrarian opposition movements and later also disloyal public servants, core tasks included surveillance of political and social opinion. Aan de Wiel argued that these activities and structures reflected the 'airs of a police state'; Irish intelligence, however, suffered from 'red tape' and a 'culture of distrust'.

Alan MacLeod (Leeds) opened the afternoon panel by setting out what a Bourdieusian approach can reveal about the nature of the developing 'field' of British intelligence and how the transformative experience of the Second World War impacted ideas of 'professionalism' and changed the face of the British secret services. He argued that a focus on intelligence activities rather than on the development of bureaucracies is key to understanding British intelligence culture. Competition for control of 'high-capital' activities, he continued, attracted fresh people into the field during the Second World War, and fostered both a newly won focus on efficiency and professionalism and the emergence of an (increasingly civilian) postwar intelligence elite in Britain.

Presenting a case study of BBC 1's widely viewed and well received early 1980s TV show Spy, Christopher Murphy (Salford) considered the significance of television programmes produced by the BBC in relation to wider public knowledge and understanding of British intelligence. The show's inherent inaccuracies and the BBC's appeasing attitude led to public misconceptions about how British intelligence conducted interrogations of POWs during the Second World War. Although the show's depiction of physical violence against prisoners was repeatedly denied by witnesses of the interrogations, the resulting public misconceptions were in themselves, Murphy argued, an unintended consequence of Britain's long-standing culture of (official) secrecy.

Huw Dylan's (Kings College) paper then examined the struggle to create a culture of 'national intelligence' within the field of defence intelligence after 1945. Key figures of British inter-war intelligence such as Lord Victor Cavendish-Bentinck and Denis Capel-Dunn had understood early on that the age of total war required total intelligence and thus 'national intelligence'. In order to solve chronic problems in British military-related intelligence, they fostered the creation of the Joint Intelligence Bureau which was intended to integrate military

intelligence with the wider machinery of intelligence. The military agencies struggled, however, to integrate with the new arrangements, which relied on many more civilians and were more centralized.

Concluding Friday's presentations, Martin Thomas (Exeter) explored the unique role that France played in equipment provision, officer training, and security service reorganization during the early post-independence years in Algeria. The turmoil surrounding France's violent exit from Algeria in 1962 has tended to obscure how swiftly the security connections between the French authorities and the armed forces of the now independent Algerian Republic were re-established. Thomas's findings challenged prevailing notions that Algeria predominantly received expertise and material from Egypt and the Eastern bloc states.

The conference concluded with Saturday's panel on German intelligence in the first half of the twentieth century. Frederik Müllers (Potsdam) focused on the changing prescriptive perceptions and collective interpretations of what German society (both military and civilian) considered 'intelligence' between 1871 and 1945. Müllers highlighted several constant themes. During the whole period of investigation, the gathering of information was considered important in war, but efficiency and swiftness on the battlefield always remained the military's major concern. Consequently, Müllers also identified a lack of professional meta-reflection on national intelligence during the inter-war years, which obstructed meaningful systemic improvements in German intelligence organization.

The evolution of the all-source military intelligence system in Germany between 1890 and 1918 was at the centre of Markus Pöhlmann's (Potsdam) paper. In the German case, apart from the lack of a civilian culture of surveillance, Pöhlmann argued that the presence of an established culture of (military) intelligence cannot be identified in the first half of the twentieth century. It was not until the emergency of the First World War that military intelligence started to look for answers to the new parameters of war, increased its level of staffing, established subdivisions for East and West, a section for propaganda and censorship (3b), and thus evolved into an all-source intelligence system. Germany's defeat, however, prevented the newly acquired expertise being transferred to the Weimar Republic.

Markus Pahl (Dresden) then presented his research on the nerve centre of Hitler's military intelligence on the Eastern Front, the

General Staff Division of Foreign Armies East (FHO). His major focus was on the organization's working methods during the war. The FHO was efficient, recruited industrial and academic experts on Eastern Europe as *Sonderführer*, and was respected as an important branch within the General Staff. Pahl concluded that although the FHO was on the way to becoming a modern intelligence service, it was still a General Staff organization with only limited expertise at strategic level. Nevertheless, its wartime leader, General Reinhard Gehlen, established himself and his organization and expertise as the nucleus of today's civilian foreign intelligence service, the Bundes-nachrichtendienst (BND).

In his concluding remarks, Sönke Neitzel (Potsdam), Principal Investigator of the Gerda Henkel Foundation's Cultures of Intelligence research project, brought together some of the results of the conference. As a common denominator of the conference papers he identified that political, social, and military cultures all have an impact on the development und configuration of national intelligence systems. While the emerging national intelligence systems of the first half of the twentieth century seem less far from each other than contemporary media coverage and popular culture suggest, the conference confirmed that national intelligence cultures *did* exist with respect to methods, sources, and public representations. Another factor which seems to hold true for every major intelligence nation under scrutiny at the conference was that public discourse and public opinion were more closely woven into the fabric of professional discourse and political decision-making on intelligence than had been assumed. The conference also pointed to the existence of a British *Sonderweg* in the first half of the century, expressed in a) the close interaction between professionals and the public discourse (for example, through spy novels) and b) the prominence of civilians in controlling and coordinating national intelligence. The following plenary discussion highlighted that the analytical category of 'culture' sometimes remains elusive in its relation to national intelligence, but that it provides a perspective which is a productive point of departure for future research and case studies on national intelligence systems.

BERNHARD SASSMANN (Mannheim)
TOBIAS SCHMITT (Freiburg)

The Contemporary History of Historiography: International Perspectives on the Making of Professional History. Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 16–18 June 2016. Conveners: Lutz Raphael (Trier/London) and Benjamin Zachariah (Trier).

This conference was organized by Lutz Raphael and Benjamin Zachariah from the University of Trier's Department of Modern and Contemporary History. It brought together scholars from across the globe engaged in different sub-fields of historical studies to present and discuss some of the challenges facing the discipline of history and to engage in a critical examination of how contemporary scholars' perspectives are influenced and shaped by various external factors, such as national politics, culture, social class, university politics, publishing practices, the academic job market, and so on. It was a unique opportunity for researchers who would otherwise not normally attend the same conference or panel because of their very different fields of specialization to come together in one place and learn about each other's experiences.

The first paper, 'Coping with the Colonial Past in Historiography and History Teaching', was given by Karel van Nieuwenhuyse (Leuven) and Denise Bentrovato (Brunswick). This presentation was a comparative study of the portrayal of Congolese history in Belgian and Congolese textbooks from the colonial era to the present. Van Nieuwenhuyse began with a discussion of the Belgian sources. In the 1940s and 1950s a triumphalist, totally uncritical depiction of the Belgian colonial enterprise reigned unchallenged. The pre-colonial history of Congo was ignored, King Leopold II was described as a genius and a great man of history, and the Belgian colonial venture was characterized as an act of generosity which brought only positive results for the natives. In the 1960s a more nuanced narrative appeared, and some mention was made of colonial cruelty and exploitation of the Congolese people. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a bifurcation between textbook and academic history. The writing of history textbooks was confined to history teachers who were not aware of the latest developments in their field. Thus while academic historians

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both Belgian and foreign produced important new studies that radically altered the received narrative of Congo's colonial history and exposed the abuses perpetrated by the Belgian government in Africa, this research found little or no echo in Belgian history textbooks of the period. For example, textbooks made no mention of the Belgian government's involvement in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. After 2000 a 'limited rapprochement' between the academic and pedagogical historical communities occurred in Belgium, but there is still much need for improvement and development of the history curriculum as it relates to the colonial period.

Bentrovato talked about Congolese history textbooks. Those of the 1940s and 1950s reflected Belgian colonial propaganda, ignoring Congo's pre-colonial history and glorifying the Belgian conquest and colonization of that land. In the 1960s a native Congolese perspective developed for the first time. Congo's pre-colonial empires were covered along with the abuses and crimes of the colonial system. Resistance to colonialism and the independence struggle became a major theme. In the 1970s and 1980s under the Mobutu regime there was an increased focus on the pre-colonial past as a source of legitimacy. The tribal chief was glorified along with the traditional symbols of Congo's ancient kingdoms. Textbooks written since Mobutu's overthrow have rehabilitated Lumumba as a national hero while describing Mobutu as an agent of neo-colonialism. The revolution launched against the latter by Kabila is seen as a continuation of anticolonial resistance, this time against the domestic agents of foreign imperialism.

Following this, Berber Bevernage (Ghent) spoke on 'Contemporary Historiography and Theories and Practices of Narrative Reconciliation and Historical Dialogue'. He undertook a critical review of the relation between historiography and truth and reconciliation committees. He noted that professional historians rarely occupy roles of leadership and influence in such committees. Among the motivations for truth and reconciliation projects are belief in the power of confession and forgiveness, a belief in what Bevernage calls the 'just king principle', meaning that if only the holders of power were made aware of a situation they would intervene and bring justice, the belief that understanding the past will prevent it from being repeated, and a belief in the importance of giving voice to opposing narratives in a conflict.

Bevernage pointed out some often overlooked pitfalls of truth and reconciliation committees. He noted that there is a tendency to attribute conflicts solely to opposing narratives and perspectives while ignoring tangible, material causes (for example the economic causes of war, competition for resources, and so on). Sometimes truth itself (finding out what happened in a specific situation) is viewed as secondary to the project of airing opposing narratives. Finally, Bevernage reminded us that not all narratives are equal. Narratives are produced and often one side in a conflict has the resources of a modern state with copious archives while the other side largely lacks this infrastructure.

The keynote address of the conference was a paper delivered by Dominic Sachsenmaier (Göttingen) on 'The Problem of Historiography as a Global Professional Field'. Sachsenmaier observed that though we live in a highly globalized world in which non-Western actors such as China and India play increasingly important roles in the spheres of economy, technology, and politics, the field of historical studies remains extremely Western-centric, reflecting the global power structure of the late nineteenth century more than that of our present time. The most prestigious journals, academic conferences, and history departments are in North America and Western Europe. If we were to apply the techniques of intellectual historians to our field, such as the study of networks and their centres, we would find that the centre of our profession is in the Western nations while the non-Western world remains peripheral. As Sachsenmaier pointed out, the new field of 'global history' reflects this imbalance. For instance, an expert on the history of one of the Western nation-states who knows nothing about non-Western history may become acknowledged as an expert on global history, while it is inconceivable that an Indian or Chinese historian could write a history of historiography that ignores Western works. The result is a great cultural imbalance in the field of historiography which must be taken into account as we attempt to develop our profession further and make it more relevant to the world that we live in.

The second day of the conference began with a paper by Mohamed Jemal Ahmed (Jigjiga) entitled 'Challenges of Teaching National History in Multi-Ethnic Countries: Ethiopia'. Unfortunately, Ahmed was unable to attend the conference in person because of visa problems and his Skype connection failed, so his paper was read aloud by Lutz

Raphael. Ahmed argued that though Ethiopia is a very diverse country in the ethnic, linguistic, and religious sense, this diversity is not reflected in the history curriculum. Through a survey of history students he showed that those from minority communities find the study of Ethiopian history irrelevant and unhelpful because they feel strongly that it is not their history. A common theme is that the history textbooks present a monocultural perspective which depicts Ethiopia as an Orthodox Christian nation that was united and ruled through the centuries by the Solomonic dynasty. Students from minority groups such as the Oromo and Somalis feel that they have been written out of this history. They feel that their history lessons consist of uncritical accounts of the lives of the Ethiopian kings and their wars, with little information about the society and economy. To make matters worse, the historical discipline in general suffers from a lack of prestige and interest in Ethiopia. Where history departments exist (many have closed) they attract only small numbers of students, and often these students have the lowest grades in the faculty. Ahmed made some suggestions as to how this unfortunate situation could be reversed. A revised history curriculum should be created on a national level that will include the histories of formerly marginalized peoples and remove derogatory and divisive statements about particular ethnic groups. He also recommended that Ethiopian history be made a compulsory course for all college and university students.

The next paper, 'The World in a Grain of Sand: Global Histories and their Framing', was presented by Benjamin Zachariah (Trier). In his talk Zachariah asked what global history is, and how we come to terms with it? He noted that global history arose out of the critique of national 'statist' histories and as a response to the post-Cold War trend towards 'globalization' of the world economy. Global history does not always guarantee a non-Eurocentric perspective, which is in any case not *a priori* a bad thing. It should incorporate the *longue durée* vision, if only to disarm some of the legends of authenticity that nation-states habitually use as means of self-legitimation. Zachariah recommended a thematic approach to global history. Courses might be built around the following themes: oceanic histories, empires and imperialism, the history of states and state-building, and travelling ideas and the histories of political movements.

Kavita Philip's contribution was entitled 'Historiographies of the "Anthropocene"'. Her paper was read by Benjamin Zachariah as she

could not attend the conference in person. In her paper, Philip described the contrast between environmental activism in the first and third worlds. She noted that the American climate change documentary *Disruption* was a disappointment to Indian audiences because for them it reflected middle-class, Western preoccupations that had little relevance for their particular circumstances. She also criticized the concept of Enlightenment humanism. In her view it 'risks erasing decades of academic work done on the different and violent ways in which caste, gender, race, class, and region effect environmental changes on different groups'. She said that science must be understood in its historical and social context. It must be recognized that climate change affects different social classes and countries in different ways.

Then Andreas Eckert (Berlin) presented a paper on 'Africa in/and Global History'. He gave an overview of the development of the field of African history since the middle of the twentieth century and its relation to global history. He noted that African historical studies blossomed in the 1960s amid great enthusiasm in the immediate post-colonial era. Governments and society supported and accorded prestige to history since it was seen as part of the nation-building project. Indigenous African history departments and journals flourished and academic congresses were held in Africa. Pre-colonial history and resistance became major themes of research while colonial history was seen as outmoded. There was also great enthusiasm for learning local languages and for the study of oral history.

In the 1970s African historical studies in Africa itself suffered a loss of prestige and underwent a retraction which has unfortunately continued to the present. Journals and history departments have closed, there is a lack of hard cash to purchase foreign books and periodicals and to fund travel abroad. Eckert also mentioned the 'NGOization' of African academia. Disciplines that are seen as helpful to gaining employment in NGOs such as development studies are favoured over traditional disciplines such as history. Contemporary African historians are interested in local history because it does not require expensive research abroad and it is seen as something that is useful in the context of current politics, or to provide 'local expertise' for foreign companies and NGOs. Global history is often viewed with suspicion, particularly because Africa often features in such histories only in the context of the slave trade.

The last presentation on Friday, entitled 'China, Cultural China, or the Sinophone World: Who Gets to Write Chinese History', was by Charlotte Kroll (Heidelberg). In her presentation Kroll looked at the various meanings of China in contemporary discourse and how this has impacted the field of Chinese historiography. To some, 'contemporary Chinese historiography' refers to the practice of academics in the educational institutions of the People's Republic of China. Others have a broader definition. Tu Weiming talked about a 'Cultural China'. This embraces mainland China, Taiwan, Singapore, the Chinese diaspora abroad, and even the international community of individuals who have worked or studied in China, and who try to understand Chinese culture and interpret it for their respective linguistic communities. What unites all of these groups is shared culture.

An alternative model is the concept of a 'Sinophone World', a term coined by the Australian Sinologist Geremie Barmé. Barmé's Sinophone World is as broad as Tu Weiming's Cultural China; the difference, however, lies in the uniting factor, which is not culture, but a shared language. It is a global, transnational linguistic space similar to the Anglophone and Francophone worlds. Barmé believes that the act of critically engaging with Chinese culture and language makes one a part of the Sinophone world. Thus we can conclude that the definition of the 'Chinese World' is still a subject of debate and personal interpretation as is, by extension, our notion of the Chinese historiographical community.

The third day of the conference began with Johannes Zechner's (Berlin) presentation 'Nations Behind Glass: Negotiating Identities at the History Museum'. In it, Zechner compared German and American museums of national history. The National Museum of American History in Washington DC was established in the 1960s with the goal of showing the USA as a society driven by progress and democracy. Arrangement of exhibits is topical with sections about the American presidency, invention in America, America at war, and daily life. The history of non-white groups was largely sidelined until 1976. Museums for Native American and African American history are located near the National History Museum.

The German Historical Museum was founded in West Germany in 1987. After unification it took over the collection of the East German Museum for German History. The German Historical Museum's per-

manent exhibition covers 2,000 years of German history in chronological order. It is particularly strong in political and military affairs artefacts. It also has a strong focus on labour history, which reflects the heritage of East Germany. Germany is treated mainly as a white Christian nation, and there is little inclusion of recent migrant communities. According to Zechner both the US and German museums are political endeavours as much as, or even more than, scholarly institutions. Both were founded in times of national uncertainty with the goal of consolidating and reinforcing a certain vision of the national identity.

The last paper of the conference, 'History Museums, Memory, Traumas in the last Twenty Years?', was given by Ilaria Porciani (Bolgona). She looked at the relatively recent global trend of museums created around the themes of victims and traumatic heritages. She asked how these museums deal with trauma, whether they 'freeze' it, and what role their objects play in this process of freezing the trauma, how they bring people together over traumatic experiences, and what effect the memory of this trauma has on the next generation. She noted various cases. For example the Australian Museum presents the Aboriginal genocide as a trauma for both sides. In Eastern European museums communism has been represented as a trauma that came from outside Eastern Europe, ignoring the fact that Eastern Europeans were a part of the communist history of their nations. She also explored the possibility of keeping the site of trauma exactly as it is to freeze the moment in time. A good example of this is the site of Oradour sur Glane in France, which has been left in its destroyed state.

Finally she discussed museums of forced migration such as the museum of the Pied Noir migrants in Marseille and, in particular, the museum of the Italian forced migration from Istria. This museum chronicles the suffering of the ethnic Italians who were forcibly expelled from Istria after the end of the Second World War. Porciani notes that such museums by their nature only consider the events under question from a national perspective. The Istrian museum does not seek to understand the Italian forced migrant experience within the larger context of the Second World War and the Italian government's role in the Balkans during this period.

At the end of the conference Lutz Raphael noted that despite the great diversity of the conference participants in terms of their aca-

demic backgrounds, fields of study, and methodologies, they were all able to reach a common ground through recognition of major, problematic issues that face the professional discipline of history today in different parts of the globe. He said that a better awareness of the state of our field had been achieved. The discussions were very lively throughout the entire conference and much exchange of ideas occurred. The participants agreed that the conference was a great success and look forward to future work on the themes and problems that were discussed.

AMAR BAADJ (Trier)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year of postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to Dr Felix Brahm, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the second allocation for 2016 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Norman Aselmeyer (EUI Florence), Imperialism, Technology, and Landscape: The Construction of the Uganda Railway in British East Africa, *c*.1895–1903

Arno Barth (Duisburg-Essen), Bevölkerungspolitik als Risikomanagement der Pariser Friedensordnung

Alexandra Esche (TU Berlin), Under a Cloak of Civility: Bourgeois Answers to the 'Jewish Question' in London and Berlin (1890–1914)

Christoph Galle (Marburg), Predigten des Frühmittelalters

Manuel Geist (Freiburg), An den Schnittstellen der Macht: Französische und britische Russlandexperten und die Beziehungen zu Russland 1890–1924

Julia Hauser (Kassel), Embracing the World: An Entangled History of Vegetarianism (*c*.1800–1957)

Nicholas Lang (Münster), Ein 'Vierer-Direktorium . . . der westlichen Welt'? Die Entwicklung der Vierer-Konsultationen und ihre Bedeutung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1974–1982

Benjamin Müsegades (Heidelberg), Angeeignet, gestiftet, verehrt. Heilige im Reich und England (ca.1050–1540): Die Städte Speyer und Lincoln im Vergleich

David Noack (Mannheim), Das zweite Turnier der Schatten: Das Agieren der Großmächte Deutschland, Großbritannien und Sowjetunion in Sowjetisch- und Chinesisch-Turkestan 1919–1933

Vernessa Oberhansl (Frankfurt am Main), Kapitalismus, Krise und Nation: Wirtschaft und gesellschaftliche Selbstbeschreibung in Deutschland und England im 19. Jahrhundert

Robert Raman (Göttingen), From Girangaon to 'Mini Pakistan': The Precarious Place of Working Muslims in Twentieth-Century Bombay

Patrick Rummel (Marburg), Antike Kolonisation und britisches Empire: Griechische Kolonisierung als Modell imperialer Rekonfiguration, 1850–1900

Alrun Schmitdke (HU Berlin), Veröffentlichungspolitik und Entscheidungsbefugnisse: Der Verlagsberater Paul Rosbaud und die wissenschaftlichen Verlage Julius Springer, Pergamon Press und Wiley Interscience, 1927–1963

Jenny Standke (Göttingen), Karrieren zwischen Hof und Wissenschaft: Ärzte und Chirurgen an den Höfen in London und Hannover im Zeitalter der Personalunion

Philipp Vogler (Karlsruhe), Entwicklung und Einsatz militärischer Luftbildphotographie in Deutschland (1918–1945)

Amelia Wiegeshoff (Marburg), Von Menschen und Erregern: Eine globalhistorische Untersuchung seuchenpolitischen Handelns (ca.1870–1919)

John Carter Wood (Mainz), Christliche Intellektuelle in Großbritannien und die europäischen Krisen der 1930er und 1940er Jahre

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Pop Nostalgia: The Uses of the Past in Popular Culture. Workshop organized jointly by the BSSH South Sport and Leisure History Network and the German Historical Institute London, to be held at the GHIL, 10–11 November 2016. Conveners: Dion Georgiou (London) and Tobias Becker (GHIL).

Pop nostalgia, we are told, is everywhere. Our current golden age of television—from *Mad Men* to *Vinyl*, *Downton Abbey* to *Call the Midwife*—lovingly recreates earlier periods of the twentieth century, while club nights devoted to the 1980s or 1990s allow us to return to our youth. What is more, popular culture is, in the words of music journalist Simon Reynolds, addicted to its own past. It not only reminisces, it revives, reissues, remixes earlier forms and styles instead of coming up with anything genuinely new. Finally, our most modern technologies are always also time machines, producing sepia images of the present for an anticipated nostalgic recollection in the future.

These very different cultural phenomena, which are often subsumed under the term nostalgia, raise a number of still underexplored questions. How new is this development, given that period films are as old as the cinema and that popular culture and music have always drawn on earlier periods? Cannot the recycling of old styles and forms be highly creative and result in innovations? Are period settings and costumes, retro and vintage styles as such indicative of and synonymous with nostalgia? Is it really nostalgia that drives our interest in and engagement with the past? And if not, what other motivations are in play? What role, for example, have media technologies such as film and the internet played in preserving the culture of the past in the present?

These are some of the questions the workshop Pop Nostalgia addresses. It will explore the uses of the past in popular culture across all media and genres, from literature, cinema, television, and video games to theme parks, club nights, and sports events. It is interested not only in representations of the past but also in their production and circulation as well as in audiences and reception. The workshop is especially interested in the historical dimension of pop nostalgia.

The Best Ideas? Natures, Nations, and Collective Memory. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 1–3 December 2016. Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHIL) and Frank Uekötter (Birmingham).

In 1872 Yellowstone became the first national park in the world. Forty years later, with similar parks existing all over the world, James Bryce declared that national parks were 'the best idea America ever had'. The remark became legendary and stands as a fine example of post-colonial humour, as Bryce was the British ambassador to the United States. It raises interesting questions about the nationalization of nature and the naturalization of nations.

Nature has served as a resource for nation-building, and the reverse is no less true: nations and nationalisms have framed appreciation of the natural environment. Sometimes a historic first captured the collective imagination. For example, England has claimed a special attachment to animals ever since the foundation of the world's first society for animal protection in 1824. In other cases, the link grew out of a peculiar endowment of nature, such as the Amazon rainforest in Brazil, tigers in India, or pandas in China. Sometimes a disaster left its mark on national identity; Chernobyl and Bhopal may serve as examples. The meaning of environmental icons can be positive as well as negative, and places such as the silver mines of Potosí occupy an ambiguous place somewhere in between.

Both nature and nations came across with a whiff of eternity, but recent scholarship offers a different perspective: it views nations as imagined communities and nature as a cultural construction. Furthermore, nations were never homogeneous in their appreciation of nature, and the dividing lines shed revealing lights on societies, identities, and changes in the land. Memory studies have stressed the pivotal role of groups with specific interests and mindsets in the shaping of collective memory. For example, icons of nature were important commercial assets for hotel owners and tourist managers. Scholars have also shown how the construction of national identities was tied to processes of exclusion and inclusion. Environmental historians have recognized that human interventions in nature mirrored and created social inequalities. In short, both nations and natures show an enormous dynamism over time, and yet societies displayed a remarkable inclination to depict them as permanent and im-

mutable—all the more reason to discuss the intended and unintended changes over time.

The De-Industrializing City: Urban, Architectural, and Socio-Cultural Perspectives. Workshop organized jointly by the Society for the Promotion of Urban Discussion (SPUD) and the German Historical Institute London, to be held at the GHIL, 12–13 December 2016. Conveners: Jörg Arnold (Nottingham), Simon Gunn (Leicester), Otto Saumarez Smith (Oxford), and Tobias Becker (GHIL).

When the Coventry-based band The Specials released their single 'Ghost Town' in June of 1981, they appeared to give poignant expression to a broader sense of crisis that characterized Britain's urban environment in the early Thatcher years. The song's invocation of urban decay, social dislocation, and violence, juxtaposed with a romanticized past of 'good old days [when] we danced and sang and the music played in a de boomtown', struck a chord with contemporary audiences. It provided a fitting soundtrack to the urban riots that broke out in many British cities later that summer. Yet at the same time, the band's innovative fusion of the different musical influences of Ska and Punk, their attention to branding and style, and, not least, their ethnically diverse line-up, pointed in the direction of opportunities and new departures amid the gloom that the music so hauntingly evoked. Above all, the song 'Ghost Town' illustrated that the urban environment had become a space in which intersecting developments were taking shape that characterized the late twentieth century more generally: de-industrialization and transformation; migration and multiculturalism; conflict and resilience; farewells and new beginnings.

The workshop takes up these multiple transformations and examines their intersections and frictions in a comparative Anglo-German perspective through the lens of the late twentieth-century city, with a particular emphasis on urban, architectural, and socio-cultural developments. It aims to bring together scholars from the UK and the European continent in order to explore vistas for further research on the European city as a key site of sweeping societal changes from the end of the 'Golden Age' of the 1970s to the present.

The Kaiserchronik. Workshop to be held at the German Historical Institute London on 14 February 2017, organized jointly with the *Kaiserchronik* Project at the Department of German and Dutch at Cambridge University.

This workshop is organized in collaboration with the Cambridge-based AHRC research project that will produce the first-ever critical edition of the A, B, and C recensions of the *Kaiserchronik* headed by Mark Chinca and Christopher Young (Cambridge) and Jürgen Wolf and Jürg Fleischer (Marburg). The goal of the workshop is to investigate the cultural uses of Charlemagne in the late Salian and early Hohenstaufen period, since this is the context for the vernacular account of Charlemagne's life which features so prominently in the *Kaiserchronik*. The workshop will consist of working sessions with invited speakers from Britain and Germany in the afternoon and a public event in the evening.

Luther's Legacy: The Thirty Years War and the Modern Notion of State in the Empire, 1530s to 1790s. Panel Discussion with Robert von Friedeburg, Mark Greengrass, Jo Whaley, and Peter Wilson, moderated by Andreas Gestrich, to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 21 March 2017.

Is there a distinctive German concept of the state? When and under what circumstances did it emerge? What was its intellectual context? The renowned historian Robert von Friedeburg (Rotterdam) has presented a new interpretation of this much debated question which is relevant not only for our understanding of the early modern period, but for modern German history in a wider perspective.

The Long End of the First World War: Ruptures, Continuities and Memories. Herrenhausen Symposium to be held at Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, 8–10 May 2017, organized by the Leibniz University of Hanover, Zentrum Moderner Orient, Volkswagen Foundation, and the German Historical Institute London.

This symposium will focus on relations between global history and social history. It will highlight actors and regions, and systematically engage with the issue of diverse periodizations. In discussing linkages between experience, historiography, and commemoration, the symposium aims to unsettle the notion of a static and clearly defined 'end' of the First World War, a construct mainly based on European developments.

While the armistice of 11 November 1918 marked the end of fighting on the Western Front, the case was different in other parts of the world, in particular, in the former Russian and Ottoman empires and in East Africa, where armed conflict relating to the destruction and reformation of political orders persisted, in some places for several years. These struggles affected daily life and biographical trajectories as well as local perceptions, representations, and interpretations of the war. What events or developments marked the 'end' of the war? How did the processes which marked the end of the war differ regionally, and how did prisoners of war, demobilized soldiers, women, and children from and in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East perceive and experience the 'end'? How did this 'end' influence new networks, social movements, society, economic processes, and ecological developments? And how were these questions discussed by contemporary intellectuals in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East?

With the centennial of the outbreak of the war in 1914 and the increasing temporal distance it conveys, the nature of remembrance, too, is changing. The centennial in 2014 was marked by extensive commemorative activities in many parts of the world, at various political levels, in the media, literature, and the arts. The symposium asks whether and how they shaped contemporary dialogues on commemoration, not only in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also in Europe. Can the use of electronic and other media compensate for the loss of *Zeitzeugen* (eyewitnesses)? And does this make transnational commemoration easier (or more difficult)? We are especially interested in issues relating to what could be called 'non-memory', that is,

forgotten or submerged memories. What is written out of historical narratives and what is rediscovered? In this respect, the symposium will also discuss questions of changing memories and contested commemorations.

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

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Althoff, Gerd, *Kontrolle der Macht: Formen und Regeln politischer Beratung im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2016)

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Behrisch, Lars, *Die Berechnung der Glückseligkeit: Statistik und Politik in Deutschland und Frankreich im späten Ancien Régime*, Francia, Beiheft 78 (Ostfildern: Thorbecke Verlag, 2016)

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Berger, Stefan and Chris Lorenz (eds.), *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation-Builders in Modern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

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Birkle, Stefan, *Reichsritterschaft, Reformation und Konfessionalisierung in Oberschwaben*, Geschichte und Kultur, 19 (Epfendorf: bibliotheca academica Verlag, 2015)

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